“A temporary oversimplification”: Mayr, Simpson, Dobzhansky, and the origins of the typology/population dichotomy (part 2 of 2)

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Highlights

  • The origins of the typology/population dichotomy are traced.

  • This dichotomy did not originate with Ernst Mayr, as is commonly thought.

  • Early type/population distinctions due to Simpson and Dobzhansky are explicated.

  • It is argued that Mayr confounded these individually meaningful distinctions.

  • The resulting account is situated in the broader Modern Synthesis historiography.

Abstract

The dichotomy between ‘typological thinking’ and ‘population thinking’ features in a range of debates in contemporary and historical biology. The origins of this dichotomy are often traced to Ernst Mayr, who is said to have coined it in the 1950s as a rhetorical device that could be used to shield the Modern Synthesis from attacks by the opponents of population biology. In this two-part essay, I argue that the origins of the typology/population dichotomy are considerably more complicated and more interesting than is commonly thought. In the first part, I argued that Mayr's dichotomy was based on two distinct type/population contrasts that had been articulated much earlier by George Gaylord Simpson and Theodosius Dobzhansky. Their distinctions made eminent sense in their own, isolated contexts. In this second part, I will show how Mayr conflated these type/population distinctions and blended in some of his own, unrelated concerns with ‘types’ of a rather different sort. Although Mayr told his early critics that he was merely making “a temporary oversimplification,” he ended up burdening the history and philosophy of biology with a troubled dichotomy.

Section snippets

Mayr's mixed tape

In part one of this two-part article, we have seen that Simpson and Dobzhansky each developed their own typology/population distinction in relative isolation from the other. This is not to say that they independently came up with the term ‘typology,’ but rather that the arguments they formulated under this banner were of their own making.1 Until the 1960s, Simpson and Dobzhansky indeed never cited each other when

The Coon controversy

In spite of the considerable divergence between Mayr, Simpson and Dobzhansky over the interpretation of the typology/population dichotomy, none of them ever used a public forum to draw attention to this fact. It may indeed seem surprising that Simpson and Dobzhansky adopted Mayr's term ‘typology’ without making clear that they were each using this term in a different (and much more disciplined) sense. Didn't they have a good reason to distance themselves from Mayr's ever more liberal, ever less

Conclusion

It is time to take stock. We have seen that the emergence of the typology/population dichotomy was a complex affair. From the late 1930s onwards, several type/population distinctions were being drawn in different literatures, with different meanings. These early, substantive distinctions were not due to Mayr, but were articulated by Dobzhansky and Simpson. Mayr, the likely source of the later typology/population terminology, was primarily responsible for misrepresenting the substantive

Acknowledgments

This essay is based on chapters 3 and 4 of my PhD thesis (Witteveen, 2013). My doctoral research was generously funded by scholarships from Trinity College, Cambridge and the Prins Bernhard Foundation. I have profited a lot from extensive discussion of the material in those thesis chapters and in this essay. I would like to thank Joe Cain, Hasok Chang, David Depew, Tarquin Holmes, Andrew Inkpen, John Jackson, Tim Lewens, Alan Love, Staffan Müller-Wille, Laura Nuño de la Rosa, William Provine,

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      Citation Excerpt :

      ‘Typological thinking’ (also conflated by Mayr with the broader ‘essentialism’), is the assumption that species are defined by an underlying and static ‘type’ or ‘essence’, and was claimed by Mayr to characterise both pre-Darwinian and anti-Darwinian thought (including the wild type concept employed by classical geneticists). ‘Population thinking’, the belief that species are nothing but interbreeding populations in a state of constant flux, is attributed by Mayr to Darwin, the revolutionary hero of this narrative, but the revolution is presented as incomplete and endangered until its victory is secured by the Modern Synthesis (Witteveen, 2015; 2016). Mayr's dichotomy proved rhetorically useful but came under fire from historians of science (example quote: “This polemic usage does violence to the historical record and confuses contemporary debates rather than clarifies them” [Farber, 1978]).

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