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I expect every reader knows the hackneyed old joke: ‘What is matter? Never mind. What is mind? No matter.’ Antique as this joke is, it none the less points to an interesting question. For the so-called mind–body dichotomy, which has been raised to almost canonical status in post-Cartesian philosophy, is not in fact at all easy to draw or to defend. This of course means that ‘the mind–body problem’ is difficult both to describe and to solve—or rather, as I would prefer, to dissolve.
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- Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 1988
References
Notes
1 Aristotle's De Anima, Books II, III. ed. and tr. Hamyln, D. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968).Google Scholar
2 Hume, D., An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Selby-Bigge, L. (ed.) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), s. vii, part 1, para, 52, p. 66.Google Scholar
3 Austin, J. L., How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), 38.Google Scholar
4 Davidson, D., ‘Mental Events’, in Davidson, , Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 207–225. First published 1970.Google Scholar
5 For Sokolov's theory see Gray, J. A., Elements of a Two-Process Theory of Learning (London: Academic Press, 1975), 22.Google Scholar
6 Nagel, T., Mortal Questions (Cambridge University Press, 1979)Google Scholar, Ch. 12, “What is it Like to be a Bat?”