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Conceptual Change in Biology pp 459–482Cite as

Evo-devo as a Trading Zone

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Part of the book series: Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science ((BSPS,volume 307))

Abstract

Evo-Devo exhibits a plurality of scientific “cultures” of practice and theory. When do these cultures act—individually or collectively—in ways that actually move research forward, empirically, theoretically, and ethically? When do they become imperialistic, in the sense of excluding and subordinating other cultures? This chapter identifies six cultures—three styles (mathematical modeling, mechanism, and history) and three paradigms (adaptationism, structuralism, and cladism). The key assumptions standing behind, under, and within each of these cultures are explored. Characterizing the internal structure of each is necessary for understanding how they collaborate or compete, and how they are fragmented or integrated, in the rich interdisciplinary trading zone (Galison 1997) of Evo-Devo. Evo-Devo is an important example of how science can progress through a radical plurality of perspectives and cultures.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In a forthcoming book, I develop a critical assumption archaeology (my term, following Michel Foucault 1966, 1969; Ian Hacking 2002; Michael Friedman 1999), which explores methods for identifying different types of assumptions (e.g., ontological, theoretical). One aim of this philosophical methodology is to investigate opportunities for collaboration of theories that make different (perhaps even conflicting) assumptions. The dialogue and self-reflexivity through which such collaboration can happen—and in which the philosopher can play a significant role—occurs in what is called an integration platform (Winther under contract).

  2. 2.

    The first terms are Kwa’s. When present, second terms are Crombie’s and third terms are Hacking’s.

  3. 3.

    For a discussion of Richard Levins and Richard Lewontin’s analyses of objectifying model assumptions, see Winther 2006c.

  4. 4.

    Kauffman (1993) argues that there are 256 cell types, or 28. But consider B cells of the mammalian immune system. Each human being literally makes millions of new sorts of B cells every day, each with a distinct external protein chain signature. Should these be considered different cell types?

  5. 5.

    See Valadez Blanco (2011) and Winther (2011) for recent discussions.

  6. 6.

    For recent work on reduction in the biological sciences, see Wimsatt (2007), Brigandt and Love (2008), and Winther (2009a).

  7. 7.

    A more complete archaeology of the history style would require further investigation of the way history, and cladism in particular, became incorporated into Evo-devo. This would include looking at ways in which initially open and exploratory theory became stabilized into standardized computer platforms and molecular biotechnology that could produce phylogenies at industrial scales.

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Acknowledgments

Claus Emmeche, Alan Love, Karl Niklas, and David Wake kindly provided feedback on earlier versions of this chapter.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Philosophy Department, University of California, Santa Cruz, CA, USA

    Rasmus Grønfeldt Winther

  2. Biocomplexity, Niels Bohr Institute, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark

    Rasmus Grønfeldt Winther

  3. Center for the Philosophy of Nature and Science Studies, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark

    Rasmus Grønfeldt Winther

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  1. Rasmus Grønfeldt Winther
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Correspondence to Rasmus Grønfeldt Winther .

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA

    Alan C. Love

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Winther, R.G. (2015). Evo-devo as a Trading Zone. In: Love, A. (eds) Conceptual Change in Biology. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, vol 307. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-9412-1_21

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