Abstract
J.J.C. Smart famously complained that rule utilitarianism is incoherent, and that rule utilitarians are guilty of “rule worship”. Much has been said about whether Smart’s complaint is justified, but I will assume for the sake of argument that Smart was on to something. Instead, I have three other goals. First, I want to show that Smart’s complaint is a specific instance of a more general objection to a moral theory—what I will call the Incoherence Objection. Second, I want to illustrate how the Incoherence Objection can apply both to consequentialist and, surprisingly, some nonconsequentialist theories. Finally, I want to demonstrate at least one way nonconsequentialist theories that make use of rules, principles, and the like can dodge the Incoherence Objection.
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Notes
Of course, there are other ways to specify rule utilitarianism. For present purposes, I don’t think too much hangs on exactly how we spell it out. I should, however, explicitly exclude those versions of rule utilitarianism according to which the value of rules does not derive merely from the value of the utility of general compliance with them; see (Hooker 2000, 99–102). And it also matters that I am considering RU to be a criterion of right action, and not merely a decision procedure.
Whether Scanlon’s actual view is vulnerable to the Incoherence Objection would require the sort of exegesis I am no position to undertake here. Again, I discuss contractualism only to illustrate my main contention, not to rebut any particular view.
References
Hooker, B. (2000). Ideal Code, Real World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lyons, D. (1965). The Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Millgram, E. (1997). Practical Induction. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Millgram, E. (2004). Does the Categorical Imperative Give Rise to a Contradiction of the Will? The Philosophical Review, 112, 525–560.
Smart, J. J. C. (1956). Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism. Philosophical Quarterly, 6, 344–354.
Acknowledgements
I thank Thad Metz, Dale Miller, and the audience at a meeting of The International Society for Utilitarian Studies for their help and suggestions.
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Wiland, E. The Incoherence Objection in Moral Theory. Acta Anal 25, 279–284 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-010-0098-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-010-0098-5