Searle,Burge and IntentionalContent MaciejWitek, Zielona G6ra, Poland 1. Searleon IntentionalContent ln his lntentionalrty Searle(1983)advocatesa versionof an internalism aboutmentalcontentwhich embracestwo claims.Firstly,the Intentionalcontentof a given mental stateis determinedindependently of any propertiesof the agent'sphysicaland socialenvironment, and, secondly,it sufficesto determinethe objectof the state.Searleargues that internalism, when properlyelaborated,can accommodate some "Twin Earth" examplesthat are traditionally treatedas refutingthe doctrinein question.Moreover,this viewis capableof accounting for the particularity of mental and linguisticreference.Contraryto externalism,Searle pointsout,singularthoughtsachievethey objectssolelyby meansof theirIntentional, internalsatisfaction conditions. Searlefocuseson visualperception, whichis commonly regardedas paradigmcase of singularmentalact. Some philosophers,like Tyler Burge (1977) and Kent Bach (1987),claimthatthe particularity of perceptionmeansthat it is an irreducibly de re acf.What they have in mindis the idea that the contentof a perception-based thoughtcontainsa noncon@ptual, contextualelement,namelya phenomenallycharacterised percept.The perceptdesignates its object by means of the agent's standingin an appropriatecausal relationto the object.Therefore,Bach concludes,the Intentionalcontentof a perception-based thoughtdeterminesthe intendedobjectonly in a relevant externalcontext. Searle'sdefenceof his internalistaccountof perception restson two ideas.The first one is that perceptualstates are causallyself-referential, which meansthat they figure in theirown conditionsof satisfaction and are describedas being causedby their objects.Accordingto the second ideathe Intentional contentof a givenstatedeterminesits satisfactionconditions contextually. But contrary to externalists, the relevantcontext is comprisedsolely of internalitems,such as the agent'sother Intentional states (the Network)and its nonintentional, mentalabilities(the Background). In short,the Intentionalcontentof a given perceptual act determines its satisfactionconditions relatively to the agent'sNetworkand Background. Let'sconsider,followingSearle,the truthconditionsof a sentence"d sees the F'. In orderto reflectthe intentional characterof perceptionthe sentence should be paraphrasedas "d sees that the F is in front of d'. This statementarticulatesthe Intentionalpropositional content of ds visual experience.The content determinesthe conditionsunder which the experienceis satisfied.The Intentional contentof ds visualexperienceis the proposition that the F is in frontof d. The conditionsnecessaryto satisfythisare: (1) The F is in front of d and the fact that the F is in frontof d causesthis visualexperience. The abovestatementidentifiesthe Intentional objectof ds perception by descriptive and indexicalmeans.Butwhat is indicatedin this case is ds own inner visualexperience. The description,in turn, is causal,but the causationis definedfromds internalpointof view. Statemenl(1) says nothing about the relationof the Intentional contentof ds oresentact to ds Networkand Background.This dependenceis crucialfor the case of reidentification. The point is that d does not merelysee something(or someone)in particular;he also sees whatit is (or whohe or she is).To allowfor this,Searleclaims,(1) is to be spelledout as follows: (2) The objectwith identicalF-likefeaturesis befored and its presenceand featurescausethis visualexperienceand it is identicalto the object whose presenceand featurescausedds previousvisual experiences of the objectd regardsas the F, which in turn causedds presentmemoriesof these experiences. The conditionsso specifiedstate, in my view, that two distinct methods of individuationdeterminethe same object.FollowingJaakkoHintikka(1975)we can call the first method perceptualand the second physical.The individuationin question is the so-called cross-world identification, since it establishesthe identity between objectsoccurringin differentpossiblecoursesof events. The frame of referencefor the first methodof individuation is the agent's perceptualspace (more accurately,all possibleworldscompatible withwhatthe agentsees).As a result, objects so individuated are represented by descriptionsreferringto the agent's point of view. The frame of referencefor the physicalmethodconsistsof possible worlds representingwhat the agent remembersand believes.Correspondingto these two methods of individuationHintikkaproposestwo distinctexistentialquantifiers: "J' for speakingabout objects individuatedperceptuallyand "f" for speakingabout objectsindividuated physically.Usingthis notationI proposeto representthe formalstructureof (2) as follows: (3) (-*) (1Y)(x = y) Statement(3) allowsfor two facts.First,d seessomething in particular.Second,d sees what this particularobjectis. In other words, the perceptualand physical methods individuate one and the sameobject.Accordingto Searle's version of internalismthese two methods ooerate on internally possibleworlds. characterised 2. The Dispute BetweenSearleand Burge ln his "Vision and IntentionalContent" Tyler Burge concedesthat statement(1) sets the conditionsrequired for ds visualexperienceto be satisfied.He also accepts the idea that these conditionsare determinedby the Intentional contentof ds perception.What he qualifiesis Searle'sclaimthat suchdetermination deDendsexclusivelv on ds internalfactors. For Burge "a theoryof Intentionalcontentis not just a theory of satisfactionconditions",but also "a theory of mentalstates- mentalabilitiesand cognitivepointof view" (1991,203). From this point of view what makes an elementof the satisfactionconditionsinternalis the fact that it is subjectto the agent'sreflectionand its conceptualisedexperience.lf this is the case,Searle'sinternalism boils down to the claim that to be able to oerceive particularobjectsan agenthas to be ableto experienceor be awareof its own experiences. But there is a mismatch betweenthis claimand Searle'snaiverealism,namelythe 413 Searle, Burge and lntenlional Content - Maciej Witek doctrinethat physicalobjects are direct objects of our perception. Burgeconcludesthat statement(1) ascribesto the agentmorereflectionand conceptualresourcesthan it really has. ThereforeSearle should either abandonhis accountof Intentional contentor his directrealism. ln his responseSearlestatesthat Burge'sobjectionis basedon two misunderstandings. First,Burgeneglectsthe idea that the Intentionalcontentof a given state determines its satisfactionconditionsrelativeto the agent's Networkand Background. Second,Searlerejectsthe idea that an adequateaccountof the particularity of perception presupposes the agent'sepistemicaccessto its experiences. In short,what determinesthe satisfactionconditionsof a givenperceptionis the Intentional contentsfnct/y speaking- namelythat the F is in front of d - incorporated in the contextembracingthe agent'srelevantexperience and its Networkand Background.In spite of the agent's ignoranceof the elementsof the context,they are internal to it. As Searle puts it, "an adequatespecificationof consciousIntentionalcontentscan use conceotsthat are nol availableto the agent"(1991, 230) and "noteverything which is an internalmental preconditionfor determining the conditions of satisfaction of an Intentional stateis itself partof a contentof thatvery Intentional state"(233). In short,to perceivesomethingin particularthe agent has to have a relevantexperiencethat figures in its satisfaction conditions.But it is not requiredthat the agent is awareof thisexperience. 3. The GeneralLine BehindSearle's Responses Let me startwith an observation that thereare at leasttwo possiblecriteria of drawing a distinctionbetween the internaland the external.The first one is ontic: the borderlinebetweenthe internaland the rest is simplyour skin.In this senseall elementsdetermining the objectof a perceptual act are, accordingto Searle'saccount,internal. The second criterionis eoistemic.Vr'hatis internalare elementsaccessible to a reflection. The pointis that Burge appealsto the secondcriterion,whereasSearleuses the flrstone. The epistemiccriterionis controversial. lt leadseitherto the conclusion that some of our experiencesare not inner or - given direct realism - that physical objects are internal.lt is notsurprisingSearledoesnot use it. Nevertheless my conclusionin this paragraphconcerns epistemological viewspresupposed by Searle'saccountof lntentional content.In my view,there is a uniformstrategy behindhis responsesto the objectionposedby Burgeand the scepticismabout perceptualknowledge.The strategy resembles,at least in one crucialrespect,the externalist approachto the analysisof knowledge.Let me say a word aboutthe scepticalobjectionin question. The objectionstartswith a statementthat the necessary conditionfor the agent'sseeingthat p is the fact that p causesthe agent'srelevantvisualexperience.In short: (4) d sees that p -+ the fact that p causesds relevant visualexoerience. Next,the scepticclaimsthat it is impossiblefor d to know whetherthe impliedpropositionis true. The point is that such knowledgewould have to be based on further perceptions,the reliabilityof which would have to be examinedby furtherperceptions, and so on. Therefore,the 414 scepticconclude,since there is no neutralpoint of view, thatperceptualknowledgeis impossible. Respondingto the objectionSearlepointsout that one can have perceptualknowledge- in short,one can see that p - without necessarilyknowing that the very conditionsfor perceptualknowledgeare satisfied.That means that Searle rejects an epistemic principlethe sceptictacitlyassumes: (5) SaF-+ K6SaP where "Sdp"standsfor the propositionthat d sees that p and "K" is an epistemicoperatorfor knowledge.The formula (5) is a version of the so-calledKK-thesisfor perceptualknowtedge.The rejection of the thesis in questionis motivatedby some considerations concerning the natureof knowledgeand justification that supportthe externalist accountof theseepistemicconcepts. The proposition that d knowsthat d sees that p implies, first,that d knowsthe elementsfiguringin the satisfaction conditionsof his visualexperienceand,second,that these conditionsare satisfied.In his disputewith Burge,Searle rejectsthe first implication, whereasin his responseto the scepticalobjectionhe abandonsthe second.In order to justifythesestepshe couldappealto the reliabilist account of justification. Independently of whetherSearle'sepistemology is true or not, it has someproblematic implications. Nevertheless, it doesprovidea sufficientbasisfor rejectingscepticism as well as Burge'sobjection.On the other hand,it seemsto posea threatto the doctrineof privilegedself-knowledge. 4. lnternalismand Self-Knowledge Accordingto the doctrineof privilegedself-knowledge we can have non-empirical knowledgeof our currentthought contents.In other words, we are able to justify our first person content attributions yla introspection.Some philosophers (Boghossian1997)arguethat the doctrineis incompatiblewith contentexternalism.Accordingto the latterviewthe contentsof our thoughtsdependnot onlyon our internal properties,but also on propertiesof our environment.lf these two doctrineswere compatible, Boghossianargues,we would be in a positionto know certain external facts just by simple reflection,which is absurd. Others (Bernecker2000) attempt to reconcile externalismwith the doctrine of privileged access. Independentlyof whether they succeed or not, it is commonlyagreed that it is externalism,not internalism, that posesa genuineor allegedthreadto the doctrineof self-knowledge. It turnsout. however.that Searle'sversionof internalism aboutcontentcan be reconciledwith the doctrineof selfknowledgeonlywith difficulty.Statement(2) listselements determining the particularsatisfaction conditionsof a given perceptualact. These elements,Searle argues,do not have to be availableto the agent by reflection.What determinesthe contentof this act. therefore.are factors thatthe agentis usuallyignorantof. Let me consideronce againthe caseof d seeingthe F. One can say that what d knows by reflectionis the fntentionalcontent sfflbtly speaking, namely the proposition that the F is in front of d. Does it sufficeto maintainthe thesisaboutprivilegedaccess?| am not sure. In Searle's view,what determinesa particularcontentof a givenstate is the agent's Network and the state itself. Therefore,in orderto maintainthe thesisabout privilegedaccess,one i\ Searle, Burge and IntentionalContent- Maciei Witek couldacknowledge thatalthoughcontent-determining facts are not subjectto immediateintrospection, they can be known by more thorough reflection. Such a claim, nevertheless,is incompatiblewith the general line of Searle'sdefenceof his account against the objections raisedby Burgeand the sceptic. One solution to the problem is simply to maintain Searle'sinternalism and simultaneously rejectthe doctrine of privilegedself-knowledge. But such a step puts some limits on Searle'sprincipleof expressibility, namely the claimthat whatevercan be thoughtcan be said. Furthermore,it blursSearle'sdistinctionbetweenthird-oerson and first-person accounts,namelythe differencebetweenthe answersto the questions"Under what conditionsdoes [Jones]refer to Sally,whetherhe knows it or not?,,ano "Underwhat conditionsdoes he take himsetfto be seeing thatSallyis in frontof him?"(Searte1983,64). Literature Bach, Kent 1987 Thought and Reference, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bernecker,Sven 2000 'Knowing the World by Knowing One,s Mind",Synfhese123,1-34. Boghossian,PaulA. 1997"Whatthe extemalistcan know a priori", Proceedingsof the Aristoteliansociety97, 161-175. Burge,Tyler 1977 "Belief de re", Joumal of phitosophy74, 3gg362. Burge,Tyler 199'l 'Vision and IntentionalContenf, in: Emest Leporeand RobertVan Guick (eds.),John SearleAnd His Citics, Oxford:BasilBlackwell,195-213. Hintikka,Jaakko 1975 "On the Logic of perception",in: Jaakko Hintikka,Models for Modalities:Se/ecfedEssays, Dordrecht:The KluwerAcademicPublishers, 151-183. Searle,John R. 1983 lntentionality.An Essayin the philosophyof press. Mnd, Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Searle,JohnR. 1991"Response:Referenceand Intentionalitv', in: ErnestLeporeand RobertVan Guick(eds.),Jof,n SeatleA;d His Cnircs,Oxford:BasilBlackwell, 227-241. 415