Contents

List of Tables and Figures	
Acknowledgments	XV
PART ONE	
DISCIPLINING THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE MIND	
1 The Individual in the Fragile Sciences	3
1 Individuals and the Mind	3
2 Individuals and Science	4
3 The Fragile Sciences	8
4 Individualism in the Cognitive, Biological, and Social Sciences	9
5 Inside the Thinking Individual	14
6 The Beast Within	17
7 Culture, Nature, and the Individual	19
8 The Metaphysical Picture: Smallism	22
9 A Path Through Boundaries of the Mind	24
2 Individuals, Psychology, and the Mind	27
1 Psychology amongst the Fragile Sciences	27
2 The Disciplining of Psychology	30
3 From Physiology to Philosophy: Wundt and James	31
4 Disciplining the Social Aspects of the Mind	36
5 Wundt's Individuals	40
6 Galton's Individuals	41
7 Nativism and the Continuity Thesis	$\overline{45}$
8 Overlaying the Mind	48

3	Nativism on My Mind	50
	1 Nativist Threads	50
	2 From Chomsky to Fodor to Pinker: A Thumbnail	51
	3 Empiricist Alternatives to Nativism	54
	4 The Two-Dimensional Approach	56
	5 Making Do with Less?	60
	6 Satisfying Some Desiderata	65
	7 But Could Two Dimensions Be Enough?	67
	8 Nativism about Cognition and Biology	68
	9 Conceptual Analysis and Nativism	72

PART TWO

INDIVIDUALISM AND EXTERNALISM IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND AND THE COGNITIVE SCIENCES

2	Individualism: Philosophical Foundations	77
	1 Making Sense of the Individualism-Externalism Debate	77
	2 Individualism, Taxonomy, and Metaphysical Determination	79
	3 Getting to Twin Earth: What's in the Head?	82
	4 The Social Aspect to Having a Mind	87
	5 Narrow and Wide Content	90
	6 Functionalism, Physicalism, and Individualism	93
	7 The Appeal to Causal Powers	96
ż	8 Metaphysics and the Fragile Sciences	98
נייני אין אין אין אין אין אין אין אין אין אי	5 Metaphysics, Mind, and Science: Two Views	
2	of Realization	100
	1 The Metaphysics of Mind and the Fragile Sciences	100
	2 Realization within the Philosophy of Mind	101
-	3 A Sketch of Two Views of Realization	102
	4 The Standard View (I): Realizers as Metaphysically Sufficient	103
	5 The Standard View (II): Realizers as Physically Constitutive	104
2	6 Smallism, the Standard View, and the Fragile Sciences	105
5	7 Context-Sensitive Realization and Metaphysical Sufficiency	107
2	8 Physical Constitutivity and Wide Realizations	111
	9 Wide Realizations in the Biological and Social Sciences	114
	10 Two Views Reconsidered	117
(fin) (Context-Sensitive Realizations	120
	1 Adjusting One's Metaphysics	120
	2 Microphysical Determinism, Relations, and Smallism	121
	3 Dispositions and Science	125
	4 Nonreductive Materialism	128
Univer	ert A., BoTrillari A. Och Burghov Stand Control of Control Con	130 D=266619.

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6 Context Sensitivity within the Standard View	133
7 Keeping Realism Afloat	137
8 Pluralism about Realization	139
9 Abandoning the Subject?	141
10 Putting Our Metaphysics to Work	143
Representation, Computation, and Cognitive Science	144
1 The Cognitive Science Gesture	144
2 Individualism in Cognitive Science	145
3 Mental Representation as Encoding	147
4 The Debate Over Marr's Theory of Vision	150
5 Segal and Egan on Computation and Representation	155
6 Exploitative Representation and Wide Computationalism	162
7 Narrow Content and Marr's Theory	172
8 Locational versus Taxonomic Externalism	174
9 Having It Both Ways?	178
10 Beyond Computation	179

Contents

PART THREE

THINKING THROUGH AND BEYOND THE BODY

8	The Embedded Mind and Cognition	183
	1 Representation and Psychology	183
	2 Life and Mind: From Reaction to Thought	184
	3 The Embeddedness and Embodiment of Higher Cognition	187
	4 Memory	189
3	5 Cognitive Development	198
	6 Folk Psychology and the Theory of Mind	206
9	7 The Mind Beyond Itself	210
9	Expanding Consciousness	214
	1 The Return of the Conscious	214
2	2 Processes of Awareness and Phenomenal States	215
5	3 Expanding the Conscious Mind: Processes of Awareness	217
Š	4 Arguing for Expanded Consciousness	221
	5 Global Externalism and Phenomenal States	225
	6 TESEE and Sensory Experience	232
5	7 Individualistic Residues	238
5	8 Global Externalism and the TESEE View	240
10	Intentionality and Phenomenology	242
	1 The Relationship Between Intentionality and Phenomenology	242
	2 Dimensions of the Inseparability Thesis	244
	rt A. Boll (Antel Bight Wind): Still AND (Anter Anter Anter ty Press, 2004. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uwa/detail.action?do	246

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4 Phenomenal Intentionality	252
5 Individualism and Phenomenal Intentionality	² 55
6 How to Be a Good Phenomenologist	260
PART FOUR	
THE COGNITIVE METAPHOR IN THE BIOLOGICAL	
AND SOCIAL SCIENCES	
11 Group Minds in Historical Perspective	265
1 Group Minds and the Cognitive Metaphor in the Biological	
and Social Sciences	265
2 Two Traditions	267
3 The Collective Psychology Tradition	269
4 The Superorganism Tradition	² 74
5 Group Minds and the Social Manifestation Thesis	280
6 Collective Psychology, Superorganisms, and Socially	
Manifested Minds	282
7 From the Past to the Present	284
12 The Group Mind Hypothesis in Contemporary Biology	
and Social Science	286
1 Reviving the Group Mind	286
2 On Having a Mind	288
3 Minimal Minds, Consciousness, and Holism	293
4 The Contemporary Defense of the Group Mind Hypothesis	295
5 The Social Manifestation Thesis	299
6 The Cognitive and the Social	302
7 From Group Minds to Group Selection	303
8 Groups, Minds, and Individuals	306
Notes	309
References	
Index	

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