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Reply to Goodman

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Timothy Williamson
Timothy Williamson*
Affiliation:
Wykeham Professor of Logic, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
*
Email: timothy.williamson@philosophy.ox.ac.uk
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Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 46 , Issue 4-5: Special Issue: Williamson on Modality , August 2016 , pp. 640 - 653
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2016

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References

Carnap, Rudolf. 1947. Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Fritz, Peter, and Goodman, Jeremy. Forthcoming. “Counting Incompossibles.” Mind.Google Scholar
Goodman, Jeremy. 2016. “Williamson on Necessitism.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46(4–5): 614–640.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stalnaker, Robert. 2012. Mere Possibilities: Metaphysical Foundations of Modal Semantics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Williamson, Timothy. 2013. Modal Logic as Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199552078.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williamson, Timothy. 2016a. “Modal Science.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46(4–5): 453–492.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williamson, Timothy. 2016b. “Model-building in Philosophy.” In Philosophy's Future: The Problem of Philosophical Progress, edited by Blackford, Russell and Broderick, Damien. Oxford: Wiley.Google Scholar