


# REMODEL[L]ING REALITY

an InstallationPackage

TINE WILDE





# Remodel[l]ing Reality

Tine Wilde







De Taal en haar Broekje  
(Language and her Tightly-whities) 5|11 2006







# Corrido[o]r

Studies for a Philosophers' Room







Corrido[o]r





**Studies for a Philosophers Room**







# REMODEL[L]ING REALITY

an InstallationPackage

Wittgenstein's übersichtliche Darstellung &  
the phenomenon of Installation in visual art

academisch proefschrift ter verkrijging van de graad van  
doctor aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam op gezag van de  
Rector Magnificus prof. dr. D.C. van den Boom ten overstaan  
van een door het college voor promoties ingestelde commissie,  
in het openbaar te verdedigen in de Aula der Universiteit  
op woensdag 12 november 2008, te 10.00 uur door  
Martina Christina Wilde, geboren te Nijmegen



Promotiecommissie

Promotor: Prof. dr. M.J.B. Stokhof

Overige leden: Prof. dr. R.I. Bartsch  
Prof. P. Goldie, PhD  
Prof. dr. M.R.M. ter Hark  
Prof. dr. M. van Lambalgen  
Prof. dr. R.M. Sonderegger  
M. Craig-Martin, expert  
L. Gillick, expert

Faculteit der Geesteswetenschappen



## > INSTALLSTATEMENT

The book, that you have opened just now, explores the relations between philosophy and the art of installation, and provides a package tour of the concept ·reflexive dynamics·. It is an  $\langle\text{InstallationPackage}\rangle$  that presupposes your active engagement and is meant to remodel your reality (somewhat).

A large, stylized blue signature or scribble, possibly reading 'Tine Wilde', written in a cursive, flowing style. The signature starts with a vertical line on the left, moves right, then loops back and forth in a series of peaks and valleys, ending with a long, sweeping curve that points towards the upper right.

Tine Wilde





## > CONTENTS

Installstatement	1
Contents	3
Preamble	7
1    Guide to the reader . . . . .	8
2    A package tour . . . . .	11
2.1    Concept and description . . . . .	12
2.2    Some additional remarks . . . . .	14
2.3    The question . . . . .	14
List of Figures	17
PART I	19
1    Setting the Stage	21
1    übersichtliche Darstellung . . . . .	24
1.1    Übersicht and Darstellung . . . . .	26
1.2    Paradigm and paradox . . . . .	28
1.3    Backgrounds . . . . .	30
1.3.1    Goethe and Spengler . . . . .	33
1.3.2    Morphology and method . . . . .	37
2    The Art of Installation the viewer's perspective . . . . .	40
2.1    The quest for meaning . . . . .	42
2.2    Philosophy as a component element of Installation . . . . .	43
3    Art and life . . . . .	46
3.1    Contexts and aspects . . . . .	48
3.2    Ways of seeing . . . . .	50
4    Setting the stage . . . . .	52
2    Following rules & Form of life	57



1	Meaning and rules . . . . .	59
1.1	Williams . . . . .	60
1.2	Bloor . . . . .	65
1.3	Luntley . . . . .	71
2	Similarities and patterns . . . . .	77
2.1	Seeing aspects . . . . .	78
2.2	Aspects and perspectives . . . . .	81
3	Form of life . . . . .	88
4	Going solo . . . . .	94
3	Way & World . . . . .	103
1	Dimensions of knowledge . . . . .	106
1.1	Knowing-that and knowing-how . . . . .	107
1.2	Creative knowledge . . . . .	115
1.2.1	Artistic knowledge . . . . .	119
1.3	An übersichtliche Darstellung of knowledge . . . . .	121
2	Übersichtliche Darstellung and philosophy . . . . .	123
3	The aim and purpose of philosophy . . . . .	126
3.1	Theory and explanation . . . . .	127
3.2	Therapy, elucidation and process . . . . .	128
3.3	Conceptual analysis . . . . .	135
4	Reflexive dynamics . . . . .	136
4.1	Imagination and aspect seeing . . . . .	137
4.2	A package tour of a concept . . . . .	139
	PART II . . . . .	141
4	Remodel[ing] Reality . . . . .	143
1	The art of installation the creator's perspective . . . . .	144
1.1	The quest for meaning . . . . .	147
1.2	Art and philosophy . . . . .	150
2	Art and life . . . . .	151
5	Do not Erase . . . wait for Meaning . . . . .	157
1	A poem with proportion . . . . .	158
1.1	Corrido[o]r studies for a philosopher, room . . . . .	161
1.2	Do you? . . . . .	163
1.3	Wiederholte Spiegelungen . . . . .	165
1.4	Do not Erase . . . an installation . . . . .	170
1.4.1	A new perspective on the art of installation . . . . .	177

---

PART III	181
6 Conclusions	183
1 Layered levels . . . . .	183
2 Amazing! . . . . .	186
Acknowledgements	188
Bibliography	191
Index	197





## > PREAMBLE

This book is about analysis and synthesis – about philosophy and visual art. Unlike so-called ‘artistic research’ it is not an art project that wants to illuminate or work out some scientific issue or problem. An autonomous artist is not an assistant of some professor who wants to have his scientific results visualised. The artist is not an employee working for a scientific enterprise. Nor is art meant to function as PR for a university or research institute. This is not what art is for.

This publication also does not reflect a philosophical investigation meant to provide foundations for art in general or, more specifically, the works of art that were accomplished in the scope of this project. The philosophical part is neither an explanation nor a description of the works of art. Conversely, the art-works that make up the project are not in any way an illustration of a philosophical treatise.

It is not an attempt at a combination of art and science. It is not about science, because in my view, philosophy is not science. In the course of this writing this will become clear. Philosophy can stand on its own, as an independent discipline.

The project does not provide a reaction or some sort of a response to a philosophical or an artistic issue. This is a project about art *and* philosophy. Not about the combination of art and philosophy, but about the ways in which art and philosophy could have something to say to each other. In the course of this thesis I will show that there are some striking similarities and one main difference, and that the two disciplines could benefit from each other while not being reduced into one another.

First and foremost, it is a personal project. It has nothing to do with politics or trends or fashion or whatever. It stems from a personal fascination with making art as well as practising philosophy. After practising art for nearly fifteen years, the philosophical journey began in 1998 with my decision to start a full time study in philosophy at the University of Amsterdam. In my Master’s thesis I combined my fascination for colour and colour systems with an investigation of Wittgenstein’s remarks on colour. After having finished, there remained the question of how to combine my two fascinations, art and philosophy, in a meaningful way. It is with this challenge that I began a four-year’s PhD journey of which this publication is the result.



## 1 GUIDE TO THE READER

1 >  
For an explanation  
of the notion of  
·InstallationPackage·  
I refer to the folder  
*Remodel[ing] Reality*  
that accompanies the book.  
In the second part of this  
volume I will elaborate and  
extend this notion.

The book covers the latest InstallationPackage<sup>1</sup> «Do not Erase... wait for Meaning» that ranged from 1998 to 2008. The package includes a study in philosophy from 1998 to 2001. A preparation phase for a PhD project lasting two years, from 2002 to 2004, in which the most important insights on the ideas of Remodel[ing] Reality were written in a booklet (Dutch only), tested out in a course ·Installation Art and the quest for Meaning· taught at the Gerrit Rietveld Academie in Amsterdam and completed with an exhibition called ·One Installation· at Arti et Amicitiae, Amsterdam. After that, the project started officially in 2004 under the supervision of Martin Stokhof and was financially supported with a bursary by the Board of Governors, the Faculty of Humanities, and the research institute ILLC, all within the University of Amsterdam. I was also supposed to find additional funding for the artistic works. This last condition appeared to be rather problematic. The art world is not very keen on sponsoring projects within a university setting – especially not for just one artist – and conversely, the university system and its procedures are not capable of providing the means for an independent artist to make and sell art within the context of such a project.

In some sense this InstallationPackage is the continuation of a way of making art that I have been doing for some fifteen years. However this project differs from the previous ones in scale as well as degree. First of all, four years is a very long time for an art project and the fact that making art and writing a philosophical thesis were intermingled was fascinating, but did complicate matters somewhat. Practical matters, especially, such as organisation and time management were difficult to handle, as academia is not very well equipped for active artists. The corridors at the department of philosophy can best be compared with a mortuary where complete silence and obedience to introspective and internal thinking dominate. A visual artist such as myself is used to working out ideas from several directions into sketches or models and to do so at her own pace. At some point in the process we tried to arrange some sort of a working space on the third floor, but it did not work out because of some unhelpful behaviour from a few people. Liberation set in the moment the basement of the Amsterdam University Library was empty and free to use.

Why then, should a visual artist, someone who is skilled in materialising ideas and as a consequence at times can be rather noisy and extrovert, go through all the fuss to make a PhD project in an environment that is marked by the most introverted atmosphere situated at the edge of the world? And conversely: Why should the inhabitants of a philosophical community bother themselves with a nosy and noisy artist? In the case of the artist, she can answer for herself that she happens to have an obsession with philosophy as well as for art, and has the knowledge of two disciplines united in one person. As for the case of the philosophical community, you had better ask them yourself.

There was another complication with respect to content. The aim was to combine the two disciplines, philosophy of language and the art of installation in such a way, that the combination would reveal a surplus value, in the sense that the conclusions of the writings would lead to a new perspective on the art of installation. It was also that the installation would show a different view on the philosophical Wittgensteinian idea of *übersichtliche Darstellung*. I was not after an explanation of a work of art by means of the thesis and the installation was not intended to be an illustration of what was written. A fascinating and challenging 'package tour of a concept', but at the same time very difficult to fully accomplish in all detail.

The idea behind this entire project is grounded in the belief that intuition can be understood as a worthy partner of reason: when we combine our cognitive understanding of the world with a personal, intuitive vision we acquire a holistic and precise view on reality. It is holistic, in the sense that the characterisation by comprehension of the parts of something is intimately interconnected and explicable only by reference to the whole. And for both philosophy and art the main aim, at least in my opinion, is to see the world as it really *is*, that is, to be able to understand the complexity and the richness of the world without illusion or projection of beliefs, presuppositions and the like. That is, to see (a part of) reality at any point in time 'anew'.

The art of installation has made attempts to integrate everyday life and art, but in my view has bypassed what we could call 'communal knowledge' as an active part of the human life world. Because art history pulls art back into conventional solipsism art, and from this, also the art of installation merely tends to refer to itself, restricted to the context and the conventions of the art world. Artists who are also skilled as philosophers can make an important contribution here, by opening up and bringing back its insights to the world again.

This communal or general knowledge is best reflected in what I call 'poetic understanding'. It reflects our knowledge of the world the moment our propositional knowledge turns into non-propositional knowledge but yet remains meaningful. It is that which we cannot say anymore, but only show – be it in text where we can read the ambiguous poetic meaning between the lines – or in (visual) art when we look at a painting or wander through an installation.

Wittgenstein's way of doing philosophy has proved to be of great help for me to shed light on the complicated relationship of intuition and reasoning, especially by investigating his notion of '*übersichtliche Darstellung*' as a tool to obtain a perspicuous overview on a part of our language.

All this has come down to the broadening and deepening of the intuitive insights I had worked on before. Because the process played such a decisive role, I have decided to make the enterprise into a book that is neither a conventional thesis nor a strict commercial edition thereof, but a reflexive journey into four years of investigation and imagination, culminating in a new perspective on the art of instal-



lation and a new insight in Wittgenstein's übersichtliche Darstellung. The outcome is a book that is an InstallationPackage, which is about doing full blown philosophical research for four years and, in doing so, reflecting upon the process of making art. At the same time, it is about engaging in an artistic adventure of four years and, in living and breathing this adventure, reflecting upon the process of doing philosophy. Bear in mind, that no predictions or new methods are presented. Instead what is given is a new way of looking at Wittgenstein's inquiries into the notion of übersichtliche Darstellung related to his remarks on aspect seeing as well as a new perspective in the development of the art of installation. Again I want to emphasise that I did not practise what is contemporary called 'artistic research' nor did I practise art history or philosophy of art or aesthetics in any way. This InstallationPackage is not *about* art, but art itself.

Because the book that lies in front of you is in the form of an InstallationPackage, it can be understood as a *package tour* holding two parts of writing – a philosophical treatise and the working out of a new installation – complete with photos and drawings, together with a booklet/folder. This folder, bearing the same title as this publication, Remodel[l]ing Reality, was printed in 2006, halfway through the project, and functions as an overview of the previous «InstallationProjects». These are the ones that were completed before I began studying philosophy in 1998 at the University of Amsterdam. In this way, it provides the context for the project at hand.

The booklet/folder Remodel[l]ing Reality is also visually related to the current enterprise. Four chapters of this book all begin with a picture from one of the previous projects, all of which are written out in the booklet. In this way, there is the opportunity for the reader to make connections and notice interrelationships between the previous projects and this PhD project, that I call «Do not Erase ... wait for Meaning». Obviously, my past experiences resonate with the issues discussed in this book. These are sometimes explicitly used, as for instance in the rule-following-case discussed in Chapter 2 of the philosophical part, at other times they are lurking more implicitly in the background of a deliberation. The booklet/folder, then, is meant to provide the background and foundation for the project at hand so that little explanation is needed to put the current project into perspective.

Because the processes played such an important role, many everyday events and small accomplishments influenced the undertaking in numerous ways. It appeared to be the case, for instance, that the various rooms along the corridor of the department of Philosophy situated at Vendelstraat 8 somehow provided the framework, literally and symbolically, for the materialisation of the project. These rooms became almost an obsession, both from having some difficulty to find my place within this philosophical community and also, because of the quest to find a proper room for myself to live in Amsterdam. These experiences intermingled with the writing and

making of the works of art, for instance in a website ·Corrido[o]r· and an exhibition of a concertina fold<sup>2</sup> with the title ·Studies for a Philosopher, Room·.

The inside of the front cover carries the booklet/folder Remodel[l]ing Reality as well as a time line that shows all activities accomplished in these years in a perspicuous way, and a leaflet with several photos that were taken from the final installation. Because an InstallationPackage is also meant to be something active, you can make your own choice of how and where in this publication you want to paste these photos. Enjoy your journey!

2 >

A concertina fold is a book that can be opened or closed in stretched, multiple folds.

## 2 A PACKAGE TOUR

Qui fecit refecit  
Augustinus

Every quest for knowledge about our world mirrors our need for clarity. We feel the need and the compulsion to obtain complete transparent insight. Mathematics, science, philosophy as well as art are domains par excellence where this search for transparency can be found. Models and systems, such as the übersichtliche Darstellung of Wittgenstein, mathematical formulae or what we call installation in visual art are all crucial tools for the elucidation and clarification of complex problems. In the choices we make of those models, systems or forms of art, our understanding of the world is presented and in one way or another visualised, i.e., materialised. We incorporate these models and systems and carry them as knowledge of our world with us, passing this ‘lived’ knowledge to others.

Creating these models, systems and forms of art has everything to do with our powers of imagination. It provides us with the opportunity to not only learn to understand reality in a better, that is, more profound way, but at the same time to enrich this reality with the things we make. We add certain aspects to our world, or become aware, through certain solutions, of other problems we had ignored before. From the choices made and the solutions accepted, we show which aspects of reality are important to us and how we communicate that which we value – how these values determine our (cultural) identity.

From this, we could say that we constantly are changing reality in one way or other. We remodel reality – each of us in his or her own way. I wish to call this constant remodelling a  $\llcorner$ reflexive dynamics $\lrcorner$ , because it refers to itself by means of a different aspect in a dynamic way. The dynamics can be found in the simultaneous changing of reality as well as in the changing of the model or system, and the alteration of the relation between the model, the system or the work of art and reality.

Perception and memory are our tools. The ability of seeing aspects and our capacity to call up and remember past experiences provide the means for a dynamic

remodelling, readjusting or restructuring of our life world. The context in which we use our concepts is decisive, for it is the perspective we take as well as the aspects involved in the context in which they appear that allow for the range of possibilities as well as constraints.

The notion of reflexive dynamics implies a dynamics that is reflexive with an  $x$ , referring to itself by means of a different aspect, as well as a dynamics that is reflective with  $ct$ , reflecting on the changes and the insights we gain thereof. For matters of convenience the term ‘reflexive’ is meant to cover both.

## 2.1 CONCEPT AND DESCRIPTION

As already mentioned, this undertaking lasted four years. I gave each year a ‘Year’s Sentence’ as a thread that can be followed throughout the book and can be found as the heading on the pages where you can paste your self-chosen photos of the final exhibition that are printed on the leaflet that accompanies the book.

PART I is a philosophical treatise in which the ideas on reflexive dynamics are elaborated upon by concentrating on Wittgenstein’s notion of *übersichtliche Darstellung* and how it is related to the practise of doing philosophy and the art of installation.

First, I discuss Wittgenstein’s remarks on *übersichtliche Darstellung* and analyse its features and backgrounds, followed by the same procedure for the phenomenon of installation in visual art. As will become apparent, there are some striking similarities, albeit also an important difference. Both phenomena are always somehow influenced by the context in which they appear and both show a reflexive dynamics, i.e., as said before, they refer to themselves by means of a different aspect. But in the case of the *übersichtliche Darstellung* we expect a result that shows us how things stand for us, while in the case of the art of installation we want something startlingly new and unexpected. These similarities and difference hang together with the notions of aspect seeing and aspect change, playing a key role as they are connected with our powers of imagination.

What is obvious or unexpected is intrinsically bound up with our participation in a community. Where does innovation and novelty come in? The relationships between the individual and the social, and from this, the known and the new are investigated in a second chapter called ‘Following rules & Form of life’. This chapter is devoted to Wittgenstein’s inquiries into rule-following and how this relates to his notion of ‘Form of life’. The elaboration of the issue of rule-following, taking up the insights of Williams, Bloor and Luntley, will help to achieve a better understanding of the role of the individual and the social and how they are intermingled. From the investigation of the question whether the possibility of rule-following is either something individual or something collective, I come to the conclusion that the distinction is for the most part purely a matter of practical decision, made up for



communication purposes in order to model our language in the most appropriate way within the specific context it requires. By way of example, I detail the Shelter Project from 1998: a fourteen day stay in a fallout shelter, addressing the question of what happens to a human being when totally left upon her own resources and without any contact with the human, everyday form of life. The experiences in the fallout shelter contribute to my conclusion that we need everyday life in a community within the context of a life world in order to be creative.

It is due to art, but also the models or systems we make, such as the *übersichtliche Darstellung*, that we can look at the complexity of the world from a perspicuous overview and at the same time look at it anew, from a different perspective. A third chapter named 'Way & World', then, considers the notions of creative and artistic knowledge and how they relate to our powers of imagination on the one hand and our rules and systems on the other. Wittgenstein's notion of *übersichtliche Darstellung*, not so much as a model but a way of practising philosophy, leads us to an elaboration on the notions of ·process· and ·vision· and, related to this, creative and artistic knowledge. From this discussion, I investigate the therapeutic conception of philosophy as well as the process reading thereof and connect the outcome of the comparison of the therapeutic and process conceptions to my findings on the art of installation.

The point where the *übersichtliche Darstellung* meets the phenomenon of installation lies somewhere between the propositional and the evocative, and culminates into something I call ·poetic understanding·. This is hinted at by Wittgenstein, but never made explicit. From this, the conviction is put forward that the analysis of Wittgenstein's notion of *übersichtliche Darstellung* and my insights into the phenomenon of installation give us the opportunity to take a fresh view on both. This thereby sets the stage for deepening our understanding of the relationship between the philosophy of language and the art of installation.

PART II begins with a first chapter called 'Remodel[l]ing Reality' which deals with the art of installation from the creator's perspective, followed by a second chapter 'Do not Erase ... wait for Meaning' which describes my personal view on the art of installation and works out – in roughly the same way as was done in the booklet/folder *Remodel[l]ing Reality* from 2006 – the works of art that were accomplished in the course of these four years up to the final installation that was exhibited from June 21 until July 13, 2008. The second chapter ends with a proposal for a new perspective on the art of installation.

The entire enterprise is capped off in PART III with some conclusions drawn from the results: about art, about philosophy and about this combination of art and philosophy. Nine Propositions in the front cover of the book complete the project and show in a condensed way what more than four years of adventure, quest and research amount to.

## 2.2 SOME ADDITIONAL REMARKS

At some points in the text I refer briefly to secondary literature from art history, aesthetics or philosophy of art in order to provide the proper context and perspective for my arguments. Nonetheless, it should be noted that I have no intention whatsoever of analysing and discussing the phenomenon of installation nor the notion of *übersichtliche Darstellung* in terms of art history, aesthetics or philosophy of art. The way in which I treat the issues stems from my background as a visual artist who has specialised in the art of installation and as a philosopher who is explicitly dedicated to the philosophy of language, more specifically, to Wittgenstein's inquiries.

Also, you may notice some slight differences in terminology on the notion of *·InstallationPackage·* in this volume compared to the vocabulary used in the booklet/folder. This refinement was necessary for a full extension of this notion that I developed further in the course of the PhD project.

Another remark concerns the fact that I have utilised text previously published in articles or on the world-wide-web. There is, for instance, the elaboration on Wittgenstein's remarks on colour and the colour-octahedron that has its source in an article published in 2004 in a Dutch philosophical journal *Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte* and the proceedings of the Austrian Wittgenstein Society. Also, the remarks and elaboration on the phenomenon of installation were successively published in a Dutch periodical called *Boekman Cahier* in 2004 and a Belgian art catalogue *Ithaka #13*, printed in 2005. For full details on the previously published texts I refer to, you can consult the timeline in the inside of the front cover that accompanies the book and the bibliography at the back of this volume.

## 2.3 THE QUESTION

Why is it of any interest to combine the later work of Wittgenstein with the art of installation?

First of all, in both cases the role of memory and remembering play a crucial part if we want to investigate the relation between perception, truth and certainty. For we are curious what role our powers of imagination plays in the relation between the individual and reality.

Human memory is characterised by a constant restructuring of experience, something that is called *·memory morphing·* and can be understood as the re-adjusting or re-modelling of occurrences. Our stories and mythologies articulate the highest values of the existence and constitution of a community. They illustrate what binds us and symbolise what can be called *·the forgotten dimension·*. Yet, we tend to bypass insights and values when they have become so obvious for us that we have simply forgotten about them. Philosophy's aim is to reflect on this forgetfulness and

its consequences and bring it back to the fore.

Something similar holds for art. It is the art of installation especially, in my opinion, that can detach the viewer of his habits and convictions because of its overwhelming and manipulative character and thereby provide him a shift towards the possibility of remembering and assigning new meanings to himself and the world he is living in. At the same time, this shifting meaning also raises new questions.

Ultimately, both philosophy and the art of installation are about an encounter between the viewer and himself within the context of the world he is living in, and it is the future that is inherent in this encounter. It is in this way that philosophy and art have something to say to each other.

Second, the later work of Wittgenstein and the art of installation are engaged in a conceptual inquiry – in which ways and how exactly this comes about will be explored in greater length in the chapters to come. For now, we can say that what matters is our grammar of concepts, that is to say, the ways in which we use these concepts and their importance for our notions of truth and perception. The art of installation, more than another form of art, such as painting, photography, drawing and the like, takes on a hybrid and by consequence contextual perspective with regard to perception and truth. The result is an *übersichtliche Darstellung* as Wittgenstein exemplified by his discussion of the colour-octahedron.<sup>3</sup>

The context is decisive for the way in which we use our concepts, since this use is relative to the perspective we take and the aspects that are involved in the context in which they appear. I wish to call this simultaneous interaction between ourselves and the context: a reflexive dynamics. We construct our concepts actively within the broader context of a community we live in, with as the ultimate limits our biological and historical constraints. Throughout the book, I will come back in more detail to this.


On a meta-level, this investigation is concerned with the question of whether there is a way of doing philosophy as well as making art, i.e., the art of installation in which each of these disciplines not only merely refers to itself or to some ideal, but remains attached to and engaged in the world – a way that brings the concepts revisited, revised or remodelled back to the world in a meaningful manner.

3 >  
This colour-octahedron is the only *übersichtliche Darstellung* Wittgenstein actually discussed and will be elaborated in greater length throughout this book. See also the figure on page 17.





## > LIST OF FIGURES



The colour-octahedron, Wittgenstein, PR XXI, 221



The duck-rabbit diagram, Wittgenstein PI II, p520



The double-cross, Wittgenstein PI II, xi, p541





>> PART I



# 1 > SETTING THE STAGE



1994-1995 Unter der Laterne

For Wittgenstein a philosophical problem has the form of ‘I do not know my way about’ (Philosophical Investigations (PI hereafter) 123). He states that such a problem can be solved by loosening up our thinking in order to free ourselves from misunderstanding. This is accomplished by unravelling the immense manifold of different and complex connections and networks of our language that keep us imprisoned. The immense manifold and the imprisonment are two aspects of the problem. In the former case there is the lack we as language users have, to get a sufficient overview of our language. These misunderstandings are related to our language and are therefore grammatical problems. In the latter case suggestive expressions might slip into the language and keep us imprisoned. We use and repeat these suggestive expressions and tend to generalise them, especially when we are doing philosophy. In this sense, philosophy has a special relation with our language since it questions the nature of our concepts and can do so only by means of the use of our language. In this dynamic interaction between ourselves and the language we use, the final responsibility rests upon us and not on the language as such (PI 108).

Our language is connected with all sorts of pictures, i.e., habits of thinking. Wittgenstein is fascinated by the fact that language evokes pictures that can direct us to possibilities – new ways of understanding – that can also be a source of misunderstandings. He investigates this fact, for instance, in his comments on Frazer in ‘Remarks on Frazers Golden Bough’ (Philosophical Occasions (PO hereafter) p115-155), where we recognise manners of speech which are inheritances of old rituals that have influenced our language to this very day. We would have to rearrange our



entire language in order to come to see all these pictures. But this is neither possible nor necessary. Instead, we can only try to obtain clarity and perspicuity by solving a specific problem that is related to a fragment of our language. It is therefore the task of the philosopher to rearrange the elements of a particular part of language in a perspicuous way. A tool for achieving clarity that puts us at ease is what Wittgenstein calls an *übersichtliche Darstellung*.<sup>1</sup> It is this tool that is the subject of inquiry in this chapter.

1 >

The term *übersichtliche Darstellung* is not translated in this thesis, because *Darstellung* can be translated as 'presentation' (as Stanley Cavell prefers) or 'representation' (the way Judith Genova translates it), as well as 'description', 'depiction' and 'creation', but none of these terms seems to accurately describe what Wittgenstein wants to say. Therefore it will be used as a technical term and left untranslated.

In PO p98ff, Wittgenstein tries to shed light on the difference between the nature of an everyday problem and that of a philosophical problem and shows us that this distinction has to do with the nature of doubt or uncertainty that is connected with each type of problem. In an everyday problem uncertainty can be resolved. But in philosophy, we are not supposed to solve a problem; we are supposed to gather what is already there and present the result in a perspicuous way so that we can come to see new aspects or perspectives. Yet philosophy is not concerned with these new aspects or perspectives themselves in contrast to science. Philosophy is what is present before all new discoveries and inventions, since it questions the nature of concepts. Science can then make use of these philosophical reflections in its inquiries. This applies to art as well, but in a different way. It is the aim of this thesis to show how this can come about. The philosophical methodology is strongly related to the notion of *übersichtliche Darstellung* and our inquiry into this notion will therefore also shed light on our practice of doing philosophy.

As Wittgenstein says in Letter on Ethics (LE hereafter) p9: I cannot imagine the world *not* existing. When we say 'I wonder at the existence of the world', what in fact we want to say is that we experience the world as a miracle – as something magical. We express our wonder at the world through our language. It is the existence of language itself that amazes us and in that amazement and in our need to express this amazement, we crash against its boundaries. Through this tension, transformation of our views may happen and poetic understanding may emerge. This wondering about the world we live in cannot be expressed in our everyday language, because we are unable to find words that cover the depth of our experiences and feelings of this magical totality. It is in this pushing against the boundaries of our language where a special kind of meaning emerges, telling us important things about what we human beings are, yet at the same time remaining ineffable whenever we try to grab a hold of it. Philosophy deals with the complexity of our language, art takes up the wondering.

In the work of Wittgenstein we can discover a need for logical clarification, a method for solving philosophical problems; but we also find a need for aesthetic clarification, as is shown for instance in the Notebooks 1914-16 (NB hereafter), 20 and 21 October 1916:

---

[...]The artistic miracle is that the world exists. That what exists, exists[...]

And in LE:

‘wondering at the existence of the world’ concerns the absolute experience of things: [...]the work of art is the object seen *sub specie aeternitatis*[...]²

Sub specie aeternitatis is an expression of Spinoza that means: ‘under the aspect of eternity’. It refers to aesthetic experience that is experienced in an absolute sense *with* space and time instead of in a relative sense *within* space and time. Wijdeveld (1994, p187):

If the result is successful, [...] it connects philosophical clarification with artistic clarification and this combination resolving in perfect expression, can only be shown. They both have aesthetic detachment or the absolute view in common (CV p6)[...]³

This wondering about the world is an ethic and aesthetic wondering. In this respect, aesthetics is not science, but it is neither aesthetics as Baumgarten⁴ understood it and as it is currently taught - a separate discipline in philosophy. The notion of aesthetics is a problematic one, not only in contemporary art, but also for Wittgenstein. However, full elaboration on this issue would exceed the scope of this chapter. Thus, I will restrict myself to what matters here, namely the fact that Wittgenstein explicitly emphasises the idea that ethics and aesthetics are *one*. This is a view that underscores the extended vision of how the world *is* – something that in a similar way also applies to art. In this chapter I cannot fully explicate the complex dynamic relation between art and philosophy, but I can set the scope. This scope is limited to discussing only the most relevant aspects of this relation insofar as it is linked to the notion of *übersichtliche Darstellung*. It is with this question – what is this dynamic relation between art and philosophy – in the back of our mind, that Wittgenstein’s notion of *übersichtliche Darstellung* is explored.

Similar observations can be made in mathematics. Wittgenstein is fascinated by the idea that mathematics accomplishes something. But, as in the case of poetry, we cannot say *what*, and thus can only *do* or *show* mathematics (cf. Floyd 2002). Time and again he tries to show the various ways in which we tend to communicate and motivate mathematical proofs, algorithms and notations by way of intuitive, heuristic or metaphorical terms. Wittgenstein called these terms ‘prose’ (Marion, 1998, p4ff). For Wittgenstein, the task of philosophy is to explore the conceptual tensions inherent in our efforts to say what can only be done or shown: thus, to separate prose from proof, and to recognise misleading prose whenever we see it (Floyd, 2002, p71). The need for prose is inevitable if mathematics is to grow.

2 >

Genova distinguishes in the first chapter of *Wittgenstein. A way of seeing* two manners of seeing. The first one is seeing something *sub specie aeternitatis*, prominent in TLP. The second one is the idea of seeing an overview as *übersichtliche Darstellung*; this one is important in the later work of Wittgenstein, e.g., in PI. Both manners of seeing can be described as networks that describe reality. But according to Genova, the first manner of seeing describes reality from the outside, while the latter is placed by Wittgenstein in the midst of the concepts and thus not on a meta-level (Genova, 1995, p31). It remains to be seen whether she is right here. Take for instance Zettel (Z hereafter) 455, where Wittgenstein says that on the one hand we cannot take a standpoint outside any community of ideas, but on the other hand we cannot be satisfied taking our place only as an inhabitant or citizen of a form of life. This remark refers to the next one Z 456 where he discusses the place a philosopher occupies. The question is not *whether* these two notions of seeing are related (they are), but *how*: that is the important question, for the philosopher as well as for the (visual) artist. Cf. CV p6-7.

3 >

This quotation from Wijdeveld is originally situated within an elaboration on architecture and philosophy. It should be noted that the art of installation is not related to architecture, as is sometimes assumed. In architecture, one is not concerned with transformation, whereas for installation, the possibility of transformation is the crucial point.

We have to bear in mind that this notion of prose has a positive and a negative connotation, both related to Wittgenstein's notion of grammar. It is positive in the sense that we have to use prose in matters of mathematics, because we simply have no other ways to communicate that what only can be done or shown. It is negative, because this same prose can never adequately or fully express the mathematical issues we want to communicate and reflect upon in philosophy. In this way, prose can cover up or obscure things and thereby deceive us.

## 1 ÜBERSICHTLICHE DARSTELLUNG

4 > Godlieb Baumgarten 1714 - 1762, was a German philosopher and follower of Leibniz and Wolff and influenced by Kant. He coined the term 'aesthetics' first as an appendix of moral philosophy and a reflection on taste, linking good taste with beauty, later as a theorisation of the perfection our senses are capable to access, and finally as a critique of (aesthetic) judgement. See also (Duve de, 1998, p76ff)

Despite its central role, the notion of *übersichtliche Darstellung* is a difficult one, and there is by no means any agreement in the literature on how it should be interpreted. One reason for this, no doubt, is the lack of references to it in Wittgenstein's work. The only place where Wittgenstein explicitly refers to the notion of *übersichtliche Darstellung* is in PI 122, where it is referred to as a notion that is of the greatest importance to us. He even asks whether it could be some sort of a worldview. Why is this *übersichtliche Darstellung* of such importance when there are no further remarks that refer either explicitly or implicitly to this notion? What is it that makes this notion of *übersichtliche Darstellung* so special, yet so hard to get a hold on?

In the course of our examination, we will see that the notion is related to our powers of imagination; that is, to a special kind of understanding – something that Wittgenstein calls 'living pictures'.<sup>5</sup> What is the scope of these living pictures – something I want to call 'poetic understanding' – and how is it related to philosophy and to our language? Language is here understood in a broad sense, linguistic as well as non-linguistic. It includes not just written and spoken language, but also all kinds of gestures, graphics, pictures, signs, and also visual art. Hence, the inquiry into the *übersichtliche Darstellung* will be also an inquiry into the connections between philosophy, language and visual art.<sup>6</sup>

5 > Cf. the influences of Paul Ernst on Wittgenstein's conception of *Weltbild* and Genova (1995) with her elaboration on the concepts of picture and thinking. When the *Bergen Electronic Nachlass* is checked, we see that Wittgenstein refers to poetic language 1. in Item 136 Band Q and 232 and Typoscript Band 135-137 with respect to Schiller 2. in Item 137 Band R, pages 126 and 718 in combination with the 'black/white double-cross' 3. in Notizbuch Item 168 and 174 on 'poetischer Stimmung' and finally 4. in Brown Book, item 310, 64 in connection with his remarks on formula and the ability to follow a rule.

As already mentioned, there are few places where one can find remarks on the notion of *übersichtliche Darstellung* in the work of Wittgenstein. He discusses the term only five times explicitly and once implicitly.

In Philosophical Remarks (PR hereafter) p1, he exemplifies this notion in terms of the colour-octahedron which represents a perspicuous representation of our grammatical rules, and on page 2, he asks himself why philosophy is so complex. In a second instance, the term is discussed in PO concerning Frazer's *The Golden Bough* (FGB hereafter). In PO Philosophy 89, he extrapolates this notion to our philosophical problems, and more specifically in the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (RFM hereafter) with respect to the notion of proof. Finally, in PI

we find remark 122 which is explicitly dedicated to the notion of *übersichtliche Darstellung*.

Implicitly, the notion is present in his remarks on ethics and aesthetics, namely, in his applications of Goethe's morphological method used to shed some light on the concepts *·good·* and *·valuable·* with respect to our judgements. See also Baker (2002) and Hacker (2004).


In all cases mentioned above, Wittgenstein uses the notion of *übersichtliche Darstellung* as a tool for understanding: understanding how we can get rid of philosophical problems (PO); understanding why we need proofs in mathematics (RFM); to investigate what things such as gestures, pictures, etc. mean to us and how they influence our language (FGB); to understand how we act when running up against our boundaries of the language (LE); and to realise that this notion is of the greatest importance to us in finding different ways in which we can look at things (PI 122 related also to PI II, xii). The core passage is PI 122:

A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not *command a clear view* of the use of our words. - Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. A perspicuous representation produces just that understanding which consists in 'seeing connections'. Hence the importance of finding and inventing *intermediate cases*. The concept of perspicuous representation is of fundamental significance for us. It earmarks the form of account we give, the way we look at things. (Is this a 'Weltanschauung'?)

Like many epistemic notions, such as having a clear view, perspicuity, seeing connections, the notion of *übersichtliche Darstellung* indicates for a visual way of obtaining perspicuity. This is something that might be characteristic of our Western culture more general. Strangely enough, though, the only visual *übersichtliche Darstellung* Wittgenstein actually discusses is the colour-octahedron in PR. Another example, at least according to Hacker (2004), is the so-called 'logical square' Wittgenstein discusses in PI 48, although it is not clear whether Wittgenstein meant it to be explicitly an *übersichtliche Darstellung*. This square is composed out of nine blocks that 'describes' the sentence RRBGGGRWW showing the original colours (red, red, black/green, green, green/red, white, white) as a particular arrangement, that is, in rows of three. What is interesting though, is that both examples have a strong emphasis on the use of aspect seeing and aspect change in order to be able to see all possibilities. The notions of *·aspect seeing·* and *·aspect change·* will be discussed at greater length later on in this chapter.

Whenever we ask for *·Übersicht·* of a certain domain, we ask for clarity, transparency - insight into a particular something. In the example above it would be clarity regarding the rules for the use of colour words. This 'something' is too complex for us to be able to grasp in one clear view, and therefore can be very confusing. For instance, we might have the desire to obtain an insight in our system of rules

6>  
According to Pichler 'language works in the same way as mythology' and art, I would like to add, because they both make use of analogies as well as of the ability of transformation. See also Pichler (2000).



The colour-octahedron PR XXI, 221



for colour words, because it disturbs us that there could be rules other than the ones given. This treatment of relativism as a certainty would put us at ease.

7 > Thus, we want to compose an overview of possibilities, not only to put possibilities side by side,<sup>7</sup> but also to obtain an overview of possibilities in one clear view. Such an overview has to be something that is a transparent and precise picture – i.e., an *Übersicht* that is composed of a certain amount of necessary logical connections. An example is the colour-octahedron, which shows us all the grammatical rules of our colour words in a perspicuous and visible way; indeed, one can read the rules off from the figure on page 17 or 25, in *one* clear view.

Compare Baker's remarks on the difference between *Zusammenstellung* and *Darstellung* in Baker (2002).

### 1.1 ÜBERSICHT AND DARSTELLUNG

8 > The seeing in 'seeing an *Übersicht*' is not meant to be exclusively visual, but is also an intellectual intuition. Wittgenstein distinguishes between intuition as a psychological process and intuition as phenomenon – that is, an object of grammar (Gier, 1981, p110,113). When we take a closer look again on the examples on page 24, it is clear that the notion of *Übersicht* is indeed not restricted to purely visual models like the colour-octahedron, but also extends to more intellectual issues like ethics, aesthetics, and aspect seeing. Hence, context and our imagination play an important role.

Hagberg emphasises, after Davidson, that the content of a propositional attitude is inextricably bound up with background, context, and psychological nuances the moment we undergo the experience of performing an action. It is something that is constituted holistically, and thus, amounts to imaginative understanding and human depth. See for more details Hagberg (2002) and Hagberg (2003).

Language is more than mere propositional content.<sup>8</sup> We can understand the notion of *Übersicht* as consisting of spoken or written language as well as pictures. But it is also something that is both propositional (when it tells us something) and something that is evocative (when it brings something to mind). What Wittgenstein calls *·living pictures·* and I want to call *·poetic understanding·* lies somewhere between language as propositional content and language as pictorially evocative. In order to get a better hold on these complicated matters, let us first try to get more of a grip on Wittgenstein's notion of *Darstellung*.

9 > Grammatical problems are difficult problems, because they are connected to the most elementary, oldest habits of our thinking, that is, to the oldest pictures that are embedded in our language (Big Typescript (BT hereafter) 423). Philosophical problems are forced upon us by pictures that accompany our use of language. These pictures play an important role in practising philosophy; they can be cause of philosophical confusion, but at the same time they can help to clarify that same confusion.

Without specification, I understand the term 'representation' whenever used in this publication in the everyday meaning of the word.

10 > *·Darstellung·*, as Wittgenstein uses it, can be such a picture, for instance, in PI 143 and 144, where it is used as a norm or a process for representing<sup>9</sup> many cases in a particular way.<sup>10</sup> *Darstellung* here functions as a paradigm – a representation of the way we look at things (cf. PI 122; RFM I, 105). It shows, for instance, in what ways we can meaningfully speak of the colours and their relationships, as we can observe in the model of the colour-octahedron.

Rothhaupt (1996) mentions, that the notion of *Darstellung* is already present in Hering's colour investigations.

In the case of more specific pictures, we should be aware that *Darstellung* as a picture is not that of an object; what matters are the connections, the relations between objects. It is concerned with the roles the objects play in the language-game. It is not something that is represented (i.e., a sample of the colour sepia), but it is itself a means of representation (PI 50). It is both our method of representation and a means of expression (PI 403).

This notion of *Darstellung* covers a wide range of issues, but all of them have two characteristics in common. They are visual, literally as objects we can perceive in reality, for instance, as in a proof (RFM III, 22). But they also function as general representations as the standard metre in Paris does (PI 50). *Darstellung* is a form of representation that shows us a manifold of cases in a specific way. We can understand it as a paradigm that functions as a norm. In PI 143:

Let us now examine the following kind of language-game: when A gives an order B has to write down series of signs according to a certain formation rule. The first of these series is meant to be that of the natural numbers in decimal notation. – How does he get to understand this notation?—First of all series of numbers will be written down for him and he will be required to copy them. (Do not balk the expression ‘series of numbers’; it is not being used wrongly here.) And here already there is a normal and an abnormal learner’s reaction. –At first perhaps we guide his hand in writing out the series 0 to 9; but then the *possibility of getting him to understand* will depend on his going on to write it down independently.—And here we may imagine, e.g., that he does copy the figures independently, but not in the right order: he writes sometimes one sometimes another at random. And then communication stops at *that* point.—Or again, he makes *mistakes* in the order.—The difference between this and the first case will of course be one of frequency.—Or he makes a *systematic* mistake; for example, he copies every other number, or he copies the series 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5... like this: 1, 0, 3, 2, 5, 4... Here we shall almost be tempted to say that he has understood *wrong*.

Notice, however, that there is no sharp distinction between a random mistake and a systematic one. That is, between what you are inclined to call ‘random’ and what ‘systematic’.

Perhaps it is possible to wean him from the systematic mistake (as from a bad habit). Or perhaps one accepts his way of copying and tries to teach him ours as an offshoot, a variant of his.—And here too our pupil’s capacity to learn may come to an end.

Here we get another paradigm/picture that we can use in an aspect change, thereby giving ourselves the opportunity to change our way of seeing, as we will see later in this chapter.

In his later work, Wittgenstein uses the notion of picture in a broader sense. Genova calls this a ‘scene’ instead of a model, because, as she notes, the emphasis is

more on time and action than on space and relation. The representation becomes totally dependent on the language users by restricting pictures to models (Genova, 1995, p68-69). In that way, there is no role for context and circumstances. What Genova wants to show, and I fully agree with her on this, is that the context of *Darstellung* is as important as the *Darstellung* itself.

### 1.2 PARADIGM AND PARADOX

As we have seen,<sup>11</sup> an *übersichtliche Darstellung* does not concern one object, but always deals with the relation between a number of objects. That is why an *übersichtliche Darstellung* can take the form of a picture, a diagram, or a representational model of a complex structure that is condensed into an overview, but also of a scale model, a mathematical proof, a formula, a scene or even a style as Pichler in Pichler (2000) indicates.

11 >  
Paradox here understood in  
the sense of confusing  
opposites.

Where the *übersichtliche Darstellung* is called a proof in science, it can be called a question in philosophy. It is a demand for the meaning of something that we have no overview of and want to gain insight in. This is related with the *Urphänomenon* as Goethe sees it, although Wittgenstein takes it more as a prototype. I will come back to this later.

What do we want to achieve with an *übersichtliche Darstellung*? We want something we could call the truth regarding a particular case. But since truth is not a fixed issue, rather more of a dynamic process, what we do is lay down certain ordering structures on which we have reached a consensus, in a perspicuous (re)presentation. We want an overview of necessary, logical connections in a certain area, condensed in one *Darstellung*. In doing so, we restore perspicuity, intimacy and familiarity, and at the same time gain openness and an understanding of the issue at hand in a new way.

From these considerations, we can distill four apparent *paradoxes*, summed up below, which can all be observed in the example of Wittgenstein's discussion of the colour-octahedron (see page 17 or 25 for the figure). These oppositions are an important clue for our investigation, because they lead us to a particular kind of understanding – the kind I call poetic understanding.

First, a *Darstellung* is future oriented, yet also obvious and certain. An *übersichtliche Darstellung* gives us a synoptic overview of a part of our grammar in that it is a model or a standard that guides our next steps – our (future empirical or mathematical) judgments. It leads us to a new way of looking at things, the dawning of a new aspect, a new picture, and in this respect it can be said to remodel our concepts. Think of the colour-octahedron and other colour-systems people developed when they had to come up with different colour-system applications for the needs of computer science (Gerritsen, 1984). As an *übersichtliche Darstellung*, it appears to us as obvious, transparent, necessary and certain. It cannot be otherwise, although it

can be hard to see why it comes to us so naturally, as something that *must* be that way. It serves as a means for dealing with our uncertainties in that it stands fast and functions as a standard.

Second, an *übersichtliche Darstellung* is at the same time complete and remains open ended. It is limited in its applications and always subject to renewal or change. It convinces us in a way that is not fully expressed. Because it is open-ended, there is room for progress and resolving other particular problems. Zettel (Z hereafter) 447:

[...]But it may well be done, if one means a cross-strip.–But in that case we never get to the end of our work!–Of course not, for it has no end.  
(We want to replace wild conjectures and explanations by quiet weighing of linguistic facts.)

Like the expansion of *pi*, philosophy can improve without ever getting nearer to completion (Glock, 1996, p282). At the same time, however, complete transparency by means of giving an *übersichtliche Darstellung* of a specific problem makes the problem as a problem disappear. It appears for us *so* complete, and because of that *so* convincing, that the problem just vanishes for us and leaves us perspicuity instead of murky water. We feel no further need for explanations or hypotheses.

Third, it is changeable, but also reproducible. The *übersichtliche Darstellung* shows us the route to a specific form of conviction. A route that can be reproduced: think, for instance, of proofs in mathematics, or of the above mentioned octahedron, with all the relations between the colours and the place they occupy in relation to each other. It shows us how we can achieve a certain solution and why it is, and should be, this solution. Yet, our insights may change in the course of time, for instance, when new scientific discoveries ask for revisions and changes in our manners of *Darstellung*. Think of the different colour systems developed over the last century when computers entered our life and operated with systems other than the colour-octahedron.

And finally, the *übersichtliche Darstellung* is context dependent as well as independent. It shows us aspects of things that are independent of empirical inquiries. It convinces us in such a way that it does not undermine, nor is dependent upon other principles, convictions, or theories. It also constitutes its own elements; that is to say, it is orthogonal to science (cf. Glock, 1996, p252 and Williams, 2002, ch8). But at the same time, it is also context dependent. Take the model of the colour-octahedron. It has value only for a community that uses this model. In this sense an *übersichtliche Darstellung* is always relative to the context.

These so-called ‘paradoxes’ connected with an *übersichtliche Darstellung* will be revisited, when I discuss the installation as an art form that brings oppositions between two extremes into play. But before we come to that, let us first take a look at the backgrounds of Wittgenstein’s ideas on *übersichtliche Darstellung*.



### 1.3 BACKGROUNDS

Wittgenstein first introduced the term *Übersicht*<sup>12</sup> in the context of methodological reflections on anthropology (FGB 130-133). He claimed that Frazer did not provide the genetic explanation of the King of Nemi ritual he sought, but instead came up with a different kind of illuminating summary of the data (Glock, 1996, p278).

We can find Wittgenstein's discussions on Frazer in PO pp115-155. James Frazer was one of the principal anthropologists of the Victorian era. He made an extensive study of rituals from different cultures, which was finished as the 12-volume *The Golden Bough* in 1922. His thesis is that the earliest history of philosophy begins with the natural law of magic and subsequently evolves in a progressive way through phases of theology and metaphysics into the triumphant highest stage, that of science.

Frazer examines a broad range of magical and religious practices, comparing these practices on matters of similarity, contiguity and differences. It should be noted that Frazer does not interpret magic as something irrational: whenever magic is applied legitimately it yields science; whenever illegitimately applied it will yield superstition and occultism, the bastard sister of science. So superstition and occultism are explained by Frazer in terms of *error*. In Frazer's opinion, uncultivated people are primitive in their attitude, because they are not able to recognise the law of cause and effect, and hence are unable to manipulate natural forces and use them to their advantage (Clack, 1999, p10).

The various rituals and practices, magical and religious views of mankind that have existed and still exist, develop, according to Frazer, in a linear way: from innocent, savage and primitive understanding and insight, progressing towards a more cultivated and sophisticated one (cf. PO p121). Primitive, and thus ignorant, people are, according to Frazer, misguided by magical and religious practices. Although Frazer does not reject the possibility of change in these practices and their understanding – they *do* evolve in Frazer's view – these practices are a step-by-step journey towards development and positive progression. Looking backwards in time we will see, according to Frazer, that in earlier days people were mistaken because of their ignorance and therefore made errors in judgements. Wittgenstein's criticism of this view is that Frazer starts from an erroneous and blurred conception of the notion of understanding.

Wittgenstein investigates and reflects on what Frazer has to say about magic and primitive religion and on the way in which Frazer tries to explain the different expressions of mankind. To Wittgenstein, Frazer misses the crucial point of understanding the nature of the ritual in his urge to explain magic and religion in terms of human progress, because he lacks poetic imagination and is blind to spirituality (Clack, 1999, p14). We can assemble the data in Frazer's way for historical explanation as hypothesis of development, but we can also assemble the data in a different

12 >

When we check the *Bergen Electronic Nachlass*, we read that the term *Übersicht* appears for the first time on 22 november 1931 in PG, page 112. But according to information in PO p115, Wittgenstein obtained a copy of Frazer (1922) from Drury in the first half of 1931 and wrote a collection of remarks in what is now MS 110. Later he grouped and incorporated the remarks in a larger typescript TS 221.

manner to show a general picture of their relations to one another without thinking of it as a temporal development (Wittgenstein, FGB p131). Thus, historical explanations are not excluded, but they are not the ones we are looking for in a philosophical context.

We can distinguish three objections Wittgenstein makes to Frazer's procedure in *The Golden Bough*. First of all, Frazer's collection of data provides neither a genetic nor a generic explanation, but rather the raw material for an overview which accounts for why we find the rituals horrifying. This links them to basic human impulses with which we are familiar. Furthermore, we should not even want a genetic or generic *explanation*, but restrict ourselves to the description of the rituals. And finally, there is the problem that Frazer presents rites as instrumental, aiming for certain causal consequences, when in fact they are expressive or symbolic (Glock, 1996, p35ff).

Are rituals, according to Wittgenstein, *essentially* expressive acts or attitudes? Rites, like for instance the Beltane fire-festival, symbolise certain important aspects of the physical and socio-cultural environment, such as birth, marriage, sex, death, seasons, elements, war etc. (Clack, 1999, p35). What is expressed, that is, what the meaning is of these rituals and ceremonies, is the importance and significance of these complicated matters. The participants are engaged in a practice that affects them, and us, profoundly. For Wittgenstein, this is something real and not something metaphorical. For instance when Wittgenstein says of religious pictures in Lectures on Religious Belief (LRB hereafter) 71:

it says what it says

and in LRB 72:

the whole *weight* may be *in* the picture.

'In', here, is important for Wittgenstein: the significance of such pictures lies not in external, causal relationships, but is internal, that is, grammatical in the Wittgensteinian sense. Clack, in (Clack, 1999), shows that Wittgenstein's remarks on Frazer do not give a straightforward expressivist account, but neither one that is straightforwardly cognitive. Take for instance the example of a woman kissing the picture of her lover. This is something that can be understood as an expression of her love for him (she does not expect him to feel her lips) but also as an action that satisfies her, that puts her at ease. Magic is that which connects the picture as part of our language with our own feelings and thoughts, that is, with our language.

The notion of ritual can be understood as a play without any element of competition. Competing behavior is of no use in this kind of play. For rituals like the ones Frazer discusses, and also in opera, myth and fairy-tales, and in some forms of visual art (e.g. the art of installation) connections are made visible, and thus become apparent. And this gives us also the opportunity to reflect on them. These

connections, laid down in such a *Darstellung*, evoke a poetic understanding, what Wittgenstein calls a living picture (cf. Large Notebook C2, 1933-34, p49-50) This poetic understanding, or living picture, is not a pure intellectual understanding, but an understanding that is connected with values in the ethical/aesthetical sense of Wittgenstein.

Wittgenstein tries to show that magic brings a wish to *Darstellung* (PO, p125). And the *Darstellung* of a wish is the *Darstellung* of its realisation, and this is not something one can approach with a scientific method. What surrounds mankind plays a part in thinking and acting; our frame of reference is much broader than only the scientific point of view, although science plays a role in our lives.

We also convert thoughts into pictures and invent primitive rituals whenever we feel it necessary. Magic and religion, for instance, make use of rituals as ceremonies that impress us by means of all kinds of special effects. Be it a fire, or colours, or smells, it creates a special setting – a special *atmosphere*. The phenomenon of the ritual or the ceremony itself is not something special, it has no meaning, rather it is the whole gathering, the whole setting that impresses us. This impression is what evokes meaning, a meaning that in a reflexive dynamics can only be shown in the ritual itself (FGB, p129). This reflexive dynamics is a creative process that implies a simultaneous interaction between what is obvious and conventional, and what is uncertain and opaque. I will come back in more detail to this notion of reflexive dynamics later.

What kind of meaning is a meaning that can only be shown? It is not opinion, or a view, or a belief, although these can be part of the ritual. No, it is imagination or maybe we should call it vision. Wittgenstein says in FGB p131:

that is itself composed out of a complicated pattern made up of heterogeneous elements: words and pictures.

Pictures and words do not stand opposite each other! As Wittgenstein emphasises:

we must plow the whole language.

We use words in our everyday language that evoke a mythology, a gesture, or even what Wittgenstein in regard to rituals calls ‘a gesture-language’ (FGB p135). We still have all of these processes, these differences in meaning in our verbal language. An example is the discussion of Frazer’s corn wolf.<sup>13</sup> The way I read Wittgenstein is that every person sees the significance of this ritual practice in his or her own way. Every view is equally significant, yet is not something arbitrary. Every person sees it as it is, from his or her own perspective, but at the same time within the shared language of a community. Because of the shared language, the interpretation of a ritual is not reduced to relativism; the grammar of our language, linguistic and non-linguistic, guards us from arbitrariness, relativism and scepticism. On the other

13 >  
In short, the narrative about the corn wolf runs as follows: the corn-spirit can be embodied and take on the image of a wolf. The ‘savage’, according to Frazer, believes that it is present in the corn and that it has to be caught and killed in the last sheaf. The corn-spirit is thought to live wherever the corn still has to be threshed. The man who cuts the last corn or binds the last leaf, gets the name of the animal. For the whole story, I refer to Frazer (1922, p447ff).

hand, people can choose to act in different ways, evoked by the same situation or the same object.<sup>14</sup> As an alternative to Frazer's explanations of magical rites and beliefs, Wittgenstein presents the notion of *übersichtliche Darstellung* (PI 122; Z 464; PI 209; PR 52). This *übersichtliche Darstellung* is one possible ordering of, in this case, ritual phenomena. This ordering presents a possible unity of them. Wittgenstein is influenced here by Goethe's ideas on the metamorphosis of plants (Clack, 1999, p66ff). Goethe's method of morphology appears to be intuitive: the investigator *somehow* comes to see the principle of unity that binds a particular grouping of natural phenomena together.

But Goethe's method is a method meant to improve *science*, it is an alternative strategy for explanation; this is something Wittgenstein is not aiming for. Wittgenstein does not search for any scientific method; he stresses that we can also gain insight into ritual phenomena when we make use of thought experiments, imagined examples, language-games that have the form of 'suppose that . . .' or 'try to imagine that . . .' etc. In what follows, I will discuss in some detail Goethe and Spengler's views on morphology. That discussion should help make clear why Wittgenstein took up this idea of Goethian morphology, yet came to use it in a different and very personal way as a tool for his philosophical inquiries.

### 1.3.1 GOETHE AND SPENGLER

[...]Don't say: 'There *must* be something in common, or they would not be called 'games'' – but *look and see* whether there is anything common to all. –For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to *all*, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that.[...] (PI 66)

What we see the first time when we look at language-games, and also on closer consideration, is not so much that what all have in common, but rather similarities, analogies, something that Goethe called *·wiederholte Spiegelungen·* (Schulte, 1990, p13) and Wittgenstein *·family resemblances·*. Wittgenstein adapted this from Spengler, who understood it as a gathering of several people who – over the course of time – have some aspects in common.<sup>15</sup>

Spengler uses some of Goethe's ideas on morphology concerning *·Gesetz und Gestalt·* and applies them to history. According to Spengler there are two ways to understand the world: through *Gesetz* – which could be translated into law or system – something that is dead and mechanistic by nature, and through *Gestalt* – which could be translated into form, variation within sameness, or physiognomy – which is organic and alive by nature. Spengler sees it as his job to explore *·Urformen·* or *·Urbilder·* in the development of history by means of a comparative investigation, and derive predictions for future history from them by the use of analogies. This *·method of descriptive morphology·* is meant to function as a morphologic prognosis; not in the sense of how *Gestalt* will occur in the *Urformen*, but what kind of

14 >  
Compare this with the discussion on how the sound of the name 'Schubert' seems to fit with his works or with his face. Cf. also Katz (1930, xii) who discusses the magic power of words: the name that belongs to a child Wittgenstein explicitly mentions this in PI II, xi, 254ff.

15 >  
Galton's *Remarks on Colour Associations and Visionaries*, as well as his plea for the *Variety of Human Nature* were known to Wittgenstein (cf. MS 139a, 16 – the preliminary remarks of LE). In this *Composite Portraiture*, Galton tries to visualise multiple photographs of human portraits, projected into one single image that show common traits in agreement in all faces and leave as a ghost a trace of individual peculiarities. This Galtonian methodological overview of relationships, a family likeness as he calls it, Goethe's morphological method and Wittgenstein's own *übersichtliche Darstellung* together with his remarks on family resemblance show a common interest (Rothhaupt, 1996, 185ff). As Rothhaupt (1996) indicates, these remarks were originally situated in MS 110. Compare also BB 17ff. What is also interesting here, is the principle of the *Übersichtbarkeit* of colours, discussed by Katz (1930, p105). Whenever two colours are situated at the same distance against each other, we get a better impression in one clear view, than when one of the two colours is situated more backward.



development their Gestalt will take. In contrast to a causal, mechanical view, Spengler's meta-theory understands every historical occurrence as organic: cultures are organisms (Haller, 1986, p177ff).

Wittgenstein's critique of Spengler (Schulte, 1990, p33-35) is that he does not differentiate sharply enough between the Urbild as object of comparison and the Urbild as object of investigation. The mistake is that Spengler puts too much emphasis on the latter. Note that the objects mentioned do not concern two types of objects, but two *functions*. The result, according to Wittgenstein, is a dogmatic observation in the sense that this or that *must* have a certain quality, because the Urbild has that quality. For Wittgenstein, this Urbild is a paradigm, an example, a tool of our language, not something Dargestelltes (presented), but a means of Darstellung (PI 50). It is a norm of observation, and one that is relative to the context in which it appears.

The notion of paradigm automatically brings in the notion of comparison. In order to be able to compare two phenomena, we need a principle that justifies this comparison (Haller, 1986, p178). As Wittgenstein underlines in CV p45:

One of my most important methods is to imagine a historical development of our ideas different from what has actually occurred. If we do that the problem shows us a quite new side.

In order to be able to do that, we cannot refer to causality, since then things *must* be that way. Rather, we have to enter the space of possibilities, i.e., the various possible realisations and actualisations of a certain phenomenon. Wittgenstein differs here from Spengler, who wants to predict by means of drawing comparisons, future developments of Gestalt from the Urbild. Wittgenstein in contrast, tries to show that things can be (totally) different. Wittgenstein's point is that we have to direct our attention to the manifold of possible appearances as a manifold of possible individual phenomena. Whenever we want to put this manifold under the heading of something general, the context in which we can decide about similarities and differences is lost. And the context is necessary for our understanding. PI 568:

If I understand the character of the game right - I might say - than it isn't an essential part of it. ((Meaning is a physiognomy.))

and PI 654:

Our failure is to search for an explanation, where we should see the facts as 'Urphänomene'; i.e., where we ought to say: *'this language-game is played'*.

Every language-game can also be applied as a model of comparison. This model of comparison suggests something unrefined, unfinished, while a paradigm suggest something that is totally defined.

According to Wittgenstein we can make better comparisons using the notion of family resemblance. Similarities are always relative similarities, and family resemblances obtain only from a certain perspective. It is up to us to clarify this perspective, i.e., the object of comparison has to be completely clear, so that the similarities can be checked. The same holds for the detection of failures. More can be said about this issue in relation to Wittgenstein's notion of 'Form of life'. I will come back to this in Chapter 2.

Goethe was convinced that the observation can also be experienced at a higher level; we can imagine a meta-sensory ·Urpflanze· as a model for something – a plant – that can, but need not exist. This possibility is present, not just as a product of poetry or painting, but as an inner truth and necessity. For Goethe, such a model is a postulate that gives us the opportunity to determine what it is to be a plant, what differentiates one plant from another, and what point of development an individual plant has reached at a certain time.

So, a model may play a role on various levels, but models themselves can be of various types. They can be a design and plan of an architect, but also a scale model made out of wood, glue and papier-maché. They can also be an artifact or prototype, or an example in the sense of the hero as a role-model. What all of these different models have in common, according to Goethe, is that they represent something meta-sensory – ·übersinnlich· – in a sensory form. But they are not a sort of substitute or replacement, but a means for recognising rules and laws, lines of development. They represent a means for searching for resemblances and marking boundaries and using the powers of imagination, e.g. the ability to imagine a state of affairs (Sachverhalt) that does not (yet) exist. The Urpflanze cannot be materially fixed in a picture (Bild). This last point, as Goethe himself notices, is a problem; this can be seen in his conversations with Schiller, in which the latter understands the Urpflanze to be a representation of a symbolic plant, in contrast to a causal, mechanical view (Schulte, 1990, p20). But how is it possible that such a symbolic plant can be 'seen' without it being fixed into a material image?

This becomes more clear when we think about the Urpflanze as something that leads to a model of development, that only gets its sensory form by means of a perspicuous representation. Suppose we have to describe the development of the various parts of a plant. That is to say, we have to clarify the rules through which it becomes this or that Gestalt and then evolves to other Gestalts, thus gaining insight into the model. The key of the model consists in the rules of development. And, conversely, plants can illustrate the character of a model when we use them for representation of rules of development.

Consider a filmstrip of the step-by-step development of a rose: it is only in the *connection* between the individual shots – the individual steps in the process – that the development can be seen. Thus the individual steps get their meaning through

the role they play in the model, and it is the model as such that has explanatory power. What we see are rows of pictures, embedded in a proper context of explanation, and the viewer adds his powers of imagination in order to actively participate in this model. In this way, the model is neither a mere material representation nor an abstract Platonic idea.

We can understand and see in a single petal the entire rose, as well as its matter, but not solely through the combination of our powers of imagination and the immediate experience. It is also presupposed that the experience is directed in the *right* direction. What we call ·rose· will be exposed ‘übersichtlich’ and all varieties will be ordered in the correct direction in an interconnected chain, and with that, *a* picture can be projected. We have to see the whole in the detail, which for Goethe means that we have to represent and develop an ordered chain by way of *analogy* that leads from one object to another.

According to Goethe, we have to go out, experience and look at what parts of an animal are the same for all animals, and in what respect they differ from each other. We have to look for the Ur-animal as a Type. The *function* of this Type is that it can serve as a means for comparison. What is interesting about the Type is that we can reduce the complete ordering of a model of development to a description of the phenomena of the scheme. This scheme is an empirically gathered list of parts of organic entities. We can isolate parts of the list and hold the gathered descriptions side by side. In this way the comparisons emerge as a matter of course. Goethe calls this Type an Urbild: something that can not be materialised, but only seen before the mind’s eye, although it has been entirely composed from experience. The status of Type is not as complicated as the status of Urpflanze. In the end Type is nothing more than a scheme, in which the arrangement can only be justified by explanatory success (Schulte, 1990, p25). Success in the sense of a correct description of phenomena.

The idea of Urpflanze as well as that of the Type establishes an übersichtliche Darstellung that shows the phenomena in a consistent row, ordering the Gestalt deviations in a chain. Both rest on experience without being mere generalisations of experience. And both permit the deduction of further possible and real phenomena.

There are also differences between the Urpflanze and the Type. The notion of ·plant-metamorphosis· comes to the fore in a single case by the use of examples; here we can generalise from the single case. This can be done through experience, but without relying on *specific* empirical phenomena. The notion of Type is also obtained from single cases, but can be composed independently of them: the Type is not a sample of the whole. Like a standard, the Type has a structure, in contrast to a model like the Urpflanze that needs a key for application. Thus, the Type uses an ideal construction (Schulte, 1990, p27).

The basic idea of both notions is the ordering of perspicuous rows of Gestalt or forms; something we meet again in Goethe’s notion of Urphenomena. Goethe es-

pecially uses this conception in the theory of colours.<sup>16</sup> Goethe's ordering is his theory; one understands the theory when one guides their eye forwards and backwards along the row and gathers the multifaceted once again in the Urphenomena. The Urphenomenon is 'as a law articulated factum. That is, a last and highest factum' (Schulte, 1990, p29). It is at the border and its boundary where the Urphenomenon turns into amazement.

16 >  
See for instance  
Goethe's elaboration in  
his *Farbenlehre* # 175.

The point that remains unclear is how we can come to recognise such an Urphenomenon. Goethe's idea of *aperçu*, in the sense of the brilliant mind's operation, is not convincing here. The construction of the chain – the scheme – is something that requires trying things out, searching and critical testing and it will take time before some sort of a chain is revealed. The point at which we cannot go any further satisfies us and sets us at ease, yet at the same time is also the resignation of the fact that it is completely determined or fixed forever.

How is what Goethe calls *Urpflanze* and *Type* compatible with Wittgenstein's *übersichtliche Darstellung*? There is the sense that an *übersichtliche Darstellung* can contribute to the discovery of something new, create the moment we notice that there is still something missing (cf. RPP I 950); thus, the *Darstellung* is not forever closed. But Wittgenstein indicates that there is an end to explanations, as well as to doubts (On Certainty (OC hereafter) 625). Note that there are strong similarities with the four apparent paradoxes discussed in subsection 1.2., especially in the strong emphasis on the future orientation of the *übersichtliche Darstellung*, its serving as a norm of observations, and context dependency.

### 1.3.2 MORPHOLOGY AND METHOD

Goethe and Wittgenstein each had a very different relation towards science. Goethe's morphology developed because of two main dissatisfactions with the existing scientific methods: the meaningless gathering of empirical material, thus the lack of directed research, and the lack of a principle of explanation that can show the results of the research in a perspicuous, well organised way (Schulte, 1990, p17). Wittgenstein too was sceptical about hypotheses and hypothetical explanations, but within the context of philosophy; instead of explaining we have to describe, for the philosopher is neither a scientist or a discoverer (PI 109). And whenever hypothesis is an option, then it is just as one possibility among others (PO 36ff).

The ideas of Goethe's morphology that Wittgenstein took up and made his own, come to the fore in RFM, for instance in matters of proof where *Übersichtlichkeit* is a necessary component of the proof (RFM p143 and 215,150). The *Gestalt* of the mathematical configurations emerges for us by way of its functioning in the context. The *Gestalts* have the role of pictures (*Bilder*). We do not give qualities of *Gestalts*, but transformations of *Gestalts*, thought of as paradigms (RFM 229ff). The mathematical configurations – Wittgenstein time and again talks of them as



physiognomy or faces – are not so much recognised when implemented in a perspicuous row, but have to be brought to light by application in institutionalised practices (Schulte, 1990, p40). This has the effect of highlighting conceptual flaws in the development of mathematics that produce oversimplified pictures of the nature and objectivity of mathematics, thereby producing pseudo-theories of mind and language. As Wittgenstein says in RFM p143, 1:

‘A mathematical proof must be perspicuous’. Only a structure whose reproduction is an easy task is called ‘a proof’. It must be possible to decide with certainty whether we really have the same proof twice over, or not. The proof must be a configuration whose exact reproduction can be certain. Or again: we must be sure we can exactly reproduce what is essential to the proof. It may for example be written down in two different handwritings or colours. What goes to make the reproduction of a proof is not anything like an exact reproduction of a shade of colour or a hand-writing.[...]

Or in RFM p229, 11:

Arithmetic as the natural history (mineralogy) of numbers. But *who* talks like this about it? Our whole thinking is penetrated with this idea.

Indeed: then prose comes in.

A whole mythology is laid down in our language (PI 422-426; OC 90).

In order to curb the temptation to take overtly simplistic pictures for granted, an *übersichtliche Darstellung* of a segment of the grammar must be made in a detailed and perspicuous way. This thereby brings about an aspect change – or *Gestalt-switch* as it is called – by highlighting a new aspect of the use of our words, not by making statements, but by letting these models speak when we place them next to reality – our ordinary language – and say: just look at that! The model provides an understanding that is purpose-relative. It *must* not be like that, it *can* be seen differently. The alternative to dogmatism is not relativism, because relativism would mean that anything goes. The crucial point is the grammatical nature of the *übersichtliche Darstellung*, the ‘quiet weighing of linguistic facts’ (Z 447). In this respect Wittgenstein sees himself as a realist.

The problem is that we associate words that are familiar with specific feelings or convictions about the nature of certain objects, as in mathematics, and mistakenly conclude, Wittgenstein says, that these feelings constitute the meaning of these words. Wittgenstein elaborates on this issue in PI II, xi, where he takes up his inquiry on aspect perception. Moreover, we have the tendency to focus maniacally on a particular phenomenon to the exclusion of others. Wittgenstein shows us an example in PI 38:

[...]when a philosopher tries to bring out *the* relation between name and thing by staring at an object in front of him and repeating a name or even the word 'this' innumerable times[...]

or in PI 593, where he even underscores the main philosophical disease as an unbalanced diet where we stick to only one kind of example.

Another confusion according to Wittgenstein is that we want to solve philosophical problems through explanatory theories instead of using übersichtliche Darstellungen as grammatical reminders, in order to satisfy our need for generality. We have the conviction that there must be something in common to all games, whereas in reality games have the form of family likenesses. This idea of generality stems from our preoccupation with the method of science, Wittgenstein says in BB 17 and 18. And we also have the inclination to dig deeper without understanding when to stop, as Wittgenstein shows in Z 314 (see also RFM 102-103; RPP I 889).

We tend to project features of one language-game onto another as described in PI 293, where there is a tendency to generalise a sensation, for instance, pain from one case only, i.e., my pain. Grammatical structures may mislead us into metaphysical illusions, because of the pictures that are embedded in the language. Harmless or fruitful in our everyday life, they obscure conceptual connections in philosophy.

So, to summarise: we tend to oversimplify matters; we often restrict ourselves because of presupposed convictions or feelings; we are liable to be stuck on one aspect solely; and we have a proclivity to generalise.

From the above analysis of Wittgenstein's investigations into the roots of our confusion, philosophy thus becomes the descriptive morphology of language, that is to say, an übersichtliche Darstellung of the grammar of (a part of) the language.

Wittgenstein asks himself whether this methodological idea is a worldview, a ·Weltanschauung· in PI 122, competing with the scientific one as another form of understanding, as an alternative for the causal explanation of the deductive-nomological sciences. This methodology sheds light on a diverse multitude of phenomena without discovering anything new, arranging what is already known in a way which clarifies the links or interconnections. Wittgenstein applies it to aesthetics (LA 29) and mathematics, but his main use of it is in philosophical methodology (PI 122; CV 3,7). An elaboration on this idea of philosophical methodology is therefore necessary, yet I will not do so here, but in Chapter 3. Instead, I want to turn to an analysis of the art of installation and show how Wittgenstein's insights and this form of art have some striking similarities as well as one important difference. From the comparison of the übersichtliche Darstellung and the art of Installation we can put a new perspective on both phenomena, something that also will effect our ideas concerning Wittgenstein's method.

### 2 THE ART OF INSTALLATION THE VIEWER'S PERSPECTIVE

The phenomenon of the art of installation and Wittgenstein's notion of *übersichtliche Darstellend* are connected in several ways with the concept of *·meaning·*. I will turn now to a brief description of the emergence of this relatively new form of art. There are numerous ways in which this art form can and has been investigated and described, but I will only illuminate here those aspects that are important for setting the scope for our inquiry into the notion of meaning. Be aware that I have no desire whatsoever to do this in terms of art history, or art theory, or any form of art critique. The chosen examples are taken from a personal view on the matter at hand, being both a philosopher and a visual artist.

An installation is a form of visual art that emerged after World War II and is typically a *hybrid* discipline that unifies art and life at different levels. One level is that this kind of art involves many sorts of disciplines and therefore extends far beyond more traditional art practices. The art of installation is strongly related to the public space, because the artist no longer restricts herself to the place she used to make her painting or sculpture. Instead she expands her studio to, in principle, the whole world, where she works in disciplines such as the combination of sculpture with drawing and painting, but also engages in disciplines from outside the arts, such as mechanics, cognitive science, new technologies, cooking, food preparations etc.

Another reason this form of art also extends far beyond the studio of the artist, is because what matters is not a concentration on one object. Rather, what matters is the relation between a number of elements or an interaction between several elements and their context, that is, the environment in which the elements are situated. Keywords in the fifties are: environment, site-specific, minimalism, conceptual art, work in progress, happening, political statement. This hybrid discipline always shows a reciprocal relation between viewer and work, work and space, space and viewer (Reiss, 1999, p.xiii).

From precursors such as Kurt Schwitters's *·Merzbau·* in Europe and Frederick Kiesler's *·Horse Galaxy·* in New York, the art of installation evolved from two movements: Environment and Minimalism. The concept of a work of art as an environment begins with the idea that the viewer not only observes, but that he also walks round and *lives* in this work of art, much in the same way as he lives in the world. Because of this, the viewer is not a passive, but an active agent. This conception has a consequence. The work of art constitutes the place; it becomes site-specific, so to speak. The meaning of the work of art is for the most part dependent on the place and its physical qualities. Because of this, the work of art often is only temporary. The same objects, exhibited at a different location, generate a different meaning.

Every artist attributes his or her own interpretation to this concept. I will briefly discuss some examples, but only insofar as they illustrate the central point of this

publication: the question of how we generate and transform meaning.

Allan Kaprow, for instance, who uses the term Environment for the first time in 1958, demands that the viewer perform a special activity in order to make a connection between art and life (Kelley, 2004). Kaprow states that 'environments must be walked into' (Reiss, 1999, p9), forcing the viewer to follow a trail that has been set out in advance. Another, and perhaps the most well known example of these kinds of temporary and site-specific works of art from that era are perhaps the reworked buildings of Gordon Matta Clark, the ones that he calls 'splittings' – making incisions, cutting out large parts, or splitting whole houses in two in an attempt to let the light come in.

[...]searching for some kind of almost hermetic place in the city that I can identify. It's a strange sort of connection and divergence at the same time.  
(Crow et al., 2003, p6)

Minimalism, the other movement, starts from scientific developments such as the progress in Gestalt psychology, and is connected with the idea of art as *possibility*, creating an environment or architectural space. Developed from the ideas of Gestalt psychology, meaning unfolds as, Michael Fried states in Oliveira (1994, p27):

a consequence of consciousness of the relation, psychological or physical and possibly conceivable from the perceiver in relation to the object.

Within the context of Minimalism, artists also give their own interpretation to these insights, in which the relativity of the experience of perception plays an important role, something that is translated into an investigation of the experience of the various perspectives of the viewer. Robert Morris, for example, explores the conception of art as a lived experience in which relatively simple materials such as wooden platforms are brought in to a specific place in such a way that they cause strong Gestalt sensations in the viewer.

In both Environment and Minimalism, a tendency gradually develops to either modify the entire (exhibition) space, for instance, by filling it from ceiling to floor with text as Kaprow did, or like Robert Morris by bringing in pallet boards to lift parts of the floor. There is also emphasis on the relationships between various objects in a space, as seen in Donald Judd's early installations. The former emphasises the transformation of the place itself by means of objects. The latter demands transformation of meaning by means of placing the objects in an interdependent relationship within the context of a specific place.

In the course of time the two movements Environment and Minimalism merged together, along with other insights, forming something that since the beginning of the nineties has been called 'the art of installation'.



What is crucial in experiencing an installation is that we cannot read off or see the meaning of this work of art as something already given and in one view, because it is not just an object or a thing, but an event or a situation. Here, a first quest for meaning arises; the viewer has to actively construct the meaning from the elements and the way in which they are connected to their environment. It is incumbent upon the viewer to make use of all his active knowledge and imagination concerning reality, the everyday life he is living in. He is obliged to actively bring this knowledge and imagination into the installation in order to complete this work of art; without the activity of the viewer, the installation is meaningless and in some sense does not even exist. At the same time however, the viewer is urged to, be it only partially, take the position of an outsider in order to reflect on this work of art and the experiences that were evoked by his engagement with the installation.

From this, we can say that the artist constructs a manipulation between two opposites (Kabakov, 1999, p35). The current undertaking stands in this tradition and works out the above mentioned characteristics of the art of installation in order to extend this form of art with an elaboration on Wittgenstein's insights on *übersichtliche Darstellung*.

### 2.1 THE QUEST FOR MEANING

The installation is built in and for a specific space, exploiting certain qualities of that space, more often indoors than outdoors. In the installation, the viewer is an active moving perceiver, opening oneself up to an interaction with objects, space and the relations between the objects and the space at *that* moment, at *that* spot. At the same time, he is asked to look at the entire installation from a distance, to look at it from different angles by reflecting over his actions and his attitude towards his experience of the work of art. The installation enables him to recall memories from his life history, combine those lived experiences and relate them to the objects of the installation as well as the whole setting, thereby creating new meanings. In this way, be it only temporal and partial, art and life can be united.

There is a second quest for meaning that is evoked by the art of installation. Normally it will take the artist, often with the help of one or more technicians, several weeks for the construction and building of the installation. After the opening of the exhibition, the public has the opportunity to visit and experience the installation at a specific location for some limited time span. But after that, most of the time, the entire installation is demolished and dismantled. All that remains and will be known to posterity is through documentation. This documentation comprises pictures, text, and sometimes video, but although it refers to the original exhibition, in many respects it has become a different installation with a different meaning. We, as viewers, combine our previous experiences with the images and text in the documentation into new insights, often long after the installation has disappeared. But

how then can the various levels of meaning be visualised and preserved for further discussion?

Related to these two quests for meaning that are more or less individual, at a different level there is a third quest for meaning: a quest for our perception of reality and the interpretation that accompanies it. In short: the question of how 'existing' meanings can be used. How are images and language related to each other in an installation when we ask for meaning? How is the artist able to play with the diversity of meanings evoked by the hybrid elements of the work? And how is installation art and its meaning related to the broader historical and social context?

The spatiality and temporality of the art of installation mark its strength as well as its weakness. Its strength is reflected in the fact that the work forces us to open ourselves up and give it our utmost attention since we know it will be there only for a limited amount of time. But the bringing together of viewer and work as something one-time only is at the same time a weakness, because the viewer needs time to digest the experiences evoked by the installation and his interaction. The viewer who undergoes and is actively involved in the work of art, is most of the time only able to establish the various meanings that are evoked *afterwards*, when he has left the installation or only after the installation has been demolished. Unfortunately, because of the temporality he often has no opportunity to return and have a second or a third opportunity to get a closer look and reflect on his experiences so that the questions raised by the work of art can extend or deepen the knowledge of himself and the world he lives in.

The way in which the installation is documented on video, dvd, in a book or a catalogue, or in photos, does give us a lot of information about the installation and its environment, and from this, creates a meaning of its own, but falls short in representing the experiences that were gained when visiting the installation in reality. Also, there remains the problem of how we visualise the ways in which the artist succeeded to play with the variety of meanings, evoked by the hybrid elements of the installation, and how we can reflect on her position concerning reality. We – viewers (who can also be the artists) – want an interesting perspective on reality, in some sense an exclusive one, a vision that has been brought to light in an startling setting by way of visual powers, something that evokes amazement. I will come back to this notion of 'vision' related to the notion of 'creative knowledge' as well as Wittgenstein's method in Chapter 3.

## 2.2 PHILOSOPHY AS A COMPONENT ELEMENT OF INSTALLATION

The complexity of our world is reflected in this complicated form of art. The art of installation uses aspects from various disciplines and, in part, refers back to them again. Dance, theatre, film, developments in computer technology like *virtual reality*, scientific discoveries in biology and cognition, but also everyday experiences –

nothing is safe from the installation-artist; in principle, she can make use of it all.

Steiner (2001) signals an increasing emphasis on the intellectual powers of the artist, something that, according to his view, is an evil genius that haunts the arts. This intellectualising of the arts will have negative effects on fantasy and visual powers, and, as a result, will devalue the arts in such a way, that the visual powers will remain active and vivid only within the narrow realm of experience (Steiner, 2001, p273).

In my opinion, however, Steiner ignores that throughout history artists have always used their intellectual capacities to make art. Every era asks for its own form of intelligence, and history shows that the results have been different in every given period. Concerning the instrumental use of intelligence we can think, for instance, of the studies in perspective drawn by Dürer or the changes in perspective artists began to use in their work after having seen the images of the earth when the first men landed on the moon. The artist, after all, is in some respect also a viewer and member of a community. But the more intrinsic values of knowledge in art, at least for me, are evoked by, and are part of, our complex world. More specifically, I think of philosophy as an instrumental as well as an intrinsic part of art, at least, when it is done properly.

The activity of the viewer in the installation consists in the triggering of his memories and imagination by means of bodily movements, evoking meaning to his experiences by insights into differing perspectives. Science has taught us that perception and understanding are not two separate abilities, an insight fully utilised by artists. In the making of an installation, the artist plays with this knowledge and takes from the world whatever she needs to work out her ideas, be it the attribution of certain technical devices or scientific developments that can be made visible thanks to technical possibilities. She may also utilise established artistic disciplines such as drawing or sculpture, mixtures of text and image, etc.

The terms *·Gesamtkunstwerk·*, *·Total Installation·* as Kabakov calls his installations, or the well-known term *·Mixed-media·* all presuppose a physical and conceptual relation between this hybrid form of art and its viewers. This form of art departs from the conviction that the viewer is not only someone who experiences, but also has knowledge of the world, the culture, the community he lives in and the questions that are present in his culture and community.

The art of installation is a form of art that questions institutional presuppositions and narrow conceptual frameworks (Suderburg, 2000). From this assumption, the installation itself is a participant in discussions and reflections concerning unanswerable questions that occupy society. It cannot, by itself, provide any answers, but it can raise these questions and present them in an unexpected way, opening up closed off ways of thinking or behaviour by trying to overrule them, pointing us in a new direction and providing a novel or interesting perspective that addresses the question in a totally different way. In this way, unexpected possibilities or dif-

ferent connections can loosen up rigid patterns of thought and make a difference to the world we live in. Thus, the art of installation is not about merging science, technique and art, as Steiner suggests, but about posing conceptual questions.

In posing such questions, philosophy can play a special role, reflecting and pointing at connections, relations and cross-overs between art and all forms of knowledge to which we are blind to in everyday life. On a meta-level, the art of installation can be put into a new light by way of philosophical reflection. But also, and more importantly, on the level of 'typical' philosophical reflection, the viewer gets the opportunity, long after the installation is demolished, to think about questions that were raised by the installation, and to assign meaning to the uncertain and unstable reality he lives in. This can all be seen as an attempt to see the world as it actually - really, in the Wittgensteinian sense 'without illusion', - *is*.

Paradoxically, the world is not fully surveyable for us – we are observers, standing in the middle of this world and often lack active participation. It is the artist who can provide an overview of a part of the world and in my view it is the art of installation that is an art form par excellence to accomplish just that. It is in the installation that the viewer is in the proper disposition to work with his past and present experiences, and also with the objects of these experiences. This experience is conceptual in the sense that it is an event between object and subject. The tension in the experience is situated in the fact that this event shows an asymmetric subject-object relation.

The viewer becomes conscious of his relations with the objects of the installation or, at least, of his experiences with the objects and the relations between the objects and their environment. This consciousness is emphasised, because everything one perceives is taken as part of that specific situation. He engages in the installation, connecting to the various elements, and because of this, the viewer is not able to distinguish which aspects are aesthetic and which are not. The meanings are not in the object, neither in the subject, but in the experience of all of the objects and thus of the installation as something evocative – bringing up conscious images, memories and feelings.

The viewer is element in a play: at *that* moment, at *that* spot, it is 'the world' for him. At the same time he can also look at it from a certain distance and reflect on his actions and his attitude towards the installation. From this, he gets the opportunity to combine memories from his earlier life history with the experiences that are evoked by the installation into new interpretations or meanings. This reflection on the nature and status of perception and action are particularly the domain of philosophy.

In this way there is an attempt to unite art and life. The viewer brings in his whole life, so to speak, and puts it to the fore in order to contribute or modify that world with the experiences gained by active participation in the installation. We could say that he *remodels* his reality. And conversely, it is the installation itself



that is a remodelled reality. A problem that is connected with this is the fact that an installation cannot be reproduced in pictures, without losing its essential function. As we have already discussed, we have to be there, experiencing the event in the original three-dimensional setting, and even more-dimensional if video or film fragments are included. We cannot – as in the case of a poem – cite or quote the installation. The intriguing question is, then, how can we refer and assign meaning to the installation as a ‘complete world’ after it is demolished?

Here, also, there can be a role for philosophy. More specifically - posing conceptual questions connects philosophy with the art of installation. This is not on a meta-level, but on the same level as the work of art and evokes questions that cannot be answered in the short term, but can provide a new perspective. The installation can - in this way - be understood as a participant in the discussion, functioning by means of a ‘package tour of a concept’, as a sparring partner. I will come back in more detail on this notion of package tour later on. For now, it is important to notice that in this way, questions combine direct experience with reflection and meaning afterwards.

### 3 ART AND LIFE

Every work of art is shown and thereby exhibited to the public in a certain ‘world’, be it a museum-world or a gallery-world. The urinal as a readymade by Duchamps, for example, is only a work of art within the context of an art-world. We can understand this phenomenon as an apparent paradox; it is only because the work of art is situated in such an art-world, with all the institutional impact that goes with it, that the work of art can call upon the outside world, upon everyday reality. Yet, at the same time this outside world is transformed by it and becomes part of the art-world.

Initially, it has been the art of installation wanting to withdraw itself from the official, institutionalised museum- and gallery-world. At the same time, as we have already seen, the artist wanted to expand her studio: move into the open world – breathe in reality – drink it – inhale it all and consequently make an intervention in reality in such a way that the perspective of the viewer changes and his everyday customs are questioned. Significant examples are the so-called ‘splittings’ of Gordon Matta-Clark.

Time and again we can notice that artists add their own emphasis to the signalling, exaggerating, distorting, and transforming of certain – social or political – aspects of reality, with which they generate their own world. And thereby, the work of art also adds a new aspect to reality; it actively calls for participants to take a different view on the world. The artist tries to get the public involved, challenging the viewers on certain matters in order to awaken them. In this way, art and life

enter into a dialogue, with both coming from reality and going back into reality. Thus, art and life are related to each other in a reflexive, dynamic way. The notion of ·reflexive dynamics· has already been mentioned in connection to Wittgenstein's investigations and will be discussed in larger detail in Chapter 3.

We can compare the installation with a landscape or a scene, in which there is movement – of the light, the air, moving elements with respect to each other, video, film fragments etc. – that is also activated by a spatial dramaturgy. The contrast between the installation that in principle can be experienced for an infinite amount of time and, more practically, the limited time allowed to pass through the installation combine in a reflexive, accumulated tension. Think for instance of Kabakov's idea of a deserted scene, where the viewer follows a more or less preconceived trajectory. The dramaturgy is in the transition from one space to another. The individual elements of the installation get their meaning from their ordering in space. Not only because of the place they occupy in relation to each other, but also because the elements appear for the viewer in a temporal order. Because viewing is temporal, we can only understand the relationships between the elements partially and never get a total view in one glance. This can have a rather large impact. Because the viewer is never able to obtain a complete overview, he has to walk a trajectory that offers him various perspectives, but not a Bird's-eye view on the whole installation. This creates a tension between the various spaces that are present in the installation and the movement of the viewer in his engagement in the installation. As a consequence, one might also fail to discover certain aspects.

Summing up, we saw that an installation is a hybrid form of art, spatial and site specific. It is almost always temporary and there is always some reciprocal relation between space and work, space and viewer, viewer and work. The viewer is an active element and as such part of the installation. The installation invites the viewer to actively make use of his imaginative ability. Together these features evoke a reflexive dynamics, thereby showing a very special and unexpected way we can look at things.

Concerning Wittgenstein's *übersichtliche Darstellung* we can say that it is meant to give a perspicuous overview of a part of our language. Something complex is condensed into something comprehensible and manageable. For example, the colour-octahedron shows us all necessary relations of our colour-grammar in one clear view and it does so by inviting the viewer to actively make use of his imagination the moment he uses the model. Evoking a reflexive dynamics, it shows a particular form of representation - the way we normally look at things.

### 3.1 CONTEXTS AND ASPECTS

The observations made above show that a model such as an *übersichtliche Darstellung* or an installation is always connected to some sort of a context. We can detect three kinds of contexts that are involved.

First, there is the context that is constituted by the *übersichtliche Darstellung* or the installation itself. Think of the example of the colour-octahedron again; the colours are not listed singly, rather the context provided by the octahedron shows that every colour stands in a certain relation with the other colours. The same holds for the specific individual elements in the installation.

Second, there is the direct context in which the *übersichtliche Darstellung* or installation is used; that is, the context in which they function. The colour-octahedron is used to order and manipulate the colours in reality. The installation is used to provoke certain reactions by being situated within a particular environment.

And of course, both refer to the indirect, broader context of reality, our community, the world we live in. The colour-octahedron is one system among others, the installation is one expression within the context of a variety of expressions within an art-world. Without this broader context these models would be inoperative, dead. So, we can say that the context is the *energising factor*.

In all cases, our powers of imagination play a crucial role. These powers of imagination are connected with our ability of aspect seeing. This is a notion known from Gestalt psychology, that has been utilised by artists working on installation, especially in the early days of the Minimalism movement, as well as by Wittgenstein, for example in PI, II. Let us now concentrate on Wittgenstein's inquiries into aspect seeing.



The duck-rabbit diagram  
PI II, p520

Acquainted with Köhler's writings on Gestalt psychology, Wittgenstein was fascinated by pictures or diagrams that can be seen under more than one aspect. The strange thing is that, when we look at, for instance, the duck-rabbit picture or the so-called double-cross, in one sense the diagram stays the same and in another way it changes completely. We can see the same picture as a head of a rabbit, but also as the head of a duck. With the double-cross, we perform an aspect change so that we can see the picture either as a blue cross against a white background or as a white cross against a blue background.



The double-cross  
PI II, p541

In the course of Wittgenstein's inquiries into aspect seeing, it emerges that whenever we report the dawning of an aspect to others, this is not a matter of a description of an inner experience, or of an interpretation, but much more a spontaneous reaction, related to what we perceive. What changes in an aspect change is not *what* we perceive, or the organisation of what we perceive, but our *attitude* towards what we perceive. We suddenly see the same picture, listen to the same piece of music, or read the same poem in a totally different way. We situate what we perceive in a

different context, and because of this we are able to discover new connections (cf. PI 122).

What we need for aspect seeing, aside from the capacity for normal seeing, is our imagination and our receptiveness – our susceptibility for impressions. That is why a different context for the same object can change our perception of the object. What is important here is that the normal seeing of an object implies that we approach it in all kinds of circumstances as the same object. But in aspect seeing we approach the same object differently. Let us analyse the most important features of visual aspect seeing:

> First of all, we have to understand that aspects are essentially plural. To speak of one way of seeing something presupposes that there are others. But there is a local incompatibility. It is impossible to see the duck-rabbit picture simultaneously as a duck and as a rabbit: visual aspects are essentially non-additive, consequently, seeing something in one way excludes seeing it differently.

> Aspect seeing is, in contrast to normal seeing, voluntary in a certain sense. That is to say, we can ask a person to try to see something in a certain way. Yet, at the same time we could say that aspect seeing is quasi-objective. On the one hand we are tempted to say that different aspects are just there to be seen, but on the other hand a visual aspect cannot be imposed upon us against our will. Thus, aspect seeing might be said to be part perception, part imagination – or part subjective, part objective.

> As in exercises of imagination, no information is acquired in the dawning of an aspect. No new object is discovered. In that sense, aspects are cognitively empty. However, something is discovered in that there is the discovery of the aspect change itself, the realisation that there are two objects. In this respect seeing as belongs to a different dimension than normal seeing.

> In aspect seeing there is also the possibility of blindness. An aspect may be visible for one person and invisible for another. Unlike ordinary blindness, this deficiency may be absolutely specific, i.e., tied to just one visual object. But we may also encounter aspect blindness in connection with a more wholesale inability to see certain kinds of aspects of a given thing - think of meaning blindness.<sup>17</sup> Note that only someone who sees a particular aspect can ascertain that someone else is blind to this aspect of what is in plain view, no one can establish by himself that he is blind to an aspect or more generally aspect blind.

> I cannot demonstrate to someone a possibility of seeing this as that without getting him to actually see this aspect. And when someone fails to see it, this is not necessarily a defect of his visual system.

> The set of aspects of a given thing is essentially open-ended; there is no closure. This point is related to aspect seeing being voluntary, and, in part, an exercise of imagination. We have in principle the ability to see anything different than what is given. Solving a picture puzzle or engaging in artistic appreciation may depend on

17 >  
The notion of 'meaning blindness' and its analogy with aspect blindness will be discussed at greater length in Chapter 2



getting another person to see an aspect to which he is now blind.


> It is a form of rational persuasion without the possibility of proof. We have to convince the aspect blind person who can only take our word for it (Baker, 2004, pp280-83).

### 3.2 WAYS OF SEEING

We should distinguish between the use of our powers of imagination and something that calls for our imagination. The first can be triggered by the second in such a way that it can give rise to change and renewal in unexpected ways. We could call this a dialectical relation, associated with a reflexive dynamics – the one we already came across – calling upon and referring to itself by means of a different aspect.

Artists, especially, make use of this reflexive dynamics, breathing back life, i.e., re-assigning meaning to everyday notions that have become so obvious for us that they are rendered empty. This is accomplished by switching between continuous aspect perception and their artistic aspect perception – their specific ways of seeing. The notion of ‘continuous aspect perception’ is used by Luntley (2003), who emphasises that in everyday life we already see something as something, i.e., a fork as a fork. Continuous aspect perception as well as artistic aspect perception are discussed in greater length in Chapter 3.

One of Wittgenstein’s remarks I want to discuss here in some detail, is remark 1017 from *Remarks of the Philosophy of Psychology* (RPP hereafter) part I. Here, Wittgenstein observes that diagrams such as the duck-rabbit picture and the double-cross do not necessarily show only two possibilities within one picture:

Doesn’t one have to distinguish among aspects, separating the purely optical from the rest? That they are very different from one another is clear: the dimension of depth, for example, sometimes comes into their description, and sometimes not; sometimes the aspect is a particular ‘grouping’; but when one sees lines as a face, one hasn’t taken them together merely visually to form a group; one may see the schematic drawing of a cube as an open box or as a solid body, lying on its side or standing up; the figure  can be seen, not just in two but in very many different ways.

This observation squares with my own experience. The duck-rabbit picture could be classified as a purely optical one; we see either the duck or the rabbit, but not something entirely different. The first association I had when I saw the picture of the double-cross, however, was that of a parasol on the beach. Thus, it is not so much a picture I can see in two different ways, but much more a picture evoking a sphere or a scene. To see a parasol on the beach is, of course, due to my personal background, rooted in a European culture and tradition. Someone with a different

culture or background would probably have seen something quite different in this picture.

This reassigning of meaning by means of our powers of imagination, something we are all capable of, is extended by the artist by way of her artistic aspect perception. This is something that is, of course, only possible against the background of our everyday perception, which is based on continuous aspect perception. The artist lives and functions in an everyday community; at the same time, however, she experiences the world also in a different, in some respect more *intensified* or *heightened* light and is able to switch between the former and the latter. We could indicate this intensified attitude as something both qualitatively, quantitatively and motivationally different, something I will not go into any further here, but is taken up again in Chapter 3 when we discuss matters concerning creative knowledge. What matters here is that it is the philosopher, subsequently, who reflects on these insights and brings them into perspective.

Thus, we have a continuous aspect perception that can be understood as a continuous understanding, an aspect switch which is a coming to understand and an artistic aspect perception that has its equivalent in a poetic understanding.

Reflexive dynamics implies a simultaneous interaction between perception and language, in which we actively construct our concepts. The way we look at things, for instance at a certain colour, is relative to the perspective we take and the aspects of the colour involved in the context. These aspects trigger on the one hand our abilities to see and think and imagine and on the other hand emphasise the properties of the context in which – in this case – the colours appear. In the case of the colour-octahedron that shows us all the relations of the colours in one clear view, this reflexive dynamics appears when we use this octahedron to compare a colour with that same colour in reality. It refers back to itself by means of a different aspect. Take for instance the time we saw a blue dress hanging in a shop and are convinced it is of the same blue colour as the blue in the colour-octahedron. Yet, when we hold the octahedron next to the dress we suddenly see that it is of another blue shade.

This reflexive dynamics is not something that we can express in language – it is something ineffable. But we can come to *see* it in our use of language. This ‘seeing’ is connected with our receptiveness and our ability to imagine something that does not exist in reality. We can reflect on a change and thereby come to recognise, as in a mirror, something reflexive that is not recognisable in a direct way. The same sort of activity takes place when we experience an installation in art. In both cases it is uncertainty or ambiguity that allows us to reflect on what we think as well as on the unthinkable. Thus, it is the conscious, the unconscious and the dream that is reflected upon: the pictures we make of reality and that we are capable to reflect on all of this.

Apart from these similarities between an *übersichtliche Darstellung* and an instal-

lation, there is also a big difference. This difference is connected with the same notion of aspect seeing.

In the case of art – here the art of installation – we want or expect a startlingly new (in the sense of unexpected) way in which we can look at things. We want something that creates astonishment, amazement and a sudden insight evoked by the visual powers of this piece of art, be it in our personal life or in the broader context of a society. We want something that we value, something that lets us see the world in a different light, in some sense anew. In contrast, we do not expect from an *übersichtliche Darstellung* in philosophy something totally new or exiting; we want to see relations between things, objects, in a perspicuous way – as a reminder – of how things stand for us; we want a view of what is accepted within our community, but which can be something that *looks* for us *as* something new again. This reminder relieves us and puts us at ease. What is of interest here, is that we need to know ‘how things stand for us’ in order to be able to see something ‘anew’ and reflect on it. In both cases, there are emotional phenomena involved: to see something different/new and to leave things the way they are.

The difference that is mentioned here is related to the fact that a model as *übersichtliche Darstellung* in science or philosophy can be reproduced. Although, when reproduced, the *effect* is context dependent; this is something that holds more for philosophy than for science. An installation is always something unique/one-time only, and thus is itself, by definition, completely context dependent and in principle not reproducible.

## 4 SETTING THE STAGE

According to Ernst Mach it is the role of fantasy that allows us to break away from our habits and the common everyday situation, and enter the space of possibilities. It even allows us to pass the boundaries of logic and enter spaces that are logically impossible. Mach distinguishes between two sorts of fantasy: the one that continues the row of possibilities of actual achievements, and the one that rises, as it were, over history and creates its own web of relations and associations. It is this second kind of fantasy I am interested in, the kind that can be called ‘poetic fantasy’, according to Mach (Haller, 1986, p70-86). We need thought-experiments and paradoxes, mistakes and failures, and we have to take risks in order to be constructive and poetic.

Practising philosophy and/or making art has something to do with searching for gaps, breaks, holes in our wall of beliefs, questioning our habits and what we take for granted. It is investigating how we can assign meaning to ourselves and the world we live in. The tension between what we call art and information culminates

in poetic understanding. Somewhere between the propositional and the evocative lies poetic understanding – something Wittgenstein calls living pictures. These pictures fulfill a crucial role in our thinking and imagination within a certain culture and act as a form of (re)presentation. With these pictures we are able to express what is important in our life, what impresses us, what frightens us or what we think is great or wonderful. On the other hand, these pictures can also deceive us, especially (but not exclusively) when we do philosophy.

Whenever we want an overview of something – of a problem, a method, a complex structure of our language – and whenever we want to say something philosophical about the nature or the status of some phenomenon, we need to take two steps. The first step is to open up possibilities and the second step is to provide the scope of the issue at hand, that is, a constraint. We have to limit the domain we want to examine and condense it into an *übersichtliche Darstellung*.

We have only partial insights into the various domains of our existence, and a need to communicate our amazement about the world we live in and the insights we gain while investigating this world. In the characterisation of the limits of our language and of our understanding, we slowly reach a solution of a specific problem. Constraints, indicating things that cannot be, for instance a square circle, a transparent white or a reddish-green, as the limits of our thinking that evoke our powers of imagination, are crucial in this. In this respect we are concerned with the relation between what we call reality and what we can imagine – i.e., what we can actually experience in reality and the experience we can imagine. In shedding light on these restrictions we gain insight into the limits and thus are able to sketch the contours of a specific problem we want to investigate.

In order to get a hold on these restrictions, we cannot systematically in any sense search for or wonder about a solution, but we try to do something that will generate a conviction that is for us represented in a perspicuous way. Think, for instance, of posing a question or speculating, or deciding that the solutions must be given within a certain framework and that solutions have to be generally applicable. We can also interpret a question that underlies the problem in a new way.

What seems to be an impossibility can be made perspicuous and may enter the domains of the possible and the obvious, thereby producing a certain very special sort of understanding. In mathematics as well as in philosophy this comes down to a perspicuous, lucid showing of an impossibility, producing a very special meaning (Floyd, 2000). See RFM V-28:

We can always imagine proof by *reductio ad absurdum* used in argument with someone who puts forward a non-mathematical assertion (e.g. that he has seen a checkmate with such-and-such pieces) which can be mathematically refuted.



The difficulty which is felt in connexion with *reductio ad absurdum* in mathematics is this: what goes on in this proof? Something mathematically absurd, and hence unmathematical? How – one would like to ask – can one so much as assume the mathematically absurd at all? That I can assume what is physically false and reduce it *ad absurdum* gives me no difficulty. But how do we think the – so to speak – unthinkable?

What an indirect proof says, however, is: ‘If you want *this* then you cannot assume *that*: for only the opposite of what you do not want to abandon would be combinable with *that*’.

But this notion of understanding or meaning is itself a vague and fuzzy concept that cannot be fully illuminated and specified by our grammar or by a set of explicitly formulated rules (RFM VI-13). Yet, we feel a need for improvement every time we have reached an ultimate solution (at that moment, within the context of the possibilities and constraints of that moment etc.) that determines whether something is accepted as a proof or solution, and that is a matter of *conviction*.

In mathematics as well as in philosophy we have the *übersichtliche Darstellung* as a tool for obtaining perspicuity on a problem within a certain domain. An *übersichtliche Darstellung*, as we have seen, can have all sorts of expressions: a blueprint, a model, a proof, but it can also be a philosophical question. The point here is that philosophical questions are not questions in search for an answer, but questions in search for *meaning* (Baker & Hacker, 1980). Philosophical problems are conceptual, not empirical. They are solved by directing our attention to the use of our words (Z 463); thus, our domain is the grammar of our language (PI 126) (Philosophical Grammar (PG hereafter) 256) (Big Typescript (BT hereafter) 418) (PG 66) (The Blue and Brown Books (BB hereafter) 18, 25).

Our investigation of language has to show what our concepts are. It is only then that we can direct our minds to how we think the world is. Philosophy is not science; there are no new facts we can discover, only new insights into already known, old facts (PG 256). These new insights differ in nature from the old ones. Moreover the problem in our practicing philosophy is *·prose·*; we pose the wrong questions or try to answer the right questions in a wrong manner. Only the nature of philosophical questions – unanswerable questions – and our elaborations of these questions are what distinguishes philosophy from science.

Our form of *Darstellung* is embedded in our everyday language use and we have to clarify these embedded forms in order to have philosophical confusions disappear (BT 409). Clarity can only be obtained by *Übersicht*. There are various methods, therapies or ways to obtain such an *Übersicht*. Wittgenstein acknowledged the analogy between his style of philosophising and psycho-analysis (BT 410; MS 158, 34), despite a methodological difference. Freud assumes the unconscious as a scientific hypothesis, and that is something that Wittgenstein denies. There is great deal to be said on whether and how Wittgenstein’s own writings and way of

practising philosophy can be compared to therapy or not. Elucidation of this issue will have some impact on our investigation into the art of installation. We will return to it in Chapter 3. For now, we can say that in as much as philosophy is a quest for Übersicht, there has to be some kind of system, because an overview does not consist of an arbitrary collection of things. We can describe this system in terms of family-resemblances, that is, in terms of analogies and seeing connections, between concepts and phenomena, and the roles that models play in the clarification thereof.

Goethe's search for the *Urpflanze* suggests that only a hidden unity can justify the application of a single term for various phenomena and that this unity is generic and in process.<sup>18</sup> The first suggestion calls for analogical insights and expresses a conviction in a moral world-order. Like fairy-tales and folk tales, myths and rituals show a moral world-order, not by moralising, but through poetic imagination, exaggeration, and by posing impossibilities and repetition. We can think of a ritual as some sort of highly developed language of gestures (GR 36).

There are more similarities between our two objects of investigation, the *übersichtliche Darstellung* and the phenomenon of installation, than are apparent at first sight. Our magical totality that can be experienced physically in a Total Installation of Kabakov; the wondering about the world we are living in; the connection between art and life; the *Gesamtkunstwerk* Wagner was talking about. All refer to a desire for making visible – for making perspicuous – some aspects of reality we are dealing with.

In the next chapter, the emphasis will be on the investigation into the notion of meaning derived from Wittgenstein's discussions on rule-following and form of life. We shall also explore the interrelatedness of the individual and the social. In all of these matters the *übersichtliche Darstellung* plays a key role.

18 > Spengler compared his morphological method with that of Goethe, stressing the relation with Leibniz. Both were searching for morphological, necessary connections. According to Spengler a 'physiognomy that is precise, clear and certain of itself and its boundaries' (Baker & Hacker, 1980, p538ff).

Breathing back into Reality we live the paces of Thought

Photo installation Do not Erase ...

Do not Erase ... wait for Meaning, Arti et Amicitiae, Amsterdam 21|6-13|7 2008

Photo installation Do not Erase ...

Do not Erase ... wait for Meaning, Arti et Amicitiae, Amsterdam 21|6-13|7 2008

## 2 > FOLLOWING RULES & FORM OF LIFE



1998 Shelter Project

In Chapter 1 we discussed Wittgenstein's notion of *übersichtliche Darstellung* as a tool for our investigation into the reflexive dynamic relation between art, philosophy and life. The *übersichtliche Darstellung* addresses our powers of imagination as well as our ability to adapt to circumstances, learn, and act according to the rules of the community we are born in. These domains of the possible and the obvious that were discussed in the previous chapter are intrinsically bound up with an inquiry into rule-following and from this with creativity and novelty.

The core of Wittgenstein's rule-following exploration can be found in PI 138 – 242 where he discusses the different ways the meaning of a word is its use in the language. A tension exists between meaning as an individual moment of understanding and meaning as a social phenomenon that extends over time (Stein, 1997).

Is the possibility of rule-following for Wittgenstein primarily to be regarded as something individual or is it something that is necessarily social? This question, discussed extensively in the literature, addresses the relation between language, mind and world. What is the proper view on rule-following? Is the relation between the individual and the social more refined in the sense that we merely *construct* this distinction for practical purposes? Also, if we find out that the latter appears to be the case, there remains the question of whether we should think about language as starting as something individual or as something collective. Being able to answer this question can shed light on the possibility of renewal and novelty.

The quest for meaning is intrinsically bound up with the above question. A person or a thing becomes meaningful for us when we are able to assign meaning to them. And we have to interact with a person or a thing in order for them to become a thing or a person for us. But since one cannot assign meaning by oneself to oneself – one cannot look at oneself from a certain distance, i.e., one has no clear view on oneself – it is only through others that one can assign meaning to others and thereby to oneself. How then can we analyse this complicated relation between ·I· and ·Other·?

What were Wittgenstein's ideas on this issue of ·I· and ·Other·? In what respect can we say that the individual is merely playing by the rules of a community, and in what ways is a person able to go beyond the rules, extend them and follow his own rules and ideas as an individual?

In the previous chapter we investigated Wittgenstein's notion of *übersichtliche Darstellung* in the light of what is called his philosophical method. In this chapter I will concentrate on perspicuous (re)presentation in relation to the issue of social primacy and rule-following. We have already seen that our powers of imagination plays a key role and that the notion of *übersichtliche Darstellung* is an important tool to obtain a clear view on matters. The relation and tension between having a perspicuous overview of something and our imagination plays a crucial role in the quest for novelty and innovation.

I will concentrate on the views of Williams, Bloor and Luntley, weighing their various standpoints on the issue of the so-called 'social basis of rule-following'. I will analyse and look at what they have to say only in terms of their ideas on rule-following and creativity, but it will become clear in the course of my investigation that none of them have much to say about the general notion of creativity, and that a discussion of artistic creativity is completely absent in their writings. Williams and Bloor both advocate a social stance, though each from a different perspective. Williams stresses the philosophical significance of language learning, Bloor emphasises the sociological connections. Luntley takes a strict individual perspective as primary.<sup>1</sup> In this chapter I will show why, in all three cases, leaving out artistic creativity is a shortcoming.

In an attempt to answer the question of primacy, I will also examine Wittgenstein's discussion on what has become known as 'meaning as use', in relation to a strict individual perspective: the example of Wittgenstein's solo-linguist, the cave-man, and the example of the solitary rule-follower Crusoe. By a solitary rule-follower I mean someone who did learn rules in a community but does not interact with other rule-followers due to certain circumstances. By solo-linguist I mean someone who has never participated in any kind of engagement with others. These extreme cases allow us to explore the question whether it could be possible that the notions of the person/individual and the collective/social are in some respect one and the same and, if so, how this comes about. Answering this question has implications for

1 > The rule-following discussion is one of the most explored issues in the exegetical literature on Wittgenstein in the last decennia. See for instance Baker & Hacker (1985), Kripke (1982), McGinn (1984), and Stein (1997). In this thesis I will not elaborate on their points of view. Instead I have chosen for Williams, Bloor and Luntley, because they are representative for the current discussion and also because I do not want to focus on an exegetical discussion concerning Wittgenstein's insights on rule-following, but on a systematic one.



a proper understanding of Wittgenstein's inquiry into rule-following and because of this, for our understanding of the *übersichtliche Darstellung*. It also gives us the opportunity to investigate how rule-following, creativity and novelty are related.

As we shall see from the discussion that follows, Wittgenstein's investigations on language include not only spoken or written language (signs), but also gestures, learning by watching and observing others (PI 31) and hints, pictures, and the like (cf. PI 2). When we follow Wittgenstein's insights, we come to the conclusion that an isolated caveman is in principle capable of following rules and having a language of his own, something that we could observe in his behaviour (MS 165, 116-117). But, at the same time, actually having a language and following rules in a community is bound up intrinsically with response and (re)action; this is something necessarily and essentially communal (cf. PI 2). So, we could say, that capability alone is not enough for speaking a language, although it obviously is a necessary condition.

In what follows, I will discuss the views of Williams, Bloor and Luntley and, elaborating their points of view, I will situate the debate on the individual/social basis of rule-following within the context of a 'Form of life' and I will show that ultimately the individual *is* in some respect the social. This merging of the individual and the social is also emphasised when I examine the results of an artistic, conceptual investigation that I carried out in 1998. I will not do this by writing *about* this performative,<sup>2</sup> but rather by sketching the impressions and experiences that occurred and by connecting them with the investigation on rule-following discussed in this chapter.

2 >  
A performative in art is a performance that lasts longer than just one event, takes into account some form of repetition, is carried out in real time, and is performed with or without audience. For example in the case mentioned in this chapter, the Shelter project as a performative lasted fourteen days. A performative can also be set up as something that makes an explicit statement, sometimes in combination with other disciplines. An example of the latter is *De Taal en haar Broekje* (Language and her Tights-whities), a performative presented in 2006, which lasted for one hour. A still can be found at the beginning of the book.

## 1 MEANING AND RULES

How can the word 'Slab' indicate what I have to do, when after all I can bring any action into accord with any interpretation?

How can I follow a rule, when after all whatever I do can be interpreted as following it?[...] (RFM VI 38)

With this remark, Wittgenstein wants to direct our attention to the fact that there is nothing in the word 'Slab' itself that determines a proper response. It is only within a shared practice of a community that we are able to check and correct in order to understand the meaning of the utterance. What matters is in which language-game the word 'Slab' is expressed, with the context playing a decisive role. How public or private, then, is our rule-following? That is, what makes meaning possible?

In what follows I will discuss three different points of view that together provide the scope of the rule-following debate in as far as it contributes to the theme of this chapter. Meredith Williams and David Bloor both opt for a social stance on rule-following though each from a different perspective. Michael Luntley advocates an

individual point of view. What matters is not so much who is right or wrong in the debate, but the arguments that are brought to the fore. I will test these arguments by bringing an extreme view into the discussion, introducing a solo-linguist and a solitary rule-follower. Let's see where that leads us to.

### 1.1 WILLIAMS

Meredith Williams starts from the claim that grammar, rules, and concepts are not Cartesian or Kantian a priori, metaphysical or epistemological conditions for the possibility of experience, judgement and action. Rather, the grammar, rules and concepts can be abstracted from our ongoing practices – from our language-games – but they do not ground those games (Williams, 2002, p3-4). According to Williams, 'bedrock-rule-following is to be found in an inimitable social dimension to rule-following' (Williams, 2002, p7). Our shared judgements form the preconditions for a normative similarity. This is why the language we use can be learned and this learning has an explanatory as well as constitutive role with respect to the bedrock-rule-following of practices and concepts. In this way, Williams uses two forms of bedrock: first, our agreements in bedrock practices and judgements that constitute the certainty that is logically necessary for any normative action; and second, the bedrock of language learning that is constitutive of what the individual learns. Thus, according to Williams, there is 'a necessary social basis for rule-following and a philosophical significance for language learning' (Williams, 2002, p2).

In line with her strongly social point of view, Williams emphasises the contextual aspects of our language and our learning of language. It is only in the context of human practices and ways of acting that the dynamic and social character of norms make meaning and rule-following possible (Williams, 2002, p26). At the beginning of a learning process we do not need to have any propositional knowledge, says Williams, which implies that she presupposes abilities that are common to teacher and student. She also assumes that the student is willing to follow and obey the teacher. In this way, a rule is not an interpretation of another rule as an interpretation of . . . ad infinitum, instead there is something like a basic rule following predisposition used in a particular kind of training, that in its turn rests on shared obviousness and shared natural reactions (Williams, 2002, p222,180).

Williams distinguishes between ostensive teaching and ostensive definition. Ostensive teaching is thought of by Williams as the causally grounding role. The background structure for teaching or training is provided by the social environment personified in the actions of the teacher (Williams, 2002, p193ff). The teacher is supposed to regulate the behaviour of the pupil, who is a novice, and direct him to actions that are rule-obeying. Because the novice is 'thrown' into a social context completely unfamiliar to him, it is the teacher that has to make the novice acquainted with all the rules that are supposed to be appropriate within that so-

cial context. In this respect, initiate learning must be public and social, because we can only say the novice has learned something insofar as it conforms the norms of society taught by the teacher as a logical necessity, within the right context – the logical space. Ostensive teaching is not simply a kind of stimulus-response conditioning. Rather, it effects an association in a normatively structured setting (PI 6) and provides a shared, unquestioned and certain sense of the obvious.

Whereas ostensive teaching is part of the learning process in an early stage, when the pupil does not yet have propositional knowledge, ostensive definition provides the standards for reference, because here the focus is on the learning of skilled techniques; it is public training that gives us a ‘second nature’ (Williams, 2002, p177). Wittgenstein distinguishes between the two in PI 6, discussing pointing to objects, directing the attention of the pupil in a certain direction while at the same time uttering a word. For example, this could be pointing at a red rose and saying: ‘this colour we call red’, which presupposes a public language although the child may be unaware of it. This teaching is a conditioning and parroting, which in itself does not effect an understanding of the sign. The sign must be embedded in a practice or a custom and has to be trained in order to become meaningful.

Ostensive teaching does not locate the place of use for a word though it may be used as a teaching aid in training the child to master a practice; ostensive definition, on the other hand, fixes the place, but it cannot explain naive language acquisition nor how the place was prepared. Both, however, in different ways, presuppose a context of language mastery’ (Williams, 2002, p22).

This is Williams’ social-stage-setting and she underlines her viewpoint with the Wittgensteinian examples:

- > PI 198 [...]a person goes by a sign-post only in so far as there exists a regular use of sign-posts, a custom.
- > PI 201 [...]there is an inclination to say: any action according to the rule is an interpretation. But we ought to restrict the term ‘interpretation’ to the substitution of one expression of the rule for another.
- > PI 202 And hence also ‘obeying a rule’ is a practice[...]

She concludes that because the concepts receive life from our practices, and not the other way around, these concepts are susceptible to change and thereby generate a dynamic, changeable practice. But there is something not quite transparent in her line of argument. Because the practices are skilled, known and repeatable/reproductive, how can these practices account for something dynamic and changeable? For instance, learning the word ‘red’ itself does not give us the opportunity to invent new colour words. What, then, does she mean by something ‘dynamic and changeable’?

What Williams calls the ‘dynamic conception of meaning’ consists of three points. First, Wittgenstein’s contextualism is understood by Williams as referring to the surroundings and circumstances of a specific social community (cf. PI 581, 583). Wittgenstein’s contextualism applies to our understanding of representation and rules, but also to how anything is identified (Williams, 2002, p55). Second, there is the primacy of action. Meaning something is doing something. I do not observe what I mean, rather I act meaningfully. It is not that I merely observe that I take this colour to be red, but just that I want to buy this red rose and thus say to the shop keeper: ‘Give me the red one’. Both the defenders of the individualistic stance as well as those who take the collective point of view can agree here, although their reasons may differ. Third, there is the significance of learning a language in order to be able to express oneself within a community in a meaningful way.

From these three points, we can say that Williams emphasises a dynamic conception of meaning, in which meaning is not a special kind of object, but a *function* of how words are used. One cannot have meaning before the experience (PI 258). This way of reading Wittgenstein is uncontroversial. But Williams also tries to make clear not only that meaning is a function of how the word is used, but also that this structured use can only be found within the community of practitioners. The individual is trained in a social practice. From this, Williams concludes that Wittgenstein’s accounts of meaning and intentionality are contextualist and dynamic (PI 444). The foundational role of training in a social practice that Williams emphasises is rather controversial (compare this to Luntley later in the chapter). Not in the least, because this social interpretation raises doubt concerning the problem of novelty. For, when we are taught in a practice, we have learned things that are already known within the community – from our teachers. Then, where can something ‘new’ come from?

The notions of ‘change’ and ‘uncertainty’ are not discussed at length by Williams, yet in my view, they should be if one wants to explain the dynamics of a practice. It is an important issue concerning her claim about the dynamic of the social practices, related to Wittgenstein’s suggestions about the notion ‘Form of life’.

Williams shows us how social stage-setting is possible: basic rule-followers rest their interpretation on a specific kind of training – ostensive teaching – that does not presuppose cognitive rule-following capacities, and, in a later stage, ostensive definition – thus providing a social ground for normativity. Yet, she does not take into consideration that in the rule-governed practice the dynamic – evoked by the context – becomes reflexive by the creative aspects brought in by the individual which can account for transgressions of meaning and change in Form of life. And this is something Wittgenstein takes up explicitly in his remarks everytime he urges us to imagine something: ‘we could imagine that ...’ (PI 2), ‘suppose that ...’, ‘think of ...’.

It is because of the reflexive dynamics between what is opaque and what is

obvious that a society can develop and refine. As we have already seen in Chapter 1, human beings tend to take various perspectives on a certain matter in order to understand the choices they are able to make and the insights that can be gained regarding specific problems. Tools for this include the *übersichtliche Darstellung* or a work of art. But these require the ability to make use of imagination and go beyond the norms and rules that constitute a society. By focussing on that, we can see the relation between the individual and the social more clearly.

In regard to the use of our imagination we can distinguish between our use of our powers of imagination and something that calls for our imagination. The first is an intention, that is, we use our powers of imagination and open ourselves up. This can be triggered by the second. Something that calls for our imagination can evoke our imagination. In this way, there is a reflexive dynamics – a mutual movement towards each other – that can produce change and renewal in unexpected ways. For me, this is the crucial point – aside from the other objections surrounding the individual-social debate – as it touches upon the question how new meanings can arise. This is worked out in more detail in Chapter 3.

In the discussion of ostensive teaching and ostensive definition we have already seen that intentionality is an important notion in the learning of a language. We have a *directedness* towards everyday social life the day we are born (Williams, 2002, p34ff). According to Williams, human intentionality is marked by its sensitivity to norms and standards. Thus, the problem of normativity is the problem of understanding how standards are set that fix meaning and can provide a guide and/or justification for subsequent use. A social practice, then, is necessary for the process of language learning. The child is dependent on his parents or other adults and in a similar way the laymen is dependent on the expert. Social context is required for both (PI 584). Like the teacher, who can be either a parent or other adult, the novice's action is only what it is against the background of its historical and social setting; but unlike that of the teacher, this status is not ensured by his own competency but by that of the teacher. For Williams, the point of learning 'bedrock-rule-following practices' – the rule-following practices that constitute the shared sense of the obvious – is to come to share a form of life. As novices we act blindly, in the sense that we follow the examples and the instructions of the teacher as a matter of course. As teachers we act also blindly, but in a different sense. We act and judge without checking with others.

Training in a custom or a social practice is for Williams the way in which we come to follow rules. We need a regular use of a rule over time to understand the patterned activity within the appropriate context. This understanding is thus highly structured, public, and social (Williams, 2002, p171). It is this structure that makes it possible to follow a rule blindly (PI 219; 238). Blind obedience of a rule expresses seeing and understanding how matters must be. According to Williams, it is this



‘mustness’ that constitutes the form of life against which error and mistake, truth and falsity can be discerned (Williams, 2002, p178).

Williams takes the process of training as pivotal in creating the logical space for the distinction between what is perspicuous and what is obscured in complex adult language (RFM VI 22). Understanding the role learning plays, sheds light on the nature of normativity itself: ‘Normativity is restricted to performances that can be judged as correct or incorrect’ (Williams, 2002, p193). The fact that meaning is social and individual learning is indispensable are two sides of the same coin (RFM VI 34, PI 199, RFM VI 21). The change in the novice is the change from an unskilled participant in the practice to a skilled one (cf PI 242). The function of training a technique is to limit the array of behaviours available to the agent. This involves a transformation in the status of the test from experiment to proof, or from what looks empirical to what is normative.

There is a shared, unquestioned and certain sense of the obvious that is acquired in learning rules, concepts, skills and techniques. Williams refers to RFM VI for a better understanding of Wittgenstein’s characterisation of the background of this *obviousness*:

How do I know that the colour I am now seeing is called ‘green’? Well, to confirm it I might ask other people; but if they did not agree with me, I should become totally confused and should perhaps take them or myself for crazy. That is to say: I should either no longer trust myself to judge, or no longer react to what they say as to a judgement.

If I am drowning and I shout ‘Help!’, how do I know what the word Help means? Well, that’s how I react in this situation. – Now *this* is how I know what ‘green’ means as well and also know how I have to follow the rule in the particular case [...] (RFM VI 35)

‘I realised that it must be like that’ – that is his report. (RFM VI 7)

There are two important features concerning the notion of training and technique, according to Williams. In the first place, constraints, repetitive regular behaviour, and normative judgement of sameness go together. And second, the technique is external to the pattern of proof (RFM VI 2). In this way, the learning circle moves from the experimental activity of testing in which the pupil’s reactions are shaped by the teacher, creating the sense of the obvious, to the activity of testing in which the result is seen as necessary, as what must be (Williams, 2002, p210). With these two features, Wittgenstein can keep the contrast between the conceptual and the empirical, according to Williams. For her this is important, because with that distinction Wittgenstein is able to retain a place for necessity. What must be stands fast for us as obvious and implicit in what is obvious. The actual use of an expression shapes the space for the concept. But, we could object to this in that the way she formulates her ‘social basis of meaning’, *everything* becomes something necessary, including

the conceptual. And this would bind everything into a static society deprived of any possibility for invention, creation and renewal: a non-reflexive, non-dynamic society. The only dynamics to be found are within a learning circle that is a closed circuit.

## 1.2 BLOOR

What Williams (2002) calls the individual and the social, Bloor (1997) labels individualism and collectivism. For the individualist, he says, a rule in its simplest form is just a standing intention; for the collectivist, it is a shared convention or a social institution (Bloor, 1997, p.ix). Bloor differs from Williams in that he defends a collectivist account for rules as well as a collectivist reading of Wittgenstein. However for Bloor, individualism and collectivism are family resemblance phenomena that change over time, taking on a different character and moral significance in different historical circumstances (Bloor, 1997, p.x).

Bloor takes up two central questions: What is a rule? And: What is it to follow a rule? These two questions are related to the problems of infinity and compulsion. The requirements the rules impose will typically apply to an open-ended and indeterminately large class of cases. The problem is that at no point of actual rule-following are we able to grasp that class. The problem of compulsion, i.e., the normativity of rules (the hardness of the logical must, RFM I 121), is how the normative force of a rule comes about. These questions are related to ·meaning determinism·, the idea that the meaning of the rule itself and what is meant or intended by the rule-follower are somehow fixed on a strictly individual level. The individual would be fully capable to make his own rules and their meanings without any involvement of other people (Bloor, 1997, p5).

Meaning determinism is a notion that is linked to an individualist basis of rule-following. This individualist account of rule-following is opposed to the collectivist point of view, which says that making rules and their meanings can only be a shared convention or a social institution. According to Bloor, Wittgenstein rejected meaning determinism: for Wittgenstein rules are social institutions, customs or conventions and therefore, to follow a rule is to participate in an institution, a custom or a convention (PI 199). Instead, the Wittgensteinian approach is marked by something Bloor calls ·meaning finitism· (Bloor, 1997, p5).

In emphasising finitism, we start from the observation that the number of illustrations and examples a teacher offers his pupil must always be finite. An example in which finitism is unproblematic is that of learning the alphabet, which is a finite list. The point, however, is that learning a rule and how to follow it is in many cases something infinite. There is an infinite – or at least indefinite – number of cases that we have to learn via finite examples. The pupil has to go beyond the given examples and at times even the teacher will not always know how to proceed. For instance,

learning the word 'red' is learning the rules for using the word, but also involves moving from a finite number of examples – this flower is red, this stone we also call 'red' – to an open-ended, indefinitely large range of future applications.

Williams tries to escape finitism by taking the learning circle as something temporally bounded, yet changing in status from an empirical proposition into a normative proposition. 'The vehicle for that change in status is the mastery of a cognitive skill or technique through training' (Williams, 2002, p209). The learning circle moves from the experimental activity of testing in which the pupil's reactions are shaped by the teacher to the activity of testing in which the result is seen as necessary, as what must be. But, as we have said before, the question remains of how novelty can come in. I take it that Williams wants to say that novelty can be found in the changing of level or dimension, that is, in the move from empirical to normative propositions. However, I am not sure how this could account for the creation of a *new* rule since the result should be what counts as what must be the case within the community. In any case, we can observe that Williams does not differentiate between changing an already existing rule and the installation of a new one.

In regard to the issue of novelty Williams has little to say and thus, we could ask ourselves whether she is too limited in merely focussing on what she calls the learning circle. She describes how social learning happens, but fails to explain how these practises originate and therefore leaves the notion of novelty practically untouched.

For Bloor, the notion of novelty also remains a problem, although a different kind of problem than that for Williams. Bloor emphasises that in learning a rule there is always the problem of the next step, the move from past to new instances of a concept (cf. RFM VI 29; PI 29). We have instinctive responses towards the examples that are used in teaching (OC 359, 475); we learn a colour by comparing it with other objects that have the same colour in an unmediated way (RFM VII 40; OC 358, 359, 110). This is not some sort of insight or seeing, but a way of acting (OC 204). On the basis of our (natural) inclinations we decide between wrong and right by consensus, for instance, what it is we call red or green (RFM VI 39, 30; VII 40). According to meaning finitism, we do not interpret a rule, but *create* meaning as we move from case to case. This is not an arbitrary matter, but subject to constraints. The sources of these constraints are the local circumstances: our instincts, our biological nature, our sense experience, our interactions with other people and the like.

Bloor extracts what he calls a naturalistic, down to earth, concrete and causal picture from Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein treats infinity, according to Bloor, as something negative, something 'not finished off' (RFM II 45). The word 'infinite' must get its meaning from our finite, rule-following activities. The finitist meaning of the word 'infinity' comes from its use, not its use from its non-finitive meaning (Bloor, 1997, p23). Beliefs and intentions are not fully specified with respect to all possible circumstances. We cannot plan for all contingencies, and yet in practice we never

feel this fact as a lack (cf. PI 68).<sup>3</sup>

Bloor distinguishes three dimensions or aspects of Wittgenstein's conception of rule-following. First, there is the biological or psychological aspect, which concerns our instinctive and automatic responses. Second, Wittgenstein's discussions on rule-following have a sociological or collectivist aspect, in regard to the shaping and sanctioning of our innate tendencies and their organisation into customs, conventions and institutions. And, third, there is the background of meaning finitism against which the entire process is set and provides the constraints. All three must be kept in mind when Wittgenstein says that 'a game, a language, a rule is an institution' (RFM VI 32) cited by Bloor (1997). What then, is an institution?

According to Bloor, we can treat social institutions as giant performative utterances, produced by the social collective (Bloor, 1997, p32). An institution is a collective pattern of self-referring activity and its most obvious role is in connection with the normative aspect of rules. We learn not by logical definition or verbal explanation, but by being socialised into the practice that is called 'following a rule'. This presupposes an established practice. But now the problem is: how can a practice get started?

Williams takes this starting point to be the experimental stage in the learning circle. Bloor observes that Wittgenstein links the role of the context in giving meaning to our mental states with the performative and self-referencing process by which the context is itself made up. The question then is: is the person reporting a bond that already exists or is he creating a bond?

"I am leaving the room because you tell me to".

"I am leaving the room but not because you tell me to".

Does this proposition *describe* a connexion between my action and his order; or does it make the connexion? Can one ask: "How do you know that you do it because of this, or not because of this?" And the answer perhaps: "I feel it"? (PI 487)

And in PI 682:

"You said, "It'll stop soon." – Were you thinking of the noise or of your pain?"

If he answers "I was thinking of the piano-tuning" – is he observing that the connexion existed, or is he making it by means of these words? – Can't I say *both*? If what he said was true, didn't the connexion exist – and is he not for all that making one which did not exist?

Bloor speculates here that for Wittgenstein mental states *are* social states (Bloor, 1997, p50). To follow a rule blindly means for Bloor not that it is done entirely without thinking, but that it is done automatically in the sense of needing no reflection. All the thinking required is routine, the mechanical awareness of the average competent member of a society, socialised into its customs and institutions. We

3 >

See also Marion (1998) on the issue of infinity. Notice that what Marion calls finitism is not completely compatible with Bloor's interpretation. Marion uses finitism as a technical term from mathematics. Finitism as Bloor uses the term is an analogy with the technical term. Compare note 7 on page 72.

follow some rules automatically, but do so within a social framework in which we are known to be responsive, and within which we operate according to acceptable standards of competence and awareness. We can call this an attitude or ‘the conscientiousness condition’. In this process we do not use any other sort of reflection. We merely *act*.

The boundaries of language-games, as the boundaries of concepts themselves, are social accomplishments; they too have the status of conventions or institutions, according to Bloor (1997, p67). Meaning is a moment by moment creation, collectively and pragmatically. Agreement between the members of a linguistic community is agreement in actions, without any propositional content and must be automatic (RFM VI 39; PI 241).

In order to get a firmer grip on the problem of novelty in a social framework of rule-following, such as Williams’ or Bloor’s, we now turn to an examination of a case that is often discussed in the literature: that of the solitary rule-follower.

Can a person who is physically isolated from the community still follow a rule? That depends. In order to provide a proper answer to this question, we have to make a distinction between a socialised person who has become physically isolated, for instance, one who is washed ashore after a shipwreck, and a person who has been physically isolated from birth. In the former case, the individualist will say *yes* for on the individualist view, although many rules are designed to regulate social interactions, rule following does not necessarily always involve interacting with other people. Crusoe<sup>4</sup> cannot follow or be indifferent to fashion or be in commerce, but he can apply a rule for generating number sequences. He does not need agreement from any other person to be said to have got it right. (But should he be able to agree with and by himself?) The need for teachers or judges is just a contingency; they can be useful in practice, but are by no means necessary. The idea behind this is that rule following is made possible by our power to grasp the meaning of the concepts used in the rule. Once we have grasped them, then it is their meaning which guides or determines our behavior. The standards for right and wrong are implicit in the very contents of concepts. In Bloor’s opinion, the individualist rule-following is nothing more than forming an intention and carrying it out, where intentions are taken as things with intrinsic propositional content generated by the individual mind.

Bloor emphasises he wants to distinguish between physical and social isolation (cf. PI 243, 258ff). Social isolation does not entail physical isolation. Social interactions are typically episodic, containing gaps between periods of face-to-face encounter. For the duration of the gaps we may be alone, but the vital ingredient in the process is not the physical, but the cognitive character. This cognitive dimension must be given due recognition. The social character of a situation arises when we have interactions that are informed by expectations and some measure of shared understanding. Bloor concludes that a convention is an essentially social activity,

4 >

See the story of Daniel Defoe, based on the true adventures of Alexander Selkirk who stranded in 1676 on an island and remained isolated for more than four years. We can find remarks by Wittgenstein on the example of Robinson Crusoe in Item 116/Band XII; Item 165 Taschennotizbuch [103] and Item 166 Notes for the ‘Philosophical lecture’ 1v.



being a regularity in behaviour predicated on the condition that others conform to it as well (Bloor, 1997, p92). So, for the individualist, the rule is there, but the context and the change are external to the rule. For those who emphasise the social basis of rule-following, like Bloor, context and change are internal to the rule. For them, if the individualist is not able to respond to change, there is no rule.

How can we account for innovation and creation from a social basis of rule-following? Bloor presupposes that for the individualist, innovation is an event, for the collectivist it is a process. This notion of process with regard to innovation and creation is elaborated in Chapter 3 in connection to Wittgenstein's way of practising philosophy as well as with the art of installation. For now, it is important to note that Wittgenstein always emphasised the need to select the right focal point for understanding and investigation. A fruitful paradigm, object of comparison, prototype or Urbild is vital (CV p14, p26; PI 122, 130, 131, 385). For him, human behaviour is always intertwined by patterns of social life over and above the meaning of its individual components. I will discuss this below in greater detail when elaborating on Wittgenstein's remarks Z 567 and Z 568. For now, we can say that each individual episode is understood as being part of an overall weave, with the individual threads of action appearing and disappearing like the warp and weft of a fabric. Wittgenstein characterised the pattern as one requiring for its detection the participation in a ·conceptual world· (Begriffswelt). Institutions, on that model, could be called conceptual worlds (cf. Z 567-80). Sharing a conceptual world is, however, not necessarily a stable, enduring state. Although we share the same concepts within a certain community, future applications of a term are not 'in some *unique* way predetermined, anticipated – as only the act of meaning can anticipate reality' (PI 188). In Part II of this volume the idea of conceptual world is taken up in connection to my view on the art and making of an installation.

Bloor emphasises the fact that new inventions and creations are rarely done by one single person and need a (scientific) community to get consensus in order to get accepted. Thus innovation has the character of a process and not a point event (Bloor, 1997, p105). But here Bloor misses the point that the notion of creativity has various meanings in different practices. So it might be appropriate to distinguish between ·everyday creativity· and ·artistic creativity·. I will elaborate in greater detail on the subject in Chapter 3 when I discuss the various dimensions of knowledge, but it must be emphasised here that the discussions of Williams, Bloor (and Luntley later on) – and also Wittgenstein's insights – deal with the everyday setting of rule-following and do not take into account how rule-following relates to artistic expression. All the more interesting, then, to blend a philosophical inquiry into this subject with an investigation on the art of installation.

Bloor has little else to say on creativity. For him, it is only a repertoire of behaviour of a group of people that brings something into existence, that is, existence within a certain practice. Bloor gives the (sociological) example of the coin becom-

ing money (Bloor, 1997, p29). He is opposed to the idea of creativity or innovation being associated with isolation or asceticism, as in the cultural stereotype of a creative genius. For Bloor, creativity cannot be an individual accomplishment because the community decides whether or not a creation is an error, a confusion, a misinterpretation of a rule, or an innovative following of a new rule. To this, one may object that whether or not a community adopts a certain innovation says nothing about the creative act itself.<sup>5</sup> Undoubtedly there have been and still are numerous creative expressions or acts that are never picked up by anyone or that will be forgotten or unrecognised for a long time, because these expressions had nothing anyone else could recognise. This is most prominent in artistic creativity, as this form of expression challenges the accepted rules and issues of a community. For Bloor, creativity begins with the initiation of something he calls 'a proposal' that may evolve into a culmination when others begin to pick up this proposal. A response to Bloor could be that the real creative act is already present before this proposal.

5 >  
Compare here for instance what Steiner (2001) says about 'The ontological aloneness of the creative moment' (p71) and his discussion of a preliminary definition of 'creation' as the enactment of freedom and something which 'could not have been' or 'could have been otherwise' (p107ff).

A second argument against Bloor is that even from an individualist point of view creation is a process and not an event. If I understand him correctly, Bloor wants to situate *the results* of creativity within a shared institution (Bloor, 1997, p107). He restricts his views to scientific innovations, referring to Kuhn's sociologically oriented history of science and Popper's ideas on scientific development. Bloor does not have anything to say on *artistic* creativity, because his line of reasoning cannot deal with any outcome that would be an outcome outside the scope of a community. The strange, the weird, the outcast, the visionary prophets – none of them have a place in Bloor's institutions. Institutions are described by Bloor in a sociological way, thereby leaving no room for these particular kinds of innovation and renewal. In line with this, it is also obvious that (self)-reflexivity is not an issue for Bloor, since all reflection comes from engaging in a community, that is, from others. Thus we must conclude that Bloor offers us a somewhat restricted picture. I will come back to this in more detail later.

To summarise Bloor, a rule is a social institution and following a rule is participating in a social institution. An institution can be usefully analysed in terms of collective processes, having a self-referring or performative character. For Bloor, there is no individualistic fact of meaning. Wittgenstein's finitist theory of meaning says that meaning is generated in a step-by-step fashion. It does not pre-exist, but is created in response to the sequence of contingencies attending each stage of concept application. We cannot understand the properties of a group as a simple aggregation of the properties of its constituent individuals. What is characteristically social are the interactions of members of a group. Ultimately, for Bloor the mental *is* the social.

## 1.3 LUNTLEY

In contrast to Williams and Bloor, Luntley reads Wittgenstein's inquiries into meaning and rule-following as pointing towards an individual account – it is the primacy of the individual that counts in matters concerning rule-following. It is an account for representations plus rules for use (Luntley, 2003, p3). This use is understood by Luntley as consisting of the actions of agents taking an attitude of a judge. In the concept of individual doing, normativity is intrinsic and not social. So, Luntley's account is in a particular way strongly individualistic (Luntley, 2003, p96).

Luntley's main question is: What are the conditions for the possibility of intentionality and judgement? Luntley claims that the answer to this question reveals that grammar is perspectival and that the conditions for the possibility of intentionality and judgement consist, not in theoretical, but in perceptual knowledge – in seeing things aright, or, to put differently, in having a clear view (Luntley, 2003, p.vii). Because Luntley takes a metaphysical stance on grammar, he focusses on the conception of the subject's place in the world. He claims that there is such a thing as 'how things are for me' and situates this in how things are more generally (Luntley, 2003, p.vii). Hence, Luntley understands representation in terms of intentionality, i.e., a point of view. He presents 'seeing-as' as understanding in an unmediated way and concludes that grammar is perspectival.

As a consequence of his claim, the notion 'Form of life' is understood by Luntley as a transcendental concept. 'The given is the continually shifting, dynamic, pattern of life, the form of life,' although for Luntley this is not necessarily the pattern or the form of a community. Thought and reality (form and world) are one; seeing similarities is judging (Luntley, 2003, p45). It is our ability for seeing aspects that lets us dynamically see things aright [ibid].

Luntley opposes an empirical – contingent – notion of Form of life (cf. PI 19), but instead emphasises a biological – necessary – interpretation. In Luntley's interpretation of Wittgenstein's concept Form of life, it does not pick out mere empirical circumstances that surround the use of words, but it picks out circumstances that are necessary conditions for the meaningful use of words (Luntley, 2003, p71). It is a transcendental concept that selects the form of accommodation in which the world normatively impacts upon us. We study patterns of words, but what we learn and remember is more than the exhibited patterns. We learn and remember that words have been and are correctly used in certain ways. As a consequence, learning a word involves learning a Form of life. In this respect, a Form of life is the practice of using words calibrated directly against those things that provide the standards of correct/incorrect use. A Form of life is then another version of *use as practice*. It concerns our accommodations with the world which are purely conceptual (cf. PI 2 and 19) (Luntley, 2003, p72). Luntley, however, is not very clear about how these necessary conditions and this transcendental notion of Form of life hang together.

I take it that he means ‘necessary’ from an individual and normative point of view.

Luntley considers the notion Form of life primarily from an individual point of view. The pattern of collective action emerges from intentions, plans and perceptions of individuals as they respond to one another. What the social does, is support the focus of individual attitudes. A Form of life, then, concerns the shape of our individual attitudes and is consequently an agreement in attitudes (Luntley, 2003, p145). Luntley doesn’t differentiate or argue explicitly whether Wittgenstein meant Form of life as singular or plural, but his biological interpretation implicitly points at the singular.<sup>6</sup> It remains an open question of how singularity and/or plurality in agreement comes about. This is an important question, because Luntley makes a distinction between two dimensions of generality in concept possession: repeatability over time and repeatability over subjects. However, Luntley says the latter is of no concern, which is odd, because he argues for agreement in (individual) attitudes.

Luntley’s conception of intentionality is the idea that a subject has a point of view in terms of the conditions for the possibility of judgement. The subject – the individual – actively configures an attitude that involves a wilful organisation of systems of representation. Being a judge, the individual puts representations together as an attitude of will in order to make sense of his ongoing confrontation with things (Luntley, 2003, p1). Again, the question can be raised as to how agreement and normativity can be established from this individualist account. Let us, then, analyse Luntley’s position.

6 >

There has been quite some discussion on the question whether Wittgenstein had in mind a singular or a plural Form of life. There is the debate between Garver and Haller, for instance, where Haller emphasises the multiplicity of Form of life as a multiplicity of cultural facts. Garver, on the contrary, defends a Form of life as a singular concept. For more details, I refer to their discussion in Lütterfelds & Roser (1999, pp37-72). See also note 14 and section 3, pp88ff.

7 >

Marion (1998) provides a detailed overview on the problem on infinity – the ‘and-so-on’ – concentrating on Wittgenstein’s so-called transitional period. He discusses how Wittgenstein’s investigation into infinity wants to draw our attention to the complexity of proofs in mathematics and our wish for perspicuity. A proof is not a mere vehicle for recognising the truth, but determines the meaning of a mathematical statement or proposition. A rule does not assert that it is infinite, it *shows* it by allowing us to see an infinite possibility. Thus, there are no infinite *extensions*, only infinite *possibilities*. A perspicuous showing of an impossibility be it in mathematics or philosophy can produce a very special kind of understanding. See also Floyd (2000).

Grammar is the structure of the subject’s attitude to the world and thus perspectival. It is how the individual sees the signs. This is not an empirical fact about the world; that signs have grammar is a condition for the possibility of systems of representation. Grammar consists in the individual seeing the world aright (Luntley, 2003, p21). This ‘seeing aright’ is bound up not with an empirical dimension, but with the attitude we take. The will cannot alter the facts, but only alter the attitude towards the facts. The concept of attitude is required to make sense of the concept ‘and-so-on’, according to Luntley.<sup>7</sup> It is because we see things aright that we know in advance what form propositions take. Luntley combines this notion of seeing with the concept ‘and-so-on’ – thus invoking the infinite – that is understood as the concept of the successive applications of an operation. There is no fact that underpins the and-so-on and neither is there an experience. It is not given in experience, for it is a condition for the possibility of meaningful experience. That the form of the propositions is foreseeable – that we can see the ‘and-so-on’ – is a condition for the possibility of signs carrying meaning (cf PI 208). This is directly opposed to Bloor’s meaning finitism (compare Bloor’s point of view on page 67).

The conditions for the possibility of judgement do not require stating, they need to be *seen*. For understanding what we see in language use, we ask for a clear view (PI 5, 122). But that may be rather complicated, because there can be things

hidden from us without being part of an essence (PI 129) Luntley (2003). Here, hidden is better thought of as the ways our usage hangs together, that is, 'the aim and functioning of words' (PI 5). What is hidden is the structure of use, because it is a structure immanent to language use. Given its multi-faceted shape, this structure is difficult to take in, in a perspicuous (re)presentation. The aim is to see things right, and the way to do this is to throw light on the facts of our language by way not only of similarities, but also differences (PI 130) (Luntley, 2003, p51). What is hidden are the connections that exist in language use that must be seen – they cannot be stated. Here Luntley differentiates between having a Bird's-eye view – a view from the outside that is impossible for us to obtain – and having a synoptic view, that is, a view that is immanent rather than transcendent (PI 129).

It is in this way that Luntley underscores use as practice in which the notion of 'use' is treated as being the immanent normative structures of language use. Luntley sees this notion of language as use as having both a negative and a positive point. On the positive side, syntactic use and ordinary use of language can both be displayed fully transparent. The negative point is that Luntley sees use as practice as something opaque. In contrast to syntactic use and ordinary use that can both be described and displayed in a transparent way – as they are thin concepts – use as practice is opaque, because it cannot be fully described or articulated. Therefore it is also contestable and open-ended. This is a thick concept of use; it is more than a conception of words and the way they fit together (Luntley, 2003, p63). At the same time, we can take a positive view on this matter: we don't just learn the word 'game', but also what a name is. This involves a Form of life; words are embedded in their standard connection with action and with things (See also Cavell in Crary & Shieh, 2006).

Luntley doesn't discuss rule-following extensively, but focusses on the idea that for Wittgenstein seeing similarities underpins patterns of language use. Seeing similarities between things is primitive, and in it the patterns of correct use are immanent. Such a pattern thus does not consist in matching an abstract structure, but in our capacity to see similarities. Thus, it is not so much that our use of an expression in the context of a language-game fits a rule, but that we see similarities and act upon those (cf. PI 154). As Wittgenstein says: We do not see general forms, we see things aright (cf. PI 114, 134) – the normative force is in the seeing, not in the rule (cf. PI 69). Patterns emerge from particular couplings with the environment, and the absence of a general rule does not mean that we have to take a leap in the dark, but it is a space in which we have yet to achieve an appropriate coupling with things. Luntley treats seeing similarities as a coupling with particulars and concludes that creativity is not a later add-on, but is intrinsic (Luntley, 2003, p87).

Luntley's concept of practice seems akin with Williams in some respects. But contrary to her and Bloor, Luntley's practice-minimalism doesn't mention people; it



is engagement with *things* that constitutes a practice, not engagement with others. The latter supports the former but is not constitutive of a practice. According to Luntley, in understanding the notion of practice we should focus on the doing. This is something that Bloor's finitism also accounts for. But in contrast to Bloor, in the concept of doing, normativity is intrinsic and not social. This point of view makes Luntley's account in a particular way strongly individualistic (Luntley, 2003, p96).

Luntley's basic model of experience implies a confrontation between the self-as-will and that which is independent of will. As we have already seen, Luntley understands the subject (the individual) as a judge – or in other terms a 'self-at-will' – because he is actively, intentionally engaging with things. It is a direct touching and manipulation of things that takes place from within the intentional stance. What is independent of will is, according to Luntley, how things are; for instance, the physical fact of being in pain. Being in pain is not something I can will. In this way, a practice is composed of engagements with things by judges (Luntley, 2003, p108).

Joining the phenomenological tradition, but in contrast to Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, Luntley emphasises that there is no such thing as a body bringing in something intrinsically 'different' or 'extra' that is not already available from within word use (Luntley, 2003, p112). Doing certain things, then, is not what constitutes grasping a rule, it is what *exhibits* grasping a rule; there are not two things that are internally related, there is *one* thing – an active and directed attitude to the world. Luntley concludes that 'words have meaning only in the stream of life' (RPP II 687). Through our use of words the conceptual reaches into the world. There is no distinction between an inner and an outer life; it is the concept of the living human being that is primitive. Expression, then, is making oneself or allowing oneself to be transparent. What is special about subjectivity is the idea of a point of view, understood in terms of attitude of the will. Attitude is our take on the world. It is the point of view that makes reason-giving possible.

The notion of attitude has to do with aspect perception, according to Luntley: it is a form of aspect change when I suddenly see how to play the game. Luntley draws the conclusion that Wittgenstein's central insight is that we need to make a shift to a perceptual account of the conditions for the possibility of judgement. It is important to note that Luntley uses the notion of perception in an unusual, broader sense in his unitary model of experience. This model boils down to the idea that 'I may not know for sure how things are going on in the world, but at least I know for sure how things stand for me'.

Behind this model is a disjunctive account of perception that has a positive and a negative point. The positive point is that how things are for me becomes part of how things are. The negative point is that we lose Cartesian transparency – the idea that what is available to you in experience is knowable by and with certainty.

Luntley wants to emphasise that our mind is part of the world, and as such, is something that one can make an effort to know.

How does this standpoint work out in the case of meaning? Understanding consists in how you go on, it will depend on what you do. And that is something that is not transparent to you, for you cannot know for sure how you will go on until you do it (Luntley, 2003, p104ff). We, then, lose here the transparent Cartesian authority about how my own experience is going (Luntley, 2003, p104): there is no gap between me and the world. Transparent Cartesian certainty is exchanged for opaque uncertainty. This implies that the subject must be an active agent, with a specific attitude, a goal-directedness towards the world. This attitude is captured by saying that the subject stands to the world as a 'self-as-will', engaged with that which is independent of will. The inner is the way we stand to the world, it is the subject's point of view as being the directedness of their engagement (Luntley, 2003, p152). Furthermore, the subject's attitude to the world is based on a repertoire of capacities for seeing similarities and it is an attitude of judgement. This role of judgement points, in contrast to technique in the sense of Williams, to the fundamental creativity of language use.

Technique, as Williams understands it, suggests conforming oneself to something learned and accepted, while judgement reflects a more open attitude from the subject towards the world and thus can leave more room for uncertainty and doubt. Educated, competent language use is fundamentally open-ended and the structures and patterns of language are dynamic. So, Luntley understands the dynamics of the language use in a different way than Williams does.

The concept of seeing the world aright is what Wittgenstein means by continuous aspect perception, according to Luntley. Grammar is perspectival and the aim is to obtain a clear view, that is to see the world aright. This grammatical perspectiveness is presented by Luntley as an alternative for what Wittgenstein calls 'the ineffable' and is understood as the attitude of the dynamics itself. It is simply the encounters between us and the world that we do not need to talk about, not because they are ineffable, but because they are the kind of encounters in which we see the directedness of what we and others are doing; this is the way we simply do it – without reflection.

Luntley distinguishes three concepts of seeing: seeing-objects, seeing-that and seeing-as. The first needs to be trained and is, according to Luntley, the kind of seeing that we (but especially artists) need to acquire in order to present 3-dimensionality in 2-dimensional patterns. Wittgenstein focusses on seeing-that, which is what he means by continuous aspect perception; the seeing of similarities, which allows us to perceive internal relations (cf. PI 122). Luntley, then, takes Wittgenstein's conditions for the possibility of judgement not as theoretical knowledge, but as *perceptual* knowledge. We may add that this 'seeing that something is the case' is not only our

basic attitude but also is related to the artist's attitude, something that is already touched upon in Chapter 1 and will be elaborated on more extensively in Chapter 3 when I discuss Ryle and my idea of detached knowledge.

What I want to point out now, is that the word 'judgement' may be not the most appropriate word here. I would have preferred the word 'evaluation', because, in my opinion, that is what we do; we are constantly evaluating and re-evaluating our knowledge. The word 'judgement' points to decision and conclusion, while the word 'evaluation' takes a reflective element into account and thus gives rise to a more dynamic interpretation of attitude.

For Luntley, perceptual experience has two components. First, it has a given component, and second, it has a meaning-providing component concerning the first component. The meaning-providing component can be either a visual impression, something Luntley also calls a mental picture, or an interpretation or organisation of a number of experiences. Attitude, then, is the structure of our attention - the dynamic, restless judging. According to Luntley, Wittgenstein had two conceptions of will: the breathing in and out *with* the world and the setting/testing of our will *against* the world.<sup>8</sup>

8>

It is in this last case that the relation individual – social (world) can lead to paradoxes. Something I will not go into here.

For Luntley, creativity together with novelty is exhibited at the most basic level of cognition. Where there is an absence of a general rule that can guide our next step, this is simply the space in which we have yet to achieve an appropriate coupling of ourselves with things (Luntley, 2003, p86). This is similar to Bloor's ideas concerning finitism to some extent, but it differs from meaning finitism in that for the meaning finitist this next step is taken not by insight or seeing, but by *acting*. We create meaning as we move from case to case, on the basis of a decision. And, I would like to add, also by (re)evaluating, since we *do* reflect on our decisions and evaluate them for future steps, such as when we have the desire to improve ourselves.

Patterns emerge from particular couplings of the agent with the environment, they do not precede our encounters. Seeing similarities has priority over classifications for, if the seeing of similarities is treated as a coupling with environmental particulars this can explain how patterns of classification emerge from such couplings rather than precede them (Luntley, 2003, p87). Creativity in the sense of spontaneity for Luntley is part of the ground-floor account of concept possession; it is intrinsic to what we know about word use. Luntley does not distinguish between the various meanings of creativity, so that it remains rather obscure how he thinks that for instance artistic creativity may come about.

There also remains the question of how agreement between people, and people and objects can come into play and have consequences (see also page 72). Luntley distinguishes between two dimensions of generality in concept possession: one concerns repeatability over time, the other concerns repeatability across subjects (PI 199). Luntley claims that the second one is simply not important for Wittgenstein – it is generality in use that matters. The word must have a use over time; extension

of use over persons is not an issue (RFM 67, PI 257) (Luntley, 2003, p107). This last claim is problematic, because to acknowledge a Form of life – and thus in some way agreement between subjects – is to give account for some sort of repeatability over subjects. I will come back to this issue using Wittgenstein's remarks Z 567 and Z 568 to be discussed in further detail in section 2.1, on pages 78 and 79, and remark RPP I 175, quoted on page 87.

## 2 SIMILARITIES AND PATTERNS

According to Wittgenstein we respond toward similarities in a natural way. This is a precondition for human beings following rules, but this being attuned is not sufficient by itself. Bloor's as well as Williams's discussion of the role of similarities in Wittgenstein differ in a number of ways from Luntley's account. In what follows I will discuss the main differences.

Bloor and Williams do not specifically address the notion of similarities elaborated by Wittgenstein; this is probably because they start from a social point of view. The community – the institution – is built up from pattern governed rules that have to be learned. For Williams, the surroundings and circumstances dictate which rule(s) we follow. For Bloor, we move step-by-step in a self creating process against a social and collective background that consists of patterns. For both, seeing similarities is a pre-condition for training and learning.

Luntley elaborates on the notions of game and family resemblances in Wittgenstein's remarks, claiming to show that for Wittgenstein the seeing of similarities forms the basis for patterns of language use. Seeing similarities comes before the (normativity of) patterns, and thus is primitive. As a consequence, the primacy of seeing similarities between things requires a reconceptualisation of the role of judgement in concept possession (Luntley, 2003, p79).

Whereas Williams situates similarities within social practices and calls them our shared obviousness – shared as a result of training, learning and socialisation – Luntley takes similarities as a biological primitive. Thus, we could say that both take our biological make up as something primary, but for Williams the emphasis is on learning and the shared seeing of similarities as a product of that, whereas Luntley underscores seeing things aright, which does not require learning in a social context.

What Luntley calls a practice, 'is a composition of engagements with things by judges. It is the engagement in which we see similarities. Attention is purposeful seeing' (Luntley, 2003, p108). The concept of engagement picks out the directness involved in seeing that a word is used correctly (Luntley, 2003, p109). Be aware that the concept of seeing is a very rich concept. As Wittgenstein says, 'many concepts cross here' (PI II p211; p212f).

PI 154: ‘If there has to be anything “behind the utterance of the formula” it is *particular circumstances*, which justify me in saying I can go on.’ With this remark of Wittgenstein, Luntley tries to convince us that the normative force of reason is in the seeing, not in the rule. We do not see general forms, we see things aright (Luntley, 2003, p80) (cf. PI 69 and 71). The patterns of language use follow the seeing of the similarities. As we have seen, Luntley emphasises that in many cases there is no general rule; the seeing of similarities in particular instances must then be self-authenticating. This touches an epistemological as well as a constitutive point (Luntley, 2003, p83). The first indicates that justifications stop at some point, the latter indicates that there is an active role for language users: ‘the role of judge with a capacity to see similarities in things’ (Luntley, 2003, p84).

Philosophical Investigations Part II is dedicated to the notoriously difficult issue of seeing and Wittgenstein tries to shed some light on it by discussing what he calls ‘aspect seeing’ and ‘aspect change’, which I will consider in more detail later on in this chapter. What matters here is the emphasis Luntley (2003, p157) gives by taking seeing-that, viewed as ‘continuous aspect perception’, as primitive; as something that allows us to perceive internal relations. It produces an ‘understanding which consists in “seeing connections”’ (PI 122).



The duck-rabbit diagram  
PI II p520

Luntley presents a rather twisted argument concerning aspect change, using as an example the duck-rabbit picture. He rightly argues that seeing the duck in the picture is not a matter of interpretation, but a matter of seeing similarities with other ducks; thus it is a matter of being sensitive to an internal relation. But then, Luntley declares the switch itself as introducing a form of seeing that takes the notion of being *struck* as primitive (Luntley, 2003, p160-1). The picture-object can strike us and force a link upon us – for instance, between the duck picture and ducks we know in reality. But how does this come about? Luntley presents the solution in pointing out that it is our (engaged) attitude to the world. But is this sufficient to justify his claim here? As we already have discussed, an engaged attitude is in one way or another an agreement between subjects over time. To engage with things is not enough. As we have already seen at the beginning of this chapter, we cannot assign meaning by ourselves to ourselves – we cannot look at ourselves from a certain distance. That is, we have no clear view on ourselves; it is only through others that we assign meaning to others and thereby to ourselves. This is something that necessarily involves a temporal dimension.

### 2.1 SEEING ASPECTS

Where Bloor understands, citing Z 567, the whole hurly-burly of life as a pattern, weaving a social conceptual world (Bloor, 1997, p99), Luntley takes the same remark to emphasise the individual: ‘it [the whole hurly-burly] is the ongoing indi-



vidual engagement with the world and one another. Patterns, some of which we call social, emerge from this, but they are not constituted by anything social, let alone social agreement.’ (Luntley, 2003, p144). Who reads Z 567 right?

How could human behaviour be described? Surely only by sketching the actions of a variety of humans, as they are all mixed up together. What determines our judgement, our concepts and reactions, is not what *one* man is doing *now*, an individual action, but the whole hurly-burly of human actions, the background against which we see any action.

When we take a closer look on Wittgenstein’s remark in Zettel, we can see that he puts an emphasis on both the word ‘one’ and the word ‘now’. In my view he does this because he wants to emphasise the temporal dimension of our human behaviour and because of this the primacy of the social.

Bloor (1997, p99) directs our attention towards Z 567 after having discussed the case of Crusoe, who could not make any new rules because of his being deprived of a community. Bloor explains that Crusoe could give a new kind of bird a new name, thus creating and applying a new rule. But for a collectivist like Bloor, this strictly speaking has no meaning; Crusoe cannot be doing what appears he is to be doing, because he depends entirely upon his own resources. Innovation, for instance applying a new name to a new kind of bird, is a process according to Bloor. And being a process, it has an historical and social inner structure (Bloor, 1997, p96-97). Bloor divides this process in two parts: the initiation or what we could call the ‘proposal’ and a culmination, the fact that others may begin to take up the proposal and model their practices on the new exemplar. It is only in the latter case that innovation will become an institution. When we stop at the first phase – the initiation – it would remain something filled with ambiguity and could never produce any clear sense. To have a name is to have a *social status* – the individual move becomes a collective practice and the name an institution.

This idea of social status is linked by Bloor to his interpretation of Wittgenstein’s ideas on prototype or Urbild: something derived from everyday life and not mere thought experiments or our imagined responses to them. But as our discussion of the Urbild in Chapter 1 has made clear, this is not how Goethe understood it and Wittgenstein never disputes Goethe’s interpretation on this point anywhere! Bloor, however, reads Z 567 from the conviction that it refers to selecting our prototypes from concepts used for describing collective behaviour or behaviour within an interacting collective. To underscore this collectivist stance, Bloor also quotes the next remark, Z 568, where Wittgenstein emphasises that we should see life as a weave.

Seeing life as a weave, this pattern ... is not always complete and is varied in a multiplicity of ways. But we, in our conceptual world, keep on seeing the same, recurring with variations. That is how our concepts take it. For concepts are not for use on a single occasion (Z 568).

Bloor interprets this pattern as a pattern of social life. On Bloor's view, the collectively created, self-referring patterns are institutions that could be called conceptual worlds.

Luntley's interpretation of Z 567 seems to differ radically from Bloor's. The question then is: Are they really that different? And if so, given that it is only one brief paragraph, how could the interpretations be so radically different?

Concerning Z 567, Luntley remarks that 'Even this is not *constitutively* (my emphasis) social.' The bustle of life can still be interpreted as the individual against the world, as the ongoing individual engagements with the world and one another. Some of the resulting patterns we call social, but not all are constituted by social agreement. In this way, Luntley understands the patterns as individual behaviour patterns, while Bloor sees them as essentially collective, since for him the patterns can only emerge from engagement in a community or practice. So the answer to the first part of the question is *yes*. Bloor and Luntley interpret Z 567 in an essentially different way.

Luntley stresses the importance of coordinated group behaviour which can be revealed from individuals' responses to particular circumstances, that emerge from the intentions, plans and perceptions of individuals as they respond to one another (Luntley, 2003, p145). Bloor would not disagree with this last remark of Luntley. He would simply say that only in the institution – the social environment – are these intentions, plans and the like triggered. The point where the two views diverge is when Luntley successfully argues that the social supports the focus of individual attitudes, something Bloor would strongly object to. For Bloor, the individual is not the shaper of our attitude, on the contrary, our attitude is shaped by the social. It is the social that has meaning content. For Luntley, patterns become apparent from the way we use words and see similarities. That is why he makes his major claim that grammar is perspectival. It is the point of view the subject takes, it is his individual attitude that matters. This leaves us with the second part of the question: How can this difference in interpretation come about?

Luntley's point of view is connected with the notion of aspect seeing, as we have seen above. But how would Wittgenstein have interpreted his own remark? In my view, he implicitly takes this notion of aspect seeing into account: we can understand some action *now* as individual, *now* as social. So as a consequence, we could say that there is no need to choose between Bloor and Luntley – both are right and wrong at the same time. But this position raises the question of whether we can take the notion of aspect seeing as broadly as is done here.

So far we have only discussed aspect seeing in terms of visual perception. Therefore we need a more profound analysis of the notion of aspect seeing. This is something that can be done with the help of Baker. I will now discuss Baker's insights on the matter, because he connects aspect seeing to Wittgenstein's notion of *übersichtliche Darstellung*. Baker's elaboration provides insight into the relation

between the individual and reality and between meaning and seeing.


## 2.2 ASPECTS AND PERSPECTIVES

A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not *command a clear view* of the use of our words.— Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. A perspicuous representation produces just that understanding which consists in ‘seeing connections’. Hence the importance of finding and inventing *intermediate cases*. The concept of a perspicuous representation is of fundamental significance for us. It earmarks the form of account we give, the way we look at things. (Is this a ‘Weltanschauung?’) (PI 122)

It is obvious from the above remark that the *übersichtliche Darstellung* is an extremely important concept for Wittgenstein. Yet the only example Wittgenstein actually discussed in all of his writings is the colour-octahedron. Did Wittgenstein think of this colour-octahedron when he wrote PI 122? And why didn’t he give any other concrete examples of such an *übersichtliche Darstellung*, if the concept was such a central one?

In an article initially published in 1991,<sup>9</sup> Baker gives a survey of the notion of *übersichtliche Darstellung* as it appears in PI 122, stressing the connection that can be made between the remarks on the colours and the colour-octahedron. The issue at stake for Baker is the fact that *Durchsichtigkeit* or *Übersichtlichkeit* as such (Baker does not differentiate between these two concepts) is a leitmotif in the later work of Wittgenstein. Unfortunately the concept of *übersichtliche Darstellung* itself is not very surveyable or transparent. On the basis of two directions in which we could interpret the concept, Baker draws our attention to the fact that this concept is intrinsically related to aspect seeing and not to a notion of surveyability in the sense of perception or a perceptual report. In what follows, we will analyse Baker’s conclusion.

According to Baker the colour-octahedron discussed in *Philosophical Remarks* p52 is a diagrammatic presentation of conceptual connections. It seems as if the whole grammar of the colour words is orderly tied up in the diagram, and that, conversely, all sets of rules can be reconstructed by careful observation of it (Baker, 2002, p69). Just as clarity is considered essential for a mathematical proof, in which a complex fact is comprised and reduced to something that is manageable and surveyable, the clarity of a representation is, according to Baker, apparently explicable by its reference to the convenience with which we can remember and reproduce it (cf. RFM pp95, 143-53, 174). Once we have studied the colour-octahedron most of us are capable of drawing it and working out the further relations between the colours (ibid.). In this way we can discover, for instance, that we can meaningfully speak of a yellowish-blue, but not of a reddish-green (see also Chapter 1).



The colour-octahedron  
PR XXI 221

9 >  
Originally this article was published in R.L. Arrington and H.-J. Glock (eds), *Wittgenstein’s ‘Philosophical Investigations’: Text and Context*, pp35-68. Routledge 1991. Also reproduced in *Ludwig Wittgenstein. Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers* Volume II. pp68-94, 2002. Eds. Stuart Shanker and David Kilfoyle. Recently reprinted in *Wittgenstein’s Method. Neglected Aspects. Essays on Wittgenstein by Gordon Baker* Edited and introduced by Katherine J. Morris, pp22-51 Blackwell: Oxford. 2004.

Baker, too, is perplexed as to why there are no further examples of *übersichtliche Darstellungen* in Wittgenstein's work. Does the term *übersichtliche Darstellung* cover a family of representations of the uses of symbols, and if so 'should we then go on to identify numerous unlabeled instances in the text' as *übersichtliche Darstellungen* (Baker, 2002, p69)? Or is the lack of diagrammatic representations of conceptual connections in PI 122 'a proof that the remark on perspicuous representations is a fossil remnant of an extinct conception of philosophy?' After all, PR antedates PI by some 8 years, in which Wittgenstein may have changed his conception of philosophical method.<sup>10</sup> And there is a second problem, that of the indeterminacy of grammar as Wittgenstein understands it, captured in the phrase 'eine *übersichtliche Darstellung*' (PI 122) (*ibid.*), because it can only be a temporally and purpose relative capturing of a part of our grammar.

Baker points out two directions for exploring the notion of *übersichtliche Darstellung*. The first direction emphasises the concept of *Darstellung*. Because grammar and the use of our words lack perspicuity, we demand a representation that can provide that. The colour-octahedron for example can be taken as a representation – or a picture – of grammatical rules, visualised in a perspicuous manner. This approach has as a consequence that the representation is essentially distinguished from what is represented.

The second interpretation moves in a different direction and can be derived from the description of the colour-octahedron as an *übersichtliche Darstellung*. It is a 'rough representation of the colour space – and this is a grammatical representation, not a psychological one.' (PR p51). This suggests that the role of the colour-octahedron consists in a description of colour space by means of a representation of the grammar of colour words. But, Baker argues, a list of combinatorial rules for colour words, like 'There does not exist a reddish-green' or 'A shade of red can be more or less yellow' fulfils the same role. The diagram, then, would be only something that is more understandable than a separate rule or a list of rules. This implies that *Darstellung* – a representation – would not be effectively distinguished from *Zusammenstellung* (a composition). Viewed in this way, a perspicuous representation is only a specific arrangement.

The problem with this second direction is that for Wittgenstein an *übersichtliche Darstellung* is supposed to be a representation or an arrangement of grammatical rules taken as one whole. This ordering is aimed at a very specific relation, that as a whole gives us more than just an arrangement of those same rules. In the case of the colour-octahedron, the complete domain with all mutual connections and cross-connections between the colour-words is presented in one single perspicuous picture – that is, in a *meaningful* whole.

To summarise, the first interpretation Baker discusses is a perspicuous representation – *Darstellung* – of grammatical rules that is vitally different from a perspicuous ordering – *Zusammenstellung* – of grammatical rules. The latter implies that

10 >  
PR was written between 1929 and 1931, whereas the first prewar version of PI, the so-called Typescript, originates from 1937 or 1938. For an extensive elaboration see also the Bergen Electronic Nachlass.

the perspicuous representation is nothing more than a specific sort of ordering of descriptions of the use of our words. Baker describes the *Zusammenstellung* and qualifies it as a Bird's-Eye View Model, and subsequently shows that this approach is problematic (Baker, 2002, p71). Baker analyses these problems starting from the precursors of PI 122, that is to say TS 220, roughly the remarks 98 until 116. This will prove to be illuminating.

TS 220 is the early version of *Philosophical Investigations*. Here the source of the philosophical problems concerning the analogies that are embedded in our forms of language are taken to be the main problem of the 'form of representation of our language' (98a). According to Wittgenstein, a solution for philosophical problems is to bring about a change of aspect by putting analogies next to each other. For example, a juxtaposition of one notation, e.g., the verb 'is', can be converted into another one, for instance '=', or '∈'. Baker poses the question of whether we can generalise these examples from 98 and 99? In what respect can some part of our language game, e.g., with numbers or colour words, represent the whole? Or does it represent only itself? (Baker, 2002, p77). As far as Baker is concerned, what matters here is the generalisation of one example or a few examples over the whole of our grammar.

Something three-dimensional can be represented in something two-dimensional. Similarly, from a simplified object of comparison we can go to the full complexity of language, which can be seen as a new dimension concerning the symbols of the simple language game (PI p200-1). From this, Baker concludes that Wittgenstein does not take the simple language game as a fragment of a more complex one, but 'as a complete language game which can be projected onto an isomorphic subsystem within the complex one (on the model of correlating the natural numbers with the non-negative whole numbers within the system of rationals)' (Baker, 2002, p78). In this respect we can notice that Wittgenstein's use of examples marks an overall strategy within different therapies<sup>11</sup> in order to have philosophical problems disappear, because the correct treatment of each problem sheds light on the correct treatment of all (Z 465) (Baker, 2002, p78). Compare also the perception-puzzles Wittgenstein presents in PI II, xi and RoC.

From this point of view, an *übersichtliche Darstellung* is more than just a specific ordering showing us the use of our words. In some respect it is a complete ordering, in which all the possibilities stand in a necessary relationship. If we want to free ourselves from a certain picture we have of our language, we have to actively compare the picture that holds us captive with a model or example as an *übersichtliche Darstellung* in or of a language game, in order that this picture can be seen in a different light by means of a change in aspect. This 'seeing in a different light' is nothing but the performance of an aspect change. By subsequently pointing to a philosophical mistake with the help of an analogy, philosophical problems may

11 >  
The notion of 'therapy' should be understood in this respect as a technical term used within the context of philosophy.





The duck-rabbit diagram  
PI II p520

disappear. Only in a change of aspect between model and picture can a different way of seeing dawn.

Baker emphasises that the point of seeing aspects and aspect blindness is prominently present in TS 220, because the unity of the philosophical method works through the application of the concept of an aspect to grammar and language. Philosophical problems arise, for example, because the forms of representation of our language have taken a disturbing twist, in which language seems to leave no way out (98). A main cause of our lack of understanding is that we do not have an overview of the use of our words (100); the most important philosophical aspects remain hidden because of their simplicity and triviality, so that we do not notice them anymore as they are lying just in front of us (105). We then have to change the aspect in such a way that the system of expression that holds us captive is broken down by juxtaposition with another system (99). Wittgenstein himself elaborates this theory of aspect seeing in his investigation of the notion of the *Elementarsatz*, which he now considers as a ‘picture that holds us captive’ (108). It seems to be some kind of an illusion: what we take to be imprinted on our retina we see as the essence of things and only when we remove this optical illusion, we notice language as it is (110): so, we must learn to see other possibilities (102).

Whenever a picture holds us captive, our position is comparable with a certain perceptual report of the duck/rabbit diagram, Baker says. At a certain moment we see the picture only as a picture of a rabbit, and we are not able to see something else in it. At this point, what is needed is either a change of context or persuasion. We can persuade ourselves or be persuaded by someone else, in either case effecting a sort of conversion. This causes us to become open to a different perspective on the matter (116). For example, we can invent some absurd phenomenon to create different ways of looking, or we can surround the duck/rabbit diagram with other pictures of ducks or rabbits (BB p28) (LW 165). In Wittgenstein’s writings, *übersichtliche Darstellungen* can have totally different shapes and that diversity suits the diversity of procedures that can be used to show someone a new aspect. What all these procedures have in common is that they uncover unnoticed aspects or patterns in the use of our words.

The sequence 98 until 116 in TS 220 therefore points in the direction of a totally different interpretation of *übersichtliche Darstellung* than that of the Bird’s-Eye View Model.<sup>12</sup> Baker indicates that we cannot understand the method of construction of an *übersichtliche Darstellung* apart from the duty to solve specific philosophical problems. So, the introduction of an alternative notation, like the replacement of ‘is’ by ‘=’, or the substitution of the colour-octahedron for a two-dimensional colour circle, is always relative to a specific purpose. An *übersichtliche Darstellung* is a representation that makes it surveyable. In this way, the colour-octahedron and the standard method which uses colour co-ordinates<sup>13</sup> are two different *übersichtliche Darstellungen* of the use of colour words. This means that the

12 > Here Baker refers to the -logical geography- as Gilbert Ryle advocated with an approach to a positive role for philosophy and those who have an Augustinian picture of language (Baker, 2002, p72).

13 > In trades it is a custom to use colour metres (spectrophotometres), departing from a numerical colour system introduced by the Commission Internationale de l’Eclairage (CIE) in 1931 and extended through the years by defining the dimensions/parameters of the colours anew in l(clarity), a(red-green) and b(yellow-blue). The system is now known as CIE-lab and is especially suitable to capture colour differences or changes in colour (cf. www.colorsystem.com).

criteria for a successful *übersichtliche Darstellung* are strictly relative to specific situations and that they have to be judged by their effectiveness in changing a way of seeing that is connected to that situation. To find a way of inducing an aspect change and bring it to the attention of a person is a *creative* achievement and not a mechanical procedure. Making somebody see things differently is done by persuasion.

According to Baker, this is the reason why the Bird's-Eye View Model has to be rejected. The *übersichtliche Darstellungen* resemble above all the descriptions of possibilities. Not a single fact is stated; not a single thesis formulated and therefore nothing can be either attacked or defended. The forms of representation rest deeply embedded in our thinking as well as in our activities. That is why a change in point of view can be very difficult to achieve and may have far-reaching consequences. Seeing aspects is in some ways voluntarily and therefore not equal to perception. One must want to see things differently – if not, no change of aspect will take place. A person has to be willing to be open for change; in this respect, doing philosophy is working on oneself (CV 16).

In this way, Baker convincingly shows that an *übersichtliche Darstellung* is more than a *Zusammenstellung* and he illustrates his point by means of the colour-octahedron. The notion of an *übersichtliche Darstellung* as a leitmotif in the later work of Wittgenstein can only be analysed, just as the colour-octahedron, in terms of aspect seeing and not in terms of perception or a perceptual report.

Now we can ask how Luntley's ideas are related to Baker's analysis and how far Luntley's elaboration on the perceptiveness of grammar reaches.

The complex relation between individual and reality is also investigated by Wittgenstein in his remarks on colour and by means of the notions of aspect seeing and aspect change. The concept of *·Gestalt·* plays an important role here. We do not hear or see a set of unorganised sounds, or of dots of colours: we hear a melody, or see an object or a painting. We can call this 'an organisation', or 'a *Gestalt*' according to Gestalt psychology. Wittgenstein certainly was acquainted with Köhler's writings on Gestalt psychology, and was fascinated by the pictures typically used in that framework. These pictures, or as Baker calls them, diagrams, can be seen under more than one aspect.

The strange thing is that when we look at the duck-rabbit diagram in one way it stays the same and when we look at it in another way it changes completely. This picture can be seen as the head of a rabbit, but also as the head of a duck. Another example of the same phenomenon is the double-cross, which can be seen either as a blue cross against a white background or as a white cross against a blue background.

One explanation Köhler gives for this phenomenon is that we actually see two pictures in this aspect seeing, two distinct visual realities. But this implies the existence of private entities, assuming that in the change of aspect a change in the



The double-cross  
PI II p541

organisation of something other than the two pictures takes place. An aspect change would mean that we perceive the spatial relations between the various elements of the picture differently. That however, Wittgenstein claims, cannot be the case: no change whatsoever takes place in the organisation of the elements before and after the change of aspect – neither in their form nor in their colour.

Another explanation would be that it is not our private impression that has changed, but our interpretation of the picture. Wittgenstein's inquiry into aspect seeing mainly concentrates on this point: Is noticing an aspect a matter of perception or a matter of thinking? In particular, Wittgenstein wonders to what extent a concept like the perception of an aspect is situated between perceiving, which is a condition, and interpretation, which is an act.

For Wittgenstein both the relation between the individual and reality and the relation between meaning and seeing is situated in acting and not in some mental construction. His philosophy as grammar contains within it a quest to illuminate the use of our concepts and therefore emphasises behaviour and context. In the course of his inquiries into aspect seeing it emerges that whenever we report the dawning of an aspect to others it is not a description of an inner experience or of an interpretation, but much more a spontaneous reaction related to what we perceive. What changes is not what we perceive, or the organisation of what we perceive, but our *attitude* towards what we perceive.

We suddenly see the picture, or the colour, differently; we suddenly listen to a piece of music, or read a poem, in a totally different way. We situate what we perceive in a different context, and thereby are able to discover new connections. That is why a different context for the same object can change our perception of the object. What is important here is that, in ordinary perception, seeing an object implies that we approach it in all kinds of circumstances as the same object. In aspect seeing we approach the same object differently. This implies that normal seeing is constitutive for aspect seeing and therefore forms the background against which aspect seeing can take place. What is important for aspect seeing is our *imagination* and our *receptiveness* – our susceptibility to impressions.

For Luntley, attitude is intimately connected to continuous aspect perception. It is a form of aspect change when I suddenly see how to play the game; this is the 'Now I know how to go on!' (PI II xi) (Luntley, 2003, p148). This continuous aspect seeing can be regarded as a constant understanding, whereas an aspect change has to be regarded as a coming to understand. We all have in principle the capacity of aspect change, and someone who does not, we call aspect blind.

Wittgenstein discusses this understanding in PI II, but also in RPP with respect to meaning blindness:

If you say “As I heard this word, it meant ... for me” you refer *to a point of time and to an employment of the word*. – The remarkable thing about it is of course the relation to the point of time.

The ‘meaning-blind’ would lose that relation. (cf. PI p175a) (RPP I 175)

Meaning content is connected here with time, because a word can have different meanings at different points in time. We all have in principle the ability to assign different meanings to one word at different points in time and in various circumstances. This ability allows us to perform an aspect change. Someone who is meaning blind cannot make this aspect change, because he is unable to make the switch between the various meanings this word may have over time. Compare here the ‘Blitzschnelle’ of a thought with the necessity for the meaning blind to describe step by step every analogy or interpretation, that is to say, at every point in time the meaning-blind must orient himself anew.

Another point that ought to be mentioned here is that we can *all* become meaning blind the moment words have become so obvious for us that have lost their meaning. We have used them so often that they, as it were, have disappeared from our sight. Take, for instance the word ‘God’.

What matters in case of an aspect change, as we have seen, is its paradoxical character: something changes - we see either a duck or a rabbit - and at the same time nothing has changed in the picture. For Luntley this ostensible paradox can only be accounted for by a unitary model of perceptual content. This is presented by him as a model in which the normative standards of use are immanent to use (Luntley, 2003, p49). The unitary model of the content of perceptual experience, is the only model that can account for the paradoxical character of an aspect change, because what you see or hear always comes with normative content. It is the idea of the subject having a point of view, where this is understood not in terms of qualia, but in terms of attitude of the will. When I grasp the point of some activity, my attitude changes.

For Luntley, only the seeing is important here; although we may be tempted to say that it is half seeing half thinking, Luntley claims it is clear that Wittgenstein takes the concept of seeing as central. To support his claim Luntley refers to PI II, p200a, which says that ‘the primitive language-game which children are taught needs no justification; attempts of justification need to be rejected.’ By quoting this remark, Luntley wants to show that there is nothing paradoxical about (continuous) aspect seeing, because we can understand this seeing in a broader sense – that is, as *perceiving*.

Luntley distinguishes between two kinds of seeing: seeing objects and seeing similarities. The latter is subdivided in seeing-as, for example the aspect change in the duck-rabbit picture and seeing-that, which is continuous aspect perception. Seeing-that, for Luntley, is primitive in that we see that *x* is a rabbit, we see that

*y* is a duck. The duck-rabbit picture disrupts our ordinary sense of seeing-that and makes us aware of what is normally and naturally taken for granted – our perceptual experience has conceptual content all the way down (Luntley, 2003, p157). Again, my worry here is that Luntley is only analysing in a horizontal way and does not differentiate in levels or dimensions. There are other dimensions of perception he does not take into account. I will come back to this also in Chapter 3.

To be sure, Luntley only aims to analyse everyday perception, albeit in a broad sense. Still, there is another kind of perception, something Wittgenstein now and then touches on, especially in PI II, but never makes explicit. It is what one might call *poetic perception* (compare poetic understanding discussed in Chapter 1) – akin to the way artists perceive the world. This poetic perception takes place simultaneously with everyday perception, like a figure-ground picture. The artist experiences the world in a different light. Yet at the same time she is also a human being who lives and functions in an everyday community. This can be illuminated by an example from Wittgenstein, already discussed in Chapter 1.

The diagrams discussed so far, the duck-rabbit picture and the double-cross, show two possibilities within one picture: we see either the duck or the rabbit; we see either a white cross against a blue background or a blue cross against a white background. But Wittgenstein does not stop here. In the case of the double-cross he observes in RPP I 1017 that we can look at this picture in more than two ways:

Doesn't one have to distinguish among aspects, separating the purely optical from the rest? That they are very different from one another is clear: the dimension of depth, for example, sometimes comes into their description, and sometimes not; sometimes the aspect is a particular 'grouping'; but when one sees lines as a face, one hasn't taken them together merely visually to form a group; one may see the schematic drawing of a cube as an open box or as a solid body, lying on its side or standing up; the figure ♣ can be seen, not just in two but in very many different ways.

This observation squares with my own experience: the first association I had when I saw this picture was that of a parasol on the beach. Thus, it is not so much a depiction in two different ways, but a picture evoking a scene, against my personal and cultural background – within my Form of life.

### 3 FORM OF LIFE

The notion 'Lebensform' or 'Form of life' is only used five times explicitly in Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* and four times in his other work. These occurrences have been subjected to many interpretations. The five following quotes can all be found in PI:<sup>14</sup>



> PI 19: ‘And to imagine a language means to imagine a life-form[...]’ Wittgenstein tries to underline in this remark the fact that our language-games are interwoven with non-linguistic activities. When we exclaim ‘Slab!’ we not only understand what is meant with the word, but we also immediately understand the whole hurly-burly, that is, the entire scene this expression is embedded in. As early as in PI 6 he draws our attention toward these non-linguistic activities, when discussing how we teach children by pointing to objects, i.e., by ostensive teaching, and, later, by ostensive definition of words. The child is not yet able to ask, it is the teacher who directs the attention of the child to a particular object, while expressing the word. This ostensive teaching of a word is embedded in a nonlinguistic context. Therefore the nonlinguistic context is essential for understanding linguistic activities. In BB 134, imagining a language is equated with imagining a culture.

> In PI 23 where the term “language-game” is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the *speaking* of language is part of an activity, or of a life-form (Compare also RFM p335 and MS 119, 148). Wittgenstein wants to emphasise in this remark that speaking as such is nothing, i.e., it is not that what language consists in. Only within the broader context of including non-verbal actions is speaking the use of language. The multiplicity of language-games is typically something that belongs to us as human beings: we pray, we dance, we report, we speculate, etc. It is this ‘complicated surrounding’ that gives us the possibility of following a rule, as well as going against it or even extending it, since it is this practice that gives us the tools for our notions of correctness and incorrectness.

> PI 241: ‘It is what human beings *say* that is true and false; and they agree in the *language* they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in Form of life’ (Compare also RFM 353). As Wittgenstein already noted in the remark before PI 240, we do not disagree on the rules we as a community pass on from generation to generation. They form the framework for our practices. Thus, rules are not opinions, that is, they do not have the status of convictions or shared convictions.

> PI II p148: ‘Can only those hope who can talk? Only those who have mastered the use of a language. That is to say, the phenomena of hope are modes of this complicated Form of life.’ We humans do not hope only at particular instants; our hopes are tied up being with others within a context of a lived life, bound within a context of a period of time and circumstances and interactions with other human beings.

> PI II p192: ‘It is no doubt true that you could not calculate with certain sorts of paper and ink, if, that is, they were subject to certain queer changes – but still the fact that they changed could in turn only be got from memory and comparison with other means of calculation. And how are these tested in their turn? What has to be accepted, the given, is – so one could say – *forms of life*[...]’ – ‘Does it make sense to say that people generally agree in their judgements of colour? What would it be like for them not to? – One man would say a flower was red which another

14 >

The English translations are taken from PI. We can also recognise the concept of Form of life in other texts where it is not directly referred to, but a family related notion is: *Tatsachen des Lebens*: RPP I 630; *Phänomen des menschlichen Lebens*: Z 629; *Tatsachen als Urphänomenen*: PI 654; *Gemeinsame menschliche Handlungsweise* PI 206; *Gepflogenheit (Gebrauche, Institutionen)*: PI 199; *Lebensteppich*: PI II 489; RPP III 406; RPP III 862; *Fluss des Lebens*: Z 193, RPP III 913; *Gerüst der Sprache*: BGM IV 21; 323; PI 240; *Hintergrund*: OC 94; *Felsen, Grund*: PI 217; BGM VI 31; 333; *Naturtatsachen*: PI II, 578; Z 374; RPP I 48; *Naturgeschichte*: PI 25, 415, RPP I 48; *Naturgeschichte*: PI 25, PI 415, RPP I 1109.

called blue, and so on. –But what right should we have to call these people’s words ‘red’ and ‘blue’ *our* colour words?’

Four other passages, in which Form of life occurs elsewhere in Wittgenstein’s work, are more difficult to interpret, as reflected in the various ways they have been interpreted over the course of time:

> CE 404: ‘[...]it is characteristic of our language that the foundation on which it grows consists of steady ways of living (feste Lebensformen), regular ways of acting[...]’ From which we could possibly understand forms of life as forms of social interaction.

> in RFM VII 47 where he says, within the context of a discussion how a teacher will be able to interpret the rule for a pupil: ‘[...]this reaction (of the pupil following a rule) [...] presupposes as a surrounding particular circumstances, particular forms of life and speech[...]’

> in On Certainty 358-359 where he emphasises that there is a certainty that is ‘natural’ for us: ‘Now I would like to regard this certainty, not as something akin to hastiness of superficiality, but as a Form of life.[...]’

> and in PI p/226d and RPP I 630, where Wittgenstein says that it is something that we have to accept, it is something given.

From these quotations Garver (1994, p234-267) concludes that Wittgenstein thinks of the notion Form of life primarily as something that is directly related to our natural history. Kripke refers to this notion as ‘the set of responses on which we agree, and the way they interweave with our activities’ (Kripke 1982, pp96-105). Malcolm also argues for a naturalism which leaves open the relation of Form of life (Lebensform) to language-game (Sprachspiel).

Garver takes the Form of life to be a singular concept: We can only have various practices due to the fact that we have one Form of life. It shows how much we have in common. Understanding depends on ‘customs’ (PI 199), that is, it depends on both form and content and these are contingent and corrigible. Alienation from others rest on this – from not having learned the practices, but not from having a different Form of life (Garver, 1994, p248).

Garver tries to show that Wittgenstein could only have meant one Form of life, whereas Haller argues for more than one. The discussion is laid down in the so-called Garver-Haller debate and, briefly, comes down to Haller’s conviction that the ‘gemeinsame menschlichen Handlungsweise’ can be understood as various *forms* of life, in the sense of forms or types of acting – in something we could call the human being as social being (the ‘Nature of human Darsein’) (Haller, 1986, p208). Haller understands the multiplicity of Form of life as the multiplicity of language-games.

For Haller, the most obvious objection against Garver’s interpretation is to be found in OC where Wittgenstein divides two epistemological ways of certainty: a

‘kämpfende’ and a ‘beruhigte’ (compare OC 358 and 356,357,359). The first one is a doubting certainty; where we are convinced that we know something, but we have no ground for it. Take, for instance, when Wittgenstein calls something ‘Animalisches’, something beyond our rational urge for rectification. The second form of certainty is a Form of life (Haller, 1986, p211). The fact *that* people act linguistically shows the agreement of people, with an agreement in the Form of life being the practice of life – the habits, institutions and the like (PI 539). It is this ‘given’ that Garver, according to Haller, misunderstands. This ‘given’ as a physical law is not necessarily fixed forever as Garver claims. Haller quotes Wittgenstein CV, p45: ‘One of my most important methods is to imagine a historical development of our ideas different from what has actually occurred. If we do that the problem shows us quite a new side.’ In this way, problems can be seen under new angles and perspectives (Haller, 1986, pp208-216). See also note 6 on page 72. In my view, however, this argument is compatible with one Form of life, since there is only one human species and one world that can account for all development and variety. Haller confuses Wittgenstein’s remark concerning historical development with Garver’s starting from physical laws.

The way in which we interpret the notion of Form of life has an impact on our understanding of rule-following. How is Form of life connected with the individual and the social? And more to the point: Does this notion of ‘Form of life’ illuminate Wittgenstein’s ideas on the individual and the social?

By bringing in the notion of seeing into his grammatical investigations it becomes possible for Wittgenstein to situate conceptual grammatical inquiries into the broader context of a Form of life. In his inquiries into colour in RoC he discusses this wider context. In the background lurks the question of to what extent we are free in the use of our concepts. Wittgenstein compares a concept with a style of painting: Can we choose a style of painting just for pleasure? (PI II, xii). This conceptual investigation into Form of life is related, by means of the colour-octahedron in PR as well as the colour puzzles in RoC, to human nature and our natural history (RPP I 50).

What matters here is the way we human beings exist, living a human Form of life where nature and culture are inextricably bound up. The facts of our natural history, the ones for which we often have a blind spot since they belong to our life in such an obvious way that we tend not even to notice them, are a cause of ambiguity (the uncertainty or inexactness of meaning in language) and indeterminacy.

Wittgenstein discusses this point explicitly in RoC by means of blindness and colour blindness (RoC I 9, 10, 11). There appears to be a similarity between the relation of the normal sighted and colour blind and the relation between normal sighted and those who (hypothetically) could only see red and green. We have ‘no commonly accepted criterion for what is a colour, unless it is one of our colours’

(RoC I 14, 12, 13). Those who are normal sighted have no experience of what colour blindness means, nor what it means to be able to see reddish-green. Someone who is colour blind can learn the colour words and use them similarly to the way the normal-sighted does, but never in the same way. Neither can he use the word 'colour blind' in the same way the normal sighted uses it. The same holds for the possibility that there are people that have a different grammar than we do. We could never come to understand a distinct grammar of colour the way we understand our own colour grammar. But a different colour grammar can shed a new light on how we handle our colour concepts, for instance by using aspect change.

We can understand from this that nature and culture are inextricably bound up. It is our capacity to take various perspectives that allows us to get a perspicuous overview on a particular matter that we want to clarify. This capacity is related to our creativity and our powers of imagination.

According to Genova (1993a) only human thinking is capable of seeing something *as* something, that is, only humans are able to transform their ways of seeing. The reason for this is that we have imagination: we are able to make pictures of things that do not exist in reality. At the same time our use of pictures is based on convention. That is why it is sometimes difficult to see things differently. The use of pictures and, more importantly, the concrete pictures themselves, are firmly embedded in our lives. Or, as Genova (1995, p166ff) puts it: 'There is a transmutation between words and pictures that arises out of our life history and thereby makes meaning possible. In this way a word gets a face.' Because of this transmutation words get a specific meaning, a meaning that has the scope of a scene. Think for instance of Wittgenstein's discussion of the builders in PI 2: 'Bring me a slab.' That example illustrates that a picture only gets its meaning when it is embedded in an intentional situation.

The concept of a 'scene' as Genova uses it implies that the language users must be part of the scene in the language-game, in order to apply a picture and to decide whether it is the correct application. The only way to be able to do that is to vary the elements of the picture, to invent similar cases and to draw conclusions from it (Genova, 1995, p68ff). This demands active application and not just the ability to imagine a picture (cf. PI 395-397). The language-game not only emphasises the situation, but also the notion that we have to perform our thinking in concrete practices. Just like words, these scenes are public entities: 'The scenes give us public landscapes – not personal fantasies and with that pictures and also scenes are grammar.' (Genova, 1993b, p166). It is not quite clear from Genova's discussion whether she situates the primacy within the scope of the individual or that she takes a social stance. The way I read her and her reading of Wittgenstein, I take it that we do have inner images, but the pictures Wittgenstein is talking about in his later work are to be understood in a visual and spatial way, as part of human action and therefore something social (cf. (Genova, 1995, p73ff)). We can develop this extension from

picture to scene when we take a closer look at Wittgenstein's investigations of colour and aspect seeing.

First of all, as we saw above, Wittgenstein explores the notion of aspect seeing with reference to the colour-octahedron. This octahedron shows that some combinations of rules may concern different objects of comparison. Think, for instance, of the fact that the basic colour red is an intermediate colour of violet and orange and of blue and yellow, but is not a mixed colour of violet and orange, nor a mixed colour of blue and yellow. In an aspect change we can see a yellowish-red as orange and a bluish-red as violet. However, we are not able to use an aspect change in the combinations reddish-green, or yellowish-blue. Here we reach the limits of our powers of imagination. That is why we say that these colour combinations exclude each other.

Moreover, the fourth dimension of the colours is only accessible to us when we are able to perform a change of aspect, that is, when we use our powers of imagination. We see black *now* as a surface colour, *now* as deep or reflexive. Depending on the context we see the spot *now* as white, *now* as grey. The change of aspect itself is sharply fixed. The colour concepts that are involved in the aspect change, however, are ambiguous and context dependent. Consequently, in this fourth dimension we extend the flat two-dimensional colour patches with a special depth dimension, and with that we use our powers of imagination. Under a special exposure, for instance, we can assign a green cloth a red shine.

In an analogous way, Wittgenstein also tries to think about the foundations of language by reflecting on something that we cannot achieve with linguistic means. Aspect seeing is a tool by which we can get something into view without working up towards a meta-language-game. By connecting aspect seeing with the investigations on colour, Wittgenstein is able to come one step closer to the multi-dimensionality of the ineffable.

The concept Form of life refers to the ineffable tradition and cultural background against which language games are played. It is foundation and horizon of all language and language games, and indicates a contextual implication of Wittgenstein's thought concerning the overall background of language. Note that this is itself a context dependent, dynamic relationship. Form of life and language-game are related to each other as a figure-ground structure in the sense of the double-cross: what is background for one language-game can be a language-game itself in another context. This means that we cannot separate them: 'And to imagine a language means to image a Form of life.' (PI 19) (cf. (Hiltpmann, 1998, p102ff) and (Fischer, 1987, p48ff)). Hence, the facts of human history, psychological and physiological, although not expressed in language-games, implicitly are always present (RPP I 78) (OC 142).

The descriptions of grammar in the later work of Wittgenstein are connected with the reflection on the possibility of providing a foundation for language use.



The background of language, i.e., the background of what is expressible, is for us *inexpressible*, and not merely obvious, as Williams holds. The obvious, as Williams takes it, can be expressed in language, but we normally do not do so, simply because we take this obviousness for granted. The concept of the inexpressible is far more abstract. In order to get as close as possible to the inexpressible, we have to make use of linguistic means in such a way that the inexpressible can dawn ‘in between’ our use of language. This is illustrated, for instance, when we say that we see or read something between the lines of a poem or a religious text, but also what dawns between a gesture or a picture and the language accompanying it.

### 4 GOING SOLO

At this point, I want to return to the example of Crusoe and explore in which ways our powers of imagination and creativity are tied up with rule-following and how this is related to the natural and cultural context.

Bloor’s idea on Wittgenstein’s Crusoe example is that of a Crusoe being stranded on an island, separated from other human beings, thereby unable to engage in a social activity. This Crusoe will not be able to follow rules, according to Bloor. Bloor emphasises the cognitive dimension of rule-following, in which conceptual possibilities are translated into conceptual worlds, and as a consequence, show a shift from the primacy of the individual to the primacy of the community. According to Bloor, meaning does not pre-exist, but is created in the responses which necessarily come from others. Thus, Crusoe, getting no responses, i.e., isolated from any institution, can only follow rules insofar as he has already participated in a community where he learned these rules. He takes this position as to argue for a necessary social stance of rule-following for systematic reasons, but his insights here do not square with Wittgenstein’s remarks.

Wittgenstein didn’t mean this kind of Crusoe – what he meant was the *solo-linguist*, one who has never participated in any kind of engagement with others. Wittgenstein’s thought-experiment of Crusoe was meant as an attack on the idea of a private language and as an investigation into our powers of imagination. In the inquiries into our solo-linguist, Wittgenstein as well as Bloor are doing conceptual research in possibilities, that is, a conceptual investigation into the possibilities of rule-following. But Wittgenstein tries to show that possibilities as such are not enough: what also matters is the context. Let us take a look at the possibilities in relation to the context of various kinds of Crusoe and ask ourselves: What kind of Crusoes can we distinguish?

1 > The linguist within a social context. This Crusoe learned a language within the context of a community. That’s us: the normal everyday language user.

2 > The linguist outside a social context. A Crusoe who learned a language within

the context of a community, but is by circumstance deprived of human contact. This is the Crusoe described by Defoe.

3 > The solo-linguist within a social context. This Crusoe has never learned a language from a community, but has learned a language of his own and yet is somehow part of a social community. The question here is whether this is even imaginable.

4 > The solo-linguist outside a social context. In this case, Crusoe never learned a language within a community and does not live within the context of a community; thus, he is totally deprived of any human contact and has a language only he speaks. Again, can we imagine the possibility of such a person?

Luntley makes a shift from the primacy of the social to the primacy of the individual with respect to meaning and rule-following, by trying to convince us that a Crusoe need not interact with other human beings, but merely with things. Luntley needs this interaction with things, because he wants to focus on a broad notion of perception that can underscore his claim that grammar is perspectival. Luntley elaborates on the conditions for the possibilities (of judgement) on aspect perception, and the importance of the notions of intentionality and seeing. The grammar, then, consists in the subject seeing the world aright (Luntley, 2003, p21). But when we look at the list above, especially at Crusoe number 3, we come to the conclusion that Luntley is not very convincing here.

For Wittgenstein, the essence of language is that its function lies open to view and can become surveyable by rearrangement (cf. PI 92); most importantly by seeing similarities. Wittgenstein's inquiry into this essence of language is strongly related to his notion of language-game. We learn patterns of simple language use as can be seen by his example of the builders. This model of the builders shows how words are exchanged between people – the use calls forth a response (PI 2). This must be understood as something essentially communal, but it is not the case that all language-games require two or more people. We can also *imagine* language-games we do solitarily and there actually are such games, like playing patience (cf. PI 69-71). The concept of a game is not precisely described, as it is not possible to draw fixed boundaries between what we call a game and not. It is a concept with blurred edges (PI 71).

Our solo-linguist Crusoe number 2, the one who has learned a language within a community but stands outside the social context, whether a caveman or not, is a borderline case – he stands at the edge of our conceptual world (RFM VI, 41).

In PI 243 we are beyond our solitary man, totally severed from any (inter)action. There are no criteria, he will not be understood ... he will not even be understood by himself. Without criteria, he is unable to assign meaning to anything. As Wittgenstein says in PI 243:

A human being can encourage himself, give himself orders, obey, blame and punish himself; he can ask himself a question and answer it. We could even imagine human beings who spoke only in monologue; who accompanied their activities by talking to themselves. – An explorer who watched them and listened to their talk might succeed in translating their language into ours. (This would enable him to predict these people's actions correctly, for he also hears them making resolutions and decisions.)

But could we also imagine a language in which a person could write down or give vocal expression to his inner experiences—his feelings, moods, and the rest—for his private use?—Well, can't we do so in our ordinary language?—But that is not what I mean. The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language.

Luntley would have some difficulty explaining his idea on individual primacy in his response to Wittgenstein's remark that is quoted here, presumably. But what about Bloor? Bloor emphasises a radical social position with his concept of social institution as a self-referential model (cf. RFM VI 32) (Bloor, 1997, p34). What is called an institution is in fact a collective pattern of self-referring activity. These self-referential, self-creating and performative processes are located, according to Bloor, within rules and rule-following and are connected with the normative aspects of rules (Bloor, 1997, p33). Because they are self-referential there is nothing behind them – this is precisely what the normativity of rules consists in. These collective processes of self-reference leave their mark at the individual, psychological level. So, if I read Bloor correctly, our cognitive abilities of creativity – understood in a broad sense – provide the means for a collective conceptual world.

Games are constituted by practices. A practice can have more than one language-game; for instance, a university system or an art practice consists of a variety of language-games.<sup>15</sup> We can draw a connection between these language-games and the ideas Wittgenstein took from Frazer's elaborations on rituals. Compare, for example, PI p226-227 which discusses a coronation that makes someone monarch. At this point, everybody calls this person a monarch – they instituted or installed him. The act is self-referring, self-creating and self-validating. Here we see an important link with the art of installation in visual art and Wittgenstein's notion of *übersichtliche Darstellung*. The moment that an installation is presented at the opening reception of a gallery or a museum, every visitor who enters experiences the installation within that specific context. The moment an *übersichtliche Darstellung* is presented everyone will accept it as such within the context of a particular purpose.

Wittgenstein was aware that we extend labels to cases that do not contain all the features of the prototype (Z 122; CV 14). In these cases we deal not so much with rules as with analogies, since analogies leave more room for ambiguity and

15 >  
The language-game as a basic metaphor for language was adopted by Wittgenstein from Mauthner. In the secondary literature the notion of language-game is mostly treated on a par with the notion of practice.

imagination. There is no hard and fast line to draw between the thinkable and the unthinkable, just as there is no hard and fast line to draw between what can be called 'regularity' and what cannot (RFM I 116). As far as Wittgenstein is concerned, we should not reify meaning, but must keep it tied down to the context of use and interaction, and only then will its finitist and social character be evident. Meaning is always indeterminate; the correct notion of what it is for meaning to be determinate is pragmatic and contextual. Wittgenstein's position is that use determines meaning, not that meaning determines use (Bloor, 1997, p88). Future applications of a term are not 'in some *unique* way predetermined, anticipated – as only the act of meaning can anticipate reality' (PI 188). Nothing in our heads could possibly contain all determinations of a word or a concept. Constraints – e.g. the limits of a colour we name 'red' can be generated as and when they are needed, without the superfluous assumption of pre-existence.

Crusoe number 2 will survive on an isolated island, but only within the very limited context of the island. Born on such an isolated island as a full blown solo-linguist, Crusoe number 4 will somehow survive, but then . . . can we still say that he is following rules, the way we do in everyday life, embedded in a community? In what respect can we imagine solo-linguist 4 really existing? Will he be able to use language? If so, then what sort of language? And could there exist a form of life that he himself could call 'Form of life'? In the light of Wittgenstein's private language argument this would be conceptually impossible.

We started this journey with the question of whether the person/individual and collective/social could be understood as one and the same in some respect. And if so, what would the implications for a proper understanding of Wittgenstein's investigations in rule-following be. How can we account for new meanings from existing rules? How is it possible to extend rules, go beyond rules, or even set rules completely aside? Is it possible to make new rules, and if so, do we really make new rules or is something new necessarily bound up with already existing rules in some way? How are we able to play with these community conceptions of rules and normativity? In which ways are the individual and the social bound together when we ask whether new rules are possible? How does our imagination come into play?

All three, Bloor, Luntley and Williams, acknowledge that we have instinctive, primitive, biological abilities or shared natural reactions, responses towards examples. For Bloor and Williams this can be understood in terms of a way of acting, whereas for Luntley this is a matter of seeing, which like acting, is something active. In contrast to Williams, Bloor admits that in learning a rule there is always the problem of the next step, the move from previous to new instances of a concept. But he embeds rule learning within a necessary social framework; as Bloor understands it, the boundaries of language-games are social accomplishments. Meaning is created collectively and pragmatically. Unfortunately, by emphasising the primacy of

the social, Bloor excludes any person who goes beyond the rules of the community: the eccentric, the outsider, the weird, the artist.

As for Luntley, what especially bothers me about his line of argument is the fact that for him seeing things aright - having a clear view - is the ultimate aim. But isn't it the case that having a clear view precedes our motivation and our will to act instead of the other way around? In my view, it is only when we have a certain insight – be it conscious or not – concerning a particular matter (call it a clear view on what is shown or an *übersichtliche Darstellung*) that we get the motivation which in turn triggers the will to act. I will return in Chapter 3 to the notions of seeing and insight and the concept of vision related to Wittgenstein's inquiries.

Now, of course we can agree with Williams that setting a standard or fixing meaning requires a certain surrounding or situation. Bloor even underscores that it is only this situation – for him an institution – that allows for the establishment of a rule. Williams discusses the fact of transformation from the empirical to a norm, from the individual to the social and vice versa, in her emphasis on teaching; Bloor touches on the same issue in his notion of culmination. Bloor emphasises, correctly in my view, that the social character of a situation arises when we have interactions that are informed by expectations and some measurement of shared understanding.

But I differ with Bloor on his notion of the impossibility of individual innovation. I hold that individual innovation is not an event as Bloor states, but a process. Moreover, his view that innovation can only be an innovation when it is collectively processed is not very satisfying. If there is no individual process, than no social process; and vice versa – no social process, no individual process. When there is no individual innovation triggered, there is no possibility for the community to pick it up and accept it. In this respect, I can also not agree with Luntley who claims that the social merely supports the focus of individual attitudes.

My conclusion is that we need both directions: the individual *is* the social; the social *is* the individual. It is only for practical matters – for matters of clarification – that we distinguish between the individual and the social. I think Bloor's speculation that for Wittgenstein mental states *are* social states (Bloor, 1997, p50) points in the same direction. It is the perspective we take that decides whether something is called individual or social – and in this respect it is even rather deficient to speak in terms of primacy. Maybe it would be better to speak of perspectival criteria.

This apparent paradox of the individual and the social that is solved by taking the perspectival stance squares my own artistic experiences. Artistic experiences differ from everyday experiences in that the artist typically uses a meta-view in order to investigate an issue or a conceptual question. Although Williams, Bloor and Luntley, and also Wittgenstein, take everyday life as a point of departure, it is interesting to compare their insights with the artist's meta-view – something that shows the outcome, instead of describing a phenomenon or formulating a theory about it.



The artist has to deal with both everyday experience and artistic experience, and be able to differentiate between the two. What is special about the artistic meta-view – at least the way I understand it – is that it tries to shed light on, or in any case raises, publically unanswerable questions.

In 1998 I investigated the question of what happens to a human being when made to be totally reliant upon her own resources. Locked up for two weeks in a fallout shelter<sup>16</sup> and totally deprived of any human contact, I found out how intermingled the individual and the social are by experiencing the lack of a third element – something that Williams, Bloor as well as Luntley forgot to take into account – namely, that of nature.

The rules people make up together are connected with their experiences in nature: the rising of sun and moon, the division into day and night, the distinction between warm and cold, between the various seasons, and the like. In an environment such as a fallout shelter all of these natural sources no longer play a role and not experiencing them for an extended time was very confusing.

Also, the need for rules and conventions disappeared due to the lack of anyone responding. What I missed more than I could possibly imagine was the warmth – literally – of the sun and of other human beings. In these extreme circumstances – more extreme in some sense than our solo-linguist Crusoe number 4 for he would have at least a natural environment to engage with – I came to the understanding that by radiating our bodily warmth in everyday life we keep each other alive. And to lack this radiation is to experience death.

In the beginning of this two-week stay, I took a mirror when I felt the need for company and looked at myself as if I were someone else. But it was of no use, as the mirror did not reflect another human being who would be able to respond in his or her own way; so I dropped the idea. Slowly all of my senses became inert, all initiative died, there was no motivation whatsoever – only spleen and inertia remained. Speech also disappeared very fast. Speaking aloud to myself quickly turned into speaking to myself internally, which at times turned into even vaguer intuitive associations and reflections beyond, or below language. I do not know exactly how to put this.

What we are talking about here is our Crusoe number 2, the same Crusoe that Bloor has in mind. A Crusoe, completely isolated from any social intercourse and thrown upon her own resources, is of course capable to use language and follow all the rules she has learned. She can 1) proceed from what she already has and 2) on this basis invent new rules. But being stuck in an environment such as a fallout shelter she will not do so. There is no *reason* whatsoever to follow any rules except those that will keep her alive and even then .... There is no response to her actions, everything remains silent. No one corrects her, stimulates her, there is no one who listens, who (re)acts towards her behaviour. Thus, there is no reason whatsoever to act.

16 >  
For more information on the Shelter project I refer to the folder that is included in the book.

17 >  
The Scottish sailor Alexander Selkirk, born in 1676, was stranded at the age of thirty on a small island in the Pacific Ocean and was forced to stay there for more than four years. In early 1709 he was rescued and brought back to his country. Returned to Scotland, Selkirk never adjusted to civilisation, but made his home in a cave where he lived a reclusive life for the rest of his years. Later Daniel Defoe would use the story of Selkirk's adventures as inspiration for the character and adventures of Robinson Crusoe. See also Souhami (2001).

This will differ enormously from the experiences of Selkirk,<sup>17</sup> the sailor who had to survive for more than four years on a deserted island, the one Daniel Defoe based his story of Crusoe on. Selkirk had many reasons for acting: he was forced to actively search for food and shelter, to protect himself from dangers, to understand the laws of the island for his benefit. He had to remember numerous details concerning the environment and the like.

In the fallout shelter it is simply that nothing happens. There is no need to remember anything, for there is nothing meaningful to remember. There is no need to anticipate events that could happen – even the air stands still. The grey concrete is the only boundary of space, but because there are no contrasts – the contrasts between warm and cold, day and night, what is normally experienced in everyday life – this boundary is literally the end of the world, the ultimate edge. There is no colour, no daylight, no changing of sun and clouds, no change in temperature, no need for finding food, nothing of the sort. Therefore, the necessity to maintain conventions will disappear very fast, because of these total lack of responses. Ultimately, the utter lack of sense or meaning to follow rules will effect one's attitudes.

# Rules for C H A N G I N G a Belief-System

Photo installation Do not Erase . . .


Do not Erase . . . wait for Meaning, Arti et Amicitiae, Amsterdam 21|6-13|7 2008

Photo installation Do not Erase . . .

Do not Erase . . . wait for Meaning, Arti et Amicitiae, Amsterdam 21|6-13|7 2008



### 3 > WAY & WORLD



1992-1993 The Tribe

As we have learned from the previous chapters, Wittgenstein's notion of *übersichtliche Darstellung* is of the utmost importance for us. First of all, it is because we can use it as a tool to detect pictures embedded in and evoked by our language. These embedded pictures can be fascinating, but at the same time be also source of misunderstandings. When we are practising philosophy we especially want a language that is clear and perspicuous – one that tells us how the world 'really' is, without self-deception or illusion. We can try to reach this goal by rearranging elements of a particular part of our language in such a way that it puts us at ease by means of an *übersichtliche Darstellung*. In this way it functions as a tool for understanding how we might be freed from philosophical problems, as well as a tool for investigating what gestures and pictures are important to us and how they influence the language. In Chapter 1 we saw the various ways an *übersichtliche Darstellung* can manifest itself: a model, a proof or a philosophical question. However, we focussed from different angles on the one that Wittgenstein explicitly explores: the colour-octahedron.

Second, it is not only a tool – something used in a particular function – but also a method, an approach that is used in a systematic way in order to free ourselves from philosophical problems caused by suggestive language. It can be used to solve these problems through logical and 'aesthetic' clarification (see page 22 of Chapter 1). In this way it connects art and philosophy. In the second part of this third chapter I will examine the idea of a method in more detail. For now it is important to keep in mind that this tool and method addresses our powers of imagination as



well as the ways in which we learn and act according to the language rules of our community.

The second chapter, therefore, was concerned with this complex intermingling of both our ability to adapt and learn the rules in a rule-governed practice, and also the going beyond the norms and the rules that constitute a community by means of our creativity. The example of the Crusoes has shown that the distinction between the individual and social is merely a construct we use for practical purposes. It is the context that decides whether something is primarily individual or social. This context can be divided into an immediate context (of a sentence or a thing), a narrow context in which the sentence or a thing functions, and the broader social and historical context – the world we live in. The interrelatedness of rules, context and creativity brings forth a reflexive dynamics, that is, a mutual movement of rules, context and creativity that can produce change and renewal in unexpected ways. An important feature of this reflexive dynamics is our ability for seeing aspects and aspect change – that is, our powers of imagination.



The duck-rabbit diagram  
PI II p520

Conventions and customs make it that many things are for us so obvious that we do not notice them anymore. When we take another perspective – a different point of view – we can come to see these unnoticed things again, ‘anew’. In the first chapter we discussed the notion of aspect seeing mainly in terms of visual perception, but saw in the second chapter that we should explore a broader version of this notion; something that can also account for a cognitive dimension is also needed. As Wittgenstein himself asks in PI II: Is noticing an aspect a matter of perception or a matter of thinking?

As we demonstrated in our explorations in the previous chapters, aspect seeing is neither purely a matter of perception nor a matter of thinking; it happens somewhere ‘in-between’. We could call this active creative process – the taking of a different perspective on a matter at hand – a cognitive dimension, because both perception and thinking are involved in the use of our powers of imagination. This cognitive dimension comes to the fore when we perform an aspect change. In an aspect change there is something that changes. For instance we see a duck *now* as a duck, *now* as a rabbit, yet at the same time nothing has changed; the duck-rabbit picture itself remains exactly the same. What we need in order to accomplish this change is, aside from our powers of imagination and receptiveness for impressions, knowledge of ducks and rabbits. We have to *know* what a duck looks like and we have to know what a rabbit is in order to be able to see the aspect change. Aspect seeing is a tool through which we can bring something into view without working up towards a meta-language-game.

The elaborations on rule-following and normativity made clear that the rule-following debate as discussed by Williams, Bloor and Luntley cannot properly account for innovation and novelty. We need to bring in explicitly the notion of creativity and with that our powers of imagination to show how renewal and nov-

---

elty are possible. Because the notion of creativity has various meanings in different practices, we must distinguish between everyday creativity and artistic creativity.

The present chapter consists of two parts. In the first part, I will compare rule-following with everyday creativity and artistic creativity by an elaboration on 'dimensions of knowledge'. The question to be examined is: Is creativity a form of knowledge and, if so, what sort of knowledge? In what follows it will become clear that everyday creativity and artistic creativity cannot be reduced to one another, and neither are they two separate domains, but can be illuminated in terms of dimensions of knowledge. This will give us the opportunity to connect philosophy and art.

The second part of this chapter will be devoted to the question as to what extent Wittgenstein's way of practising philosophy, based on our elaboration on *übersichtliche Darstellung*, could count as a method. I will argue, that in any case his later work should not be understood in any strict sense as a method. Wittgenstein did not build a philosophical system after he finished the *Tractatus* and I do not believe he had any intention to do so in his later work. His way of working out ideas after TLP was too idiosyncratic – something he actually said himself in the preamble of PI and it was only after his death that numerous others have occupied themselves gathering of all his remarks and putting them together into publications.

In another sense, however, we could mark his later philosophy as a method insofar as it reflects a *vision* on practising philosophy, which, it can be argued, is closely related to his attitude towards life. His work shows a consistent occupation with various philosophical issues in a very personal way. I will suggest that we call it a *·way of life·* or *·attitude·* or *·vision·* instead of a method. We can appreciate a similar urge for such an all encompassing vision in (visual) art, when we say, for instance, that the work of an artist reflects a specific vision on the world. The value of the work, then, consists in the way this vision is worked out. This vision cannot be fully reproduced by others, since it is inextricably bound up with the person, the character, personality traits, attitude and personal and cultural life history, developed and expressed over the course of time into a specific body of work. I understand the visionary not as seeking the wonder in the extraordinary or the exceptional, but instead seeing the wonder in the most obvious, the most common things in our everyday life: to wonder *that* the world exists.

The chapter finishes with a reflection on the place of philosophy as well as the place of art in our present times. I will argue that the two disciplines have some characteristics in common and that they can learn from each other in an unexpected way.

## 1 DIMENSIONS OF KNOWLEDGE

In the beginner's mind there are many possibilities, in the expert's mind there are few  
Shunryu Suzuki

In this section I begin with an overview of the discussion Ryle (1949) started with his article on knowing-that and knowing-how in which he wanted to show that 'there is no gap between intelligence and practice corresponding to the familiar gap between theory and practice' (Ryle, 1949, p212). Intelligence can be practical as well as theoretical, to be exercised in an act. To do something intelligently, according to Ryle, is not doing something 'in the head' or something 'in the outside world', but it is 'to do something in a certain way'. Ryle accuses philosophers especially of not having distinguished properly between knowing that something is the case and knowing how something is done. Philosophers stress the knowledge of truths and facts, but tend to ignore the ways and procedures of doing things, something that is logically prior to knowing-that something is the case (Ryle, 1949, p215).

The debate, following from Ryle's discussion, focuses on the question of whether or not we can reduce knowing how something is done to knowing that something is the case. Stanley & Williamson (2001) (S&W hereafter) claim that we can: knowing-how is a species of knowing-that. Hornsby (2006) replies to their paper and accuses them of oversimplifying the issue: *sometimes* knowing-how can be reduced to knowing-that, but at other times definitely not. Hornsby adds a phenomenologically oriented perspective to the debate, pointing out that there are pre-conditions that are not situated within the scope of knowledge. It is because of these pre-conditions and 'residues' of knowledge that the interrelation between knowing-that and knowing-how is much deeper and more refined than S&W presuppose, thereby stressing that 'knowledge' is a fundamentally plural concept. This notion of plurality is also important with respect to the analysis and argumentation of what creative and artistic knowledge might refer to, as I will show.

1 >  
Although a huge amount of papers and commentaries have been produced on Ryle's distinction between 'knowing-that' and 'knowing-how' his insights on imagination have caught little attention. In this volume there is little room for an in-depth analysis of this issue, but I nevertheless want to emphasise the importance of such an analysis.

Alongside Hornsby, I briefly discuss some other more phenomenological directed approaches, for instance the approaches to the knowing-that/how debate of Noë (2005) and Snowdon (2003), but only insofar as their views contribute to the inquiry into imagination as a kind of knowledge that allows for detached knowledge, and help gain an understanding of creative and artistic knowledge.

Proceeding from the knowing-that/how debate I discuss the relationship between imagination and creativity. Again Ryle (1971a) is of help here with his inquiry into the concept of imagination.<sup>1</sup> I will make the claim that our powers of imagination are a source of knowledge that give rise to a different kind of knowledge than the ordinary ones, such as perception or learning. The kind of knowledge I refer to is called, in everyday life, creative knowledge. I will distinguish between two dimensions of creative knowledge, namely, everyday creativity and artistic creativity.

The latter I call detached knowledge: the poetic understanding we came across in Chapter 1. Let us see how this comes about.

### 1.1 KNOWING-THAT AND KNOWING-HOW

As already indicated, I will start from the knowing-that/how discussion Gilbert Ryle described in 1949, when he made the distinction between knowing-that something is the case and knowing-how something is done – the distinction between propositional and non-propositional knowledge. This distinction stems from the interest Ryle had in the contrast of being intelligent and the possession of knowledge.

The usual interpretation of ‘knowing-that’ is that it is a propositional attitude. It expresses a relation between an object and a proposition, just as we believe that, expect that, assume that, or doubt that something is the case. It is understood as a type of knowledge that deals with facts and information, articulated in the language that we use and is obtained by drill, repetition and habit. It is the result of a learning process, in the sense of what we learn in school as well as by perception. Knowing that something is a bike we have learned from our parents or within the broader context of a community or within the context of specific circumstances. Ontologically, someone’s knowing something is itself also a fact, related to a situation. Thus, knowing-that is about the relation between a thinker and a proposition.

In contrast to knowing-that, the concept of knowing-how refers to competence. It is something that is fluid and something we actively accomplish in the course of time.<sup>2</sup> Knowing-how is formulated by Ryle in terms of being intelligent and is, according to him, a disposition. It is not like a reflex or a habit, but ranges over a wide variety of more or less dissimilar exercises (Ryle, 1949, p46).

<sup>2</sup> > Which also holds for knowing-that by the way, albeit in a more restricted fashion.

Knowing-how, being a skill, is not a single track or a one way ticket to completion of a certain way to do things. In contrast to knowing-that, the elements involved in the case of knowing-how are complex and interrelated. Knowing-how is the unification of intentional, generic and practical elements: it is a skill. We can distinguish two kinds of knowing-how. The first is the kind of knowing-how that refers to practical skills, for example, when we say that Hannah knows how to ride a bike. The second kind of knowing-how is distinguished in terms of articulateness: in case of the second kind of knowing-how not everything can be articulated. Think for instance what Wittgenstein says in PI 78 about the sound of a clarinet:

Compare *knowing* and *saying*  
 how many feet high Mont Blanc is–  
 how the word ‘game’ is used–  
 how a clarinet sounds.

If you are surprised that one can know something and not be able to say it, you are perhaps thinking of a case like the first. Certainly not of one like the third.

or about the aroma of coffee in PI 610:

Describe the aroma of coffee.– Why can't it be done? Do we lack the words? And *for what* are words lacking?– But how do we get the idea that such a description must after all be possible? Have you ever felt the lack of such a description? Have you tried to describe the aroma and not succeeded? [...]

There are many things we learn in a non-verbal/non-propositional way, like learning to walk, opening a door, learning how to dance and the like. In the course of this chapter I will emphasise this second kind of knowing-how for various reasons. Nevertheless, knowing-how is just as knowing-that something conventional. For the skills must be learned and are established and accepted only within a community.

The rules, standards, techniques and criteria we learn in the context of a community are helpful to train, skill and govern the agent on his way to expertise in a certain domain. According to Ryle, the actualisation of this dispositional excellence becomes a second nature. The dispositions towards excellence are moulded and polished by the rules and techniques. This means that knowing-how is not an accumulation of (pieces of) knowing-that, it has become a discipline that consists in habituation and education. Habituation forms blind habits, education or training produces intelligent powers.

Knowing a rule is not knowing a fact or a truth. The rules that a reasonable person observes have become his way of thinking, when he is making sure of doing something or having done it. He performs an operation in a certain manner or with a certain style or procedure, something that can be described in terms of being 'alert', 'careful', 'critical', 'logical', etc. The style and procedures of people's activities *are* the way their minds work. In what way this is related to what I call 'vision' will be discussed in the second part of this chapter. In any case, what is important is that the knowing-how is exercised in the doing.

Understanding (how things are done) is knowing-how, but so are errors and the making of mistakes that provide the means to improve our competence. It should be noted that there is a difference between the agent, who is originating, and the perceiver, who is only contemplating. Someone might be able to understand what it is – thus to know how – to ride a bike. For example, he can imagine how it is to ride a bike, without being actually able to ride a bike and thus cannot know that he is riding a bike. This can happen, for instance, when this person is physically handicapped.

Another difference between knowing-that and knowing-how, says Ryle, is that one can be part-trained, but not part-informed (Ryle, 1949, p59). We either know that B is a bike, or we don't. We cannot partially know that B is a bike. Notice that the way in which Ryle formulates his argument here shows that he is only thinking of binary propositions, that is, propositions that are either true or false. In the case of 'knowing who was in the room', for instance, it is possible to be partially informed.



In contrast to Ryle's 'Standard View', S&W (2001) argue that there is no fundamental distinction between knowing-that and knowing-how. For them, knowing-how is a *species* of knowing-that. Know-how, -who, -what, -where refer to questions that are contextually embedded. For example, answering the question 'Who was in the room?' results in knowing that Hannah and Bill were in the room, though others may also have been there. One does not need to know all propositions in the denotation of the embedded question, it is enough to know what is at stake within a specific context in order to be able to answer the question. With this point they follow the so-called 'mention-some reading' elaborated by Groenendijk & Stokhof (1984).

S&W emphasise that knowing how to ride a bike is a matter of knowing a way or a manner to ride a bike. The knowing-how is a knowing-that with respect to ways or manners – knowing that this is a way to do something, e.g., riding a bike. They utilise Russellian propositions because they take 'ways' to be properties of token events considered under different modes of presentation, for example first-person or third-person modes of presentation.<sup>3</sup>

The modes of presentation raise the question of whether or not context is relevant to the truth conditions of a propositional-attitude ascription. S&W want to remain neutral with respect to this issue and understand modes of presentation as being associated with certain linguistic constructions (S&W 2001, p428). What they call a 'practical' mode of presentation denotes a way in which knowledge of a proposition occurs within a (narrow) context. Hannah only knows how to ride a bike if she stands in the knowing-that relation to the Russellian proposition that *w* is a way for Hannah to ride a bike and she entertains this proposition under a practical mode of presentation, (S&W 2001, p430).

The mode of presentation is a practical mode of presentation of a way and not, for instance, a demonstrative mode of presentation. Demonstratives such as 'that' are attached to particulars, while ways are properties. The claim that ways are properties is severely doubted by Hornsby. Let us try to figure out why.

To stick to our example, what one does in pointing to someone riding a bike in order to show someone what it is to ride a bike is to make use of the example that is actually present, in order to have Hannah understand how to ride a bike. Compare, for instance, what Wittgenstein says about demonstratives in PI 27-30: one cannot precisely pick out particular properties of the token event and one does not define a criterion of identity by stressing the word 'that'. So, 'demonstrative modes' cannot give a full account of a token event. S&W will agree on this, while at the same time try to elide this point by underlining that there are complex connections between knowing-how and dispositional states, and that conventional connections between linguistic constructions and modes of presentation provide extra information. They give the example of Susan, pointing at a brown chair, while saying: 'I know that that color sickens John' (S&W 2001, p428). The weakness here is, is that it could very

3 >

There are three standard theories of the semantics of propositional-attitude ascriptions. 1. The Russellian theory dealing with the relation between an individual and a Russellian proposition, in which propositions are ordered sequences of properties and objects. 2. The Fregean theory about the relation between an individual and a Fregean proposition, in which propositions contain modes of presentations of properties and objects. 3. Verbs such as 'believe' and 'know' expressing three-place relations between individuals, Russellian propositions, and ways of thinking of Russellian propositions. So, the first two are two-place relations, the third is a three-place relation. S&W claim that their view can be stated in any of the three frameworks.

well be that under certain circumstances, for example variation in light, the brown chair does not sicken John; on the contrary – he likes the shade of the chair. As a consequence, I might get the information incorrect. It is only during a certain time span, and under various circumstances in which Susan is pointing at the brown chair while uttering the sentence, that I come to understand what colour Susan actually means that sickens John.

What exactly is meant with ‘practical mode of presentation’, then, remains unclear from S&W’s article, insofar as the circumstances under which the mode of presentation take place remain unexplained. I take it they want to say that when Hannah is pointed towards a person who is riding a bike in order to show her a way to ride a bike, they want to indicate that Hannah thereby thinks about that way to ride a bike in taking a ‘practical (linguistic) grasp’ (whatever that may be. . .) of that way to ride a bike. A practical mode of presentation entails the possession of certain complex dispositions, and thus, according to S&W, there are intricate connections between knowing-how and dispositional states, and the latter are simply a feature of certain kinds of propositional knowledge. From this, no non-propositional knowledge is needed (S&W 2001. 430). But, again, I would like to say that a practical mode of presentation should be able to account for the circumstances under which the grasping of that way took place in the context of a particular time span; these could very well point towards non-propositional knowledge. Unfortunately, the examples S&W give in their paper do not mention circumstances or situations.

Thus, S&W do not account for anything non-propositional. They claim that ascriptions of knowing-how do not ascribe abilities, giving the example of the pianist who lost his arms, but still knows how to play the piano although he is not able to do so. But, as Noë – who will be discussed later in more detail – points out: we need to distinguish between not being able to play the piano simply because one lacks the skill or ability, and not being able because the conditions for playing the piano are not satisfied, e.g. due to the fact that one cannot satisfy one’s ability – in this case, because one lost one’s arms (Noë, 2005, p282). I will return to this later on.

To summarise S&W: on their account, knowing-how is just as knowing-that, propositional knowledge. It is a certain kind of intellectual propositional knowledge that has nothing to do with having an ability. For them, only the restricted context of the linguistic utterance is important – not the broader context in terms of circumstances or situations, at least not explicitly.

S&W can only hold the position they take, because they leave things out. More specifically, because they forget to mention non-verbal, non-propositional context. For example, think of matters such as knowing how coffee smells, or the know-how of experts in various fields reflected in their typical jargon, or the things we learned merely by seeing, such as how to open a door and the like. In my opinion, the fact that S&W take a neutral stance in regard to the modes of presentation is inadequate

in that leaves out an essential feature with respect to their claim. First, as I will show, taking into account Hornsby's insights, knowing-how and knowing-that are more deeply intermingled than S&W suggest. Second, this interconnectedness is not to be understood as a reduction, because the (non-verbal) context plays a crucial part in determining the dimension in which we decide whether some epistemic state is an instance of knowing-how or of knowing-that. But before we come to an elaboration on the importance of the context, let us see what Hornsby has to add to the knowing-that/how debate.

In contrast to S&W, Hornsby states that having an ability is having a certain potentiality. Hornsby replies to S&W that aside from abilities that are conferred by our knowledge of facts, we also have abilities without knowing how we do them and in the absence of beliefs of how they are done. For instance, Hornsby reminds us of our ability to suck: an ability we are born with and are ignorant of how we do it; as babies we simply suck, without making use of any knowledge. This is not even of the kind S&W have in mind, viz. that 'this is a way to suck'. Another example is our ability to speak or to dance, which we acquire in the process of maturation. Thus, on the one hand, this notion of ability Hornsby discusses refers to the obvious background conditions that we often leave out. On the other hand, it may also be provided by knowledge in order to act. For instance, opening a door or knowing how to work with a computer (or other devices) is according to Hornsby an ability, because although we do not know how the thing works, we nevertheless are fully capable of operating it.

As we already have seen, Hornsby (2001)'s intention is to integrate the knowing-that/how debate into a larger context, paying attention to the role of knowledge and abilities in rational agency in general, and the question of whether intellectualism<sup>4</sup> as Ryle meant is still at stake. Ryle argued against Descartes' myth that, briefly, boils down to the conviction that human beings have a body and a mind, where the body can be observed and inspected from the outside by external observers, while in contrast, the mind and its workings is a private state: only I can know the processes of my own mind. The myth suggests that there is a polar opposition between mind and matter. Ryle claims that this is a category-mistake. It is the way we talk about body and mind that leads us to make these kinds of mistakes when we do philosophy, that is, when we reflect upon how we use the concepts that denote matters concerning body and mind and put them into logical categories. For Ryle, 'philosophy is the replacement of category-habits by category-disciplines' (Ryle, 1949).

Hornsby (2006, p7) says that agents, who do things for reasons, act from knowledge of facts, and their knowledge *confers* abilities upon them, concluding from this that knowledge can be understood in terms of *enabling*. This notion of enabling stems from a 3-fold distinction she makes within the abilities that are used

4 >  
The notion of 'intellectualism' Ryle uses refers to the false assumption that an intelligent person first goes through an internal process of avowing to himself certain propositions about what it is to be done. A preaching before practising, says Ryle, something he calls the 'intellectualist legend' (Ryle, 1949, p29-30). This 'intellectualist legend' is at the service of Descartes' myth.

5 >  
Note that Hornsby follows Ryle here, who emphasised that knowledge is doing, thus action. Hornsby discussed this distinction in a lecture at the Wittgenstein Symposium, Kirchberg am Wechsel, 11|8 2006.

in action.<sup>5</sup> There are abilities that are conferred on us by knowledge of facts, abilities that we have because we know how to do certain things, and abilities that are what she calls ‘pure’ – the ones that enable us to do things without knowledge, if I understand her correctly – in any case, without *conscious* knowledge.

Hornsby wants to show that the concept of knowing-how is essentially plural and ambiguous. Her claim is that semantic knowledge exercised by people when they speak is a sort of practical knowledge (Hornsby, 2005, p1). She differentiates between the perspective of the public aspect of meaning and the perspective of the speaker. This leads to the differences in meaning and understanding. For the audience, in hearing the language, they exercise their perceptual capacity, which means that they hear the meaning in the words of the speaker directly. In case of the speaker, she directly voices her thoughts. Both thus are executing an intentional activity, albeit each play a different role: one exercises productive abilities and the other receptive abilities (Hornsby, 2005, p4-5).

The distinction Hornsby wants to make differs from Ryle, and is between knowing-that/how and knowledge that is without the possession of knowledge of procedures; as already mentioned before, this is the 3rd step of her 3-fold distinction. These are the ‘basic things’ as she calls them – what the agent is said to be able to simply do. She gives the example of our ability to walk. Learning how to walk is not a matter of learning facts about how exactly walking is done, but it is practical and productive knowledge. ‘Practical knowledge is what enables an agent to get started’ (Hornsby, 2005, p7). To open a door, or playing a musical instrument are among the other abilities.

Ryle did not bring abilities under the heading of knowing-how, simply because he was interested in knowledge as skills, competences, or intelligent capacities in regard to activities. S&W understand knowledge of meaning as knowledge of *theoretical* propositions, something that is too restricted according to Hornsby; knowledge of meaning is practical and this involves the enabling of theoretical and skillful knowledge, something that goes beyond the intentional. The ‘be able to simply do’ is connected with unconscious knowledge, ‘We do many things intentionally but automatically’, for instance opening a door (Hornsby, 2005, p11). Although you must know what a door is and what it is used for, what the handle on the door is for etc. you do not think about them the moment you open the door – you simply open the door. You do that unconsciously. The perspective of someone who does something intentionally comes into play the moment we realise that one does not have to be aware of one’s knowledge, but can *become* aware. And this, we might add to Hornsby, also counts for our implicit ·knowing-of· the world. We will come back to this notion of knowing-of shortly.

Awareness is relied upon keeping track of our actions when something is out of the ordinary, or in correcting mistakes. It is about knowing how to engage in a specific activity, an activity that addresses an aspect of knowing that is used against

a background of our knowing-of context and circumstances.

This leaves Hornsby with the conviction that knowing-how is ambiguous and sometimes knowing-how-to-do-something *is* an ability. These insights lead us to the heart of her objections against S&W. In contrast to S&W, she argues that token events cannot play the role S&W assign to them (Hornsby, 2006, p13). This addresses Wittgenstein's remarks PI 27-30 where he shows us that we cannot define a criterion of identity by stressing the word 'that', as we have already seen, and concludes that S&W have simply got the syntax wrong. There are no identity criteria for using 'that' in the demonstrative mode of presentation. Furthermore, various kinds of knowledge are combined when we engage in an activity: procedural knowledge and relevant perceptual knowledge that together form practical knowledge. Thus, her main objection to S&W is that there is a deeper irreducibility of knowing-how to knowing-that as ordinarily conceived than the 'irreducibility' that they allow, i.e., taking knowing-how as a species of knowing-that and therefore, just as knowing-that – as propositional knowledge (Hornsby, 2006, p15).

What strikes me is that Hornsby does not understand our background knowledge – the knowing-of the world – as *knowledge*. The background of knowing-that and knowing-how is provided by a sort of knowledge we all have and can be called 'knowing-of'. Knowing-of is the kind of knowledge that we implicitly take for granted in everyday life. It is the broad, general knowledge of the world and its history. It denotes the knowledge of ourselves and the other, as well as the knowledge that attaches us to the world, the environment, the community we live in and other human beings. This kind of knowledge is taken as something that is obvious and in some sense provides the frame against which the other forms – in the first instance, our knowing-that and knowing-how – are learned and developed in the course of maturation. I would prefer to call this knowledge as well, in contrast to Hornsby, because it is taught to us implicitly by way of our upbringing in the cultural practice we belong to. Note, that I do not refer to the 'certainties' Wittgenstein has in mind.

Let us now take a brief look at some even more phenomenologically-directed approaches by taking up the elaboration of Snowdon and Noë on the matter at hand.

Snowdon (2003) tries to reconsider Ryle's Standard View by taking the kinds of knowledge descriptions that address a question – know what, where, whether, who, why and how – and can be answered correctly as 'indirect-knowing-that' ascriptions. Notice, that the answer to the question need not be 'the' answer although contexts of ascriptions impose restrictions. For instance, in posing the question, 'Who is that person?' there is not just one answer to be given, because I can provide different information that is connected with that person. It will depend on the context as to which answer is accurate. So in general, we might say Snowdon agrees with S&W – taking the 'mention-some' reading into account – although he adds



indirect-knowing-that to the discussion and in my view, uses the notion of context in a broader way than S&W do. From this, Snowdon (2003, p7) stresses that the contrast should be between knowing-how-*to* and knowing-that.

There is a strong link between knowing-how-to and possibility; although knowing-how-to does require the possibility of doing something, it does not require that it need be possible for the subject with the knowledge (Snowdon, 2003). The conditions might not be fulfilled. For instance, the pianist knows how to play the piano, but unfortunately lost both his arms, by consequence lost the capacity to play the piano. And the opposite could also be the case: think of what we call ‘beginner’s luck’. The person who plays dart for the first time in his life, may hit the bull’s eye by ‘blind luck’. Thus, we should not reduce knowing-how to ‘being able to’, and vice versa (Snowdon, 2003, p11). There are basic actions, Snowdon says, that are things that we do and can do, but for which there seems to be no such thing as ‘the way to do them’. Here also we can add Hornsby’s basic abilities to Snowdon’s basic actions: we do not know how to blink, we simply blink.

According to Snowdon, there are some cases in which knowing-how does reduce to knowing-that: knowing-how is sometimes knowing-that, and sometimes not. Matters get especially complicated in the case of imagination. Snowdon makes two equivalencies. The first is between knowing what an experience is like and knowing how to imagine it. The second, between knowing what an experience is like – I know what *P* looks like – and *being able* to imagine it – I am able to imagine what *P* looks like (Snowdon, 2003, p20ff). But to be able to imagine what *P* looks like is not to *know* what *P* looks like. Again, we find here, as we already found with Hornsby, the ambiguity of knowing-how. This ambiguity as we shall see, is an essential feature of a special kind of creative knowledge – artistic knowledge – that will be discussed later in greater detail.

Connected with Snowdon’s emphasis on ambiguity is his conviction that not all knowledge is propositional knowledge (Snowdon, 2003, p27). Often the expression of knowledge involves a gesture or a response to the indication of examples, or can only come to the fore in a certain context or circumstance. In cases where knowledge cannot be expressed or endorsed except by way of gesture, or some appropriate behaviour that fits the circumstances, it is not propositional knowledge. Moreover, in the case of knowing-how-to, i.e., ride a bike, there is a sequence of actions as a way, method or procedure and not just one action, thus there is a temporal dimension (Snowdon, 2003, p28). Pointing, suggesting, hinting and the like need time in order to be interpreted – a host of things we learn in the course of maturation. We learn a way to ride a bike, not just at one point in time in one situation, but at various, different points in time and under various circumstances in a variety of situations.

Noë (2005), another phenomenologically oriented philosopher, also responds to S&W’s 2001 paper, criticising the examples they use, showing that they reduce

examples from different levels to one another. Take S&W's example of Hannah: 'If Hannah digests food, she knows how to digest food'. But digesting is not something one does; it is a process that takes place inside a person or an animal (Noë, 2005, p279). Digesting food is not knowing how one digests, it is merely our biological make-up – we are not (consciously or unconsciously) *doing* something, although digesting is a kind of bodily activity. It is not 'a way to', we might say.

Noë also wants to convince us and S&W that we have dispositions that are not situated within the realm of knowledge. In contrast to S&W, he claims that our possession of abilities is a matter of knowing-how. Noë makes a distinction between knowing how to do something, that is, having the relevant ability, and knowing how something is done, without knowing how to do it. It is this second kind of knowing-how that is propositional according to Noë. But he differs from Hornsby in that she also makes room for what we could call basic abilities.

Now that we have set the scope of the knowing-that/how debate, I want to make the claim that knowing-that and knowing-how are related to each other in a dynamic way. It depends on the perspective one takes, as to which of the two, the -that or the -how, prevails within a certain context and circumstances. The framework of this dynamic process is sustained on the one hand by our basic abilities, as Hornsby points out, and on the other hand by our background knowledge; what we called earlier knowing-of. The dynamics of knowing-that and knowing-how are triggered by the function between the knowledge at hand, the linguistic context and the broader context of a situation or the circumstances.

Thus, knowing-how and knowing-that are interrelated, but cannot be reduced to one another due to the fact that they function at different levels or dimensions. The interrelatedness of the various dimensions provide us with the possibility of plurality and ambiguity – this is what addresses our powers of imagination. We can substantiate this claim by looking at a third kind of knowledge, that is, creative knowledge.

## 1.2 CREATIVE KNOWLEDGE

What sort of knowledge is creative knowledge? This kind of knowledge can be understood as the ability – the enabling as Hornsby would say – to see something new, or seeing something that does not yet exist, that others can not. It involves originality through the perceiving of new relationships and is something that evolves over time, not only within the individual, as it will take time to acknowledge and understand new relationships, but also within a community and the broader scope of a human history.

All human beings have what I call 'everyday creativity'. This refers to being able to respond to sudden changes, adapting to altered circumstances and to the

ability to improve, transform and remodel one's life and environment in certain ways. As we have already seen in Chapter 1, humans are able to transform their ways of seeing, because of having what we call imagination. We are able to imagine things, situations or events that do not exist in reality. But at the same time we use pictures we perceive in reality or that are based on convention. And to make things even more complicated, pictures from reality can be utilised when we are using our imagination. Pictures that have become entrenched by means of habit or custom make it sometimes hard to see the same things differently. Thus, 'pictures' can be stimuli for creativity as well as obstacles.

As Ryle (1971b) clarifies, all imagining is imagining *that* something is the case. In this respect, imagining is analogous to knowing, believing, guessing, and not to seeing, making or begetting. Much imagining occurs in remembering, but it may not be a representation *of* anything. Ryle distinguishes three different sorts of states of affairs which we may imagine to obtain. We may imagine something to be the case involving a real object – something he calls non-fabulous imagining – for instance, when we imagine that we are riding a bike at the Plantage Middenlaan in Amsterdam, or involving an imaginary object – fabulous imagining – for instance when we are imagining a 'dinkydoydoodle'. And there can be a mixture of both, something he calls mixed imagining, for instance when we imagine that we are struck by a dinkydoydoodle at the Plantage Middenlaan. In all three cases, however, it is possible for us to imagine something as being the case which we know not to be the case, or of which we are uncertain.

Another distinction Ryle makes is between originative, constructive or creative imagining – for instance, writing a book – and derivative, reconstructive or loaned imagining, i.e. reading a book. Imagining something to be the case is not knowing a fact, though it often does involve the knowledge of some facts. The object or content of an activity of imagining is plurally ambiguous (Ryle, 1971b, p71ff). This ambiguous plurality is something that is essential when it comes to art. These are the same notions of plurality and ambiguity we came across in discussing the interrelatedness of knowing-that and knowing-how.

To imagine that one is talking comes after having learned to talk. The concept of make-believe is of a higher order than the concept of believe. We play and pretend deliberately as rehearsed performances, while fancying and imagining are make-believe activities into which we casually and sometimes even involuntary drift. The doings of the higher order acts are founded on the abilities of the lower order acts (Ryle, 1971a, p263ff). As Ryle indicates on page 269:

We might say that imagining oneself talking or humming is a series of *abstentions* (my emph) from producing the noises which would be the due words or notes to produce, if one were talking or humming aloud.

and Wittgenstein writes about 'acting as if' as a later learning stage, for example in

PI 365, when he is discussing a game of chess that is played on stage:

Do Adelheid and the Bishop play a *real* game of chess? –Of course. They are not merely pretending—which would also be possible as part of a play. —But, for example, the game has no beginning! –Of course it has; otherwise it would not be a game of chess.-

What Ryle – and Wittgenstein, albeit in a different manner – emphasise is that we first have to learn, then recall, and only after having adopted these abilities can advance to another level of use. Ryle on p274-5 says: ‘it is going over something, not getting to something: it is like recounting, not like researching.’ Here lies the distinction between imagination and memory. Being good at recalling is not being good at investigating, but being good at presenting. This ‘narrative skill’ as Ryle calls his notion of recall, can be described as something faithful, vivid, or accurate but not as something original, brilliant or acute. Thus, recalling and imagining are not the same: I can imagine something that factually does not exist, but I cannot recall something that does not exist.

On the individual level, the problem of creativity has always been connected with two concepts: the concept of intuition and the concept of the unconscious. Intuition is understood as an instinctive form of knowledge or insight - something not gained by reason. The notion of intuition is contrasted with rational thinking and is considered as something that cannot be tested, proven or refuted. Moreover, the process by which intuition works is supposed to be unconscious. Much more should be said about this, but I cannot do so here. I will restrict myself to the most important point for my argument, namely, that the various steps from intuition, through the unconscious towards a conscious verification of the conclusion or the insight, is not a ‘thing’ that happens – an event – but is a series of actions or steps that lead to a particular end and that evolve over time; it is thus a process. Also, there is no absolute difference, no split or opposition, between what we call intuition and conscious reasoning: it is a matter of degree, a continuum. In any problem-solving activity some degree of intuition is involved. On the other hand, while intuitions may present us with a solution to a problem, they do not offer a *verified* solution or proof.

If this is right, it provides an argument for saying that the same holds for the social. Individual innovation is not a point event that is completely separated from the ordinary, conventional and shared practice, but much more a continuum, a matter of degree. When a person has no ‘need’ to create an innovation, there is no possibility for the community to pick it up and accept it. The reverse direction holds as well: the individual, being part of the community uses his continuous aspect perception as well as his ability for aspect change for creating ideas evolving in time and over persons. This shows that it is impossible and even misleading to distinguish categorically between the individual and social. In the rule-governed practice

the dynamic becomes reflexive through the creative aspects brought in that can account for transgressions in meaning and change in Form of life, as we have already discussed in Chapter 2. And this is something Wittgenstein takes up explicitly in his remarks every time he urges us to imagine something: ‘we could imagine that...’ (PI 2), ‘suppose that...’, ‘think of...’

The tension between imagination and convention can become evident and meaningful for us when we make use of our ability of aspect seeing. We situate what we perceive in a different context, and because of this are able to discover new connections (cf. PI 122). In everyday life we take most things and situations as obvious: we are used to eating, sleeping, washing the dishes, walking the streets, in short, living our everyday life in a non-reflected way. We can call this ‘continuous aspect perception’, to borrow a term from Luntley (2003) which was discussed in Chapter 2. It can be understood as a constant understanding, related to our experience of everyday life. An aspect change, then, can be understood as a coming to understand, for instance, when we suddenly see our everyday environment in a different light. Both these abilities need to be considered if we want to get a handle on the problem of novelty.

So the notions of seeing aspects and aspect change are related to our powers of imagination and with that to our creative knowledge. Wittgenstein makes an analogy in his inquiry into meaning blindness. In RPP I 178, the meaning-blind person has to describe what goes on step by step, at every point in time reorienting himself, because he lacks a certain kind of imagination. But to this can be added, it is not just the one who has some disorder and therefore fails to perform an aspect change who can be called meaning blind. We all can become meaning blind the moment certain words have become so obvious for us that they, as it were, have disappeared from our sight. This can have far-reaching consequences and implications.

Perhaps we should consider creativity not as an ability, but as an aspect of imagination that in turn is a source of knowledge. The tools for creativity and artistic power, thus for renewal and change are: complexity, for instance in the artistic creation of a new rule; surprisingness – think of the aspect switch, when we *suddenly* see something we didn’t notice before; incongruity of domains; ambiguity of meaning; reference; variability in problem-solving and artistic appreciation. These are the very same notions we can detect in an analysis of aspect perception, of rule-following and its connection with the individual and the social.

In the reflexive dynamics between what is obvious, conventional and everyday, and what is uncertain, opaque and inexpressible, poetic understanding can emerge. This poetic understanding is possible due to the meaning potential of language. This meaning potential is what is latent in language, what language is capable of expressing because of what the user is capable of doing with language. Because of this meaning potential, it is always possible to see something *as* more than what it



is. Because of this, we are able to take a different point of view in which the obvious can be seen anew: everything can be new – even the most ordinary (Baz, 2000).

Until now, we have focussed on everyday creativity, the kind of creativity every human being has at his disposal. But there is another kind of creativity, namely, ·artistic creativity·. It is the kind of creativity that artists use, something that stems from everyday creativity, but cannot be reduced to that. In what follows, I will try to sketch what we can understand by artistic knowledge and connect it with the poetic understanding we already came across in Chapter 1. The outcome will be something I call ·detached knowledge·.

### 1.2.1 ARTISTIC KNOWLEDGE

In his last chapter on psychology, Ryle (1971a) notes that the artist's sensibility for ambiguity does not reflect the question *why* something is there, but instead plays with the observation *that* there is something. As Ryle puts it: [the artist] 'detaches the urge for explanation and the phenomenon itself – taking it in its own light, dismissing nothing: everything is always possible – taking an open view on an open world' (Ryle, 1971a, p326). 'To wonder that the world exists', as Wittgenstein would say (see also Chapter 1).

The knowing-that/how of our everyday reality is put between brackets by the artist who offers a different view on (a part of) the world. For example: we *know* from everyday life what a fork, a knife and a plate on a kitchen table mean in a similar way that we know from the colour-octahedron that red is opposite green and blue is standing opposite yellow in the system (cf. PI II, p167; PR XXI 221).

Hanging a fork on a ceiling, however, can give us a fresh view on the meaning of ·fork·. Putting a red square on a blue background can shed new light on the relation between ·red· and ·blue·. In the first example, the fork is taken out of its usual context. In the second example the colours are (re)combined in the same context.

Ryle introduces the concept ·abstention· which denotes the act of restraining oneself or holding back, i.e. to withdraw from the things we know or are accustomed to. Think, for instance, of persons who abstain from meat such as vegetarians. They *know* what meat is, yet they voluntarily refuse to eat it. In another way artists are trained in abstaining from the obviousness that is normally taken for granted. The act of withdrawal is related to a capacity we all have: our ability to see possibilities by way of our powers of imagination. This capacity allows us to take a different point of view at a different level and a different point in time. We all make use of this ability, but the artist sometimes uses it in a different, more heightened sense, associated with a sensibility for ambiguity.

Let us try to connect Ryle's notion of abstention and the artist's sensibility for ambiguity. I think Ryle is right in saying that a creative attitude is not characterised in terms of posing questions. An artist does not pose a question in order to know

the answer to a particular problem or issue. In my view this has to do with *wonder as an attitude* and comes after having learned and experienced numerous conventions. That is, to wonder is a special kind of questioning not articulated or focused on something, but merely wonder ‘that there is’ or ‘that the world exists’. We learn from our parents that the colour we are staring at is called ‘red’. During maturation we experience many circumstances in which there are red things or surfaces or shades and in the course of time we learn that there are various colours we all call ‘red’. We refine our sensibility for the colour red so to speak. But a painter will have another attitude in addition: she is *fascinated* by colours and will develop a heightened perception in these matters in the hope that she one day will be able to make a red that is *the ultimate red*. This is something that will never succeed – and the artist knows this – because there are no criteria in everyday experience to measure. So, there is a constant discontent concerning the results and therefore a constant trying to improve and starting afresh that keeps the artist going.

I prefer to combine the detachment of the artist, the ‘... that there is ..’ Ryle (1971a, p326) understood as ‘.. detach(ing) the urge for explanation and the phenomenon itself – taking it in its own light, dismissing nothing: everything is always possible – taking an open view on an open world’ together with the notion of abstinence.

The idea of abstinence – which is something active, because it is voluntary and intentional – on the one hand, and that of detachment – something that is more passive – on the other, sheds light on our notion of creative and artistic knowledge.

I want to call this combination of abstinence and detachment ‘detached knowledge’.<sup>6</sup> It is something that is characterised by a remodelling of facts or skill or any combination thereof culminating in new ways of seeing, that in turn can be remodelled. It is a dynamic process, albeit a *delayed* dynamic process, something that is active and passive at the same time. First, the world is set actively between [square] brackets,<sup>7</sup> in this way symbolically functioning as a gateway to other dimensions. It is, by consequence, the world being *side-stepped* and at the same time *stepped-through* by the artist. Secondly, the wandering in spheres of the unconscious is something much more passive and floating. Leaving all possibilities open to come to the fore, letting them collide and in the end coalesce into something new. The delay – the time involved from consciously setting the world between square brackets and the floating state of mind, up to the moment that a new connection comes into consciousness – is a necessary delay for the process, in order for the artist to get the opportunity to clash and mix up all sorts of knowledge, associations, feelings and experiences and from this connections to then emerge. This entire process can be understood as a detour: a *package tour* of meaning.

It should be noticed that concerning the artistic process it is not only connections of associations that matter. In the detached state, associations are running free, responding to one another in an unchecked and non-linear way, seemingly

6 >

I do not refer here to any Buddhist ideas on detachment.

7 >

Not to be confused with the notion of bracketing in phenomenology.

meaningless.<sup>8</sup> The creative process can be characterised as a disorganised dynamics, out of which emerges a self-organisation that eventually takes over again.<sup>9</sup> The result then, can be something completely new. This shows that artistic<sup>10</sup> creativity is qualitatively different from everyday creativity.

To summarise: I claim that artistic creativity can be understood as a detached knowledge, a kind of knowledge that implies knowing-that and knowing-how, but that is used in a by-passed way, in an indirect manner by [bracketing] ordinary forms of knowledge.

What, then, if any, is the relation between detached knowledge and the idea of an *übersichtliche Darstellung*? The artist will have to sharpen her skills, revise and work out, and make this new thing perspicuous so that others can experience it and comment. We have to look at it from a distance and ask ourselves whether it is really something worth while, and really something new – or could it be that we were mistaken? The artist is supposed to improve and refine the basic idea, but – differently from the scientist – without eliminating the ambiguity of the association-chains. For it is the combination of perspicuity and a multi-layeredness of meaning in a whole that gives art its strength and power. Thus, we could say, the various components of the package tour are put into a perspicuous, meaningful overview: they are put into an *übersichtliche Darstellung* that yet remains ambiguous.

### 1.3 AN ÜBERSICHTLICHE DARSTELLUNG OF KNOWLEDGE

In this first part of the chapter we distinguished various kinds of knowledge: knowing-of, knowing-that, knowing-how, creative knowledge, artistic knowledge, and detached knowledge. Could we make an *übersichtliche Darstellung* of these kinds of knowledge in such a way that it gives us a meaningful overview of all the necessary relations between them? If it is true that an *übersichtliche Darstellung* shows us something complex in a condensed transparent overview, we should be able to make such an overview of the complex matters regarding knowledge discussed thus-far.

As already argued, I prefer to look at the various kinds of knowledge as various dimensions of knowledge, because much depends on the perspective we take in the particular contexts or circumstances of how we make use of knowledge and how we value and judge it. What in one context is taken as knowing-that can be understood in another context as knowing-how.

In order to clarify what I mean, I want to make an analogy with the way in which David Katz<sup>11</sup> discussed the dimensions of the colours. It is something that Wittgenstein knew and utilised in his *Remarks on Colours* (RoC). At some points the analogy breaks down, but nevertheless it reveals some crucial insights that may help us in gaining apprehension of imagination as a source of knowledge.

Notice that in distinguishing dimensions of knowledge in this way, I take another position in the knowing-that/how debate. S&W reduce knowing-how to

8 >

Note that here is a connection to Freud's method of free association and *Traumdeutung*.

9 >

See also Steels (1999) who did experiments with robots, so-called Talking Heads, in order to understand the idea of self-organisation, restricted to words and meanings. He discovered a number of essential characteristics of self-organisation. First, the performance of multiple associations, denoting that one form can be associated with many meanings and one meaning with many forms. Second, the agent has to record a score for each association, scoring successful communication. Also, they must be able to create new words when no words are available. The agents must perform lateral inhibition – something that is necessary to achieve convergence. And finally, agents must get feedback in the case of failure (Steels, 1999, p142ff). He compares the ability of self-organisation with nests of termites for example, or cell tissue. Nature shows self-organisation all the time in various forms and circumstances (cf. p145/147).

10 >

To what degree the processes involving scientific creativity is comparable to those of artistic creativity is not discussed here, because it would extend the scope of the investigation.

knowing-that by means of form and structure. In my case the focal point is not primarily on content, but on context, that is, on *function* instead of structure. This primacy of function allows not only for propositional knowledge, but also for non-propositional knowledge. Hornsby takes up context only insofar as it is connected with the causes and reasons of the agent, in this way accounting for the primacy of the person who is able to do certain things against background conditions. Having knowledge is relevant causally to what we do, says Hornsby, and our knowledge confers abilities upon us. The even more phenomenologically directed Snowdon wants to make a distinction between knowing-that and knowing-how-to, in an attempt to show that not all knowledge is propositional knowledge, although he claims to be on the same side of the argument as S&W. Because of the functional stance that implies propositional as well as non-propositional knowledge we obtain a much richer notion of knowledge.

11 >  
David Katz was a psychologist who was interested in the ways colours are perceived by us, focussing on our experience. He differentiated the ways in which the colours appeared for us in various dimensions. Wittgenstein was familiar with Katz's book on colours.

How would an *übersichtliche Darstellung* of this functional stance laid down in the dimensions of knowledge look? In analogy to Katz's distinction of how colours appear to us in reality in terms of dimensions we can distinguish between a first, second, third and fourth dimension of knowledge.


12 >  
See for instance the Munsell Color Atlas.

A first dimension – similar to Katz's first dimension of the colours where colours are context-free, for example in the case of a colour-patch – is understood as non-contextual abilities, abstracted away from reality.<sup>12</sup> Think, for example, of the colour 'red' when we look at it through a tube, in this way isolating it from its context of surface and space. It is what Katz calls a 'free colour', reduced and isolated from its natural context – a 'flat' monochrome. In the domain of knowledge we can think of our 'basic' abilities functioning as a trigger for attention in the way a colour monochrome could. It is due to our ability to detect various colours that we can distinguish between a red and a green colour patch.

For the second and third dimension, Katz distinguishes within the depth dimension, a space-limiting and a space-filling function of colours. The space-limiting function shows itself in the depth dimension as a brightening, glowing, fluorescing, shining, twinkling or reflecting of the colours. For example, when a colour shines, it does not fill the space backward, but spreads itself a bit forward. Transparent bodies, per contrast, show their depth dimension in the fact that their transparency fills the space backward and in virtue of that they have a space-filling function. In the case of knowledge we can say that practical knowledge is situated in a depth dimension that can be divided into a second dimension, that is into knowing-that something is the case, and a third dimension, that of knowing-how something is done. From this, it will be clear that practical knowledge is understood as contextual knowledge.

A fourth dimension of the colours is strongly related to the ambiguity of the colours in reality and therefore with the notion of time (cf. RoC 33). It is also connected with the capability of aspect seeing, thus with our powers of imagination.

For the domain of knowledge, we can say that this fourth dimension shows itself in our creative and artistic knowledge, and can be understood as detached knowledge. All of this is shown in the figure below.



## 2 ÜBERSICHTLICHE DARSTELLUNG AND PHILOSOPHY

Wittgenstein's TLP and PI directly address logic, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind; the nature of philosophical puzzles and philosophical understanding is central to all of the discussions. In his later work Wittgenstein frequently diagnoses philosophical errors which involve confusions about the nature of philosophical inquiry. In TLP these inquiries give rise to a systematical, methodological way of solving philosophical problems. But in his later work, the 'method' is looser and more associative – much more moderate, we could say – tackling the nature of philosophical understanding anew without giving much consideration as to whether it should even be called to be a method, or rather that we have to understand the notion of method as a 'way of seeing' or 'way of life'. As Wittgenstein himself describes it in the preface of PI:

The same or almost the same points were always being approached afresh from different directions, and new sketches made. Very many of these were



badly drawn or uncharacteristic, marked by all the defects of a weak draughtsman. And when they were rejected a number of tolerable ones were left, which now had to be arranged and sometimes cut down, so that if you looked at them you could get the picture of a landscape. Thus this book is really only an album.

The notion of a picture of a landscape or an album suggests that the process and arrangement could have been otherwise. Certainly it does not give us the idea that he was constructing a theory or method as a system or a well developed construction that would end with a concrete conclusion. Also, I do not think that we can find any unity in method in Wittgenstein's work. Wittgenstein's description of philosophy is not reflected in respect to his own philosophical practice, as Anthony Kenny pointed out.<sup>13</sup> Again, note that this is especially the case for Wittgenstein's later work: the TLP is much more conceived as a system or method.

13 >  
Anthony Kenny during a conference on Wittgenstein in Reggio Emilia in June 2006.

From this I take it that we could better interpret Wittgenstein's way of doing philosophy as a conception – an *Auffassung* – of philosophy, a vision of how we should philosophise. This conception or vision is developed from the total activities of the philosopher (or also of the artist; we will discuss this point later on). We might say that in a complex symphony of voices, Wittgenstein problematises the conceptual and the visual and their relationship, for instance when he investigates the language-game of being in pain in PI. First of all, Wittgenstein's way of doing philosophy articulates a vision – a particular way of seeing – that nevertheless allows for other conceptions of philosophy. Second, this vision is bound up with everyday language-games, the obvious and the ordinary. Third, it is a conception that relates to visions and changes of vision, yet, it does not amount to relativism: not everything goes – the truth is not replaced by opinion or persuasion.<sup>14</sup> It remains tied up with the philosopher's life. Philosophers should have the urge to detect certain specific problems as well as to shed light upon those problems. As he says in Z 455 and 456:

14 >  
See for instance PI part II and other remarks on aspect seeing in his work. Genova (1993a) discusses this matter in detail.

(The philosopher is not a citizen of any community of ideas. That is what makes him into a philosopher.) Some philosophers (or whatever you like to call them) suffer from what may be called 'loss of problems'. [...]

In his later work, when Wittgenstein speaks about doing philosophy, the 'we' he sometimes uses does not refer to people generally, but rather to whoever takes that perspective one takes when adopting a reflective stance. The pronoun 'we' on such occasions cannot be employed in the normal sense, but should be understood in an amorphous sense. This 'we' is ambiguous and raises in each case the question of whether 'we' are the observers or the observed (cf. PI II,xii or PI I, 88-90). This matters for the point of view, for example, of the reader or for a perceiver in an exhibition. Because of our powers of imagination, we can take various perspectives

on the matter at hand. In some sense we are both the reader/perceiver and the writer/artist.

Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy is characterised by notions such as Übersicht, übersichtliche Darstellung, language, grammar and everyday use. His idea of doing philosophy is that it is to be judged by its results, in what it accomplishes. What matters is the difference it makes for us and the results that can be clarified by way of examples. Parallels can be seen in psychoanalysis, where in therapy, the patient makes use of free associations.

It is well known that Wittgenstein was acquainted with Freud's work. At some points he criticised him, for instance, in Lectures at Cambridge 1932-35, pp39-40, where Wittgenstein says: 'What Freud says about the subconscious sounds like science, but it is just a means of representation' and in Conversations on Freud,<sup>15</sup> on page 27, where he says: 'If you are led by psycho-analysis to say that really you thought so-and-so or that really your motive was so-and-so, this is not a matter of discovery, but of persuasion'.

Wittgenstein had roughly two objections to psychoanalysis. First, he is critical of Freud treating psychoanalysis as if it were physics, as hard boiled science with all the methodology that goes with it. For Freud, something hidden had to be discovered, more specifically, we should look for the truth about ourselves in ourselves. Freud presupposes an unconscious, which is a scientific hypothesis as Freud himself emphasises, but Wittgenstein rejects.<sup>16</sup>

Second, the theories Freud tries to establish only *appear* to be scientific while in fact are mere stories. For Wittgenstein, psychoanalysis is a mythology in that it tells a story that imposes a certain response on us; it gives us the opportunity to assign meaning to something in our lives that could have remained meaningless. The analyst's powers of suggestion direct the patient towards a response. It is a persuasion with a particular goal, namely, to free the patient of his problem. In this way, although it is not a scientific method, it can provide a new way of looking at certain phenomena – 'a fertile new point of view' as he says in CV p18. Wittgenstein was critical of this picture as may the outcome of therapy be a rigid or even pure speculation, but he admits its power. He was open to Freud's work especially with regard to the ideas on Traumdeutung. Wittgenstein critiqued him, because he was fascinated by the ways Freud handled the subject, comparing it with the therapeutical aspects that played a role in his own investigations.

In what follows, I shall examine the various points of view that are related to Wittgenstein's way of doing philosophy and its connections with psychoanalysis as a method. Baker's therapeutic reading of PI will be discussed in that it is in some respect similar to the opinions of authors as Cavell, Conant and Diamond. The problem is that Baker's insights give rise to a charge of relativism. Hacker, and also Anthony Kenny and Hans-Johann Glock take a contrasting view in these mat-

15 >  
Conversations on Freud is part of *Lectures & Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief*, a series of conversations recorded by Rush Rhees and published by Cyril Barrett

16 >  
The question remains, whether Wittgenstein had a proper view on what Freud meant by unconscious. Levy shows, that Freud's unconscious cannot be separated from the ideas of transference and resistance, that can only be observed in the free associations of the patient. See for further details Donald Levy's *Freud among the philosophers* from 1996.

ters; Daniel Hutto (2007) refines Baker's arguments. Weighing the various points of view and taking into account the conclusions Hutto draws from his refinement, the analysis will provide the arguments that will lead to my own insights on this matter. Briefly, it boils down to the conviction that there are some analogies between Wittgenstein's way of doing philosophy and psychoanalysis – they point to the same gap. Where, in my opinion, the psychoanalyst and the patient need a third source, for instance a psychological institution, to obtain a clear view on the matter at hand, the philosopher needs aside from the philosophical problem as a third source the world to be able to keep an open mind and a clear view.

The discussion questions also the place of philosophy as well as that of art in our community. Instead of focussing on 'the end of philosophy' or 'the end of art' I am of the opinion that it is more fruitful to look at the place philosophy as well as art occupy in our (cultural) world. Why it is they occupy that specific place and what they have to tell us because of their role, will be made clear towards the end of this chapter.

### 3 THE AIM AND PURPOSE OF PHILOSOPHY

Wittgenstein's general lesson is that all we require is a rearrangement of facts we already know; 'in philosophy we do not draw conclusions' (PI 599). I will exemplify Wittgenstein's aim in philosophy by means of his inquiries into rule-following. Only in a dialectical context can the rule-following problem come to light. In Part III of this volume we will come back to this dialectical context when we discuss the art of installation and its manipulation between two limits or extremes. For now it suffices to understand that whatever interpretation of a rule is offered, there will always be another that is equally consistent with all the facts. There are no ultimate solutions, sceptical or otherwise; as Wittgenstein notes, there are no musts in philosophy (PI 81, 101). What sets the limits for our use of terms and concepts is determined by the role they play in our lives. RFM I 116:

'Then according to you everybody could continue the series as he likes; and so infer *any* how!' In that case we shan't call it 'continuing the series' and also presumably not 'inference'. And thinking and inferring (like counting) is of course bounded for us, not by an arbitrary definition, but by natural limits corresponding to the body of what can be called the role of thinking and inferring in our life.

We are trained in a shared sense of the obvious that is manifested in our pattern of responses (PI 208, 235). In this respect, rule-following does not occur in isolation (see the discussion on Williams in Chapter 2). But that is not to say that meaning and truth rest upon prior agreements (PI 241); all necessary distinctions are made within our practices. Thus, according to Wittgenstein, there is no possibility to

explain the objectivity of meaning in terms of community assessment or by any appeal to a ratification-independent world.

Only in the context of weighing, and against the background of intersubjective normativity, do the notions of truth and error arise. ‘The foundations of knowledge must be subjective and objective at once’ (Davidson in Hutto 2003, p327ff). From Wittgenstein’s style of writing, which reflects his vision and attitude, it is apparent that he did not want to escape any paradoxes, but rather unite the parts by way of introducing various voices or perspectives on a particular matter. Hutto (2003, p163): ‘Wittgenstein’s reflections not only get us to see that there is no prospect of giving a ‘philosophical solution’ to the paradox, they also make us realise that the paradox itself is one of our own making.’

The importance of this unification of extremes within the paradox - the unification of subjectivity and objectivity – is that we are being freed of idealism as well as transcendental realism (cf. BBB p48). The inside/outside metaphor of our relation to reality collapses. The essence of the matter is the insight that we cannot step out of our everyday practices and our everyday use of our words (PI 116, 133). We can never take the step outside our own Form of life, simply because there is no place where a philosophical supreme being could reside. What we can do, however, is side-step between various perspectives. In this way, without it being necessary to take a meta-view, we can switch between various issues or practices, for example, by way of aspect seeing, or whenever we engage in art where a different perspective is offered to our view and values on the world.

### 3.1 THEORY AND EXPLANATION

Conventionally speaking, the idea of ‘method’ is thought of as theory and explanation, residing in the realm of science. Science is normally understood as an activity that is concerned with problem finding and problem solving, observation and experiment, and is built on analysis, deduction and inference culminating in evidence, proof and conclusions.

Neither philosophy nor art have their foundations in these systems, for they do not deal with empirical investigations or research as such. It is my conviction that we should not read Wittgenstein from a scientific point of view. Given the nature of the philosophical inquiries Wittgenstein is occupied with, his fundamental concerns cannot be addressed purely by empirical investigations. When we hit the bedrock of our practices – the bedrock of philosophy as well as the bedrock of art – we encounter what is fundamental. And that is something that also cannot be completely understood in conceptual terms. So, to understand the fundamental, we can only try to better understand, to situate the issue at hand in another perspective or context, but in itself this does not offer new hypotheses (PI 132).

#### 3.2 THERAPY, ELUCIDATION AND PROCESS

In his interpretation of Wittgenstein's way of doing philosophy Baker distinguishes between methodological concepts and their applications. The methodological concepts include the *übersichtliche Darstellung*, language and grammar, depth grammar, and the distinction between metaphysical- and everyday use. Their applications are seen especially in the private-language-argument, and involve the similarities and differences with psychoanalysis and finally the role of aspects in this methodology.

He proffers a profound therapeutic conception of Wittgenstein's philosophical investigations, addressing questions by comparing examples: 'a general practitioner who treated the bumps that various individual patients had got by running their heads up against the limits of language' (PI 119). From this, Baker argues, Wittgenstein compared his procedure with psychoanalysis. Wittgenstein's aim was to bring each patient to acknowledge the origins of their particular conceptual disorders, especially in the workings of analogies or pictures of which the sick person was not conscious. The patient's own acknowledgement of the rules in which he or she is entangled is a precondition of the correctness of the diagnosis (BT 410) as well as of the effectiveness of the cure (BT 410) (Baker, 2004, p68).

Baker holds that the therapeutic vision of philosophy is for Wittgenstein only *a* vision and not *the* vision. Wittgenstein offers a minimalist account on this therapeutic vision in analogy with psychoanalysis, 'minimalist' thought of as an antidote to our 'craving for generality' (Baker, 2004, p2). First, a philosophical investigation must take the form of a dialogue, be it real or imagined. In this respect, it is patient-orientated, demonstrated by Wittgenstein through the teaching of a method by means of detailed case-studies (Baker, 2004, p218), and by means of examples (PI 133). Also, the disease shows itself as internal, a 'hidden' conflict that has to be brought to consciousness. Thus, the method is supposed to be a rational, intellectual, face-to-face discussion that aims to cure the patient. The cure entails achieving an understanding of the patient by the patient. When disorders have disappeared self-knowledge is available. Acceptance of the correct diagnosis as well as the effectuation of the cure are indispensable. The entire procedure is essentially anti-dogmatic and multiple (Baker, 2004, p157), in which the patient has to recognise the analogies *as* analogies – not as the essence of things.

Although Baker's analysis as such is more or less correct, in the sense of his comparison with psychoanalysis, we can ask ourselves whether Wittgenstein thought in such rigid terms. The patient, for Wittgenstein, is always the philosopher understood in a general way or even philosophy itself, and cannot possibly be the kind of patient that takes himself to the psychotherapist with a specific, and above all personal problem. There is also the question: Who is the therapist in this case, and what is his role? If the patient is his or its own therapist – who both can be philosopher

and/or philosophy – then the enterprise is a rather solipsistic one. Merely ‘curing’ oneself without any feedback from the world is something Wittgenstein would not approve of.

We cannot get an overview of ourselves, ourselves. It is only afterwards, looking back in a reflective way, that is, only after gaining the crucial insight, that a cure is possible. The point is that we need something or someone else, outside so to speak, to provide us with fresh insights or direct us towards, or evoke and trigger these insights in us, in such a way that we can become conscious of certain obstacles. Self reflection and imagination, for instance, should be verified now and again with others in order to put things in perspective. In the practice of psychoanalysis, the patient himself does not use the method as such to cure himself, at least not in first instance. Rather, it is the therapist, being another person having a certain overview over the situation and the problem at hand, who directs the patient towards conscious insight and rest. But here also, the therapist should be checked by others, because he also has blind spots. It is commonly known that there are situations in which the patient has no problem at all, but is talked into one.<sup>17</sup> As Rorty nicely puts it:<sup>18</sup> ‘Freudian ideas have encouraged such abominations as the imprisonment of innocent parents on the basis of ‘repressed memories’ of abuse, solicited from young children by eager therapists. Should we conclude that there is nothing to be learned from Freud?’ We will come back on this later, when we discuss the role of philosophy and its place in the world.

There is another danger in Baker’s approach: we are reaching the point of relativism. The übersichtliche Darstellungen resemble above all the description of possibilities, not a single fact is stated, not a single thesis formulated and therefore nothing can be either attacked or defended (Baker, 2004, ch3). But the problem with this is that every cure becomes an arbitrary cure, something floating in the air without any criteria for correctness or verification with the patient’s history; the cure then becomes meaningless and that cannot be the aim of a cure.

Hacker, though Baker’s former companion in regard to the analyses of Wittgenstein’s work, reads Wittgenstein differently. He reads Wittgenstein as presenting ‘a cure’ by way of a dialectically structured range of voices: the interlocutor, the imagine-, as-if – and the would-be language-games, as well as various aspects of language use, practices and customs. All are used in order to free ourselves from the grip of a particular picture that holds us captive. For Hacker the therapist is only one of the voices Wittgenstein uses to take different perspectives in a case; the removal of the mental cramps by adopting a different perspective allows us to see equally valuable possibilities. So, Hacker differs from Baker in that the latter takes only one voice into account.

In contrast to Baker’s reading of Wittgenstein, Hacker (2004) claims that Wittgenstein executes two different tasks in PI: there is the therapeutic one, but also the

17 >

See for instance Elisabeth Loftus ‘Creating false memories’ in *Scientific American* 1997, volume 277, nr. 3, pp70-75.

18 >

Richard Rorty in a review with the title *Sigmund on the Couch* of Bouveresse’s *Wittgenstein reads Freud*.



elucidation of unacknowledged connections between the use of concepts to clarify our grammar via the perspicuous representations, providing a Bird's-eye view of our grammar. Thus Hacker sees the therapeutic analysis and the connective analysis as two distinct endeavours.

Understood from an individual point of view, the problem here is that if clarification only by way of describing is really the exclusive goal for Wittgenstein, then he should have had a particular view on how language *must* be (cf. PI 132 and 107). Description seems to imply some 'hidden' normative values as we always take ourselves – our personal history of understanding – into account when we try to 'objectively' describe what we read or see. From a collective point of view, that is, when we understand philosophy also as a collective enterprise, there is room for a more 'objective' way of seeing. Furthermore, when we examine the clarifications through the hermeneutics of therapy, they can serve as clarifications only if the interlocutor is able to recognise them as such, and let them lead him to see other pictures equally valuable and let them present him with a different view to the insurmountable philosophical problem he is facing. In this way, it becomes more or less dependent on the scope – the personal history of understanding – of the interlocutor as to what alternative pictures are offered.

The distinction between an elucidative and a therapeutic reading has consequences for the way in which we should read PI 122:

A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not *command a clear view* of the use of our words. -Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. A perspicuous representation produces just that understanding which consists in 'seeing connections'. Hence the importance of finding and inventing *intermediate cases*. The concept of a perspicuous representation is of fundamental significance for us. It earmarks the form of account we give, the way we look at things. (Is this a 'Weltanschauung'?)

The elucidatory reading understands the notion of perspicuous representation in the functional sense; it fulfils the functional criteria of connections identified by the philosopher. This presupposes that the philosopher or the everyday language user has insight into the way our language actually is; as already mentioned, this suggests that the description assumes some normative values whenever we take an individual point of view.

The therapeutic reading, however, understands the notion of perspicuous representation in the achievement sense; something is a perspicuous representation only when it is achieved by an aspect switch. This does not presuppose any special insight into our language, but rather is something dialogical or dialectical. The philosophical therapist enters into dialogue with the interlocutor and tries to make him see things differently by using examples tailored for this particular occasion. It is only

when the interlocutor wholeheartedly accepts another way of seeing that the philosophical spell is broken.

‘A perspicuous representation is of fundamental importance to us’ (PI 122). For the elucidatory fans the ‘us’ refers to the language users who have insight in the true workings of the language. For the therapeutic readers, the ‘us’ are the practitioners of our method – those sharing a therapeutic vision on practising philosophy.<sup>19</sup>

Is doing philosophy merely choosing this for that; e.g., choosing a rabbit for a duck? The phenomenon of seeing-as, thought of as the strategy of shifting perspectives, is explained by Baker in this light as a metaphor for the right practice for philosophy. But what then is the right practice, bearing in mind that an aspect switch or the idea of aspect seeing implies something objective?

Notice that other interpretations are possible, besides those of Baker and Hacker, who rigidly rely on their own respective interpretations of Wittgenstein’s remarks. Furthermore, in contrast to the therapeutic process itself,<sup>20</sup> the therapeutic *approach* is unambiguously deterministic; the purpose dictates the nature of the process. Also, the patient should accept the *übersichtliche Darstellung* that is suggested by the therapist as a *cure*, in contrast to conceptual analysis, which is used separately from the therapeutic method. From the comparison of the therapeutic and the elucidative reading, we can understand that Wittgenstein’s method is to teach us differences, not as a goal, but as an instrument, as a means of gaining tranquility regarding philosophical problems.

To summarise, we can say that Wittgenstein’s method is therapy in cases where the therapist tries to show other ways of seeing, for instance by questioning, providing analogies, giving examples etc. – trying to persuade the patient to accept another way of looking at a problem. It is conceptual analysis in the sense when he uses differences as a means. Thus we see that the *übersichtliche Darstellung* as a way of doing philosophy has at least a double function.

Wittgenstein often directs us to consider the circumstances under which we first learned our concepts. At that stage, we learn at face value, without any doubt, taking things as well as instructions and explanations about how things stand in the world for granted, as something obvious. This is in contrast to what we learn at a more mature level or in science, when we start by doubting certain issues in order to get a clearer view on the matter (OC 374). In this respect, description is linked to re-educating (Hutto, 2003, p194ff). This re-educating can also be understood as a therapy, in that what was taken as obvious is re-viewed and re-fined, re-modelled and seen in a new light; what is learned is a new, refined perspective about how things ‘really’ stand at that moment, in those circumstances within the context of a community. It is ‘really’, in the sense that we take the world to be that way, in the conviction of that moment, when our doubts have come to rest.

There is maybe something else that, to my knowledge, is not mentioned by ei-

19 >  
If ‘perspicuous representation’ is an achievement term and philosophical healing is achieved in using nonsense, then philosophy is not a method of reasoning at all; this is something acknowledged by Baker, Cavell, Conant, Diamond who are some of the philosophers situated in the school of The New Wittgensteinians. For them, philosophy is about passing from the disguised to patent nonsense, and the passing itself is by means of nonsense. I will not go into this discussion as it would exceed the scope of the thesis.

20 >  
Much more can be said about the therapeutic process and the similarities and differences we can detect in comparison with the artistic process, but I will not do so as that would outweigh this publication.

ther the elucidatory disciple nor the therapeutic follower, namely, that Wittgenstein stressed the procedure, the process itself as being most important, linked as it is in a contingent way to the purpose or the result, in some sense erratic and variable in outcome. See for instance RFM, part II, p127/7, where Wittgenstein emphasises that the process is part of the method.

We can also detect the importance of the process in the objections Wittgenstein made in PO to Frazer's ideas concerning the manners of categorising the various rituals and myths, as well as in his adaptation of Goethe's and Spengler's elaborations on morphology. Both issues are discussed at length in the first chapter (pp28-37), where we saw that the Gestalt of mathematical configurations is evoked by way of its functioning in the context. Because the context may change, the Gestalt can be seen differently. Wittgenstein's way of doing philosophy as a descriptive morphology not only allows for, but also emphasises the processes when he directs us to (comparisons of) rearranging and clarifying the possible interconnections within the diverse multitude of phenomena. Clearly, the emphasis is on *making* models of comparison that are – by consequence – something unrefined and unfinished.

If we start from the idea that the various aspects of meaning describe a fixed configuration, but our standpoints and perspectives are variable, then we see how the processes are directed towards an outcome; in our elaboration on the *übersichtliche Darstellung* of the colour-octahedron, we concluded that neither process nor outcome is fixed or arbitrary. And the issues on infinity Wittgenstein discusses are issues about the procedure of the calculation of numbers, not about the numbers themselves. Process, also thought of as worked out considerations, and result are not two separate issues. As Wittgenstein says: 'process and result are one.' Maybe we could say, that the process is not so much part of the method, as it *is* the method; in this way we understand why it can be called a 'vision'. What is important here is that we do not know at the beginning what processes will determine which outcome, which ways will lead to what end. Rothhaupt signals the same view where he says: 'Wittgenstein's philosophy is a philosophy in process' (Rothhaupt, 1996, p156). And that makes Wittgenstein's investigation a philosophy that is essentially a conceptual inquiry.

The *übersichtliche Darstellung* can best be understood as a *tool* that can be used in order to get a new perspective or insight on some particular issue. The New Wittgensteinians<sup>21</sup> as well as Hacker will agree on this. A perspicuous representation does not discover a problem in the way that one does in science, nor does it solve anything; it merely gives an overview of possibilities as a means to evoke some insight or understanding in us. This last remark the New Wittgensteinians will disagree with, but Hacker will accept it. Thus, in this respect, philosophy is not understood as part of science, but has a place of its own. It should be remarked that this may lead not only to solutions, but also to other problems or constraints previously unnoticed. We could say that in using an *übersichtliche Darstellung* there

21 >

The 'New Wittgensteinians' emphasise a radical negative account of Wittgenstein with the view that there is no significant showing in his work. In TLP as well as in PI the aim is to cure the reader from his illusions of his thinking by way of therapy. In this respect philosophy becomes mere description. Advocates of this view are Conant, Diamond and Floyd among others.

is a reflexive dynamics going on between stability and change in an erratic, and more or less unpredictable manner, so that afterwards there is something changed although this something might not always be articulable.

In order to refine our insights about this process reading, Hutto can be very helpful. Hutto claims that 'perspicuous representations bring 'relevant connections' to light, thereby giving us the opportunity to understand and reflect on aspects of various domains of human being' (Hutto, 2007, p300). As Hutto himself tries to show, these perspicuous representations reveal the a priori possibilities in particular domains. This implies, that we can side-step explanatory ambitions and because of this, have a descriptive, but not merely descriptive way of doing philosophy. Thus, philosophy is not entirely relative, as we cannot fix on just any feature in a given domain – nor describe every feature. As we have already seen, description is always a description from the perspective of the describer, who will have blind spots because of having had only a finite number of experiences out of an infinite number of possibilities. A perspicuous representation, therefore, is only perspicuous for us when we have a specific interest due to a certain purpose, when we narrow down the scope of the possibilities.

Perhaps we could say that in our attempt to create - and are thus in the process of making or constructing – a perspicuous representation for a specific problem or language-game, we can see what we had previously failed to see. Even if this attempt fails, it can give us insights on what we still need to clarify in philosophy. In describing our rules of grammar – thus in the process! - we also reveal our own gaps. This can be seen in Wittgenstein's failure to construct a perspicuous representation of psychological concepts, as he himself admits. Nevertheless, we still can learn a great deal about the properties and their connections in this specific language-game.

In a process there is no clear cut distinction between therapy and elucidation – they can go hand-in-hand, intermingled to a point where the two ways of treatment give rise to an insight we didn't have before.

And there is another point. If we agree with Wittgenstein, and regard the process in some respect as the result, then we can never know whether the insight we obtain is the ultimate one; the insight will be always a temporary fixed result – a rough result, useful for the time being. And this we could understand as something negative as well as something positive. Hutto convincingly argues in this respect for what he calls a 'navigational account': perspicuous representations can be adapted if a domain changes in unexpected ways. There are always possibilities: there are no musts in philosophy (Hutto, 2007, p304).

The question is whether, as Hutto believes, a perspicuous representation can in principle take any form, the form of a 'language-game' being a prime example (PI 130). If Wittgenstein would have considered perspicuous representations to be, in principle, of any possible form, one would expect that he would have discussed or drawn

many other übersichtliche Darstellungen. But there are hardly any perspicuous representations that are specifically articulated as such. It is only the colour-octahedron that, as such, is elaborated by Wittgenstein as an übersichtliche Darstellung. However, implicitly, we can detect in his later work numerous übersichtliche Darstellungen, such as Wittgenstein's inquiry into 'language-games' (PI 2) or conclude from his remarks that for him the body as a picture of the 'soul' can be understood as a perspicuous representation. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen to what extent he himself would have interpreted it as such. Take for example his attempts at constructing a perspicuous overview of psychological concepts - an enterprise that failed, because psychological concepts appeared to be too ambiguous and could not be categorised in a perspicuous way. This does not imply, however, that such an attempt is of no importance, for in this way we can learn something about the nature of psychological concepts.

The colour-octahedron was his most successful – visual – übersichtliche Darstellung, but a proof or a formula can also do the job (See for instance Floyd 2000). Still, I think we should be careful to qualify everything as such. If I am correct, and Wittgenstein did not consciously develop a full blown method, then one can imagine that it is also the case that the übersichtliche Darstellung must be understood as a 'natural' part of doing philosophy for him: experimenting, trying out and observing what happens – wherever the process will bring you.

Hutto asks himself whether philosophy need imitate science in making theories: Is philosophy merely nothing other than rational theory construction? Hutto notes on p318: 'to encode all the possibilities relevant to making even a single proposition entirely unambiguous so that there could be no confusion about its scope, reference or background presuppositions etc. would require the representation of a potentially infinite series of rules (cf TLP). We have to accept that even our best thinking and speaking is only ever approximate.' It is not so difficult to agree with him on this statement; a scientist will also admit wholeheartedly that it is only for the time being and within a limited scope that he can rely on his findings. This is also illuminated by Wittgenstein and his elaboration on the colour-octahedron that shows all the rules of the colour-grammar only roughly – 'beiläufig' – as Wittgenstein himself emphasises.

I agree with Hutto on his statement that philosophy should not imitate science, but disagree with his arguments. There is no need for philosophy to make every proposition entirely unambiguous; on the contrary, it is exactly the ambiguity of the language that gives philosophy its unique position.

Hutto (2007, p320) concludes his paper with the observation that Baker is simply wrong to suppose that in rejecting theoretical philosophy Wittgenstein promotes a purely negative, therapeutic method that leads to relativism. Removing misconceptions and re-contextualising, that is, re-modelling our practices in a way that leaves them open to be illuminated by other, non-philosophical investigations

is for Hutto one way to pursue a more positive end. My own insight leads me to think that philosophy needs a third party, broadly speaking 'the world', in order to be of any significance, to be a healthy discipline. This 'world' can be understood in what we earlier called the knowing-of, that what we normally take as obvious and accept as our certainties. The philosopher also has to detach in order to get a clear view on the matter at hand, and look at it from a fresh or different perspective. For the philosopher as well as the artist, 'thinking is always starting anew'. In the fourth section of this chapter I will return to this insight in more detail. Wittgenstein tells us the same in PI II, xii:

If the formation of concepts can be explained by facts of nature, should we not be interested, not in grammar, but rather in that in nature which is the basis of grammar?—Our interest certainly includes the correspondence between concepts and very general facts of nature. (Such facts as mostly do not strike us because of their generality.) But our interest does not fall back upon these possible causes of the formation of concepts; we are not doing natural science; nor yet natural history—since we can also invent fictitious natural history for our purposes.

### 3.3 CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS

In all three stances on the idea of *übersichtliche Darstellung* as a way of doing philosophy – the therapeutic, the descriptive and the process reading – conceptual analysis plays a major role.

In the therapeutic method, where the aim (and not the process, as we have already seen) of the conceptual analysis is a deterministic journey towards a result (the cure of a disease), descriptive method takes conceptual analysis as a way to put the disease at ease in a re-arrangement of the various aspects of a problem, so that we are able to obtain a fresh view on a particular matter. In the process-approach what counts is not the result, the cure, but the analysis itself of each step, each time re-considering and reflecting on the matter at hand. This attitude amounts to a pluralistic and open, non-linear, investigation. It is non-linear in the sense that there might be side-roads, crooked paths, roundabout roads along the way, increasing or decreasing in importance; the outcome might be totally different than expected.

For all variants the same concern holds, however, in regard to the claim that conceptual analysis is conducted on objective grounds. This idea of objectivity is the difficulty here. In some respect, it is always a matter of choice and practical decision that will account for acceptance of the outcome of a therapy or an illuminating counter-example. What constitutes a proper counter-example depends on our normative assessment of what we are willing to accept as such (Hutto, 2003, p198). Thus, an argument and its conclusion will depend on our commitment, on what we are willing to accept or refuse, and our evaluations on the matter at hand



can never claim to be an independent, completely objective verification. However, we can say that there is an objective element involved, related to what has become accepted as 'objective' within our community.

Another difficulty is that our everyday concepts tend to evolve over time. Feysabend (cited by Hutto 2003, p201): 'Our concepts are well defined only when the culture fossilises.' In this respect, there are synchronic as well as diachronic differences concerning a concept. Our practices are susceptible to potentially constant change and development. As a consequence, philosophical description can only be temporally and never decisive.

From his discussion on these difficulties in philosophy, Hutto comes to the understanding that instead of conceptual analysis we should turn to conceptual re-vision (Hutto, 2003, p203), but there remains the question as to when the development of our concepts could be labelled as better or more useful. The point is that we cannot describe the boundaries of logic independently of what we do (OC 56). There are possibilities that are in some way necessary but also at the same time contingent, given by our Form of life that gives purpose to our activities. This teleological aspect in which the method chosen is limited to a certain range of purposes, prevents our choices from descending into arbitrariness.

### 4 REFLEXIVE DYNAMICS

Wittgenstein's *übersichtliche Darstellung* is meant to give a perspicuous overview of a part of our language. Something complex is condensed into something comprehensible and manageable. It shows us all necessary relations of some part of the grammar in *one* clear view and invites the perceiver to actively make use of his imagination. Evoking a reflexive dynamics, it shows the form of our representation – the way we do normally look at things.

As for the art of installation, it is a hybrid form of art, spatial and site specific. This form of art is almost always temporary and there is always some reciprocal relation between space and work, space and perceiver, perceiver and work. The perceiver is an active element and as such, part of the installation. Thus, the installation invites the perceiver to actively make use of his ability for imagination. We can say that the interrelationships between space, work and perceiver evoke a reflexive dynamics, giving rise to a very special and unexpected way we can look at things.

Thus, both make use of our powers of imagination and both evoke a reflexive dynamics, but the *übersichtliche Darstellung* shows us how we *normally* look at things (something that can give us a 'renewed' insight on that matter), while with an installation as a work of art, a very special, *surprising* (very different) way is shown as to how we can look at things.

In a dynamic way we are constantly remodel[ing] our reality, coming back to

our reality by means of a different aspect. The dynamics can be found in the simultaneous changing of reality as well as in the changing of the model or the system, and the alteration of the relation between model, the system or the work of art and reality. The result is something that is altered or changed, providing us with a different – new – perspective on the matter at hand.

Perception and memory are the tools that are used for reflexive dynamics. These include our ability for seeing aspects, our memory of past experiences and from this, our constant restructuring of experience – the readjusting or remodelling of occurrences. What is decisive is the context in which we use our concepts, because their use is relative to the perspective we take and the aspects involved in the context in which they appear. It is the simultaneous interaction between ourselves and the context that I call ‘reflexive dynamics’. It is a dynamics that is reflexive because it returns to and calls upon itself by means of a different aspect and is reflective because it provides us with an insight on the change at hand. For matters of convenience the term ‘reflexive’ is meant to cover both.

#### 4.1 IMAGINATION AND ASPECT SEEING

Reflexive dynamics implies that we actively construct our concepts. The way we look at things, for instance at a certain colour, is relative to the perspective we take and the aspects of the colour involved in the context. These aspects trigger both our abilities to see, think and imagine, and also emphasise the properties of the context in which – in this case – the colours appear. In the case of the colour-octahedron this reflexive dynamics appears when we use the octahedron to compare a colour with that same colour in reality.

As for the colours that are susceptible to constant change in reality, they are given a fixed place in the octahedron, thus forming a permanent figure presented in the *übersichtliche Darstellung*. The octahedron, as such, is a fixed configuration, but the colours in reality may undergo a constant change because of the interchangeability between colour, context and the circumstances in which colour and context appear. In this reflexive dynamics we can see black *now* as dark, *now* as deep.

As already noted, we should distinguish between our use of the powers of imagination and something that calls for our imagination. Artists especially make use of this by switching between continuous aspect perception – what we understand as something ordinary and obvious that goes unnoticed – and their artistic aspect perception, that is, their specific ways of seeing. The latter can be called poetic understanding. The notion of continuous aspect perception is used by (Luntley, 2003) and has been discussed at length in Chapter 2.

The reflexive dynamics is not something that we can express in language: it is something ineffable. We cannot express the ineffable in language, but can come to *see* it in our use of language. This ‘seeing’ is connected with our receptiveness and

our ability to imagine something that does not exist in reality. We can reflect on a change and thereby come to recognise, as in a mirror, something reflexive that is not recognisable in a direct way. The same sort of activity takes place when we experience an installation in art. In both cases, it is uncertainty or ambiguity that allows us to reflect on what we think as well as on the unthinkable. Thus, we are able to experience reality, the virtual and the dream, and the pictures we make of this reality and the fact that we are capable of reflecting on this all.

In the reflexive dynamics between what is obvious, conventional and everyday, and what is uncertain, opaque and inexpressible, poetic understanding can emerge. This poetic understanding is possible due to the meaning potential of the language use. This meaning potential is what is possibly present in the language, what the language is capable of expressing because of what the user is capable of doing with the language. Because of this meaning potential, we are able to take a different point of view in which the obvious can be seen anew. Everything can be new – even the most ordinary (Baz, 2000). In this way the ineffable can show itself.

We can then conclude that this reflexive dynamics is a creative process and can be understood as a package tour of meaning. And this implies that meaning is not a linear trajectory towards perspicuity, but a process, a movement, carrying various aspects that can be detected in numerous ways, time and again anew. It is something that is necessarily ambiguous, pluralistic and multi-dimensional.

It is here that my philosophical enterprise merges with my artistic projects and it is at this point that for me work and life are one.

An artist is someone who is permanently on holiday. She does know the rules, but plays with them, turns them in her hand and tries to find out how far she can get, in order to discover the utmost consequences of the rules and their extensions. By contrast, Wittgenstein in PI 38 warns us that philosophical problems arise the moment our language is on holiday. He tries to show us how we are fixated, stuck to our ideas of how language should be, and urges us to look again to see and understand what language really is – something ambiguous, pluralistic and multi-dimensional.

The artist can show the philosopher where he goes wrong; the philosopher narrows down the possibilities of the artist. The two positions are related to one another in a dialectical, reflexive dynamic way. We, philosophers and artists, are passengers on board a voyage of investigation and inspiration. This journey is a package tour into possibilities, landmarks, question marks and exclamation marks, to small steps and great discoveries.

For me, art and philosophy are both about assigning meaning to the world and the journey it entails, about our capacity to give something back to the world in a meaningful way. It is a journey about the meaning potential that is being transformed (not translated!) and multi-dimensionally reflected. Art always begins with

doubt and uncertainty. Thinking is active uncertainty. And uncertainty is in some sense just a more attentive, intensified form of certainty. When we depart from the idea that art as well as philosophy are meant to enrich knowledge of ourselves and the world, the main question is whether we have discovered a different possibility for art and philosophy, one not only referring to itself or to some ideal, but keeping in touch with the world and returning the concepts to the world in a meaningful manner.

#### 4.2 A PACKAGE TOUR OF A CONCEPT

In contrast to the philosopher, who can force a particular picture upon us by argument, the artist never pushes, but, at the very most, presents a proposal – a proposal to look at a fragment of the world in another way. When it is an excellent work of art, it is revealing and multi-layered in a plural ambiguity. It is not a package of loose fragments, but rather something composed out of a multiplicity of voices, standing in a meaningful relation and presenting a different, yet coherent world view. The meaning potential is not merely transformed, but the transformations are dynamic and reflexive at the same time.

The meaning of a work of art or a philosophical treatise is not so much a message as it is a vision or a movement; it is the spirit of the maker that is present in the work. This spirit is not like a patient asking for a diagnosis, but a trace of potential – of meaning potential. This could be thought of as meaning as an attitude – as seeing the same thing differently time and again, repeatedly viewing, reviewing, re-model[ing] thereby expressing our values – to what we think is important in our lives.

Throughout the history of mankind it has always been the stories, songs, myths, talks, treatises, works of art which hold the memory that binds society. In essence, they reflect the highest values that legitimate the existence and the constitutions of a society. It is this framework of investigation and imagination that I have called ‘meaning’ and can be understood as a package tour of a concept.

## Doubt is just a more Receptive State of Certainty



Photo installation Do not Erase ...

Do not Erase ... wait for Meaning, Arti et Amicitiae, Amsterdam 21|6-13|7 2008



Photo installation Do not Erase ...

Do not Erase ... wait for Meaning, Arti et Amicitiae, Amsterdam 21|6-13|7 2008

>> PART II





## 4 > REMODEL[L]ING REALITY



1993 *Puzzled Windows*

The phenomenon of installation as a work of art originated from Schwitter's *Mertzbau* in Europe and developments in America after the second World War developing from 'happening' and 'environment' to an accepted, hybrid form of art. It is a 3-dimensional, site-specific form of art. The context of the single elements that make up the work is as much a part of the work of art as the elements from which the work of art has been constructed are. For me, it is only after the idea – the concept – is raised that the best suited medium in which the idea can be worked out is chosen. And because the processes – the intervening steps – determine the outcome, I call the cluster of installations that investigate a concept from various perspectives *InstallationPackage*.

In order to show how this perspective on the art of installation differs from what is commonly accepted and to determine its scope, I will again examine the first sketch that was drawn in Chapter 1 on the art of installation, and elaborate on the main issues as far as it contributes to my insights which are elaborated in the artistic part of this PhD project. I will describe my own views on the matter and will end the investigation with the description and documentation of the art works that were completed in the course of this PhD project. In this way, the volume at hand becomes a combination of a philosophical treatise and works of art, inextricably bound up and interrelated into an *InstallationPackage*. From this, I want to make the claim that this book itself too can be understood as an *InstallationPackage* – as an 'active totality'. Let us start this Chapter, then, with an inquiry into the art of installation from the creator's perspective.

### 1 THE ART OF INSTALLATION THE CREATOR'S PERSPECTIVE

What has the modern form of art ·the art of installation· to do with our quest for the relation between knowledge, perception and reality? Why this form, and what is the relation with the later work of Wittgenstein?

After World War II a form of art emerged and developed into what we now call ·conceptual art·.<sup>1</sup> This movement has its roots in language and is occupied with ideas – the concepts behind a work of art. Some critics have argued that this movement has devolved into a form of art that has become philosophy; others have labelled it a bad form of metaphysics. In my view, this need not be the case, as long as we hold on to the point of departure that understands art as the enrichment of our self-knowledge and our understanding of the world. This self-knowledge is not equivalent to the notion of ·truth·. Rather, what matters is that we have to look at the world through the eyes of art, instead of placing art next to reality and comparing them with each other and making judgements. And it is the ·active totality· of the artist that makes the difference, as we shall see.

1 >  
The term ·conceptual art· came into use in the late 1960s to describe a wide range of types of art that no longer took the form of a conventional art object. In 1973 a pioneering record of the early years of the movement appeared in the form of a book, *Six Years*, by the American critic Lucy Lippard. The 'six years' were 1966-72. The long subtitle of the book referred to 'so-called conceptual or information or idea art'.

Source: Tate Modern

Humans are able to manipulate their experiences by means of their powers of imagination, used in order to see the world, in some sense, in a more perspicuous and clear way. Works of art are works of imagination and the imagination of the artist can transform our experience by letting us feel, hear, see and think in a more intensified and refined manner. Our experience of ourselves and the world gets shaken-up, so to speak.

It is from this perspective that we can say that both philosophy and art can teach us something about ourselves – about our *attitude* towards reality. Yet, we should not reduce philosophy and art to one another, although both disciplines pose the same question: Can we discover a way in philosophy as well as in art, where neither discipline merely references itself or an abstract ideal, but remains in touch with the world – returning the concepts to the world in a meaningful manner?

We have already noticed that the art of installation tries to integrate art and life in various ways. This is because the art of installation is a hybrid discipline that extends itself far beyond the studio of the artist and art practices. As a consequence, this form of art is strongly embedded in public space, as because more often than not the artist takes public space as his studio. What is crucial in the art of installation is that it concentrates not so much on one object, but much more on the relation between its elements – they can also be existing elements from public space or everyday life – or on the interaction between objects and their contexts.

Moreover, the notion of ·public space· should be understood in a broad way, since a gallery space or an exhibition room is also a public space. Yet, the art of installation came about in first instance in order to bypass the institutional frameworks that were provided by the museums and gallery circuits. The artists felt imprisoned, cut off from everyday life, and enslaved to marketing and sales. Unfortunately it is

the case that the freedom of the artist to find alternative places and make art that was not for sale or trade did not last very long. Very quickly, the art of installation was institutionalised by museums and galleries, where so-called 'curators' were eager to commandeer the insights and status of the artist and try to make a living out of it. Paralysed, artists asked themselves whether there could be a way out of this dilemma, since in order to keep an open view on the world that gives one the opportunity to enrich self knowledge, a free and unrestricted environment is needed (Stallabrass, 2004). I will go in to this in more detail later on. For now, I want to elaborate on the phenomenon of installation itself and show what my own point of view on the matter is.

The ancient conception of art as a 'unified whole' is recovered in the art of installation, albeit in an altered form. Wagner's idea of 'Gesamtkunstwerk' also has a similarity with the phenomenon of installation, in the sense that the theatrical aspects do not refer to tragedy as is the case in Wagner's work, but much more to the consciousness of life-processes and the roles human beings perform. That is the reason why the art of installation can also have a narrative, fairy tale, mythical or ritual aspect. First and foremost this idea of 'Gesamtkunstwerk' in art is meant as a 'totality', in the sense of bringing together old and new materials, gathering art and politics, or the merging of various (art)disciplines. However, the phenomenon of installation is not equivalent to theatre or architecture; it is not the acting out of a story – not a performing art meant to entertain an audience – neither is it architecture, as one is not intended to live or work in an installation.

This 'totality' or 'unified whole' of the installation can be understood in various dimensions. First, an installation consists of various elements. The artist's job, then, is to explore other ways of seeing and articulate these ways into a visual language that transforms the knowledge of the viewer into something that becomes open and questions the knowledge of himself and the world, so that new insights may arise or light shed, giving a fresh view on matters that are so obvious, they seemed forgotten. From this, we can say that the artist has become a researcher – starting with perception, and adding self-knowledge as well as knowledge of the world and the culture she is living in.

Second, from the creator's perspective, the art of installation is an *active totality*. It is what one might call a 'Gesamtkunstwerk' not in the sense of the installation itself, nor in what it, as such, shows as art, but as the total activity of the artist. It is the total effort – not effect! – of the artist that leads to what we call 'vision' or 'oeuvre' or 'body of work'. This totality can be found in the doing: the research, the thinking, the writings and publications, the searching, the failures and errors, the choices of material and even the way of life. Nothing is hidden, every connection is visible, all traces can be followed back. The artist describes all dimensions in a general, total way and in doing so provides the report of an attitude. This book is an attempt to investigate how such an attitude might look.

In my view, contemporary art does not deal with questions about the beautiful, or the question of whether something from reality has been represented in the right way or not. For me, at least, art is concerned with whether or not artists are able to assign meaning to the world and its dynamics, about insight into patterns, about the way someone is able to ‘give something back’ to the world. The artist is someone who is fascinated by the meaning potential of reality transformed – not translated! – in a work of art: a multi-dimensional, multi-layered, multi-faceted, dynamic, reflexive reality. In this respect, every work of art produces a reality. Contemporary art has become a play with the world. Mind you, not a play of, it is not theatre.<sup>2</sup> Neither is it a riddle and it certainly does not provide any message or any solution. For solutions, we have universities and the various disciplines of science. Art is not *about* something, but *is* that something itself.

2 >  
Note, that ‘play’ is meant here in the broad, everyday sense of the word, not for example Heidegger’s idea on the matter.

The main dilemma of modern art is reflected in the question of how change and uncertainty should be visualised, about what is being changed – what undergoes change – as well as that what causes change. Paradoxically, all art begins with uncertainty and ambiguity and returns to uncertainty and ambiguity.

Not only art, but thinking is also a form of active uncertainty. Starting from the idea that it is the task of the artist to make a contribution to the self-knowledge of mankind, we need to ask ourselves to what extent the artist has the opportunity to reflect upon the consequences of being an artistic acting agent. In my opinion, this is a reason the artist can benefit from philosophy. Let us take another look, therefore, at Wittgenstein’s way of practising philosophy.

There are a number of characteristics in the art of installation that we can compare with the investigations in the later work of Wittgenstein, taking as key the notion of ‘übersichtliche Darstellung’.

First of all, both begin with a conceptual investigation. Furthermore, the art of installation is a hybrid discipline whose aim is to integrate life and art. We can also detect an emphasis on this integration in Wittgenstein’s life and work, where he shows us the ambiguity between what we learn and know and what we experience in life. The tension between *why* something is the case and *that* something is the case cannot be resolved, but provides us with possibilities to take various perspectives that can be worked out in numerous ways. Wondering *that* the world exists can be experienced time and again anew and lead us towards different insights of how we think the world really is at a particular point in time. Because the unanswerable questions that stem from this wondering and amazement outweigh the answers, the emphasis is on the undertaking itself, that is, the steps in the process.

More generally, we could say that it is posing questions which connects philosophy and the art of installation. Of course, this is not explicit in every domain of philosophy nor in every installation that is created, nor in other forms of art. Still, philosophy and art implicitly have something to say to each other by questioning

the values of our life, what we think is important in our society, the decisions we make, and the like. Questions play a crucial role in our way of doing philosophy as well as in the art of installation; they connect our place in the world with the experiencing of ourselves as a human being. Not all questions are equally important however. The important ones are bound up with the conceptual investigation at hand. Ultimately, these questions are concerned with the status of ·truth· and ·perceiving· and the relation those two notions have with the notion of ·certainty· – what amounts to our background knowledge – and our reflection on all of this. So, the important questions are those which emerge from life itself and the values we attach to them. For example, questions like: ‘What do we mean with the notion of ·life quality·?’<sup>3</sup> or ‘how do we preserve our sense of coherence in a fragmented world?’ – to name only a few.

For Wittgenstein, the *übersichtliche Darstellung* is a rearrangement of existing data of what we already know, but have apparently forgotten. It is about what corresponds with to being conditioned and the convictions we learn by living in a certain culture and community and through experiences (PI 51) (Genova, 1995, p37). From what we already know, we can obtain new insights when we look at the existing data and compare them again ‘anew’ with elements in reality. According to Genova (1995) only human beings are able to see something *as* something, that is, to transform their way of seeing. This capacity expresses itself in our use of imagination. In Chapter 3 I demonstrated how imagination is tied up with various kinds of knowledge. It lead me to the conclusion that imagination is also a source of knowledge and bound to the other kinds of knowledge in a dynamic, reflexive way.

Art can help us see things differently. From the rearrangement of existing and imagined data that are exposed in an installation, we suddenly discover new or different connections when we use our various kinds of knowledge, including memory, as well as our powers of imagination. Things that we didn’t see before, we now suddenly notice, and from this we may pose different questions, get a new perspective on already existing questions or get a completely new insight –in short, we gain new knowledge.

### 1.1 THE QUEST FOR MEANING

I have already argued that the installation as an expression of art can be understood as an *übersichtliche Darstellung*, that is to say, a specific grammatical (in the Wittgensteinian sense) conceptual ordering of reality. It is one of the ways in which human beings can perceive and come to understand the world. As we saw earlier, Wittgenstein’s key remark concerning this concept of *übersichtliche Darstellung* can be found in *Philosophical Investigations*, remark 122:

3 >  
The working out of the investigation of the concept ·life-quality· can be found in InstallationPackage Rhine, described in the booklet/ folder Remodel[li]ng Reality that you can find in the front cover of the book.



A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not *command a clear view* of the use of our words.-Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. A perspicuous representation produces just that understanding which consists in 'seeing connections'. Hence the importance of finding and inventing *intermediate cases*. The concept of a perspicuous representation is of fundamental significance for us. It earmarks the form of account we give, the way we look at things. (Is this a 'Weltanschauung'?)

The need to find and invent intermediary connections is also a significant point in his discussion of the colour-octahedron; both where he talks about the intermediate colours on the horizontal axis of the octahedron and also in the ways in which the colours in the octahedron are compared with the colours in reality by means of an aspect change or switch. In RoC especially, Wittgenstein elaborates on what he calls the possibility of a 4th dimension of the colours, and how this relates to aspect switch, namely in the comparison between a colour on the axis of the colour-octahedron and that same colour, for instance when it glows in reality. We either see a colour *now* as 'gold', *now* as 'yellow' or *now* as 'black', *now* as 'deep'. The consequences of these different ways of seeing are reflected in the ways we use our colour words.

4 >  
For instance installation  
Wiederholte Spiegelungen/  
Repeated Reflections that was  
accomplished in 2008. You  
can find an overview as a  
black/white picture in the  
back of the book and a  
description on the  
pages 165 to 170.

In the installation as a form of art we also encounter questions to do with the finding and inventing of intermediate connections – the connections between objects and their context that are situated in an installation, as well as connections between the installation 'as a whole' and reality.<sup>4</sup> In experiencing an installation, in wandering through the installation, the viewer is expected to have an active attitude with respect to his imagination, that is, to make an aspect change that shows a figure-ground structure with reality. He experiences himself as being in another world on his journey through the installation, at the same time bringing in his own (historical) life-world. In contrast to everyday life – which cannot be set aside to take a view from a distance – it *is* possible to step out and withdraw from the world that is offered by the installation. What is ground at one point in time can be figure at another.

An analogy can be drawn with Wittgenstein's view. We cannot step out of our reality since 'our grammar lacks perspicuity' (PB I 1), but it is possible to step out of a part of our grammar and look at it from a distance, as is the case of an *übersichtliche Darstellung*. We hold the colour-octahedron next to reality in an attempt to clear up a problem we have come across. In the same way, we can step out of everyday life by entering and engaging in an installation in an attempt to provide a fresh view on (a part of) reality.

In this way, we can switch back and forth and take various perspectives in order to get a clear view on a certain matter that intrigues or puzzles us. In both cases we need our powers of imagination. This imagination implies, aside from everyday

knowledge, cultural and historical knowledge, the ability to see something at the same time 'anew as new' and to reflect on all of this. From this, we can say that with regard to the use of an *übersichtliche Darstellung*, there is no difference between philosophy and art. Compare what we have said about the similarities and the difference between the two concepts in Chapter 1.

Concerning the installation, the questions, then, are: In what way is the viewer able to act upon what is offered in the installation? How is he able to bring in his knowledge into play? To what extent is the installation a manifestation of reality generating a certain insight concerning a particular part of reality? In what way does 'truth' come into play? Is this a more complete truth than a particular part of reality itself or is it that we merely experience it as something more truthful? How do we communicate these deliberations and how does all this relate to our higher values?

We have already explored the idea that the viewer is offered an active role in the journey through an installation; he becomes in some way an integral part of the installation itself and because of this is ritualised in a specific manner – he becomes part of the concept itself. As a consequence, the viewer completes the installation – without him the installation is meaningless.<sup>5</sup> Meaning is being constituted through the relation between viewer and installation, into something that could be considered as an 'anthropological moment'; the viewer brings into play his own history as well as the history of a particular culture.

5 >  
This is not to say that the installation is meaningless for the creator without any other viewers involved.

At the same time, though, it is equally important that the same viewer can take the position of an outsider, albeit only partially. In this way there is a manipulation between two extremes (Kabakov, 1999, p35). The viewer is element in a play, that, at that moment, at that place, is 'the world' for him and at the same time he is able to look at it differently from a certain distance and reflect on his actions and his attitude towards the installation. From this, he manages to combine memories from previous life experiences with the impressions and insights he experiences when perceiving the installation, into new meanings. It is in this way that an attempt is made to unify life and art. The viewer takes his entire world and world knowledge and brings it into action in order to complete or modify his experiences. We could say that he *remodels his reality* in this way.

Conversely, the installation itself is a remodelling of reality the artist has understood and experienced. First and foremost, she wants the installation to be experienced as a 'complete world'. It is something that is meant to be seen, perceived, experienced and reflected upon. This implies a moral and ethical dimension. We could draw some analogies here with Bloor's notion of 'conceptual world' discussed on the pages 68 and 69.

Another crucial point is that other artists or sometimes the same artist re-acts or works on an installation that already has been produced; in these cases, the meaning of the installation evolves, changes or is modified in a more complete way.

Because of this, I consider the installation together with the re-workings and reflections as an active totality: an  $\langle\langle$ InstallationPackage $\rangle\rangle$ . This implies that the intention of the artist is to do conceptual inquiries; language as an expression of conceptual investigation enters as an active part of the installation, this new form of art.

##### 1.2 ART AND PHILOSOPHY

Is the artist capable of generating meaning with her work within the dynamic, complex and unstable world we live in? In search for an answer, philosophy can point to conceptual questions the art of installation illuminates. In combining the philosophy (of language) and the art of installation unexpected and unnoticed meaningful connections can be revealed.

The spatiality and temporality of the art of installation is at the same time its strength and its weakness. The gathering of viewer and work is one-time only, but the viewer needs time in order to take in the installation in all its complexity, letting the various aspects reveal themselves. For the viewer who undergoes the work of art, full meaning and the ambiguities therein usually come into consciousness (long) afterwards and more often than not there is no possibility of going and visiting the installation for a second or a third time. The various ways in which the installation is documented on video, film or photos tell us a great deal about the installation and the situation itself, yet at the same time creates a meaning of its own. And then there is the question as to what ways the artist is able to play with the variety of meanings evoked by the hybrid elements of the installation and reflect her position in regard to reality. For we – artists as well as viewers – want an interesting, unexpected position, one that shows a kind of exclusivity and wondering in the form of visual power. We want something that happens or ‘shakes us up’.

The activity of the viewer who visits the installation consists of the calling forth of his memories and powers of imagination in order to attach or re-assign meaning that alters his self-knowledge and knowledge of the world. Science has taught us that perception and understanding are not two separate abilities: an insight that is fully exploited in the art of installation. In the making of an installation, the artist plays with this insight and takes everything she can get from the world to propagate her ideas. This may be the use of specific technological means or scientific developments that can be visualised due to technical possibilities, or more traditional tools for making art, whether ‘obvious’ everyday experiences or more complex social and political issues.

·Gesamtkunstwerk·, in which the theatrical aspect refers in the art of installation to the consciousness of life processes, ·Total Installation· as Kabakov calls his installations, the wide spread phrase ·Mixed-media·, or the active totality denoted by the word ·InstallationPackage·, all present a physical as well as conceptual rela-

tion between this hybrid form of art and its public. The art of installation starts from the assumption that the viewer not only experiences, but also has knowledge of the world, the culture in which he lives and the problems therein.

The art of installation is a form of art that brings to the fore institutional presumptions and limited conceptual frameworks and is the outcome of the thoughts and vision of the maker that evoke resonant emotions in others. From this, it does not provide us with any answers, but merely poses *questions*. These are the kinds of questions science cannot answer. In the posing of these questions, unexpected possibilities or unforeseen connections can loosen our rooted prejudices. The main point in the art of installation is not to create a symbiosis of science, technology and art, but to bring conceptual questions to the fore and throw them into our world in order to be discussed and reflected upon.

In the posing of these questions, philosophy might play a special role, because this discipline can draw our attention to connections, coherence and cross-references between art and the forms of knowledge which we tend to gloss over in everyday life. On the one hand, philosophical reflection can shed new light on the art of installation. On the other hand, the viewer gets the opportunity, even long after the demolition of the installation, to reflect on questions that were evoked by the installation and so attach meaning to the insecure and unstable world he is living in. It is in this way that philosophy can watch over any premature rejection or erasing of unsuspected, meaningful connections. It is up to us to come to see the world as it really – at any point in time anew – without illusion – in all amazement – is.

## 2 ART AND LIFE

All art is exhibited and by way of consequence surrendered to the public domain in a specific 'world'; it could be either a museum world or a gallery world. For instance, the urinal readymade of Duchamps can only be regarded as art within the context of an art world. Here, we can notice an apparent paradox between what we call 'world' and 'public domain': by situating the work of art in such an art world with all the institutional impact that goes along with it, the work can only claim to be art in everyday life due to the art world.

But it was precisely the art of installation that wanted to withdraw from this institutionalised museum- or gallery world. Moreover, the artist had the urge to extend her studio: breathing in fresh air – inhaling reality – and subsequently make an intervention. The institutional rules of a community are thus broken, overruled or broadened by the artist in order make people consciously aware – again/anew – of their behaviour and habits, and what they take as obvious in everyday life, but also in order to face questions that are not answerable in one go.

Artists like Gordon Matta-Clark, Smithson, Long, and later Kabakov, Laib and numerous others have worked in this way. What they have in common is that they make a kind of art that is not separated from reality, but situated on the same level, that is, in the midst of reality. Furthermore, they do not differentiate between what is available in reality and what is specifically identified as a work of art. In some respect, their installations can be understood as models of possibility – not examples – but much more time and again new activities and, most importantly, as new processes.

The installation artist tries to get the public involved, asserting and proposing ideas that make people think things through again.<sup>6</sup> In this way, art and life enter into a dialogue, at the same time stemming from reality – since we have only one world – and also returning to it. Art and life are related to one another in a reflexive, dynamic way.

6 >  
See for instance  
Goldie in (Goldie &  
Schellekens, 2007).

In the installation, the boundaries between art and life become the main focus, are permeable and time and again are criss-crossed. As is all art, the art of installation is context sensitive with respect to social frameworks that influence the reception of art. The essential moment in an installation is not the immanence of art in the community, but the immanence of the community in art. That is to say, the identity of the community shows itself in (this form of) art. Yet, it is at the same time put into question.

The world is for us not surveyable: we are viewers, standing amidst this world and often forgetting to participate actively. It is the artist, then, who can provide new windows of opportunity for an overview of a particular part of our world and the form of art that lends itself par excellence for these openings is in my opinion, the art of installation.

Let us by way of experiment declare the art of installation to be a refuge – a shelter – that provides the means to gain new perspectives on (a part of) the world and the community we live in. Let us, especially because of this complex and hybrid form of art, bring into question the notion of meaning. Since we are in any case part of the world, yet cannot understand ourselves and our position with respect within this world, we ask for perspicacity and vision, but lack an overview.

It is especially the case in the art of installation that the viewer has access not only to his experiences, but also towards the objects of these experiences. This experience is conceptual, starting from the same source of subject and object; it is an event *between* subject and object.

Going through the installation the viewer remains immersed because of the physical activities, related to the spatiality that is offered. Which aspects are of (aesthetic) value, and which are not, one cannot say. The meaning is not in the object, neither in the subject, but much more in the experiencing of the ‘whole’ – the installation as evocative. In this way, the landscape of experience always implies a form

of self-reflection.<sup>7</sup> Perception and understanding are thus, by way of consequence, both addressed.

Because reality as a whole is not surveyable and is complex, there is a continuous appeal to our imagination. From the choices we make of specific means and solutions – systems, models, art – humans show which aspects of reality are important, and what values are attributed to them: how they communicate those values and thus display their identity.

Related to this is the problem of documentation. What is crucial for the art of installation is that it does not merely represent itself in pictures. Experiencing an installation is one of its essences – one has to be actually there – along with the 3-dimensional, spatial aspect. We cannot, as with a poem, cite the installation or its parts. The big question, then, is how we can refer or attach meaning to the installation after its demolition. Nothing is left of this ‘whole’ world and the experiences that were present at the time of the exhibition. I will come back on this in more detail, when I describe the installation that concluded this PhD project and present a possible solution.

Posing conceptual questions connects philosophy with the art of installation. These are questions we cannot answer in one go, and eventually deal with matters such as ‘truth’ and ‘perception’ and the reflection thereof. Think of the question Kabakov poses in *The Old Reading Room*: To what extent can printed pages and books be substituted by the computer screen? The installation that is understood by Kabakov as an ‘active participant’, is even after the exhibition able to function as an interlocutor, in having the form of a publication (Kabakov, 1999). These conceptual questions connect in this way the direct experience of the installation with reflection, and attach meaning afterwards. Unlike art history, a discipline that has left aside the dynamics of reality – since it refers only *back*, to what we have already evaluated – philosophy can direct our attention to hidden connections between art and reality and re-evaluate them anew, in the light of our present being.

It is philosophy in my opinion, and not art history, that can contribute to art and the place it occupies in the world. The claim that an artist should relate herself to art history is an absurd one. It is not, that the artist should not have knowledge of her predecessors; on the contrary, every one will agree with this. But the idea that it is a legitimisation for making art has led to an industry of making art that in a solipsistic way is purely self referential: in my view, a dead end culminating in endless re-making, re-enacting, and yes, re-modeling of art forms that are already known – ‘retro’ is retrograde in this respect.<sup>8</sup> Art history interprets art with respect to tradition and convention, but does not take any future possibilities into account.

Art could benefit enormously if the art world would stop taking as leading criteria art critique that prescribes a purely art historian’s perspective, and allow responses from other disciplines, such as philosophy, in order to return the worked out concepts to the world in a new way. The strength of art lies in its capacity to provide a

7 >

The notion of ‘experience’ is a complex one in the case of the art of installation. It implies not only an aspect of sense experience (seeing, hearing, feeling and the like), but also the evocation of memory and imagination that can be triggered by bodily movement – but not always necessarily in order to guide or enrich the experience at hand.

8 >

I am referring here to the influences of Postmodernism. See Butler (2002) and Graham (2005) and the conclusions of this volume on the pages 183 to 187.



coherent, yet changeable view on ourselves; this is something science is not capable of since it can only give us a fragmented view.

It is from this that artists should also reclaim their own responsibility. Artists should, for example, resist the idea that it is sufficient that museums or galleries or art collectors buy or collect only *some* of the works of a particular artist. No one will take one or two volumes – say, A and F – from an encyclopaedia, or read just one chapter of a book. Only the total body of the work can shed light on the viewpoints and intentions of the artist, and the ways in which the work has developed.

Another area of discussion is the idea of curatorship.<sup>9</sup> Why is it that a host of critics, art historians, and people from art theory among others, think that they are more capable of making an exhibition than the artists themselves? This is perhaps connected with the explosion of (large) group exhibitions that combine works of art made by a variety of artists. The danger here is that art is reduced to a noisy spectacle or show, aiming at large audiences and consequently, increase of income. But that is not what art is for. Instead of speeding up, art should slow down life and give us the opportunity to reflect on ourselves and the place we occupy in the world. The artist should try to make excellent solo exhibitions, curated by herself – not curated by anyone else, not even by fellow artists – in order to prevent others from watering things down.

Since the nineteen sixties everyone is free to call themselves an artist, yet few real ones are shown. Postmodernism has created a crowd of charlatans, parasites and spongers who have too much money and no ideas, and walk through life only acting like an artist, but in fact are marginalising the real ones. I have no idea how to tackle this problem – and perhaps we should leave this issue for time to decide. Let us turn, then, to the making of my own works of art and the adventure and inspiration thereof.

9 >  
See also the last section of  
Part II, and the conclusions  
of this volume.

Thinking is time and again s . t . a . r . t . i . n . g . a . n . e . w .

Photo installation Do not Erase ...

Do not Erase ... wait for Meaning, Arti et Amicitiae, Amsterdam 21|6-13|7 2008

Photo installation Do not Erase ...

Do not Erase ... wait for Meaning, Arti et Amicitiae, Amsterdam 21|6-13|7 2008



## 5 > DO NOT ERASE . . . WAIT FOR MEANING



2004-2005 Corrido[o]r

After completing a study in philosophy in 2001, there remained the question of how to combine visual art and philosophy in such a way that it would make a meaningful difference. In the second part of this last chapter I will summarise the most important results from the philosophical treatise and relate them to my personal findings concerning the art of installation.

As we have seen in Part I the *übersichtliche Darstellung* and the phenomenon of installation show some similarities to each other and also one important difference. For both, the context in which each of them appears is decisive: the context constituted by the model or the installation itself, the context in which they are used and the indirect, broader context of reality. I called the context the energising factor of the model on page 48.

A consequence of the context-sensitivity is that both the notion of *übersichtliche Darstellung* and the phenomenon of the art of installation give rise to a reflexive dynamics. In the case of the first, this perspicuous overview of a part of our language invites us to actively make use of our imagination so that we can come to see our form of presentation, that is, the way we normally look at things. In the installation, there is always a reciprocal relation between space and work, space and viewer and viewer and work. The viewer is an active element who must use his powers of imagination. The reflexive dynamics, then, shows itself in a very special and unexpected way.

Whereas we want a 'distinct' clarity from a perspicuous representation, the big

difference with the installation is that it has to preserve ambiguity in order to put our normative and 'obvious' ways of existing in the everyday world into question. In Chapter 1 I elaborate how these similarities and difference are bound up with the notion of aspect seeing.

The notion of 'aspect seeing' runs throughout the chapters and seems to be an indispensable feature that accompanies our powers of imagination. I have made a distinction between continuous aspect perception, everyday aspect perception and artistic aspect perception, to investigate how normativity and novelty are related.

With the discussion on rule-following in Chapter 2, from which the observation of the intermingling of the individual and the social developed in Chapter 3 into an elaboration on the various kinds of knowledge – various dimensions – we make use of, I investigated imagination as a source of knowledge that calls forth creative and artistic knowledge in a bypassed, detached way.

The philosophical investigation, worked out in the three chapters under the heading of 'philosophical treatise', investigates the concept of reflexive dynamics from various perspectives and provides us with some understanding of Wittgenstein's *übersichtliche Darstellung* as well as the phenomenon of the art of installation. The reflexive dynamics implies a simultaneous interaction between perception and language, one in which we actively construct our concepts. It returns to and calls upon itself by means of a different aspect. It is not something that can be expressed in language: it is something ineffable that can only *show* itself in our use of language. We, in turn, can see this when we are able to use our imagination in a reflexive instance the moment we reflect on a change and recognise something that is not recognisable in a direct way. This creative process involves our perceptual and procedural knowledge in a bypassed, detached way over a delayed, dynamic process.

The artistic miracle is *that* the world exists (Wittgenstein, LE, p9 and quoted in the first chapter on page 23). Philosophical clarification is connected with artistic clarification when we experience this miracle, shown in a 'perfect' expression that provides us with truth: the moment that ethics and aesthetics are one. But because 'truth' is, just as 'memory', not a fixed point but a *process*, this notion of 'truth' itself can be understood as movement or change. In this respect, meaning is transferable in time and dynamic. It functions as a reflexive tool towards past and future. Memory, then, is nothing more than the restoration of intimacy and identity, in the sense of a meaningful whole at every point in time again, anew.

### 1 A POEM WITH PROPORTION

I like to think of the phenomenon of the art of installation as poetic possibility, and 'poetic understanding' – a poem with proportion. As with poetry, the art of installation does not merely report. Instead it is something condensed and built up

as a ‘complete world’ that we undergo, taking a package tour on a journey towards inspiration, as well as something that can be looked at from a distance. Both being the result of a process are reflexive and reflective, standing in a certain light and reflecting a quest for meaning. Every installation is a world of its own, but one that can only be completed by the viewers. And every installation is at one time *the world* and *a specific view of the world*. Therefore the art of installation is a poem with proportion<sup>1</sup> and just as poetry it is a form of art full of references, hints and gestures, parallels and analogies. It is a space – a ‘world’ – where everything is condensed to its ultimate actuality – one that produces a reality. The installation addresses us in a same way that a poem speaks to us. Having experienced an installation, one still generates meanings long after. Yet the difference is that an installation cannot be articulated: we can talk *about* it, but that is something different.

1 >  
The notion of proportion refers to the comparative measurements or size of different parts of a whole; the dimensions or relationships between one thing and another or between the parts of a whole.

In the above I have claimed that an installation can be understood as a poem with proportion and is part of a framework of investigation and imagination, something I wish to call an  $\langle\langle$ InstallationPackage $\rangle\rangle$ . Be aware, however, that this framework of investigation and imagination is not something that is equivalent with the idea of a theme. In contrast to a theme, a framework is not filled in, but will develop – step by step – during the process so that at every point in time the direction and therefore the outcome may also change or alter.

Normally, a poem does not consist of a quantity of text which explains what the poem has to say, but instead, shows gaps and white spaces, which the reader must fill in associatively. It demands an active attitude and a sensibility for ambiguity, and therefore, calls for the use of our powers of imagination. The reader has to *do* something more with the text than merely consuming pre-established meaning.

As for the installation, one could say that it is a multi-dimensional poem, which includes suggestions, hints and gaps which the viewer has to fill in. In the installation we also find the repetition of sameness as a kind of mythical, ritualising rhythm. As with a poem, the meaning is not to be found in the work of art itself, but for the most part ‘somewhere outside’, between viewer and elements, and also between elements and elements, and between elements, viewer and context. Using our imagination in an associative and idiosyncratic way we are active participants. Therefore, novelty also cannot be found in rules or in our powers of imagination itself, but is ‘somewhere outside’. Somewhere between the propositional and the evocative lies ‘poetic understanding’.

Just like a poem, the installation has no intention of giving any concrete answers to questions; instead, the installation tries to evoke an insight in the viewer via manipulation and persuasion in order to wake the viewer up and detach him from everyday norms and rules and form of life, shifting ideas and association chains taken for granted, all in such a way that re-assigning meaning becomes possible. Note, that a poem need not be a narrative nor an argument, but can also be a series



of conflicting images which move through various emotions.

Experiencing a poem/installation evokes an encounter of the viewer with himself. It is in this encounter – this conversation as a form of art as a showing in the sense of revealing and exhibiting – that the future is present. It reveals a new beginning that is already there, but for us still unknown. At any point in time it is possible that a new beginning can emerge, because reality is in constant flux, containing in any case, more than we can understand. At the same time, like Wittgenstein, it leaves everything as it is.

But in contrast to a poem that can be quoted or recited, an installation cannot be articulated in a same way. Being a poem with proportion, it is something one really has to experience, taking a journey in order to understand what the installation has to say. A poem can be read and reread and put into perspective with other poems, leafing back and forward – I can carry a collection of poems with me whenever I feel like it. With an installation that is impossible. I will come back to this problem in more detail in the section that describes the installation exhibited in *Arti et Amicitiae* which concludes the PhD project (see page 170ff). For the moment, I want to look at the assumptions that ground my claims.

I start from the presupposition that it is the responsibility of the artist to make a contribution to the self-knowledge and self-understanding of humanity. In my opinion, art is meant to enrich the knowledge of ourselves and the world. We should see the world through the eyes of art, instead of putting the world and art next to each other, to compare and subsequently judge them. The artist's job, then, is to see what is lost or tends to be lost, and create new connections by breathing life into reality. Research turns into quest that in turn becomes adventure. And conversely, adventure turns into quest which in turn, becomes research.

It is here where philosophy enters the scene. The major dilemma of modern art is wrapped up in the question of how we can visualise change. How can we visualise what is changed as well as what causes these changes? Philosophy is the discipline par excellence that can reflect on the nature of change and put the findings into perspective using an *übersichtliche Darstellung* of a particular issue at hand. The value of art lies in the way in which these changes are expressed and presented as a coherent reality. The value of philosophy shows itself in its reflections related to the world. In this way, philosophy and art teach us something about ourselves; that is to say, tells us about our attitude towards ourselves and the place we occupy in the world.

This book was meant to be first and foremost a dissertation, leading up to the university degree of a doctorate. But its combination with personal experiences and the making of art transformed it into an  $\langle\langle$ InstallationPackage $\rangle\rangle$  in which the reader can make connections between the various levels of research and inquiry: personal, philosophical and artistic. It presupposes an active attitude on the part of the reader,

who is challenged to make connections that stem from his own life history. Notice, that what is written in the philosophical treatise and shown in the works of art is not what really matters. What matters is the unification of thought and being that is expressed and reflected in this ·active totality·, that is, in what this is: Installation-Package  $\llcorner$ Remodel[ing] Reality $\lrcorner$ .

In what follows, I shall give an overview of the various artistic works within the scope of this project as well as the final installation, thereby ending the entire research project. The marginal notes direct you to sketches or photographs that might relate to the descriptions. In a leaflet that you find in the front cover of the book, a timeline shows all philosophical and artistic accomplishments in a chronological way.

### 1.1 CORRIDO[O]R STUDIES FOR A PHILOSOPHER, ROOM

A concertina fold, a photo-sequence and a website connect an artistic enterprise with a philosophical community, posing the question whether the philosophical, abstract notions worked out by the philosophical community return to reality and if so, in what ways.

#### CONCEPT AND DESCRIPTION

A two-sided concertina fold addresses the dynamic relation between what we are thinking about the world and the ways we give the results of our thinking back to the world. The successive numbers of the rooms, read when passed by, can be understood as the successive steps of this (re)thinking. The word ·corrido[o]r· has various meanings/connotations in this respect.<sup>2</sup> The concertina fold is presented in the specific artistic environment of *Arti et Amicitiae*.

By exhibiting this concertina fold on a pedestal-table, one can walk along this corrido[o]r on both sides – alongside the pictures of the entrances and the words that make up a sentence. In this way the corrido[o]r also functions as a loop: we move from pictures to words and from words back to pictures.<sup>3</sup>

Each picture of the entrance of the philosopher, room has a certain shade. The colours of each room represent the feeling that in one way or the other was evoked when I took the photos of the entrances. Nineteen rooms of philosophers at the second floor at the right of Vendelstraat 8 in the University of Amsterdam (re)present at the same time one Philosopher, Room. The people that occupy these rooms colour them with their presence; they give the room its meaning. They give colour and meaning to this limited space, breathing these colours and meanings back into reality where we live with the paces of their thoughts.

Simultaneously, a photo-sequence addressing the same issue is installed at Vendelstraat 8, second floor on the right representing this part of the philosophical community. In contrast to the concertina fold, which presents a Bird's-eye view, one can

2 >  
According to the dream-dictionary walking through a corridor signifies ones desperation in trying to escape a repetitive situation or behavior pattern. One needs to free oneself of this repetition and the corridor is seen as a passage from one phase of one's life to another.

3 >  
A black & white overview of the concertina fold as well as the Vendelstraat-sequence can be found at the beginning of the book.

only experience this part of the installation in real time/space discovering that the photos of the entrances of the rooms hang next to the real entrances, thus offering a different perspective on the corridor itself as well as creating a different view of this philosophical community.

An extension of these rooms can be experienced on the internet, not only giving a look into the rooms situated on the second floor, but an entire philosophical community – from cleaner to professor. Website Corrido[o]r can give visitors, for example students, head hunters eagerly scouting about for genius talent, mothers who have lost their clever child, politicians searching for bright quotes, visiting smart professors from competing universities, and the like, a glimpse behind the scenes of the everyday practice of a group of philosophers in the University of Amsterdam.

In order to look behind and beyond the scenes, it is desirable that one has a view on the scenes themselves. Thus, I took photographs – i.e., I made an overview – of what someone sees when he opens the door of a particular room of Vendelstraat 8. I am convinced that a philosophy department should have a perspicuous organisation, one that is intelligible and transparent to the outside world, so that students, head hunters, mothers and children, politicians and professors know what they can expect.

To get an answer to the question: ‘What is happening behind the doors at the Department of Philosophy, Vendelstraat 8, second floor on the right?’ all participants were asked to fill out a form that contains a few questions, focussing on their relation with the room they are working in. The questions: 1. Can you describe the room that you occupy now? What does it look like? Are there any particular objects that are important to you? 2. Do you feel at home / safe in your present room? Why? Why not? 3. What would you like to change in or to your room? 4. Suppose . . . imagine . . . that everything is possible: what would your favorite room look like? 5. How is your room connected with your work? 6. How do you see your room? What meaning has this room for you? Do you see it as an office, a writing desk, a studio, a prison, a garden, a cellar, a kitchen, a room for meditation, a cave, an exotic island or . . . ? And for those who have worked here for several years: has the meaning of the room changed for you over the course of time?

Together with ::: virtual space ::: [www.illc.uva.nl/hum/corrido\(o\)r/](http://www.illc.uva.nl/hum/corrido(o)r/) and ::: real space ::: photo-sequence at the second floor on the right, Vendelstraat 8, Department of Philosophy, the concertina fold completes ::: poetic space ::: installation Corrido[o]r – studies for a Philosopher, Room.

Technical details

. Concertina fold: 400(w) x 30(h) cm, two-sided, one-of-a-kind book, on sheet iron pedestal-table 200(w) x 60(d) x 90(h) cm.

. Photo-sequence Vendelstraat 8: Japanese paper Kozo, 1200(w) x 97(h) cm, mounted on wall, doorposts and doors at a height of 121 cm. Nineteen layered and coloured photoprints each  $\pm$  21(w) x 30(h) cm on double steel pipe, length 1200 cm, diameter 3 mm.

. Website Corrido[o]r – Structure of the website: first page from the left side of the page to the right respectively three columns [41:18:41 pixels], representing the corridor itself and the rooms that are situated along this corridor. The rooms are represented by their numbers. Furthermore between a white column of 3 pixels and a black column of 2 pixels there is a black/white photo [318 : 498 pixels] of the entrance door at the second floor on the right of Vendelstraat 8. The right side of the page has a red column that gives information about the location.

Each room has a separate page set up in the same manner as the opening page: three columns with the numbers of the various rooms, in the middle a black/white photo of the entrance of that particular room and at the right a red column with the names of the inhabitants of the rooms and the links to their personal page.

The personal pages are divided in two columns: a left column with a red background and a black/white passport photo, and a right grey column where the text of the participant can be read. The website is framed with a colophon page.

Construction of the website: September - December 2004.

## 1.2 DO YOU?

The installation was exhibited in Art et Amicitiae in Amsterdam. It opened on Friday October 19, 2007 8-10pm and ran from 20|10 until 4|11 2007; Tuesday - Sunday 12-6pm.<sup>4</sup>

4 >  
A black & white overview of installation Do you? can be found in the back of the book.

YOU DON'T THINK I GIVE IT ALL AWAY BEFOREHAND, DO YOU?

This installation marks a specific moment in a four year process whose object of inquiry is the combination of philosophy and visual art. It refers to the question of to what extent it is necessary or even desirable to show a work of art as a scale model beforehand. It is my conviction that it is fatal for the working out of a concept to articulate and give an overview of all the steps in the process beforehand, in this way forcing it into a specific direction or even bringing it to a standstill because of a premature judgement. On a different level the question addresses the differences between science and art: science fragments, art presents – a new or different – unity. In this way, the installation can evoke philosophical reflection.

### CONCEPT AND DESCRIPTION

The nine small windows originate from a trailer containing a mobile PTT switchboard, probably dating to the beginning of the nineteen fifties. The trailer was some

10 metres long, with a width of approximately 2,30 metres and a height of 3 metres. The aggregates, together with the relay-switch box that was fixed around the switch board, were split up in two long rows. This mobile communication system was meant to become operational the moment the regular network failed, and could provide for a large village.

In 1996, the trailer was purchased by someone dealing in cash registers and counting systems who wanted to convert it into a demonstration model. This was the reason why the switchboard had to be dismantled. Together with a couple of mechanics, I dismantled the trailer and stored the various components in my studio. The small windows that are used in this installation belonged to the switch boxes.

The shape of the small windows which are arranged in three unfinished rows reminds one of a framework that is 'under construction'. They have the same right-angled shape the pages of the concertina fold *Philosopher, Room* show. In this respect one can draw connections between the windows and the photos of the entrances of the philosopher's rooms from 2005. I tried to play with the same question in a totally different way: What outlook do philosophers have on the world and is this outlook reflected in the way they interpret their room – the space of their thinking?

The 'marquissette' net curtains have an open, square structure that is reflected in the rhythm of the windows. The two boxes reflect that open structure, albeit each of them in a different way. The type font sentence that is written behind the windows and directly on the wall is filled in with graphite by means of shading. The viewer will also notice that the sentence is interrupted. That is to say, we can only read the letters written behind the glass windows, but the spaces in between are left to be filled in by the viewer. The spatial effect is reinforced by the variation between both the letters written directly on the wall, and these letters behind the windows; furthermore the net curtains are draped loosely in front of these.

The installation presents the idea of something that is in an embryonic stage, an initial impetus to something, where it should be noticed that something which is coming into being is also in some sense turning towards disintegration. In the open box-frame three used wooden beams, varying in height, suggest that there might be something already made or demolished. The layering of this ambiguity in this pseudo-aesthetic presentation evokes a tension that is meant to provoke the viewer.

### Technical details

- . Height of the installation measured from the top to the ground of the tube that hangs the curtains: 268 cm. Width of the installation including the word 'you' is 210 cm. Depth of the installation is 93 cm
- . Width of the tube: 180 cm; diameter 28 mm
- . Interval between tube and top of the windows: 18 cm; between the utmost right side of the tube and the end of the windows: 3 cm
- . Interval between the heart of the screws: 179 cm

- . Interval from 'virtual' 1st nail on the right from the heart of the screw: 5.4 cm
- . Interval between the nails: 30 cm; between the small intervals: 6 cm
- . Intervals between the windows: 2.5 cm
- . Nine grey-green windows: 31(w) x 50(h) cm, of which there are six on row 1, two on row 2, and one on row 3
- . Behind the six windows on the first row text written with graphite (HB) on off-white Fabriano 120 gr/m<sup>2</sup> paper. The letters are installed on a level of 13 cm above the bottom of the windows
- . Two pieces of 'marquise' net curtain: on the left side the width of the curtain is 110 cm with a length of 120 cm; on the right side the width is 110 cm with a length of 259 cm. The curtains hang down the tube
- . Box 1 multiplex, 8 mm, sanded and treated with ebony stain and coated with transparent varnish, dimensions 45 x 45 x 45 cm, standing on the left side against the wall equal to the net curtain. Framework box 2 is situated diagonally against box 1, dimensions 38 x 38 x 38 cm and consists of an open aluminium frame, which is glued and screwed together. In the open box are three used, wooden beams in beige and brownish hues of various dimensions, but one is taller than the other two and directs the attention of the viewer towards the small net curtain, thereby 'filling in' the length
- . Screws and hang system for the tube sprayed in white
- . Font used: Bernard MT Condensed 36 pts. The words 'you' and 'do you' are drawn directly on the wall in graphite (HB/2B)
- . The two windows on the 2nd row and the window on the 3rd row are empty
- . Hues: beige, ebony-brown, aluminium, ivory, grey-green and grey-graphite

### 1.3 WIEDERHOLTE SPIEGELUNGEN

The opening reception was on Friday January 25, from 5 to 7pm in the foyer of the Doelenzaal and was opened officially by the director of the UB, Nol Verhagen. It ran from 26|1 to 10|2 2008. Open Monday until Friday 12-5pm; Saturday and Sunday 12-4pm. The exhibition was extended until 13|4 2008.

Wiederholte Spiegelungen/Repeated Reflections is an installation which was built in the space of the former photo-lab of the Amsterdam University Library (UB).<sup>5</sup> It anticipated the presentation Do not Erase . . . that was exhibited in June and July 2008 in the rooms of Arti et Amicitiae, also in Amsterdam. While the title of the installation alludes to a term of Goethe, it does not explicitly refer to the concept and content of it. The rebuilt space was primarily a proposal to the viewer: To slow down and stop life for a moment. To activate memories in an adventurous, reflexive experience. And, ultimately, leave the installation, in a certain respect, reborn.

<sup>5</sup> > A black & white overview of the installation can be found in the back of this book.



### CONCEPT AND DESCRIPTION

Haven't you noticed? . . . We stop life the moment we want to say something. Haven't you noticed? . . . We stop life the moment we want to think about something. In slowing down life we can make that moment visible in a different way. Slowing down is a dynamic and colourful stance: it is rest and motion in one. An installation can provide the means for this dynamic stance.

In this way, art is present (we notice where things are), past (we notice where things have been) and future (we notice the ways things might develop themselves) in one. Suspending life for a moment gives us the opportunity to think about and reflect on our lives, while at the same time engaging in an installation. We could say that this shows a reflexive dynamics within a frozen moment.

ME

...

LOOKING AT ETERNITY THROUGH THE WINDOW OF TIME

...

but

that is only what we think is the case

in fact, reality for us is merely

...

WIEDERHOLTE SPIEGELUNGEN/REPEATED REFLECTIONS

The installation is built up by means of (colour) contrasts, which is the main reason why nothing has to be explained, but instead produces a reality in which fantasy and reality work together in various roles. The literal and the metaphorical are side by side. Everything stands in a meaningful relationship, everything hangs together, but we can enter and leave the installation in only one single way.

Dream, imagination and reality unite in an artistic/poetic unity. The kitchenette is real and was already present at the time the place was offered to me. Taking it as a starting point, I decided to draw the rest of what we know to be a kitchen, roughly at the same height and with the same dimensions as the kitchenette. So, 2D and 3D are situated next to each other. In fact, the result shows itself as some sort of prototype of a kitchen. And with that it becomes conceptual art. I did not draw a detailed plate, dish, bottle or cup, but only the indications thereof – a prototype we all are able to categorise and recognise. The drawing of the cooker hood merges with the shades of the ceiling; there is a real 3D socket, throwing shadows on a 2D drawn cooker and the like. In this way, we see a kitchen and the concept of ·kitchen·.

The changes into various perspectives that we can discover when exploring the installation amount to contemplation and reflection, and allow us to stop time while at the same moment challenge our own life history.

Thus, we can detect various layers and dimensions in *Wiederholte Spiegelungen/*

Repeated Reflections. First, a horizontal dimension, which is expressed in the various contrasts, such as colour contrasts, and contrasts in materials such as solid–soft, solid–fluid, inner–outer and the like. The viewer can also experience a vertical dimension, expressed in the various reflections. And finally, there is the suggestion of a fourth dimension in the combination and the taking in of a temporal aspect. Let us see where that leads us to.

> Inner & outer

The three windows at the right side of the space are armoured with black blinds. Opposite, the oval wall shows a drawing of the concept ‘window’ as a mirroring of the three real windows. The drawn windows are filled in with a colour that raises associations and suggestions of grass, air and sea. This reflection of reality and the concept of reality also holds for the radiators. Beneath the drawings of the windows we can detect the drawing of the radiators. Originally, the left wall of the space, showing the kitchen, was part of the ramparts of the city of Amsterdam. Today it is an inside wall of the university library. To right of centre there is an object on the floor: dimensions 150(w) x 6.5(h) x 100(d) cm. It refers to a pond (outside) Narcissus saw himself in, as well as to the one (inside) who bends over to read the text: ‘me’. In this way, there is a reference to the physical self as well as to the concept of ‘self’.

> Solid & soft

The walls of the exhibition space are solid, but the lengths of cloth which are used to create see-throughs are flexible, and in case of the *changeant* even changing. Changeant cloth is cloth woven in flat strands with contrasting coloured threads. In this case, when the viewer moves, the cloth changes colour from red to blue shades. The four lengths of changeant each hang at a different height and at various distances from the back wall. As a consequence, they emphasise the lines the tubes and the ceiling make. Because of the various distances, the lengths of cloth function as spy holes and give the viewer the opportunity to look around corners, discovering various openings and paths across the installation. In doing so, he displaces air while softly moving the cloth. The blue/red changeant cloth connects the colours of the left with those of the right side of the space. The shawl (soft) that is hanging out of a connection case (solid) refers to the object, with its prints of narcissus and daffodils, and shows the set of colours that are used in the installation.

> Word & image

The object does not give the viewer an image of himself, but addresses him in such a way that an image is evoked in himself. He has to read the word ‘me’ which evokes a direct reference to the viewer, in such a way, that it freezes him for a moment and forces him to take a look at himself.

### > Dream & reality

There is a real kitchenette together with the concept of 'kitchen' covering the left wall of the exhibition space, executed in black and white (the highest contrast). From the entrance, three lengths of orange, half-transparent silk cloth partly cover the left wall in such a way that it seems as if the real kitchenette is also drawn on the wall. We are all familiar with the kitchen as being the most important space in the house for social interaction – the space where body and soul are sustained. Everyone will undoubtedly have memories about the kitchen as a space that provides warmth and (spiritual) nourishment. Also, symbolically it represents (the possibility for) transformation.

### > Realistic & conceptual

The wall drawing is not design (it is not slick and precise enough) neither it is scenery (nothing is happening/there is no background functioning for an established event), but is an evocative field of tension between what is real and what can be understood as conceptual. There is a real kitchenette and an 'unreal' prototype of a kitchen drawn on the wall. The floor reflects the wall and the kitchen – that is to say, it reflects the kitchenette but not the drawing on the wall. The object 'me' connects the left and the right side of the space, but can also exist on its own. It emphasises the conceptual character in that it gives to the viewer an abstract word instead of an image. Whenever the viewer bends over, he does not see himself – unlike Narcissus – but a word that refers to himself: 'me'. In this way, every viewer will be addressed by himself.

### > Surface & depth

Some things mirror each other, such as the left and the right wall, the various shades of colour used in the installation summed up in the shawl, etc. Other parts reflect each other in a different dimension, for instance the concertina fold that was exhibited during the opening reception, with the pictures of the entrances of the philosopher's rooms – as a 'view on the world' and a place for reflection – and the contemplative atmosphere of the installation itself as a place for the viewer to stop time for a moment. There is also a text on the wall next to the entrance that turns everything upside down. The text in the installation is weakened and negated by the title of the exhibition. The viewer can read 'me' and then, turning around, read 'looking to eternity through the window of time'. But that is only what we think is the case; in fact, what we see are only *Wiederholte Spiegelungen/Repeated Reflections*. Or, to quote from Dr. Snaut in Tarkovskys 'Solaris': 'we don't want any more worlds. Only a mirror to see our own in.'

### > Experience & change

The viewer gets the opportunity to look around and explore the installation as a private experience. The installation itself is a public space that in turn is a part of a larger public space: the library. The viewer's private experience takes place in the company of others. In this respect, the viewer has the opportunity to walk through

the installation together with other people, to look and to reflect and to experience others as part of his private experience. In this way the viewer feels himself walking in and through space, and feels the presence of others walking with their own experiences, while at the same moment experiences all of this as the installation.

Notice that the private experience of the viewer also implies a moral dimension which connects the installation with how he understands the world and the ways in which he wants to live, that is, what values are important for him.

The installation is the product of the installation of an idea, but not an idea worked out in a linear way. Moreover, the installation is built out of various dimensions which give rise to ever changing perspectives and points of view. This is something that causes uncertainty. The title, then, is meant to provide the viewer with a sort of a handle, while at the same time even this is put into question by the text in the installation. It is in this way that an atmosphere of permanent delay<sup>6</sup> is suggested, evoking a reflection of a 4th dimension of experiences as possibilities that can never be actualised.

In order to make changes visible, artists have to exaggerate. They must exaggerate in the sense of applying strange and uncommon perspectives, using intense or strong colours, caricatures and the like. I want to claim that artists have always exaggerated, pushed things to the extreme, uniquely and within the context of their lives – from the Venus de Milo and the cave drawings of Altamira to the performances of Matthiew Barney. In exaggeration, particular aspects become visible that otherwise would remain unnoticed.

This exaggeration is due to the fact that we want to visualise the wonder *that* the world exists within an ever changing context. The miracle shows itself in our everyday life. It is not something beyond or superior or interesting, but something that in our everyday life appears as 'normal' or 'obvious'. As already mentioned on page 160, it is here that philosophical clarification combines with artistic clarification, showing us in a moment of 'perfect' expression a truth in which ethics and aesthetics merge. But because truth is not a fixed point but a process, we can understand this notion of 'truth' just as 'memory', as a moment of change. From this point of view, truth is transferable in time and something dynamic. It functions as a reflexive means with respect to past and future.

There is also always a moral dimension involved, something that we could call the depth of a work of art. This moral dimension is connected with our desire to understand the world and define for ourselves a way, a manner to live, which standards and values we want to attribute to ourselves and the world. In a work of art we cannot express this in a direct way, but it is nevertheless something present in an implicit manner and evoked in the viewer when he connects both with the work of art and with his life experiences, his life history. In this way, the moral dimension is 'somewhere between' viewer and work.

6 >

The idea of delayed and detached knowledge is elaborated in Chapter 3. What is important here, is that the installation triggers the viewers' powers of imagination and his creativity.

## 5. DO NOT ERASE . . . WAIT FOR MEANING

---

On the whole, we could say that the installation as a work of art is a tool to assign meaning to ourselves and the world. Also here, philosophy and art have something in common: both take the same direction, but each of them takes a different perspective on that direction. In the course of time the meaning of the installation will alter, whenever it is being judged in the light of a changed belief system. This also implies a social dimension. That is why it is important that the artist resists the dictatorship of opinion and facts and tries to make 'timeless' art, even though she knows that it is impossible to escape the culture she lives in.

### Technical details


- . Dimensions of the installation: 890(w) x 245(h) x 850(d) cm
- . Wall painting: 352(w) x 225(h) cm
- . Object 'me': 150(w) x 6,5(h) x 100(d) cm
- . Cloth: silk shawl 50(w) x 50(l) cm; Indian silk 3 pieces of each 100(w) x 220(h) cm; Thai silk changeant 4 pieces of each 100(w) x 240(h) cm

### 1.4 DO NOT ERASE . . . AN INSTALLATION

The exhibition was officially opened by Martin Stokhof on Saturday June 21 at Arti et Amicitiae in Amsterdam. It ran from 22|6 to 13|7 2008 and covered exhibition rooms I, IV, V, VI, and VII.

7 > In this exhibition, the point of departure is the philosopher, room, in which the concept 'reflexive dynamics' is central.<sup>7</sup> On the one hand, this reflexive dynamics points to the dynamic relation between the various parts of the room. On the other, it refers to an emotional space that gives the viewer the opportunity to take a reflexive distance by means of a subtle play of colours. In this way, the installation becomes a poem with proportion.

Inside the front cover, there is a leaflet, containing eight full-colour photos of the installation meant to be cut, and pasted on the empty spaces throughout the book.



The exhibition space in Arti was divided into six rooms, each of them corresponding with a chapter's title in the dissertation. Together they make one *übersichtliche Darstellung*. The installation forces a delay upon the visitor, which is to be thought of as a space in time in which something that is expected to happen does not occur. It is the promise that keeps us waiting – waiting for meaning. We might say that the installation is offering us a frozen moment. It is frozen up to the point we begin to realise that it is us, the visitors, that should open ourselves in order to assign meaning to perceiving and experiencing ourselves in connection with what is given by the installation.

This installation – an *übersichtliche Darstellung* – a package – can be unfolded and experienced as a waiting room, a room for contemplation, a room where one can learn to see, a creative room allowing for analogies and associations. The various rooms can also be understood as the various voices of one person, or the chapters in a book. Thus, the installation is not a bundle of loose elements or fragments we can admire or wonder about. Rather, it is to be perceived as a meaningful whole, in which numerous references allow for various perspectives; yet, not anything goes. The conceptual question that underlies the installation prevents us from relativism, but instead provides both an open and coherent unity. A coherent coloured unity: we can detect the poet's colour blue and that of the scientist which is red, the colour green, referring to creativity and creative processes, the colour yellow as the colour of life and change itself, and finally the colours black and white being the largest contrast – those of dark and light.

By taking the installation as a process, we get the opportunity to add meaning from our life experiences and life history to the actual experiencing of the installation, in this way providing the possibility for a multi-dimensional reflection. For instance, there is a real staircase as well as one that is drawn; the fragmentation of the external world coming in through the windows of the yellow room resonates with the projection in the black room; in the black room the object 'me', in turn, connects with the projection of 'others'; the heap in the red room corresponds with the windows painted on the wall, etc. In short, it is time-based without being time-based art as we are acquainted with from new media.

#### THE QUESTION

What is a philosopher's room? What is its relation with the person who occupies the room? And what is its connection to the outside world on the other?

#### CONCEPT AND DESCRIPTION

##### VI/I The Black Room – Preamble

Walls, ceiling and floor are all covered in black. In the middle of the room we can detect an object with the inscription 'me' – the one already used in the previous exhibition *Wiederholte Spiegelungen* – that is meant to function as a climax/anti-




## 5. DO NOT ERASE . . . WAIT FOR MEANING

climax of the installation. Opposite the object is a projection in black/white of the faces of all the people who participated in website Corrido[o]r. What matters is the association of the visitor reading 'me' while seeing the projection of other people. If the visitor is by coincidence one of the people in the projection, it fits; in all other cases there is an ambiguity that allows for contemplation. In what respect is the person I perceive on the screen 'me'? What does the word 'me' refer to? Being the darkest room it urges us to turn around and walk back through the installation – back towards the light.

### Technical details

- . Projection: 204(w) x 152(h) cm
- . Object 'me': 150(w) x 6,5(h) x 100(d) cm




### V/II The Blue Room – Setting the Stage

It is the room allowing for hope and testimony. The walls are coloured in 'Arti-blue' and there is a wooden floor. Blue spots hang from the ceiling. Large dark blue fabric is covering one side of the room. Together with three folded packages of changeant fabric, it suggests a window to an ever changing present. Depending on the perspective the visitor takes, the changeant fabric is either reddish or turns into turquoise. Opposite the blue fabric, three square panels with blue pigment complete the room.

### Technical details

- . Fabric: dark blue cotton 440(w) x 600(l) cm, three times changeant folded 40 x 50 cm
- . Panels covered with blue pigment: three times 120(w) x 120(l) cm



### III/III The Green Room - Following rules & Form of life

The green room reminds one of a small house or a box and is situated in the middle of the large red room. Inside, it is painted black, with on one wall a green screen carrying the sentence: 'footnote to eternity'. A footnote is the place where culture and refinement survive, suggesting an eternity because of its open-endedness. In the middle there is a drawing of a staircase, leading the visitor to the 'forgotten dimension'. Surrounded by little green plants, the scene displays human creative processes. Many of the philosophers who participated in website Corrido[o]r mentioned plants as something they wished to be added to their rooms. I take it, that they longed for a creative atmosphere which unfortunately appeared to be absent. Some of them experienced the green house as something of a graveyard.

Whenever the visitor enters the green room coming out of the blue one, he experiences the drawing of the staircase as coming from the depths, upwards to the earth's surface. Should he enter the green room from the other side, it seems like the reverse: the staircase situates the viewer on surface level and directs him towards earth's depths.

### IV/IV The Red Room – Following rules & Form of life

The green room is placed diagonally in the large red room, such that the visitor is forced to pass the opening of the green room if he wishes to continue his journey. During the preparation of the installation I had planned a second lowered ceiling in the red room, in roughly the same colours as the various 'windows' that were meant to cover its walls. Halfway through the construction of the installation it turned out

## 5. DO NOT ERASE . . . WAIT FOR MEANING

---


not to be doable. At that point, I decided to let the process direct me towards a solution. I cut the 'lowered ceiling' into pieces and made it into a heap next to the green room in such a way that it blocks the passage for the visitors: now they are forced to pass from the red room into the blue room via the green one. The heap can be understood as the sketches and notes that were left out of the final work, but also as fragments, to be used for building up something that would 'finish' the installation. The solution proved to be much stronger than the original idea of the lowered ceiling.

The walls of the red room are covered with nine abstract paintings of 'Vendel-windows' all in red shades, guided by rooms numbers that can be read at the same time as line numbers of a poem. The transition from the red room into the yellow room is marked by three orange pieces of silk fabric.


### Technical details

- . Foam board covered with foil: eighty eight times 60(w) x 75(l) cm
- . Window paintings acrylic: nine times 120(w) x 130(l) cm and twenty seven times 38(w) x 30(l) cm, with room/poem numbers
- . Green house: 500(w) x 251(h) x 250(d) cm, colour H02560
- . Plants: one hundred Ficus pumila. They were installed in the green house and later on, after the dismantling of the installation, handed out to the public
- . Drawing of staircase: 110(w) x 186(l) cm
- . Fabric: Indian orange silk three times 100(w) x 220(h) cm

IV/IV - The red room // Following rules & Form of life



III/III - The green room // Following rules & Form of life



II/V The Yellow Room – Way & World

The three high windows which provide a view on the centre of Amsterdam's everyday life are covered with yellow ribbons, painted in such a way that the outside world can only enter fragmentarily. Whenever the sun is shining, strong reflections on the walls and floor emphasise this idea of a fragmented, reflected world. On the wall, at the Laundry-side, there is a text-sequence showing the weather forecasts kept over the four years the project lasted. In the corner of the yellow room, an unfolded box shows the outline on a new perspective on the art of installation, originally planned to be placed in the white room.

I/VI The White Room – Remodel[ing] Reality

Thinking is time and again . . . starting anew . . . This is the entrance of the exhibition space with a counter where visitors register and which has all sorts of information on contemporary art. It is the place of transition par excellence – where the real world transforms into a dynamic resonance and evokes contemplation over the values we assign to ourselves and that world.

Technical details

- . Geen droge dagen (No dry days): twenty one sheets with daily weather forecast for the time the project lasted
- . Windows of the exhibition space covered with painted yellow ribbon: three times 156(w) x 300(h) cm
- . Unfolded box with the announcement of a new perspective on the art of installation





1.4.1 A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON THE ART OF INSTALLATION

THE QUESTION

How can we preserve the installation in such a way that we can meaningfully reflect on this work of art and our relationship with it?

CONCEPT AND DESCRIPTION

The strength as well as the weakness of the installation as an art form is its temporality. After a certain time span, the installation is dismantled. It can never be installed in the same way since the exhibition space is intrinsically part of the art work: it is understood not as a frame, but as *material*. In that sense every installation is a unique work of art. The area of tension between the installation to be experienced in real time and the realisation that it is temporary and will be demolished, after which it is to be part of something else, allows room for memory and reflection.

Just as with conceptual art, describing and documenting is crucial, since the installation is made in, with and for *that* specific location, at *that* specific moment within the scope of our community. Documentation is important for reflection afterwards, but since meaning is not to be found in the elements of the artwork itself, neither in the technical details we have to find a way in which not only the art work itself, but also its variety of meanings is preserved: emphasising its strength, that is, its manifestation in the concept itself. Our world contains more and is much richer than we can register by means of our senses or any media. We add to what we already know with the help of our imagination: we transform and remodel reality. The process of this insight we call change, and we have already seen that visualising change is a problem for modern visual art.

Curators and custodians try to overcome the 'time-based' aspect of the installation in developing models and procedures for the acquired installations to be maintained and preserved meticulously. This is despite the fact, that the installation as a movement rejected the conventions of the institutional art world and was meant to bypass any possibility of trading and preservation. This form of art (often) contains many unstable materials which are not intended to last forever, as it is not meant to be created for our future generations in the way paintings and sculptures are. It is, in fact, by definition impossible to fully preserve an installation: the exhibition space that was used as material cannot be included in the storage of the materials of the installation. A possible solution might be found in what I want to call 'repackaging'.

Maybe we should change perspective and think of an installation as a 'book of change'. As said before – I consider an installation as a poem with proportion. And since one of the characteristics of an installation, as well as a poem, is that the viewer should also actively participate, he might as well be challenged to make an actual contribution. Change as a shift in meaning – as a move of collaboration. Instead of reducing an installation to a relic, statically piled away in the basement



of a museum, we could try to turn the installation into something dynamic which does justice to its initial character as something temporal and changeable. We can use installation *Do not Erase . . . wait for Meaning* as a prototype and test case for this insight.

### TESTIMONIAL

I start from the conviction that the installation is a physical manifestation of the installation of an idea, that is, the outcome of a range of possible answers in the working out of a conceptual question. And I take the work of art to be a totality of activities: an active totality covering the activities of the artist, those of the visitors, and finally the activities of the buyer.

First, there is the active totality of the artist, something we could call ‘Testimonial 1’. It is the active totality we already came across in Chapter 3, p145ff. All the research, the writings, sketches, notes, background thoughts, the errors, the choices of material, as well as photos, assemblages, and all other forms of documentation together with the materials that remained after dismantling the installation provide this totality; it provides the report of an attitude. Installation *Do not Erase . . .* was archived and stored in this way.

Second, there are the testimonials by the viewers, personal reports, which can make meaningful contributions to the installation – Testimonial 2. Unfortunately, these testimonials are usually lost in connection with the installation, because the artist simply never finds out what the responses of the viewers were. The viewer keeps his reports, thoughts and reflections to himself or discusses them only within a direct circle of acquaintances. That is a pity, because the various voices and insights of the viewers can illuminate different perspectives, layers or points of view than those of the artist, and thus can serve as a refinement concerning (the meanings of) the installation. During installation *Do not Erase . . .* in a lecture on July 4th, I took up this idea and asked the viewers to actively participate and report their insights and experiences of the installation, thus bringing in their testimonials and make a contribution to the archive and storage of the installation.

Third, we can extend the notion of testimonial in the repackaging of an installation. The installation – being something once-only – can only be rebuilt serving as a *testimonial* of the original set up – serving as an evidence of the first, original work of art. It is evidence of the various perspectives given by one particular conceptual question. So what we see, then, are the boxes in which the materials and the documentation were piled away, an archive in which every single thing is registered: all of the documentation, photo-sequences, books, publications, as well as the viewers’ reports. All this, then, is turned into material that can be exhibited again, provided that the way in which it is build up again is related to the original conceptual question.

This repackaging can be exhibited by a buyer who has only description and

documentation, personal reports, and fragments left from the original material, all of it connected to the particular conceptual question that was initially addressed. In this way the meaning of the whole will be changed and the viewers' reports will be a substantial part of the package. This new exhibition has to be described and documented again together with the testimonial – Testimonial 3 – of the buyer, and than will be added to the archive.

From the repackaging, the installation becomes dynamic, multi-dimensional and revealing. The focus of attention shifts from 'things' or 'objects' to 'process'. As a consequence, the role of the artist, and the role of the public, as well as the role of the work of art itself, change. All of them standing in the midst of the concepts – in the midst of a reflexive dynamics.

To summarise, I want to propose a new perspective on the art of installation by introducing the phenomenon of ·repackaging·. This is how such a repackaging could look: All original material of the installation that can be preserved is stored and archived, together with photos, description and other documentation that is provided by the artist. Every installation of an InstallationPackage is archived and described in a packing list showing the context of the InstallationPackage of which it is a part. Along with this package goes an Authenticity Certificate. For the buyer there is a certificate that gives him the right to re-build as well as to re-sell. By way of example, the repackaging of installation Do not Erase . . . wait for Meaning is worked out in detail in a separate publication.



## >> PART III



## 6 > CONCLUSIONS

This book closes with some conclusions drawn from a personal project that spanned four years and combined art and philosophy. I have no pretensions to come up with (final) solutions or conclusions that are not debatable.

### 1 LAYERED LEVELS

Do apes make art? Are the drawings of a sibling art? Is the painting of a person with severe psychiatric disorders art? Arty maybe, but in my view – not art. Where then lies the difference? I think, that the person who claims to be an artist should be able to reflect on her work and put the various works of art in a meaningful perspective, that is, make a coherent body of work, or, as discussed on page 145: an active totality. This is something apes, children or psychiatric patients are not capable of; for them, only the direct expression of emotions is at stake.

If this is true, there are several consequences. First, art and reflection somehow belong to each other. What sort of reflection, however, remains to be seen. Second, ‘not everything goes’ as to what can count as art. And third, a long time span is needed for the artist in order to make a meaningful body of work.

That art and reflection are somehow connected stems from the fact that the work of art, i.e. the body of work, is something ambiguous and multi-layered. When a work of art strikes us as hopelessly dated, it is not for example, because it depicts an ancient style, but because it is spelt out in a too obvious, too explicit manner. When a work of art remains meaningful for us over the centuries, it is because we can time and again look at it from different perspectives – it allows for different kinds of approaches. There are many levels the work can bring to light and in which it can be seen and understood. I will restrict myself here to the issues that were raised in this volume and try to spell out in some detail to what extent a combination of art and philosophy can account for revealing some of the layered levels.

### PHILOSOPHY

Philosophy in the academic sense has turned into a discipline split up into numerous specialised branches: social and political philosophy, ethics, aesthetics, episte-



mology, philosophy of language, philosophy of science to name only a few, as well as into various traditions. The urge for an interdisciplinary twist is understood by all of them, but real contact and exchange with each other is not very common – for the most part they all function as isolated islands. The jargon of one philosophical community is not understood (in the same way) by the members of another philosophical specialisation.

Philosophy is a difficult discipline that asks for many years of digging into already established insights and issues before one can begin to understand one's own thought on certain matters. It is a skill that has to be learned and trained. I found out that an MA in philosophy hardly offers real philosophical training in this respect. Of course, I learned the most basic philosophical concepts and also where they came from and why they were the basic ones, but it didn't show me what 'real' philosophical discourse could look like. It was only in the four years that followed that I got an idea of what philosophy 'really' is or could be. In this respect, I learned most from the various conferences that I attended abroad.

In my perception, the writing of this dissertation is only the first step. I remember a day in January 2008, standing in a book shop before all those books about philosophy and philosophers, saying to myself that I had learned enough: 'now I want to write my own philosophy'. That is, to work out the insights gained by the combination of philosophy and art – without being able to specify this desire at that moment any further. But it was a very strong feeling, and I believe in strong feelings. In any case, it related to the question of how philosophy should proceed. Should it remain a discipline, with its back turned to the world, preaching only to the converted? Or should it throw itself into the floating, overloaded and 'over-socialised' world in which everyday opinions are replaced by other opinions? Neither of the two seemed to be the right way out.

During the writing of this volume, I proposed a third way out. Help from other disciplines maybe could provide an opening. More specifically, art and philosophy could benefit from each other. As stated on page 160, in my view, the value of art lies in the way in which change is expressed and presented – the value of philosophy shows itself in its reflections related to the world.

But now that I have come to the end of the project, I am not so sure anymore of the mutual benefit; in any case, not so sure as at the time when I started the project. The examples of philosophy attempting to contribute in a substantial way to art, for instance a philosopher curating an exhibition, are not very convincing and at times even embarrassing. And the way art contributes to philosophy is also not very convincing – at least not in any structured, systematic way. At this moment, I think, the combination can only be successful when the two skills are united in one person. But that would mean that an artist has to learn the technique and the skill of philosophy and the reverse . . . This will not be an option for many artists – nor for many philosophers.

## ART

Conceptual art is often considered as rather elitist and ‘highbrow’ in the sense that not everyone will be able to engage with this form of art.<sup>1</sup> If true, is this problematic? In my view, not at all. Most people like what sometimes is called ‘retina art’, that is, pictures or works of art that are relatively easy to look at and meant to be consumed; other people are triggered more by complexity and references to other domains. Every form of art creates its own public in this respect.

The way I understand conceptual art might provide an answer to some of the problems raised by the postmodernist period that is now about to come to an end.<sup>2</sup> Postmodernism directed us, among other things, to ‘posing questions’, an activity that connects philosophy and art, as we have already seen. My point of departure is also that of ‘posing questions’, but in contrast to the postmodernist perspective, I mean an inquiry into questions that are to some extent ‘unanswerable’, and should be investigated in a different way. These questions need to be tackled in a more complex and more enduring ways than we find in postmodernist art. My solution can be understood as the making of an InstallationPackage, in which a specific concept is explored from various perspectives – in taking a package tour of a concept.

Butler (2002, p109) emphasises that during the heyday of postmodernism, critics were more important than art and artists. And the same holds for curators, in my opinion. As I have already indicated, I oppose these influences that dominate the arts to this very day. When I say that art could benefit from (philosophical) reflection, I do not mean the kind of reflection put forward by critics and curators who operate on an institutional and political level, something that in some sense rules out the very art they are reflecting on. What I want to emphasise is that the artist herself has to reclaim her responsibility. First, she must learn how to reflect on her own work in such a way that it adds a dimension to the artistic accomplishments. Second, reflection on the work must be given a place *within* the body of work itself, so making it part of the work. The volume at hand is a possible (personal) solution – not *the* solution – of how this might be done.

My point of view is in contrast to Butler, when he suggests that creative people may not need deep philosophical or academic understanding, because ‘they can also get their ‘new ideas’ from journalism[...]’ (Butler, 2002, p62). But taking ideas from journalism, critics, curators and the like leads to an endless remaking and reproducing of the same subjects, as the products of postmodernism show us. It is exactly this watering down – and with that the urge of the artist to fit in, in order to get funding, appreciation, exhibitions and the like – that leads the arts into an infinite regress. This is not to say that artists should also be full-blown academics, but neither is it true that they resemble apes, unable to reflect and put into perspective what they are doing and why they are doing it the way they do. It will depend on the artists’ personality traits as to what the right sources will be

1 >  
Conceptual art has some sort of a place of its own within the arts, but it runs the risk that when the concepts remain empty, it will lose that place.

2 >  
Please keep in mind that this project was not an inquiry into postmodernism, but merely a formulation of a way out of the dilemmas it posed upon art and artists. For a very good introduction on postmodernism I recommend Butler (2002). For a philosophical perspective on the same issue, I refer to Graham (2005, pp238-243).

to draw on, but I would like to plead for a more critical attitude that draws on authentic, primary, original sources, and not secondary ones – although they might be of some additional help.

### ART & PHILOSOPHY

The enrichment of ourselves and the world – that is what we think that art as well as philosophy are for. But what, then, is enrichment supposed to be?

The artist uses art in confronting and opening up the world, the reality she is living in and the time she is involved in. I deliberately choose Wittgenstein and analytic philosophy in order to move away from postmodernist ideas and influences. It helped, but it didn't make things easier. In this respect, it should be mentioned that a combined trajectory of the sort I was engaged in is not possible without already having a full blown art practice and knowledge of the art world. This means that combining art and another discipline while still being in art school is not doable. That is not to say that an art student cannot take courses in philosophy or any other discipline – of course she can – but she had better not engage in a four year PhD at university level. The practices can become soul destroying for those who are not talented in both fields.

What matters in art is not so much production as intense attentiveness, awareness, and mindfulness that works its way up to extremes. It is a different dimension of investigation and research than the academic way of doing research. But this questions the way in which a university-PhD is normally conducted: the deadlines, the emphasis on production and publication and the ways in which the supervisor wants to pull things in certain directions do not provide a very suitable framework for the making of art, let alone for a combination of art and an academic discipline. In this respect, much depends on the willingness and flexibility of the supervisor involved and the ways in which the university system allow for deviations from the academic rules and an open atmosphere. It is only in such an open atmosphere that the asynchrony of the two tempi is interesting and can provide a reflexive distance, allowing for lines of resonance that can give rise to renewal and new insights. But nothing will guarantee the outcome.

## 2 AMAZING !

In leafing through this book you may have noticed some recurrences. 'Where did I stumble across this before?' you might have asked yourself, or you might even have exclaimed at some point: 'Oh no, not again . . . !' If this was the case, I would like to ask you to have some patience with me – it wasn't all ignorance; it also served a purpose.

---

Remember that this volume was meant to be an InstallationPackage – meant to be an art work itself. And an InstallationPackage contains a package tour of a concept. In engaging in a package tour you want to discover side-roads, leaving the straight and narrow for a moment, eager to experience an adventurous trip into the unfamiliar and unknown. Although it might seem to be some sort of a paradox, repetition in slightly different settings help on such an adventurous journey. As said on page 161: repetition of sameness gives one a kind of mythical, ritualising rhythm.

It could very well be the case that you have already discovered at what places subtle recurrences appear, and maybe you also connected these repetitions with various angles and hints. For example: Have you noticed that the description of the art of installation – in Chapter 1 taken from the viewer's perspective – has a lot in common with the description of the art of installation in Chapter 4 from the creator's perspective? Or did you already detect some analogies between the (description of the) installation *Wiederholte Spiegelungen* (p165ff), the elaboration of Goethe's ideas on morphology in Chapter 1 (p33ff), and the discussion on the importance of the process reading of Wittgenstein's way of doing philosophy in Chapter 3 (p132ff)? Amazing!

I will not give any further examples since the complexity and richness should give you opportunity to perceive it from your own perspective. So, please feel free to discover other connections and analogies between philosophical and philosophical, philosophical and artistic, and artistic and artistic parts of this publication. Maybe in experiencing connections they will combine with your memories and your own life history into something new.



## > ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Although it is my name that appears on the cover of the book, this has been in no way a solo effort. First of all I want to thank the dean of the Faculty of Humanities of the University of Amsterdam, Aafke Hulk, for her prompt decision to give a chance to this experimental project. At a moment in which many details were yet to be filled in, she gave the green light for the start of  $\llcorner$ Do not Erase ... wait for Meaning $\lrcorner$ . But this project would not have had the ghost of a chance to come to fruition without the support of my supervisor, Martin Stokhof, who was willing to accept and respect the independent work traits of an artist who, through trial and error, tried to adapt to the ins and outs of a philosophical community. Together we went through numerous many (unexpected) difficulties over these four years. He had the courage to persist with the process without knowing where it all would end, providing the necessary trust to preserve and accomplish the project.

Concerning the artistic part of the project, Arti et Amicitiae in Amsterdam provided a safe haven. Special thanks go to Gabriëlle Mertz and the technical crew who helped me out, especially Ed Boersema who actively participated in the performative *Language and her Tightly-whities* in 2006, and Minne de Groot in the making of final installation. I would particularly like to thank Coen André for both his technical work in the final installation as well as assisting in past projects.

Also, the staff of the Amsterdam University Library was very generous in offering me a studio space. In the past, it had been the photo studio of the university, situated in the basement of the library. Moreover, I was allowed to make the installation *Wiederholte Spiegelungen* in the front room at the beginning of 2008. Without this space, I would never have managed to prepare and organise the final installation. Many thanks especially to Nol Verhagen and Renda Ruiterkamp who gave me every possible support.

With respect to the philosophical part of the project, I benefited much from the occasions to meet Wittgenstein scholars both local and abroad. I want to mention Jaap van der Does who can be spotted on a regular base at the University of Amsterdam deeply involved in his book on the *Tractatus*; Garry Hagberg and Rupert Read to whom I was introduced to during a Wittgenstein conference at the University of East Anglia in Norwich in February 2008, where I also gave a Wittgenstein workshop; Marie McGinn, Daniële Moyal-Sharrock and Fiona Hedges who were



present in London in 2007 at the conference in honour of Hide Ishiguro; Gabriëlle Hiltmann, Alois Pichler, as well as Jennifer Hornsby with whom I got acquainted on various occasions in Kirchberg during the yearly ALWS Wittgenstein conferences; Dorothy Singer who shared her insights with me at the conference of Aesthetic Psychology in Durham in 2007. And last but not least, Anthony Kenny and Tim Williamson, who showed in the course of a conference called ‘Is there anything wrong with Wittgenstein?’ in Reggio Emilia, each in their own way, what practising philosophy, as a discipline of its own, can be and can do.

In 2007 I was introduced to a small philosophical discussion group, meeting twice a year in Utrecht, eager to explore some philosophical issue that was brought in by one of the members. Here, I got the opportunity to share my insights on the matters at hand in a welcome atmosphere.

Referring to the writing of the thesis itself, Boudewijn de Bruin was so generous to direct me to Garamond for LaTeX, being the font I have used for typesetting this publication. We shared the same room for a time when the project started. Also many heartfelt thanks to Hartmut Fitz, who pulled me through times when everyone else seemed to have abandoned me. I have come to know him as an intelligent PhD student who combines pragmatism with empathy. The same can be said of Darrin Hindsill, who did more than just take care of correcting English grammar and spelling. He became personally involved in the project, and we had a good time together not only checking spelling and grammar, but also talking about visual art, literature and detective novels.

The two *paranimfen* Arie van den Berg and Jan Bor took care of the festive elements of the defence. Originally, these *paranimfen* had the duty to protect the candidate during his or her defence, whenever heated discussions with members of the commission would culminate in physical disputation. Today, however, their role has altered into a more symbolic, honorary job, something which is more suitable for Arie and Jan, who are excellent organisers of a party, but are not the sort of men who would have a chance to win the first prize in a body builder competition. Whether this change of role is an improvement in an academic sense, I don't know, but enjoying a party when the ritual is over and done with, that's a good thing for sure.

When I began my study in philosophy in 1998, I became acquainted with Anouk Zuurmond, who, at the time, was studying Dutch and Philosophy. She introduced me to the do's and don'ts of an academic setting, as I was someone who had not been in one for twenty years. Over the course of time we became good friends, continuing our discussions about any do's and don'ts concerning philosophy, art, and life.

## > BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Athanasopoulos, C. 1999. Bookreview Meridith Williams: Wittgenstein, Mind and Meaning. *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 7(3), pp. 419–421.
- Baker, G. 2002. Philosophical Investigations Section 122. Neglected Aspects. *Ludwig Wittgenstein. Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers.*, Volume II, pp. 68–94.
- . 2004. *Wittgenstein's Method. Neglected Aspects.* Blackwell: Oxford.
- Baker, G. & Hacker, P.M.S. 1980. *Wittgenstein. Understanding and Meaning (I).* Blackwell: Oxford.
- . 1985. *Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity.* Blackwell: Oxford.
- Baz, A. 2000. What's the Point of Seeing Aspects? *Philosophical Investigations*, 23(2), pp. 97–121.
- Bloor, D. 1997. *Wittgenstein, Rules and Institutions.* Routledge: London/New York.
- Butler, Ch. 2002. *Postmodernism. A Very Short Introduction.* University Press: Oxford.
- Churchland, P. 2005. Chimerical Colors: Some Phenomenological Predictions from Cognitive Neuroscience. *Philosophical Psychology*, 18(5), pp. 527–560.
- Clack, B. 1999. *Wittgenstein, Frazer and Religion.* MacMillan press: London.
- Crary, A. & Shieh, S., eds. 2006. *Reading Cavell.* Routledge: New York/ London.
- Crow, Th., et al. 2003. *Gordon Matta-Clark.* Phaidon Press: London/New York.
- Duve de, Th. 1998. *Kant after Duchamp.* MIT press: London.
- Fischer, H-R. 1987. *Sprache und Lebensform: Wittgenstein über Freud und die Geisteskrankheit.* Athenäum Verlag: Frankfurt am Main.
- Floyd, J. 2000. Wittgenstein, Mathematics and Philosophy. In: Crary, A. & Read, R., eds., *The New Wittgenstein*, pp. 232–261. Routledge.
- . 2002. Book Review. Mathieu Marion. Wittgenstein, Finitism, and the Foundations of Mathematics. *Philosophia Mathematica*, 10(3), pp. 67–88.
- Frazer, J. 1922. *The Golden Bough. A study in magic and religion.* Wordsworth Eds. Ltd: Hertfordshire (1993).
- Garver, N. 1994. *This Complicated Form of Life. Essays on Wittgenstein.* Open Court.
- Genova, J. 1993a. Wittgenstein: a Way of Seeing. *Metaphilosophy*, Volume 24(4), pp. 326–343.
- . 1993b. Wittgenstein on Thinking. Words or Pictures? *LW 16*, pp. 163–167.
- . 1995. *Wittgenstein. A Way of Seeing.* Routledge: New York/ London.
- Gerritsen, F. 1984. *Entwicklung der Farbenlehre.* Muster-Schmidt: Göttingen.

- Gier, N. 1981. *Wittgenstein and Phenomenology*. State University of New York Press.
- Glock, H.-J. 1996. *A Wittgenstein Dictionary*. Blackwell: Oxford.
- Goldie, P & Schellekens, E, eds. 2007. *Philosophy and Conceptual Art*. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
- Graham, G. 2005. *Philosophy of the Arts. An introduction to aesthetics*. Routledge: London/New York, 3rd edn.
- Groenendijk, J. & Stokhof, M. 1984. *Studies on the Semantics of Questions and the Pragmatics of Answers*. Ph.D. thesis, University of Amsterdam.
- Groys, B. 1996. *Die Kunst der Installation*. Carl Hanser Verlag: München.
- Hacker, P.M.S. 2004. Übersichtlichkeit und übersichtliche Darstellungen. *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, 52(3), pp. 405–420.
- Hagberg, G. 2002. Davidson, Self-knowledge, and Autobiographical Writing. *Philosophy and Literature*, 26, pp. 354–368.
- . 2003. On Philosophy as Therapy: Wittgenstein, Cavell, and Autobiographical Writing. *Philosophy and Literature*, 27, pp. 196–210.
- Haller, R. 1986. *Fragen zu Wittgenstein und Aufsätze zur Österreichischen Philosophie*. Rodopi: Amsterdam.
- Hilmy, S. 1987. *The Later Wittgenstein. The Emergence of a New Philosophical Method*. Blackwell: Oxford.
- Hiltmann, G. 1998. *Aspekte Sehen. Bemerkungen zum methodischen Vorgehen in Wittgensteins Spätwerk*. Königshausen und Neumann: Würzburg.
- Hornsby, J. 2005. Semantic Knowledge and Practical Knowledge. *The Aristotelian Society*, Supplementary Volume(79), pp. 1–21.
- . 2006. Knowledge and Abilities in Action. *ALWS symposium*.
- Hutto, D. 2000. Reviews. Meredith Williams, *Wittgenstein, Mind and Meaning: Toward a Social Conception of Mind*. *Philosophical Investigations*, 23(2), pp. 176–181.
- . 2003. *Wittgenstein and the End of Philosophy. Neither Theory nor Therapy*. Palgrave Macmillan: New York.
- . 2007. Getting Clear about Perspicuous Representations: Wittgenstein, Baker, & Fodor. In: Moyal-Sharrock, D, ed., *Perspicuous Presentations: Essays on Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology*, pp. 299–323. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Kabakov, I. 1999. *The Old Reading Room*. Vossius Pers AUP: Amsterdam.
- . 2000. *Der Text als Grundlage des Visuellen. The text as the basis of visual expression*. Oktagon: Köln.
- Katz, D. 1930. *Der Aufbau der Farbwelt. Die Erscheinungsweisen der Farben und ihre Beeinflussung durch die individuelle Erfahrung*. Barth: Leipzig.
- Kelley, J. 2004. *Childplay. The Art of Allan Kaprow*. University of California Press.
- Koethe, J. 2000. Book Reviews. Wittgenstein, Mind and Meaning, by Meredith Williams. *Mind*, 109(435), pp. 665–668.
- Kripke, S. 1982. *Wittgenstein on Rules an Private Language*. Blackwell: Oxford.
- Luntley, M. 2003. *Wittgenstein: Meaning and Judgement*. Blackwell: Oxford.

- 
- Lütterfelds, W. & Roser, A. 1999. *Der Konflikt der Lebensformen in Wittgensteins Philosophie der Sprache*. Suhrkamp: Frankfurt am Main.
- Marion, M. 1998. *Wittgenstein, Finitism, and the Foundations of Mathematics*. Clarendon Press: Oxford.
- McGinn, C. 1984. *Wittgenstein on Meaning*. Blackwell: Oxford.
- McGinn, M. 1991. Wittgenstein's *Remarks on Colour*. *Philosophy* 66, pp. 435–453.
- Mulligan, K. 1991. Colours, Corners and Complexity: Meinong & Wittgenstein on some internal relations. In: Fraassen van, B. C. & Spohn, B. Skyrms & W., eds., *Existence and Explanation: Essays in Honor of Karl Lambert*, pp. 77–101. Kluwer: Dordrecht.
- Noë, A. 2005. Against Intellectualism. *Analysis*, 65(4), pp. 278–290.
- Oliveira, N. de. 1994. *Installation Art*. Thames and Hudson: London.
- Osborne, P. 2002. *Conceptual Art*. Phaidon Press: London/New York.
- Phillips, P. 1999. Books Briefly Noted. Wittgenstein, Rules and Institutions. By David Bloor. *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 7(3), pp. 423–424.
- Pichler, A. 2000. *Wittgenstein's Philosophische Untersuchungen: Vom Buch zum Album*. Universität von Bergen: Bergen.
- Reiss, J. H. 1999. *From Margin to Center. The Spaces of Installation Art*. MIT press: London.
- Rothhaupt, J. 1996. *Farbthemen in Wittgensteins Gesamtnachlass*. Belz Athenäum Verlag: Weinheim.
- Ryle, G. 1949. *The Concept of Mind*. University Press: Chicago.
- . 1971a. Knowing How and Knowing That. *Collected Papers*, 2, pp. 212–225.
- . 1971b. *Volume II. Collected Essays 1929-1968*. Hutchinson of London.
- Schulte, J. 1990. *Chor und Gesetz. Wittgenstein im Kontext*. Suhrkamp: Frankfurt am Main.
- Seigel, J. 1995. *The Private Worlds of Marcel Duchamp. Desire, Liberation and the Self in Modern Culture*. University of California Press: London.
- Snowdon, P. 2003. Knowing How and Knowing That: A Distinction Reconsidered. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, pp. 1–29.
- Souhami, D. 2001. *Selkirk's Island. The True and Strange Adventures of the Real Robinson Crusoe*. Harcourt: New York.
- Stallabrass, J. 2004. *Contemporary Art. A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
- Stanley, J. & Williamson, T. 2001. Knowing How. *The Journal of Philosophy*, pp. 411–444.
- Steels, L. 1999. *The Talking Heads Experiment. Volume I. Words and Meanings*. VUB: Brussel, special pre-edition for 'Laboratorium', Antwerpen 1999 edn.
- Stein, H. 1997. *The Fiber and the Fabric. An Inquiry into Wittgenstein's Views on Rule-Following and Linguistic Normativity*. Ph.D. thesis, ILLC: University of Amsterdam.
- Steiner, G. 2001. *Grammars of Creation*. Faber and Faber: London.
- Suderburg, E, ed. 2000. *Space, Site, Intervention. Situating Installation Art*. UMS: Minneapolis.
- Sullivan, P. 2006. Wittgenstein's Method. Neglected Aspects - Book Reviews. *Mind*, 115(457), pp. 125–129.

- Swirnoff, L. 1989 (2003). *Dimensional Color*. W.W. Norton & Company: New York.
- Tucker, M. & Monte, J. 1969. *Anti-Illusion: Procedures/Materials*. Whitney Museum of American Art: New York.
- Whiting, D. 2005. Reviews. Michael Luntley, *Wittgenstein: Meaning and Judgement*. *Philosophical Investigations*, 28(4), pp. 369–375.
- Wijdeveld, P. 1994. *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Architect*. Thames and Hudson: London.
- Wilde, T. 2002. The 4th Dimension. Wittgenstein on Colour and Imagination. *Papers of the 25th International Wittgenstein Symposium*, pp. 284–286.
- . 2004a. Installatiekunst biedt vragen in plaats van antwoorden. *Boekman*, 16(58/59: Kunst en Wetenschap), pp. 136–139.
- . 2004b. Reflectieve Dynamiek in het latere werk van Wittgenstein. Een onderzoek naar verbanden tussen zijn opmerkingen over kleur, aspecten zien en zekerheid. *Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte (ANTW)*, 96(2), pp. 85–113.
- . 2005a. Wittgenstein over Kleurconcepten en Kleurervaring. *Kleurenvisie*, 58(3), pp. 11–13.
- . 2005b. Zwemmen. *Catalogue Eau Revoir - Ithaka # 13 Leuven*.
- . 2006a. Normativity and Novelty. *Papers of the 29th International Wittgenstein Symposium*, pp. 370–372.
- . 2006b. Remodel[li]ng Reality. *Wilde Oceans*: Amsterdam.
- Williams, M. 2002. *Wittgenstein, Mind and Meaning. Towards a Social Conception of Mind*. Routledge, London.
- Williamson, T. 2007. *The Philosophy of Philosophy*. Blackwell: Oxford.

---

ABBREVIATIONS OF WORKS BY LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN

BB	1958(2000), The Blue and Brown Books. Preliminary Studies for the Philosophical Investigations, Blackwell: Oxford
BT	Big Typescript
CE	1993, Cause & Effect: Intuitive Awareness. Reprinted in Philosophical Occasions 1912-1951. See also PO
CV	1997, Culture and Value. Vermischte Bemerkungen, Blackwell: Oxford
LA	Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Beliefs
LE	Letter on Ethics
LFM	Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics
LWPP I	Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume 1
LWPP II	Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume 2
MS	Manuscript
N	Bergen Electronic Nachlass
NB	Notebooks 1914 - 1916
OC	1969, On Certainty. Über Gewissheit, Blackwell: Oxford
PG	1974, Philosophical Grammar. Philosophische Grammatik, Blackwell: Oxford
PI	2001, Philosophical Investigations. Philosophische Untersuchungen, Blackwell Oxford, 3rd edition
PO	1993, Philosophical Occasions 1912-1951/Ludwig Wittgenstein pp. 371-426. Eds. C. Klagge and A. Nordmann. Hackett
PR	1964, Philosophical Remarks. Philosophische Bemerkungen. Ludwig Wittgenstein Schriften 2, R. Rhees, Suhrkamp: Frankfurt am Main
RFM	1956(1998), Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Blackwell: Oxford
RoC	1977(1998), Remarks on Colour. Bemerkungen über die Farben, Blackwell: Oxford
RPP I	1980(1998), Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology. Bemerkungen über die Philosophie der Psychologie Vol.I, Blackwell: Oxford
RPP II	1980(1998), Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology. Bemerkungen über die Philosophie der Psychologie Vol.II, Blackwell: Oxford
TLP	1995, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Werkausgabe Band I, Suhrkamp: Frankfurt am Main
TS	Typescript
WVC	Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle: Conversations Recorded by Friedrich Weissmann
Z	1967, Zettel (German and English text), Blackwell: Oxford





## > INDEX

- abstention, 116  
and artists, 119  
and detachment, 120
- active totality, 183  
and artists, 144  
as InstallationPackage, 143
- aesthetic, 23  
clarification, 22  
detachment, 23
- aesthetics, 10, 39  
and ethics, 23, 158, 169  
and Übersicht, 26
- agreement, 33, 60, 68, 127  
and Form of life, 90
- amazement, 22, 37
- ambiguity, 51, 91, 115, 119, 138, 146, 164, 172  
and clarity, 158  
and creativity, 119  
and imagination, 97  
and knowing-how, 112
- ambiguous plurality, 116
- analogy, 36, 84
- art, 22, 185  
and art-world, 46  
and information, 52  
and life, 42, 47, 149, 151  
and philosophy, 23, 139, 144, 150, 186  
and reflexive dynamics, 47  
as process, 10, 143
- art of installation, 40, 42, 143–147  
and art and life, 40  
and conceptual question, 45  
and context, 43  
and documentation, 43  
and institutions, 145  
and memory, 45  
and new perspective, 177  
and public space, 144  
and questions, 146  
and time/space, 47  
and übersichtliche  
Darstellung, 48  
and viewer, 43  
art and life, 146  
as conceptual question, 151  
as Gesamtkunstwerk, 145  
as poem, 158  
as possibility, 41  
as scene, 47  
as site-specific, 40
- artistic aspect perception, 50, 51, 137
- artistic creativity, 76
- artistic knowledge, 13, 123
- artistic meta-view, 99
- aspect, 12  
and attitude, 74  
and change, 80  
and creativity, 85  
and dawning of, 86  
and paradox, 87  
and will, 85  
seeing, 81  
seeing aright, 72
- aspect blindness, 49, 84
- aspect change, 12, 25, 38, 85, 86  
as juxtaposition, 83
- aspect perception, 38
- aspect seeing, 12, 25, 48, 52, 104, 118, 127, 137, 158  
features of, 49
- attitude, 72, 100  
and change, 86  
and competence, 68  
as conscientiousness condition, 68  
as point of view, 74
- Baker Gordon, 26, 50, 81, 83, 126, 128  
*BB p28*, 84
- bedrock-rule-following, 60
- Beltane fire-festival, 31
- Bloor David, 58, 77, 98
- and collectivist account, 65  
and conceptual world, 69, 149  
and creativity, 70  
and infinity, 66  
and institution, 67, 96  
and social practice, 67  
and *Z 567*, 79
- boundaries  
as social accomplishments, 68
- Bouveresse Jacques, 129
- Cavell Stanley, 73
- certainty, 29, 147
- change, 46  
and ambiguity, 51  
and coherence, 154  
and context, 132  
and exaggeration, 169  
and practice, 61  
and reproducibility, 29  
and visualisation in art, 146  
and willingness, 85  
over time, 65
- CIE, 84
- clarity, 25, 54
- Clark Gordon Matta, 41, 46
- clear view, 25  
Bird's-Eye view, 84
- colour, 26, 110, 122, 137, 148, 171  
and aspect, 93  
and aspect change, 92  
and blindness, 91  
and dimensions, 93  
and exclusion, 93  
colour-systems, 28
- colour circle, 84
- colour space, 82
- colour-octahedron, 17, 25, 28, 29, 48, 51, 81–85, 132, 137
- coming to understand, 118
- concepts, 21, 130, 179

- and package tour, 139
- and remodeling, 28
- and rules, 60, 61
- grammar of, 15
- midst of, 23
- conceptual art, 144
- conceptual connections, 39
- constraints and imagination, 53
- context, 15
  - and lived life, 89
  - and reflexive dynamics, 51
  - as energising factor, 48
  - dependent, 29
  - independent, 29
- contextual knowledge, 122
- continuous aspect perception, 50
  - as constant understanding, 118
- corn wolf ritual, 32
- creative knowledge, 13, 51, 115, 118, 123
- creativity, 104, 115–119
- Crusoe, 79
  - and rule-following, 68
  - as borderline case, 94
  - as isolated, 99
  - as solitary rule-follower, 58
  - as sololinguist, 58, 94
- CV 16*, 85
- CV p45*, 34
- Darstellung*, 26, 32, 82
  - form of, 54
  - means of, 34
- delay, 171
  - and process, 120, 158
- demonstratives, 109
- detached knowledge, 76, 120
- detachment, 15
  - and abstention, 120
- documentation, 43, 178
  - and preservation, 153
- double-cross, 17, 48, 85
- duck-rabbit, 17, 48, 84, 85
- Durchsichtigkeit, 81
- engagement, 77
- Environment, 40
- Ernst Paul, 24
- everyday creativity, 76, 115
- experience, 23
  - intensified, 51
  - perceptual, 76
  - unitary model of, 74
- family resemblance, 33, 77
- finitism, 65
- Form of life, 12, 57, 62, 127
  - and attitude, 72
  - and given, 89
  - and ineffable, 93
  - and natural history, 90
  - and rule-following, 91
  - citations of, 88
- Frazer George James, 30
- Freud Sigmund, 54, 125–129
- Fried Michael, 41
- Galton Francis, 33
- Garver/Haller debate, 72
- Genova Judith, 24, 92
- Gesamtkunstwerk, 44, 55, 145
- Gestalt, 34, 35
  - Köhler, 48, 85
- Goethe Johann Wolfgang von, 25, 28, 55
  - and morphology, 33, 37
  - and wiederholte Spiegelungen, 33, 165
- habit, 21, 52
- Hacker Peter, 129
- Hagberg Garry, 26
- Hornsby Jennifer, 106, 111
- Hutto Daniel, 126, 127
- imagination, 24, 42, 57, 63, 116, 153
  - and receptiveness, 49, 86
  - as a source of knowledge, 106
- indirect-knowing-that, 113
- ineffable, 51, 75, 137
- inexpressible, 94
- infinity, 132
  - and possibilities, 72
  - and rule-following, 66
  - and-so-on, 72
- innovation, 58, 69, 79, 98, 105
  - and process, 70
- Installation, 11
  - Corrido[o]r, 11, 161
  - Do not Erase, 170
  - Do you?, 163
  - Wiederholte Spiegelungen, 165
- installation, 40, 42
  - and conceptual question, 44
  - and documentation, 178
  - and testimonial, 178
  - as dynamic, 179
  - as poem, 46
- InstallationPackage
  - Do not Erase, 8, 10, 157
- Remodel[li]ng
  - Reality, 10, 161, 187
  - Rhine, 147
- installationpackage, 8, 143, 185
  - and repackaging, 179
  - as active totality, 150
- installstatement, 1
- intuition, 117
  - as phenomenon, 26
  - as psychological process, 26
- judgement, 25, 163
  - and justification, 78
  - possibilities for, 72
- Kabakov Ilja, 44, 55, 149
- Kaprow Allan, 41
- Katz David, 33, 122
- Kiesler Frederick, 40
- knowing-how, 107
- knowing-how-to, 114
- knowing-of, 113
- knowing-that, 107
- knowledge, 42
  - and abilities, 111
  - and biological make-up, 115
  - and certainties, 113
  - and dimensions, 121
  - and judgement, 76
  - and learning, 107
  - and plurality, 106
  - and temporality, 114
  - and transformation, 116
  - and competence, 107
  - as dynamic process, 115
  - as enabling, 111
  - as gesture, 114
  - as procedure, 106
  - as way, 106
  - in terms of function, 122
- language, 21
  - and judgement, 77
  - and limits, 22
  - and seeing similarities, 77
  - and shared, 33, 61
  - as dynamic, 75
- language as living picture, 26
- language-game, 33
  - multiplicity of, 89
- LE*, 25
- LE p9*, 22
- learning circle, 64, 67
  - and finitism, 66
- Leibniz Gottfried, 55
- leitmotif, 81
- logical clarification, 22

- LRB* 71, 31  
*LRB* 72, 31  
 Luntley Michael, 50, 58, 77, 85, 98, 118  
     and creativity, 73  
     and everyday perception, 87  
     and Form of life, 71  
     and individual, 71  
     and judgement, 71  
     and practice, 77  
     and will, 74  
     and *Z* 567, 79  
*LW* 165, 84  
  
 Mach Ernst  
     and poetic fantasy, 52  
 magic, 30  
 magical totality, 22, 55  
 make-believe, 116  
 Marion Mathieu, 67, 72  
 mathematics, 23  
 meaning, 28  
     and content, 87  
     and indeterminacy, 97  
     and novice, 63  
     and package tour, 120, 138  
     and physiognomy, 92  
     and rule-following, 58  
     and scene, 92  
     and teacher, 63  
     as action, 62  
     as function, 62  
     as vision, 32  
     dynamic conception  
         of, 62  
         new, 15, 63  
         quest for, 42  
         re-assigning, 51  
     meaning blindness, 86  
     meaning determinism, 65  
     meaning finitism, 65  
     meaning potential, 119  
 memory, 14, 139, 177  
     and colour, 90  
     and imagination, 117  
     as process, 158  
 mental states as social states, 67  
 method, 22  
     as descriptive morphology, 34  
     as explanation, 127  
     as theory, 127  
     as vision, 105  
     of science, 39  
 Minimalism, 40  
 Mixed media, 44  
 model, 36, 84  
     as Bird's-Eye view, 85  
     of comparison, 35, 132  
     of experience, 74  
     of possibility, 152  
     of the builders, 95  
     modes of presentation, 109  
     morphology, 37, 132  
     Morris Robert, 41  
     mythology, 38, 125  
  
*Nachlass*, 24  
 Noë Alva, 106, 114  
 normativity, 63, 96  
     as intrinsic, 74  
*Notebooks*, 22  
 novelty, 58, 66, 118, 159  
  
 ostensive definition, 61, 62, 89  
 ostensive teaching, 61, 62, 89  
  
 package tour, 10  
     of a concept, 46, 139, 185  
 paradigm, 26, 34, 38, 69  
 paradox, 28, 46, 87  
     and perspective, 98, 127, 151  
 perception  
     and understanding, 153  
     and unitary model of experience, 74  
 perceptual knowledge, 75, 107  
 performative, 59  
 perspicuity, 25, 53  
 perspicuous overview, 9, 23, 26, 47, 58, 92, 134, 136, 157  
 perspicuous representation  
     and achievement, 130  
     and function, 130  
     and navigational account, 133  
 persuasion, 125  
*PG* p112, 30  
 philosophy, 30, 183  
     aim of, 22, 126  
     and art, 139, 144  
     and conceptual analysis, 135  
     and questions, 146  
     and world, 135  
     as descriptive morphology, 39  
     as elucidation, 128  
     as grammar, 86  
     as process, 124, 128, 132  
     as taking perspectives, 125  
     as therapy, 13, 128  
     as vision, 124  
 physiognomy, 33, 38, 55, 92  
*PI*, 21  
     *PI* 122, 24, 25, 72, 75, 78, 81, 130, 147  
     *PI* 129, 73  
     *PI* 130, 73  
     *PI* 143, 26, 27  
     *PI* 144, 26  
     *PI* 188, 69  
     *PI* 199, 65  
     *PI* 208, 72  
     *PI* 243, 95  
     *PI* 365, 117  
     *PI* 38, 39  
     *PI* 48, 25  
     *PI* 487, 67  
     *PI* 5, 72, 73  
     *PI* 568, 34  
     *PI* 654, 34  
     *PI* 66, 33  
     *PI* 682, 67  
     *PI* 69, 73  
     *PI* II, 78  
     *PI* II 212f, 77  
     *PI* II p211, 77  
     *PI* II xi, 38  
     *PI* preface, 123  
     picture, 26–28, 38, 53, 82, 92, 116, 124  
     *PO*, 25  
     *PO* *FGB*, 24, 25, 30  
     *PO* *FGB* p131, 32  
     *PO* *Philosophy* 89, 24  
     poem, 46, 86, 159  
         with proportion, 158–160, 170, 177  
     poetic perception, 88  
     poetic understanding, 9, 13, 28, 51, 118, 159  
         as living picture, 32, 52  
     Postmodernism, 153, 185  
     *PR*, 25  
     *PR* p1, 24  
     *PR* p2, 24  
     *PR* p51, 82  
     practical knowledge, 113  
     private language argument, 94  
     process, 158  
         and change, 169, 177  
         and *Darstellung*, 26  
         and individual, 98  
         and innovation, 69  
         and knowledge, 115  
         and social, 98  
         artistic, 120  
         as worked out considerations, 132  
         of learning, 64  
         philosophical, 124  
     proof, 23, 127  
         and acceptance, 54

- and meaning, 72  
 and perspicuity, 38, 81  
 propositional knowledge, 61, 122  
 prose, 23, 54  
 prototype, 28, 69  
 psycho-analysis, 125
- questions, 15, 44, 109, 147, 185  
   conceptual, 153  
   unanswerable, 54, 99
- reflexive dynamics, 11, 12, 15, 32, 47, 50, 51, 63, 118–138, 166, 179  
 relativism, 26, 124, 129, 171  
 Remodel[ing] Reality, 13, 175  
 repackaging, 177  
 repeatability  
   over subjects, 72  
   over time, 72  
*RFM*, 24, 25, 37  
*RFM I* 116, 126  
*RFM I* 121, 65  
*RFM VI*, 64  
*RFM VI* 32, 67, 96  
*RFM VI* 38, 59  
 ritual, 21, 31, 55  
   and installation, 96  
   as gesture-  
     language, 32, 55  
 Rothhaupt Josef, 26  
*RPP I* 1017, 50, 88  
*RPP I* 175, 87  
*RPP II* 687, 74  
 rule-following, 12, 57, 94  
   and context, 126  
   and creativity, 118  
   and learning circle, 67  
   and normativity, 64  
   and patterns, 71  
   individual/social, 58–60
- Ryle Gilbert, 76, 84, 107, 116
- scene, 28, 89, 92, 162  
 Schubert Franz, 33  
 Schwitters Kurt, 40, 143  
 seeing  
   as intellectual, 26  
   as being struck, 78  
   concepts of, 75  
   ways of, 147  
 seeing connections, 25, 78, 148  
 Shelter project, 13, 99  
 similarities, 12, 77  
*Slab!*, 89  
 Snowdon Paul, 106, 113  
 social practice, 62, 77  
 Spengler Oswald, 33, 55  
 Spinoza Baruch, 23  
 Stanley & Williamson, 106  
 Stanley Jason, 109  
 Steiner George, 44, 70  
 sub specie aeternitatis, 23  
 surveyability, 81
- Testimonial, 178  
 therapy, 54, 83, 125  
   and elucidation, 133  
   and philosophy, 54  
   as process, 128  
*TLP*, 23  
*TLP*, 105, 123  
 transformation, 22, 38, 41, 98, 139  
 transparency, 25, 29  
   Cartesian, 75  
   in colour, 122  
 truth as process, 28, 169  
*TS 220*, 83–84  
 Type, 36
- Übersicht, 25, 26, 30, 54  
 Übersichtliche Darstellung, 9, 22, 24–29
- and detached knowledge, 121  
 and package, 171  
 and philosophy, 123  
 and vision, 105  
 as tool, 132  
 colour-octahedron, 81–85  
 Übersichtlichkeit, 81  
 uncertainty, 22, 51, 75, 91, 138, 139, 146  
 understanding, 25  
   as coming to  
     understand, 51  
   as continuous understanding, 51  
   as shared, 68  
 unification of extremes, 127  
 Urbild, 34, 69  
   and prototype, 79  
 Urpflanze, 35  
 Urphänomenon, 28
- values, 14, 147  
 vision, 43, 105, 139, 145
- Wagner Richard, 55, 145  
 Weltanschauung, 24, 39  
 Weltbild, 24  
 Wijdeveld Paul, 23  
 Williams Meredith, 58, 60, 75, 77, 98, 126  
 Williamson Timothy, 109  
 wonder, 22, 53, 105, 119, 146, 169  
 wonder as attitude, 120
- Z 455,456*, 23  
*Z 455,456*, 124  
*Z 567*, 79  
*Z 568*, 80  
 Zusammenstellung, 26, 82

Published on the occasion of the exhibition of installation *Do not Erase . . . wait for Meaning*, running from 21|6 to 13|7 2008 at *Arti et Amicitiae*, Rokin 112, Amsterdam (NL) and the performance *Living Picture* together with the PhD defence on 12|11 2008 in the Aula of the University of Amsterdam (UvA), oude Lutherse kerk, Spui 411, Amsterdam (NL).

Designed by Tine Wilde, because it turned out to be one of the consequences of the way in which philosophy and the art of installation were intermingled in this project. Typeset using LaTeX and composed in Garamond.

English editing Darrin Hindsill.

Printing drukkerij Mart.Spruijt bv, Amsterdam.

Binding Boekbinderij Patist B.V., Bilthoven.

Printed in the Netherlands.

Edition 350 copies.

Publisher Wilde Oceans,  
PO box 16618,  
1001 RC Amsterdam (NL).

ISBN 978-90-804240-3-6

Nur 646, 730

Distributed by Idea Books, Amsterdam.  
[www.idealbooks.nl](http://www.idealbooks.nl)

Photographic acknowledgements *Installations Wiederholte Spiegelungen* and *Do not Erase. . .* Thomas Lenden, Amsterdam. *Performative De Taal & haar Broekje* Coen André, Hengelo. The small pictures at the beginning of each chapter correspond with the ones in the booklet/folder that goes with the book.

This *InstallationPackage* was realised with the support of the Amsterdam Fund for the Arts (AFK), *Arti et Amicitiae*, Board of Governors (UvA), Department of Philosophy (UvA), drukkerij Mart.Spruijt bv, Faculty of Humanities (UvA), Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (UvA), Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO), Tijlfonds (PBC), University Library Amsterdam (UB).

Copyright 2008 Tine Wilde,  
c/o Pictoright, Amsterdam.  
All rights reserved.

[www.tinewilde.com](http://www.tinewilde.com)

Nederlandse Samenvatting *Remodel[ing] Reality* bestaat uit een onderzoek naar Wittgenstein's notie van *übersichtliche Darstellung* en het fenomeen installatie in de beeldende kunst. In zeker opzicht geven beiden een helder overzicht op een bepaald gedeelte van onze complexe wereld, maar de aard van dat overzicht verschilt. Alhoewel ze allebei kennis genereren, levert de filosofie met Wittgenstein's notie een overzicht van hoe bepaalde dingen voor ons staan, terwijl de installatie een onverwachte, verrassende invalshoek laat zien. Het vanzelfsprekende dat we geneigd zijn te vergeten en de ambiguïteit van alledag staan in een dynamische relatie ten opzichte van elkaar. In deze 'reflexieve dynamiek' hermodelleren we voortdurend onze werkelijkheid. Hulpmiddelen die ons daarbij ten dienste staan zijn onze creativiteit en onze verbeeldingskracht. In de keuzen en oplossingen laten we zien welke aspecten van de werkelijkheid we belangrijk vinden en hoe we deze waarden communiceren.








Performative De Taal en haar Broekje  
(Language and her Tightly-whities) 5|11 2006





Do you?

You don't think I give it all away beforehand  
do you?








# Wiederholte Spiegelungen

Repeated Reflections





# REPACKAGING

A PACKAGE TOUR COVERING A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON  
THE ART OF INSTALLATION

INCLUDING

- PACKAGE LIST
- 
- CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY
- 
- THE RIGHT TO RE-BUILD
- 
- THE RIGHT TO RE-SELL





A new perspective on the Art of Installation



UIT





ISBN 978-90-804240-3-6



9 789080 424036 >