Abstract
In their paper “Vagueness, Ignorance, and Margins for Error” Kenton Machina and Harry Deutsch criticize the epistemic theory of vagueness. This paper answers their objections. The main issues discussed are: the relation between meaning and use; the principle of bivalence; the ontology of vaguely specified classes; the proper form of margin for error principles; iterations of epistemic operators and semantic compositionality; the relation or lack of it between quantum mechanics and theories of vagueness.
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Williamson, T. Reply to Machina and Deutsch on vagueness, ignorance, and margins for error. Acta Analytica 17, 47–61 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-002-1003-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-002-1003-7