UTOPIA AND EDUCATION

STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, THEORY OF EDUCATION, AND PEDAGOGY OF ASYLUM

RAFAŁ WŁODARCZYK

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To Monika

So appreciate your vigor in the days of your youth, before
those days of sorrow come and those years arrive of
which you will say, "I have no pleasure in them";
before sun and light and moon and stars grow dark,
and the clouds come back again after the rain:
When the guards of the house become shaky,
And the men of valor are bent,
And the maids that grind, grown few, are idle,
And the ladies that peer through the windows grow dim,
And the doors to the street are shut –
With the noise of the hand mill growing fainter,
And the song of the bird growing feebler,
And all the strains of music dying down;
When one is afraid of heights
And there is terror on the road. –
For the almond tree may blossom,
The grasshopper be burdened,
And the caper bush may bud again;
But man sets out for his eternal abode,
With mourners all around in the street. –
Before the silver cord snaps
And the golden bowl crashes,
The jar is shattered at the spring,
And the jug is smashed at the cistern.
And the dust returns to the ground
As it was,
And the life's breath returns to God
Who bestowed it

Ecclesiastes 12: 1–7

The world here is havel havelim – 'utter futility',
it is a null, which only acquires value,
when you add a digit

Rabi Jisrael Salanter

The Sages said: The World-to-Come (Olam ha-Ba) is not like this
world. In this world there is suffering involved in picking grapes
and in pressing them. By contrast, in the World-to-Come one
will bring one grape in a wagon or on a boat and set it down in
a corner of his house and supply from it enough to fill about the
amount of a large jug, and with its wood one will kindle a fire
under a cooked dish. And every grape you have will produce no
less than thirty full jugs of wine...

Ketubot 111b

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UTOPIA AND EDUCATION. AN INTRODUCTION

The scale of reason after all is not quite impartial, and one of its arms, bearing the inscription, "Hope of the Future", has a constructive advantage, causing even those light reasons which fall into its scale to outweigh the speculations of greater weight on the other side. This is the only inaccuracy which I cannot easily remove, and which, in fact, I never want to remove

Immanuel Kant, *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*

*Do not neglect the echo.
You live by echoes*

Edmond Jabès, *The Book of Questions*

The question of utopia extends well beyond the hard-to-define literary genre that owes its name to the inventiveness of Thomas More. It reaches into the vast expanses of imagination and social practice which, according to Ruth Levitas, can be traced back to a desire for a different and better way of being or, as Frederic Jameson claims, to a utopian impulse[1].

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[1] See R. Levitas, *The Concept of Utopia*, Oxford 2011, pp. 209–211; R. Levitas, *Utopia as Method. The Imaginary Reconstruction of Society*, London 2013, pp. 3–7; F. Jameson, *Archaeologies of the Future. The Desire Called Utopia and Other Science Fictions*, London – New York 2005, pp. 1–5.

It is therefore understandable and justified, according to Lyman Tower Sargent, to see these vast spaces in the perspective of utopianism[2]. In this way the connection between utopia and education becomes palpable, though not yet clear. Thus, if we continue along this path, we can venture a claim that its mode of functioning determines that our future is not merely a matter of chance. In other words, as a result of intergenerational transmission, according to Bronisław Baczko or Leszek Koczanowicz, we inherit not only the world defined by the work of passing generations, but also the ideas of its possible transformations rooted within, including specific fears, countless or innumerable worries, dreams worth striving for and anticipations of sufficiently perfect futures, in which we learn to focus our expectations and desires[3]. Of course, the system outlined here is not permanent. As the society and its everyday worlds are remodeled, our horizons of expectations are transformed and reconstructed. Moreover, it is not only the visions of distress that overwhelm us and of model states of the future that change, whether in detail or in complexity, the projections of better-ordered societies and interpersonal relations, the images of mature humanity and proper axiological orientations, but also the scope and content of our concepts, the sheer range and logic of the interrelationship between the complex images that express our tastes and aspirations, the strength and orientation of our desires, or the spatial or temporal distance that separates the existing, imperfect reality from the desired, fulfilled one. In short, by studying utopias and how they are perceived, we can, as Krishan Kumar, Levitas, Jameson and Baczko, among others, have argued, learn a great deal about the identity, aspirations and sensibilities of the society in the period from which they originate, or in which they gain recognition or condemnation[4]. For the philosophy and theory of education, they seem

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[2] L. T. Sargent, "The Three Faces of Utopianism Revisited", *Utopian Studies* 1994, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 3–5.

[3] See B. Baczko, *Utopian Lights. The Evolution of the Idea of Social Progress*, New York 1989, pp. ix–xi, 3–6; L. Koczanowicz, *Politics of Dialogue. Non-consensual Democracy and Critical Community*, Edinburgh 2015, pp. 6–41; L. Koczanowicz, *Anxiety and Lucidity. Reflections on Culture in Times of Unrest*, London – New York 2020, pp. 16–30.

[4] See K. Kumar, *Utopianism*, Minneapolis 1991, pp. vii, 27–32, 86–107; K. Kumar, "The Ends of Utopia", *New Literary History* 2010, Vol. 41, No. 3, pp. 555–561; R. Levitas, *Utopia as Method*, op. cit., pp. xiv, 65–84; F. Jameson, *Archaeologies of the Future*, op. cit., pp. 10–21; B. Baczko, *Utopian Lights*, op. cit., pp. 5–6.

to be of particular importance because, among other things, they provide a reference point for society's attribution of specific content, forms, tasks, powers and limitations to educational practice. At the same time, not without significance are the tensions and discrepancies between the diverse ideas of a sufficiently perfect social order, the possible goal of aspirations that are maintained and expressed by particular groups of citizens, which are preferred by institutions and other socio-political agencies, and the expectations of teachers, educators and pedagogues as to the future shape of educational practice. However, the contents of this book, the subjects of research undertaken in it and the directions of considerations, see the relationship of utopia and education as more complex, more extensive, occurring at different levels of both phenomena, often less obvious and direct than in the outline cited here.

It is worth pointing out in the context of contemporary controversies around utopia that the approach signaled above differs from the oft-repeated approaches, which, viewed through the prism of the unspeakable atrocities of the twentieth century, arouse opposition, criticism or condemnation not only among philosophers and researchers, as a seductive kind of thought that can inspire social practice, draw contours of fulfillment, and lead into the vestibule of hell. A brief characterization of the phenomenon of utopia, as sketched by Judith Shklar in relation to the Western tradition of political thought and literary practice beginning, to put it simply, with Plato's dialogue *Politeia*, seems to be well suited to such an approach, according to which utopia is

> an expression of the craftsman's desire for perfection and permanence. That is why utopia, the moralist's artifact, is of necessity a changeless harmonious whole, in which a shared recognition of truth unites all the citizens. Truth is single and only error is multiple. In utopia, there cannot, by definition, be any room for eccentricity. It is also profoundly radical, as Plato was [...][5].

The list of extreme dangers connected with the development of utopian thought, especially in the perspective of its critics, leads to a leap into a perfect world composed mostly of the effects of advanced

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[5] J. Shklar, "The Political Theory of Utopia: From Melancholy to Nostalgia", [in:] *Utopia and Utopian Thought*, ed. F. E. Manuel, Boston 1966, p. 105.

rationalization, and at the same time unchangeable, complete, finished. These dangers are exemplified by the destructive effects of the rule and expansion of Soviet communism or national socialism, and go beyond the dangers of authoritarian and totalitarian excesses to include the crimes of colonialism, genocide, ethnic cleansing policies, environmental devastation, etc. However, the critics of utopian social engineering, such as Karl R. Popper, Jacob Talmon, Ralf Dahrendorf or Emil Cioran, who are often quoted in this context, are convinced of the unshakable connection between this kind of crystallized hope and its tragic consequences in the practice, escalation and multiplication of violence[6]. Such concerns are understandable. Nevertheless, from the point of view of contemporary utopian studies, the role of utopia in social life is not so clear-cut and one-dimensional, which of course depends largely on theoretical determinations. For its moderate apologists, the point is not only that the desire for a better life is a central aspect of human experience and a ground for social criticism and change, which of course can be used against individuals, groups, selected social segments, or entire populations through manipulation in the broadest sense of the term, but it is also about the capacity for progressive adaptation to an ever-changing environment and, perhaps above all, the exclusion from social life, from what directly and indirectly destroys

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[6] See K. R. Popper, "Utopia and Violence", [in:] K. R. Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations. The Growth of Scientific Knowledge*, London – New York 2002, pp. 477–488; J. L. Talmon, *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy*, London 1952, pp. 1–13, 249–255; R. Dahrendorf, "Out of Utopia. Toward a Reorientation of Sociological Analysis", *The American Journal of Sociology* 1958, Vol. 64, No. 2, pp. 115–127; E. Cioran, *History and Utopia*, Chicago 1998, pp. 80–98. See also B. Goodwin, "Utopia and Political Theory", [in:] B. Goodwin, K. Taylor, *The Politic of Utopia. A Study in Theory and Practice*, London 1982, pp. 92–115; L. T. Sargent, "In Defense of Utopia", *Diogenes* 2006, Vol. 53, No. 1, pp. 11–14; L. T. Sargent, *Utopianism. Very Short Introduction*, New York 2010, pp. 102-109. In fact, as scholars have recognized, utopianism is not usually condemned entirely from liberal democratic positions; for example, Popper contrasts utopian engineering with partial engineering (see K. Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, Princeton – Oxford 2013, pp. 147–157; B. Goodwin, *Utopia and Political Theory*, op. cit., pp. 92–94). In the 1920s, in reaction to the revolution in Russia, also for Russian liberals, the criticism of utopia was an important part of their intellectual activity, a good example being Sergei Hessen's book *Państwo prawa i socjalizm*, whose prologue has a significant title "Upadek utopizmu" i.e. 'the fall of utopianism' (see S. Hessen, *Państwo prawa i socjalizm*, Warszawa 2003, pp. 3–20). It is worth noting that Hessen also recognizes an exception, distinguishing between militant utopianism and a pacifist utopianism that despises violence (ibidem, p. 4).

it: for it is not said a priori that the cure is worse than the poison itself. This horizon of expectations seems clearly drawn in Sargent's belief that

> Most utopias aim to improve the human lot not by repression but by enhancement, and as long as we do not aim for perfection or eliminate the possibility of change, such utopias can stand up to the all-too-prevalent dystopias of the present. We need utopias today, and we need the people who choose to try to live their good life today in experimental communities, because they just may help us find the way forward out of the morass brought about by those ideologues willing to impose their version of the good life on all of us. We must never give up the search for eutopia[7].

In essence, however, the core of this work gravitates towards what Miguel Abensour, inspired by the path paved in the twentieth century by Ernst Bloch, Martin Buber, and Emmanuel Lévinas, calls the new utopian spirit, which

> could be described as the presence of a movement of suspicion of utopia within utopian culture, as if utopia had integrated its enemies' arguments into its approach without renouncing its primary aim or resigning itself to the end of utopia. What is at play here is the project of continuing the movement of utopia either by creating new figures or by elaborating new speculative gestures that would allow it to give birth to another utopia, to think utopia otherwise. The spirit of this new intelligence of utopia can be grasped in the following proposition: only a thought of utopia that does violence to itself, that includes the critique of utopia, acquires the hardness necessary to destroy the myths that ruin utopia[8].

This spirit seems to be needed, to some extent, also in educational theory and philosophy, even if the latter does not express it explicitly[9].

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[7] L. T. Sargent, "In Defense of Utopia", op. cit., p. 15. See R. Nozick, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*, Oxford – Cambridge 1999, pp. 317–320.

[8] M. Abensour, "Persistent Utopia", *Constellations* 2008, Vol. 15, No. 3, p. 15. See M. Abensour, "Le nouvel esprit utopique", *Cahier (Collège International de Philosophie)* 1987, No. 3, pp. 111–114.

[9] See G. Biesta, C. A. Säfström, "A Manifesto for Education", *Policy Futures in Education* 2011, Vol. 9, No. 5, p. 541; I. Gur-Ze'ev (in conversation with J. Boyarin), "The Possibility

Especially since, as Frederick L. Polak argues, without it,

> We do not understand and respond to the degeneration of our images of the future because we do not understand their function; our lack of understanding and response hastens the silent death of our visions. We might say that the future speaks a foreign language to us today[10].

Of course, several decades have passed since the publication cited above, but it cannot be ruled out that this is still the case. In any case, it is only the raised reconstruction of the basic findings, hinted at issues concerning utopia and its relations with education and the further parts of this book that need deepening, and development of necessary contexts and drawing the perimeter of the field within which the individual topics undertaken in this book are located.

AN OUTLINE OF THE TOPICS OF UTOPIA OR UTOPICS IN ITS RELATION TO EDUCATIONAL THEORY AND PRACTICE

Utopia owes its name, as already mentioned, to a Renaissance humanist, an English politician and a lawyer Thomas More, who, in a Latin work published in 1516, gave this name to a remote island of an unknown location[11]. It was to be inhabited by a society spread across fifty-four cities and their subordinate rural districts, organized and functioning in ways that were distinctly different from the European standards of the Renaissance, and much worse in comparison. When coining its name, More combined the Greek word τοπος with the prefix ού, which suggests that the author meant it ironically as a 'non-place', or rather a 'non-existent place'. However, the text itself leaves another interpretative clue related

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of a New Critical Language from the Sources of Jewish Negative Theology", [in:] I. Gur-Ze'ev, *Diasporic Philosophy and Counter-Education*, Rotterdam 2010, p. 173. See also: K. Maliszewski, *Bez-silna edukacja. O kształceniu kruchego*, Katowice 2021.

[10] F. Polak, *The Image of the Future*, Amsterdam 1973, p. 183.

[11] See F. Jameson, *Archaeologies of the Future*, op. cit., pp. 22–41; J. C. Davis, "Thomas More's Utopia: Sources, Legacy and Interpretation", [in:] *The Cambridge Companion to Utopian Literature*, ed. G. Claeys, Cambridge 2010, pp. 51–78; B. Baczko, *Wyobrażenia społeczne. Szkice o nadziei i pamięci zbiorowej*, Warszawa 1994, pp. 72–91.

to the use of the term eutopia in relation to the island, which can be read as a 'good place', if we accept the reference in this variant of the phrase to the Greek εὐ and its meaning of 'happily, prosperously, well'.

In *A Truly Golden Little Book, No Less Beneficial than Entertaining of a Republic's Best State and of the New Island Utopia*, as the entire title of Leuven edition reads, the task of presenting a picture of a society, based on transparent mechanisms, better ordered and functioning better than others, belongs to a traveler and philosopher, Raphael Hythlodaeus. He was to learn about its customs, organization, people's disposition and daily life during his five-year stay on the island. *A Truly Golden Little Book* is the account of an accidental meeting in Antwerp and the extensive discussions that followed between him and Hythlodaeus, who was passing through Europe as More claims in the work's plot. According to this Portuguese traveler and philosopher, a member of Amerigo Vespucci's expeditions, the abolition of private property and the suppression of the need for it open the way to a just organization, prosperity, and well--being of society, an example of which is the Utopian state system he knows[12]. His interlocutor takes a different view. More in the book claims that "people cannot possibly live well where all things are in common"[13]. He doubts the success of the change in the basic organization of life in the state indicated by Hythlodaeus and predicts its negative consequences for social practice.

The protagonists of the Renaissance work also differ on another important issue, i.e. the assessment of the condition of European states at the time and the adoption of a gradual reform strategy, a topic that focuses the author's attention in the much shorter *Book I* of the work. His porte-parole consistently takes a moderate stance and argues in favor of gradual progression. According to Hythlodaeus, More's preferred strategy of gradual reform may mitigate or attenuate the impact of actions that are harmful to the state, its people and its development, whether taken by the mighty or the ordinary citizen, but it does not lead to "restoring society to good health"[14]. The traveler and philosopher openly criticizes the prevailing social relations in the countries of Europe as commonly

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[12] See T. More, *Utopia*, ed. G. M. Logan, Cambridge 2016, pp. 39–41.
[13] Ibidem, p. 41.
[14] Ibidem.

occurring relations of abuse and oppression, which leads him to a bitter conclusion: "When I consider and turn over in my mind the various commonwealths flourishing today, so help me God, I can see in them nothing but a conspiracy of the rich, who are advancing their own interests under the name and title of the commonwealth"[15]. Subsequently, at More's request, Hythlodaeus speaks in detail about the organization of life and the various kinds of devices of the Utopians, which constitutes a more extensive part of the work, resulting in *Book II* written as first. The companion of Vespucci's expeditions sketches with enthusiasm and commitment, and in a systematic manner, the successive social institutions that determine the quality of everyday life of the island's inhabitants, thus characterizing, among other things, government and administration, economy, the social division of labor, urban development, health care, education, religion, the functioning of the family, leisure time, slavery, and relations with neighboring states, including warfare. Concluding his comprehensive, exhaustive description, Hythlodaeus expresses his conviction that he has thereby characterized the system of the state which "consider not only the best but indeed the only one that can rightfully claim that name"[16]. More in the book, on the other hand, finds the standards of the Utopians impossible to implement outside of the glorified island, and finds many of the laws and customs of that nation preposterous, especially the most important principle of their whole system, that is, living together and sharing in material goods[17]. However, he does not reveal this final conclusion to his tired interlocutor, among other reasons because he is afraid whether the latter "could take contradiction in these matters". In the end, the author of *A Truly Golden Little Book* leaves the reader of this report with a comment: "while I can hardly agree with everything he said (though he is a man of unquestionable learning and enormous experience of human affairs), yet I freely confess that in the Utopian commonwealth there are very many features that in our own societies I would wish rather than expect to see"[18]. In addition to such a clear reservation expressed in just a few words, it is worth adding at once that assessing the value of a given

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[15] Ibidem, p. 111.
[16] Ibidem, p. 109.
[17] See ibidem, p. 113.
[18] Ibidem.

society's image not only in terms of the likelihood of its reality, but also as objectively good or decent is also controversial and, as already seen here, will depend on a number of factors, including beliefs, socio-cultural and personal experiences, historical changes[19].

More's work was an important stimulus in the consolidation of a literary genre whose successive writings in the last five centuries have focused readers' attention on images of seemingly existing societies, arranged according to principles and ideas that their authors believed to be progressive[20]. Among many, the following are certainly worthy of attention: *The City of the Sun* by Tommaso Campanella published in 1602, *New Atlantis* by Francis Bacon published in 1627, *The Blazing World* by Margaret Cavendish from 1666, *The Adventures of Telemachus, Son of Ulysses* by François Fénelon from 1699, *The Year 2440: A Dream If Ever There Was One* by Louis Sébastien Mercier from 1771, *The Voyage to Icaria* by Étienne Cabet from 1840, *Looking Backward: 2000–1887* by Edward Bellamy from 1888, *News from Nowhere* by William Morris from 1890, *A Modern Utopia* by Herbert George Wells from 1905, *Herland* Charlotte Perkins Gilman z 1915, *Back to Methuselah* by George Bernard Shaw from 1921, *Return from the Stars* by Stanisław Lem from 1960, *Island* by Aldous Huxley from 1962, *The Dispossessed* by Ursula K. Le Guin from 1974, but also read as negative utopias, dystopias or anti-utopias[21] such books as:

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[19] This relativity of judgments is well illustrated by Sargent's observation: "In modern eyes, the society described in *Utopia* is not very attractive; it is authoritarian, hierarchical, patriarchal, and practises slavery for relatively minor offences. But through the eyes of an early 16th century reader, these things were the norm, and slavery in Utopia was a more humane punishment than many that would have been imposed at the time, when some minor offences were punished by death. And, most importantly, no one in Utopia was poor or rich, achieved by reducing demand, everyone working, sharing equally, and living simply. Thus, to many in the 16th century, Utopia would have seemed like paradise" (L. T. Sargent, *Utopianism*, op. cit., p. 23).

[20] See A. Juszczyk, *Stary wspaniały świat. O utopiach pozytywnych i negatywnych*, Kraków 2014, pp. 17–28; N. Frye, "Varieties of Literary Utopias", [in:] *Utopia and Utopian Thought*, op. cit., pp. 25–49; A. Blaim, "Wstęp", [in:] *Angielska utopia literacka okresu Oświecenia. Antologia*, ed. A. Blaim, P. Sørensen, Gdańsk 2018, pp. 8–19; A. Dróżdż, *Mity i utopie pedagogiczne*, Kraków 2000, pp. 62–72.

[21] As Sargent states in relation to literary material, we can understand dystopia or negative utopia as "a non-existent society described in considerable detail and normally located in time and space that the author intended a contemporaneous reader to view as considerably worse than the society in which that reader lived", while anti-utopia as "a non-existent society described in considerable detail and normally located in time

Mundus Alter et Idem by Joseph Hall from 1605, *Part III* of *Gulliver's Travels* by Jonathan Swift from 1726, *Us* by Yevgeny Zamyatin from 1921, *The Brave New World* by Huxley from 1932 or *1984* by George Orwell from 1949[22]. However, the European roots of literary utopia can be traced back many centuries before the English statesman's publication[23]. The same literary device used by More to describe the voyage to a distant, unknown island and the ideal system that prevailed there was used, among others, by the Greek writer Euhemerus of Messene, who lived at the turn of the 4th and 3rd centuries B.C.[24]. His work *Hiera anagraphē*, the account of the alleged voyage to the Indian Ocean, which is now available only in fragments, shows us a just society of happy people living in prosperity. From the traveler's description we learn, among other things, that the inhabitants of Panchaea, divided into three classes, receive their proper share of all the goods produced there, which are the property of the state. And in More's *Utopia* itself, there are direct references to another work of antiquity, an elaborate interpretation of the best system as promulgated nineteen centuries earlier in the dialogue *Republic* by Plato[25].

and space that the author intended a contemporaneous reader to view as a criticism of utopianism or of some particular eutopia" (L. T. Sargent, Three Faces of Utopianism Revisited, op. cit., p. 9. See L. T. Sargent, "What Is a Utopia?", Morus: Utopia e Renascimento 2005, No. 2, pp. 154–155; K. M. Maj, "Antyutopia – o gatunku, którego nie było", Zagadnienia Rodzajów Literackich 2019, Vol. 62, z. 4, pp. 10–29). Another example of a well-developed, though far from precise, division of counter-utopias, along with an interesting justification, is provided by Polak, who distinguishes between disutopia (actually dystopias), semi-utopias, pseudo-utopias, and negative utopias (see F. Polak, The Image of the Future, op. cit., pp. 185–194).

[22] A chronological list of significant works of western utopian thought and literature can be found in: *The Cambridge Companion to Utopian Literature*, op. cit., pp. xiv–xvi; a selection of texts from antiquity to the 20th century in: *The Utopia Reader*, ed. G. Claeys, L. T. Sargent, New York – London 1999; *Utopia w perspektywie pedagogicznej*, ed. I. Wojnar, Warszawa 1988.

[23] See L. T. Sargent, *Utopianism*, op. cit., pp. 10–19.

[24] See M. Winiarczyk, *Utopie w Grecji hellenistycznej*, Wrocław 2010, pp. 109–161. The author also discusses other selected texts of Greek antiquity, which contain, as he calls them, utopian motifs, considering as utopia *per se* only political utopia (see ibidem, p. 22) richly represented in this period by, among others, sophists, cynics and stoics. See also *Utopias in Ancient Thought*, ed. P. Destrée, J. Opsomer, G. Roskam, Berlin – Boston 2021.

[25] Scholars also point to other dialogues by Plato, such as the *Laws*, *Timaeus*, and *Kritias*, which take up the *topos* of the best political system or ideal city and may have influenced More's choices, see K. Kumar, *Utopianism*, op. cit., pp. 16–17, 20–27, 37–42; F. Polak, *The Image of the Future*, op. cit., pp. 185–186.

The polis imagined and described by him resembles the island and has a rigorous social organization with strict assignment to its citizens and division of functions and duties among three strata: craftsmen and farmers, then guards, and the best among them, dedicated to the welfare of the state and its governance. These strata acquire new members through an appropriate upbringing, which develops the natural predispositions of individuals and makes selection possible.

It is in order to add that the question of the best state system was also developed in the past by other great and influential philosophers of the Mediterranean circle, such as Aristotle in his *Politics* or Augustine in his *The City of God*, which in a way explains the modern career of utopia as a social theory, a method, a term with a wide meaning, used also in reference to the target conditions of social change, It is also used in relation to existing, alternatively organized communities which have been numerous in Eastern and Western societies since antiquity, such as, for example, monasteries, convents and other religious communities, colonies, as well as contemporary communes, kibbutzes and eco-villages[26]. Each of these works, in its own way, addresses and develops the issue of the education appropriate for the maintenance of an ideal or optimal state system. In other words, the theories of education of Plato or Aristotle, studied for centuries in our cultural circle, are complementary to their concepts of not so much real existing, but possible to realize perfect states. This kind of relationship between utopian thought, utopianism and education is clearly shown in another work of antiquity, reaching with its overwhelming authority and influence to the end of the eighteenth century, the extensive *Cyropaedia: The Education of Cyrus* by Xenophon[27]. This Athenian, who is three years older than Plato and, like him, a student of Socrates, on the basis of a fictitious biography of the Persian king Cyrus the Elder, presents the characteristics of upbringing which shape a model monarch, a benevolent despot ruling an ideal state and his admiring subjects.

[26] See L. T. Sargent, *Utopianism*, op. cit., pp. 33–65; J. Szacki, *Spotkania z utopią*, Warszawa 1980, pp. 116–151; K. Kumar, *Utopianism*, op. cit., pp. 64–85. It is worth noting that in the indicated chapter Kumar interestingly discusses the problematic of the relation between two orders: utopia as a result of literary activity and utopian practice.

[27] See P. A. Lewicki, "Filozofia polityczna Cyropedii Ksenofonta", *Dialogi Polityczne* 2020, No. 28, pp. 35–72.

A different model of the relationship between utopian thought and education is provided in Jan Amos Comenius's *Pampaedia, Or Universal Education*. The text, which can be regarded as a representative example of pedagogical utopia, was considered lost from the death of its author until the 20th century, and it was only several years after the manuscript was found in 1935 that it could be published, translated and read by its readers. Explaining in its opening sections his intentions rooted in Protestantism based on the etymology of his work's title, Comenius writes: "Pampaedia is the universal education of the whole human race" – the means of achieving which he considers in detail and systematically, closing his argument in sixteen chapters – for it is desirable, which he also carefully justifies, "that all men are taught all subjects in all thoroughness"[28]. In other words, according to the Moravian reformer, the future attainment of an 'all-round culture' presupposes the creation of such conditions of learning from birth to death, and separate for each of the eight stages of life which he has identified, in which everyone, that is "young and old, rich and poor, nobly and ignoble, men and women – in a word, of every human being born of earth […]" would be able to attain a complete education, and thus "not only in a single thing or a few things or even many things, but in everything which completes the essence of humanity […]"[29]. In the context of the entire content of the work and its overall message, it should be emphasized that Comenius's democratic utopia consistently focuses attention on the arrangement of education.

It is not, however, that in the social imagination, including the Western social imagination, the phenomenon of utopia constitutes a solitary island with a clearly delineated shoreline boundary. First, from the point of view of utopian studies, it is a matter of dispute to distinguish utopia as such from other imagined places or periods where one can speak of a realized or desired ideal of social fulfillment, the achievement of a communal optimum of happiness[30]. Cockaygne, the land of luxury,

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[28] J. A. Comenius, *Comenius's Pampaedia or Universal Education*, Dover 1986, p. 19.

[29] Ibidem, pp. 19–20. See. P. Sztobryn, "Wprowadzenie do pansoficznych podstaw pedagogiki Jana Amosa Komeńskiego", *Siedleckie Zeszyty Komeniologiczne* 2016, Vol. III, pp. 25–33.

[30] See. L. T. Sargent, *Utopianism*, op. cit., pp. 10-32; L. T. Sargent, "The Tree Face of Utopianism Revisited", op. cit., pp. 11–12; K. Kumar, *Utopianism*, op. cit., pp. 1–19; K. M. Maj, *Allotopie. Topografia światów fikcjonalnych*, Kraków 2015, pp. 255–265.

embodying the ages-old folk dream of a world of abundance devoid of toil and torment, Arcadia also enlivened by the imagination of poets, a retreat of peace, harmony with nature, order and everlasting happiness, then Gan Eden, a garden of bliss, a zone of abundance, and finally Utopolis, the ideal city – hope of philosophers and urban planners, the goal and form of organization of the space of common dwelling, are basically inscribed in the literary *topos* of a pleasant place, a *locus amoenus*[31]. Nonetheless, the effort to draw boundaries between utopia and the myth of the Golden Age, Saturnalia, messianism, and millenarianism is problematic and questionable. Second, the evoked ideas of places and periods where the ideal of social fulfillment can be spoken of help to break down the Eurocentric schema of utopics construction. Viewed from this perspective, the Krita Yuga, the first of the four ages of the world in cyclical Hindu cosmology glorified in the *Mahabharata*, would fit into the myth of the golden age, other variants of which, according to Kumar, can be found in Australian Aboriginal traditions and Chinese Taoism[32]. Whereas the legendary Tibetan land of Śambhala or the Slavic Wyraj can be considered together with the biblical Garden of Eden if one goes beyond the Western cultural circle in comparative studies. Then also Indian ashrams, Buddhist monasteries, Eastern and Western Christian monasteries or other hermitic communities, colonies created with the intention of putting political and religious ideologies into practice, moreover places of migration perceived as a promised land or fulfillment of refugees' dreams of a better life, experimental settlements and cities, Israeli kibbutzes, communes, workers' cooperatives and alternative communities could be considered in relation to the common denominator of utopianism[33]. As Kumar writes:

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[31] See E. R. Curtius, *European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages*, Princeton – Oxford 2013, pp. 183–201; Z. Paszkowski, *Miasto idealne w perspektywie europejskiej i jego związki z urbanistyką współczesną*, Kraków 2011, pp. 9–23.

[32] See K. Kumar, *Utopianism*, op. cit., p. 4. The topic of utopia in selected cultural traditions is devoted to a separate issue of *Utopian Studies* (2013, Vol. 24, No. 1). See also F. Polak, *The Image of the Future*, op. cit., pp. 24–60; S. N. Eisenstadt, *Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities*, Part I, Leiden – Boston 2003, pp. 265–277.

[33] Some scholars have taken to distinguishing, following Sargent, three faces of utopianism as utopian literature, intentional societies, and utopian social theory (see L. T. Sargent, The Tree Faces of Utopianism Revisited, op. cit., pp. 1–37).

There are other kinds of ideal societies: the lost continent of Atlantis, the hidden valley of Shangri-La, the distant El Dorado, the Land-Without-Evil of the Guarani Indians, the life of 'the noble savage', fabulus civilizations at the centre of the earth and on the moon. Times past and times future, other-worldly regions and distant planets – all have been the setting in myth, romance and science fiction for innumerable ideal societies. Ideal-society types also clearly overlap one another. Paradise is fused with the Golden Age, Cockaygne is a reproach to Arcadia while it borrows heavily from the Golden Age and Paradise; the millennium is Paradise restored; the ideal city draws upon the myths of ancient Golden Age civilizations. The religious connotations of many of these terms also point to their interconnections within overarching religious cosmologies[34].

Hence, it seems legitimate to ask, "Can all the types cited be added to utopia?", "Is it nothing more than a mixture of older concepts of an ideal society?"[35].

In addition to those mentioned above, utopias from the first decades of the twentieth century postulated by Janusz Korczak and Florian Znaniecki should be considered not only, as it seems, noteworthy for contemporary Polish pedagogy, showing the continuity and persistence of such aspirations and the diverse relations between utopia and education. *Szkoła życia* (*School of Life*), "a fantasy novel – as its author presents it – set against the background of an existing, supposedly model, reformed school, which serves the goals of all mankind, and not only, as the author puts it, a small landholding class of people"[36], was published in fragments in *Przegląd Społeczny* in 1907 and in *Społeczeństwo* the following

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[34] K. Kumar, *Utopianism*, op. cit., p. 17.

[35] Ibidem. See F. E. Manuel, F. P. Manuel, *Utopian Thought in the Western World*, Cambridge 1979, pp. 1-29. It is important to note, however, that while recognizing utopias as a secular variant of social thought, "products of particular histories and particular interpretations of those histories", Kumar nevertheless argues for the position that "There is no tradition of utopia and utopian thought outside the Western world" (K. Kumar, *Utopianism*, op. cit., p. 33). Kumar's view is constantly questioned by Sargent (see e.g. L. T. Sargent, *Theorizing Utopia/Utopianism in the Twenty-First Century*, [in:] *Spectres of Utopia. Theory, Practice, Conventions*, ed. A. Blaim, L. Gruszewska-Blaim, Frankfurt am Main 2012, pp. 13–14).

[36] J. Korczak, "Szkoła życia", [in:] J. Korczak, *Pisma wybrane*, Vol. III, sel. A. Lewin, Warszawa 1985, p. 63.

year. Korczak negatively refers in it to the pedagogies commonly used in educational institutions of the time, thoroughly and mercilessly criticizing numerous distortions and faulty attempts at improvement: "How they improved, patched, and colored what should have been burnt to the ground and put up something completely new"[37], he states. In opposition to the school of "compromises and mediocrity", the school "with its hypocritical prayers before and after the tedious, six-hour training, demoralising [...]"[38]. The detailed description of the school of life in the novel by the then almost thirty-year-old writer, and in fact the entire system of social institutions, from the workshop, dormitory and workers' home, through the nursery, kitchen, people's home or hospital, to the trade and service institutions, "combines – as Barbara Smolinska--Theiss puts it – learning with work, teaching life through work and work through life"[39].

On the other hand, Znaniecki's utopia, an extended version of which can be found in his work *Ludzie teraźniejsi a cywilizacja przyszłości* (*The Contemporary People and the Civilization of the Future*), published in 1934, is a development of the image from the final parts of the first volume of *Sociologia wychowania* (*The Sociology of Education*) published six years earlier. As the sociologist predicted, "we have entered a period when the variability of new ideas is becoming a normal feature of cultural life, and not only is there no sign of its diminishing, but, on the contrary, everything points to the fact that it will continually increase"[40]. In his opinion, this tendency, which is only now becoming apparent, stands in contrast to the strategy, dominant in the organization and functioning of contemporary societies, of adhering to the principles of static equilibrium, which makes their survival doubtful. He contrasts it with the principle of dynamic equilibrium of developmental processes, which occurs in the synthesis of creative activities, and predicts that the system of civilization of the future will be based on it. However, "for a new all-human civilization to grow and live, new people and new social groups are

[37] Ibidem, p. 76.
[38] Ibidem, pp. 78, 79.
[39] B. Smolińska-Theiss, *Korczakowskie narracje pedagogiczne*, Kraków 2014, p. 215.
[40] F. Znaniecki, *Ludzie teraźniejsi a cywilizacja przyszłości*, Warszawa 1974, p. 78.

needed"[41]. In other words, according to Znaniecki, it cannot be achieved without conscious and large-scale action. Hence, he recommends that civilization should become fluid, i.e. an appropriate social system should be introduced through educating creative people, who not only adapt to changes, but also create them. According to Znaniecki,

> the fluidity of our civilization will be something completely different from the dizzying rush of chaotic and ever more rapid changes that characterize evolution today. It will be a fluidity of the continuous creation of ever larger and more perfect creative works, growing and maturing according to the abilities of their creators, a fluidity of the incessant selection from the accumulated cultural heritage of those creations which, because of their fertilizing vitality, turn out to be the most valuable for further development; the fluidity of the synthesis of creative efforts which takes place in the very course of development and directs them not according to a plan ready in advance, but as the possibilities already realized in the pursuit of an ideal open up new possibilities which have not been seen before and thus enrich the ideal itself[42].

It is worth adding that in the nearly seven decades later published diagnosis of the condition of Western societies by another sociologist, also associated with Poznań, Zygmunt Bauman, late modernity as liquid does not seem to be an embodiment of utopia, but rather a dystopia, a type of negative utopia[43].

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[41] Ibidem, p. 96. See also: F. Znaniecki, *Socjologia wychowania*, Vol. I, Warszawa 1973, pp. 401–405, 414–418.

[42] F. Znaniecki, *Ludzie teraźniejsi a cywilizacja przyszłości*, op. cit., pp. 93–94. See E. Hałas, "Crisis or Fluidity? Florian Znaniecki's Theory of Civilization", *Historická Sociologie* 2016, No. 2, pp. 9–27.

[43] See Z. Bauman, *Liquid Modernity*, Cambridge – Malden 2000; M. H. Jacobsen, "From Solid Modern Utopia to Liquid Modern Anti-Utopia? Tracing the Utopian Strand in the Sociology of Zygmunt Bauman", *Utopian Studies* 2004, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 63–87. As Gregory Claeys pointed out in a book published two years before the onset of the pandemic caused by the SARS-Cov-2 infections, "The reshaping of dystopian writing in the aftermath of World War II was dominated by five themes. Firstly, humanity entered the nuclear age on 16 July 1945. By the mid-1950s we could destroy ourselves completely, and there were good reasons to assume we would. Secondly, the spectre of environmental degeneration, later transmuted into a discourse on climate change, with a potentially catastrophic outcome, emerged in the 1970s. Thirdly, the progress of mechanization threatened ever more subordination of people to machines, and an in-

The examples and approaches cited, which are another fragment of the issues developed here, can give us a general idea of the various complex relationships between utopia and education, which have become established in Western culture, including pedagogy, but in order to present their state and potential in more detail, it is necessary to additionally illuminate the first of these phenomena using selected, more advanced theoretical approaches.

FROM VARIANTS OF UNDERSTANDING UTOPIA TO PEDAGOGICAL UTOPIANISM

More in *Libellus aureus nec minus salutaris quam festivus de optimo Reipublicae statu de que nova insula Utopia* oscillates between an image of the perfect system of a foreign island and a discussion of the conditions for successful domestic social change and the usefulness of the ideals presented by one of its protagonists, Hythlodaeus. It is, however, impossible not to notice the diversity of the phenomena that have grown over the centuries, which are nowadays referred to as utopias, and, as a result, to indicate unequivocally their common characteristics. Especially that the very understanding of what utopia is and what role it has to play has also undergone changes both in modernity and in the present day, and the way the term is used in a given place and time has evolved differently, depending on the conditions of a given national culture and language area[44]. Nevertheless, according to Reinhart Koselleck, one of the most important transformations that entailed a significant change in the understanding of utopia is considered its temporal characteristics[45]. Already in the era of the French Revolution, it became a widespread

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creasing blurring of human/machine identity. Fourthly, liberal non-totalitarian societies showed serious signs of cultural degeneration into intellectual senility and enslavement to a mindless ethos of hedonistic consumption. Finally, anxiety regarding the 'War on Terror' came to dominate the news" (G. Claeys, *Dystopia: A Natural History. A Study of Modern Despotism, Its Antecedents, and Its Literary Diffractions*, Oxford 2017, p. 447).

[44] See R. Koselleck, "The Temporalization of Utopia", [in:] R. Koselleck, *The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts*, Stanford 2002, pp. 84–99; B. Baczko, *Utopian Lights*, op. cit., pp. 3–40; J. Szacki, *Spotkania z utopią*, op. cit., pp. 10–56.

[45] See R. Koselleck, "The Temporalization of Utopia", op. cit., pp. 84–89.

view that it is not a place in an unknown, inaccessible space that is the reference point for 'the realization of visionary political projects and their social models', but the more or less distant future. Such a possibility is assumed by Mercier's novel *The Year 2440*, which was published anonymously in Holland around 1771. The temporalization of utopia, as Koselleck calls this process, or – taking into account, for example, the versions of messianism functioning for centuries[46] – yet another time framing of utopia becomes a trend that gains the upper hand, although there is no shortage of solutions during the Enlightenment that, due to the growing knowledge of the disintegration of the land, brought utopias to the interior of the Earth or moved them into space. It can also be said that this change only brought the literary genre closer to the style of thinking that can be traced back to Plato's *Politeia*, already cited – an ideal system requires a political and educational effort spread over time in order to come into existence. However, it should be noted that a dispute arose around utopia, which continues even today, since there has been a new wave of interest in this issue in the humanities and social sciences, about the use of the term, the limits of the concept and the nature of the phenomenon[47].

Among the numerous positions formulated on the grounds of various scientific disciplines, expressing different perspectives and concepts of explaining utopia, I would like to point to five that have their roots in research conducted in the middle of the twentieth century in the circle

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[46] See S. N. Eisenstadt, "Heterodoxies, Sectarianism, and Utopianism in the Constitution of Proto-fundamentalist Movements", [in:] S. N. Eisenstadt, *Fundamentalism, Sectarianism, and Revolution. The Jacobin Dimension of Modernity*, Cambridge 1999, pp. 1–38.

[47] See e.g. R. Levitas, *The Concept of Utopia*, op. cit., pp. 179–209; R. Levitas, *Utopia as Method*, op. cit., pp. 103-149; F. Vieira, "The Concept of Utopia", [in:] *The Cambridge Companion to Utopian Literature*, op. cit., pp. 3–27; B. Baczko, *Wyobrażenia społeczne*, op. cit., pp. 91–105; G. Claeys, "The Five Languages of Utopia: Their Respective Advantages and Deficiencies; With a Plea for Prioritising Social Realism", [in:] *Spectres of Utopia*, op. cit., pp. 26–31. Following Fátima Vieira, it is possible to point to four historically shaped tendencies in Western culture in defining utopias, i.e. by their specific content as ideas about a good society, by the literary form in which the utopian imagination has crystallized, by the functions it can perform in relation to its audience, and by the desire for a better life brought about by dissatisfaction with the current condition of societies (see F. Vieira, "The Concept of Utopia", op. cit., p. 6).

of the Warsaw school of the history of ideas[48], and also their intellectual inspirations. These approaches make it possible, in their own way, to highlight the most significant differences in approaches and the fundamental dimensions of the phenomenon, as well as to organize the variety of findings concerning utopia into a theoretical spectrum, at the ends of which we can place literary fiction and political promise, which does not mean, however, that 'literary fiction' cannot lead people to revolution, and 'political promise' of future social relations cannot be perceived by certain social groups as an illusion. It should be stressed, however, that the selection of concepts proposed here does not exhaust the diversity of approaches and characteristics of the phenomenon that are the subject of discussion in the dynamically developing contemporary utopian studies.

A good starting point for this discussion may be the position that is closest to the common understanding of utopia, according to which utopia is just a pipe dream, whim or delusion, often grotesque, at other times evoking anxiety, resistance and terror. Probably we could enumerate for hours exemplifications of educational and political failures of crystal palaces, sentimental idealists, angry visionaries in support of this common truth. But that is not all. This kind of aversion seems to go deeper. It is also shared by the research community, if one accepts as authoritative and still valid the supposition expressed a few decades ago by Zygmunt Bauman that "the disrepute into which utopian thinking was fallen is that shared by magic, religion and alchemy – all those slushy paths of the errant human mind which modern science set about eliminating once and for all from the map of human action"[49]. However, according to the sociologist, "social life cannot in fact be understood unless due attention is paid to the immense role played by utopia"[50].

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[48] Its most frequently cited contributors included Leszek Kolakowski, Baczko, Jerzy Szacki, and Andrzej Walicki. As a result of the events of March 1968, Kolakowski and Baczko had to leave Poland, which was one of the factors that led to the disintegration of the work of this significant group of intellectuals, see A. Walicki, "On Writing Intellectual History: Leszek Kolakowski and the Warsaw School of the History of Ideas", *Critical Philosophy* 1984, No. 1, pp. 5-23. Link to Archive of the Warsaw school of the history of ideas: http://www.archidei.ifispan.pl/o-szkole/ (20.08.2021).

[49] Z. Bauman, *Socialism. The Active Utopia*, London 1976, p. 9. See also Z. Bauman, *Society under Siege*, Cambridge 2002, pp. 222–240; G. Picht, *Odwaga utopii*, Warszawa 1981, pp. 49–60.

[50] Z. Bauman, *Socialism*, op. cit., p. 12. See Ibidem, pp. 9-37; S. N. Eisenstadt, *Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities*, op. cit., pp. 219–247, 265–277.

According to Leszek Kolakowski, one of the leaders of the Warsaw school of the history of ideas and a skeptic about the possible realization of the tasks set by utopists, "their presence in the continuation of our culture is vital and indispensable"[51].

Recommending in the early 1980s that we should not stray too far from the colloquial meaning of the word[52], Kolakowski assumed that it indicates a vision accompanied by "logical inconsistency or empirical impossibility". Furthermore, according to his findings, utopias should be considered, firstly, "not ideas of making any side of human life better but only beliefs that a definitive and unsurpassable condition is attainable, one where there is nothing to correct any more. Second", as he declared, "we shall apply the word to projections which are supposed to be implemented by human effort [...]"[53]. According to the author of *The Presence of Myth*, utopian fantasies are a condition for the continuation of our culture and a necessary counterbalance to the skeptical mentality, whose unquestionable rule "would condemn us to a hopeless stagnation, to an immobility which a slight accident could easily convert into catastrophic chaos"[54]. The close relationship between the position reported by Kolakowski and the colloquial understanding also seems to come to the fore in the emphatic statement: "The victory of utopian dreams would lead us to a totalitarian nightmare and the utter downfall of civilization [...]"[55]. It can be assumed that this way of understanding utopia is characterized by the assumption that the proper place for its cultivation, outside which it stands on unnatural ground, are the areas of artistic activity, areas of fictionality, such as literature, film or new media, which create a space for the presentation of original solutions, peculiar games and exercises of imagination. The center of the theoretical attention of scholars advocating this way of understanding utopia is focused on the effort to distinguish convincingly the rules and conventions that would make it possible to draw boundaries between it and other genres of literary or artistic creativity, such as fantasy or science fiction.

[51] L. Kolakowski, "The Death of Utopia Reconsidered", [in:] *The Tanner Lectures on Human Value*, Vol. 4, ed. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1983, p. 235.
[52] See Ibidem, p. 229.
[53] Ibidem, p. 230.
[54] Ibidem, p. 247.
[55] Ibidem. L. Kolakowski, *The Presence of Myth*, Chicago 2001, pp. 130–136.

Jerzy Szacki's approach, already expressed in the first edition of his 1968 book *Spotkania z utopią* (*Encounters with Utopia*), links utopia more clearly than previous ones with social practice, with political criticism and with the creation of ideas about the possible shape of the future of a given society: "The utopian does not accept the existing world, is not satisfied with the currently existing possibilities: they dream, fantasize, anticipate, design, experiment"[56]. It is rather radical and stands in contrast with the current condition of society: "A utopian is not everyone", he notes, "who thinks of changing reality. It is the one who wants to replace an absolutely bad reality with an absolutely good one"[57]. What contributes to the initiation of his/her activity is the current socio-historical situation, which can have an effect on the appearance of a split between "the world that is around and the world that is conceivable"[58] in human consciousness. The sociologist is inclined to agree with the positions of those scholars who emphasize the demonstrable difference between a utopian and a reformer; in his view

> A utopian does not need to know what to do. His business is to question the old world for the sake of a vision of a different world. A reformer accepts the old world as the basis of the new world, sees in it only another phase or another form of the same order[59].

Moreover, Szacki has in mind not so much individual ideas as developed projects; he writes: "Utopia is a dream that becomes a system; an ideal expanded into a doctrine"[60]. But also in the case of utopias, this ideal, which the sociologist considers a distinguishing feature, refers more to specific social conditions than to criteria of perfection distanced from reality, as he notes: "For the most part, utopians did not want to improve the existing world by force, but tried at most to create in it the islands of the New, which by their example were to influence people of good

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[56] J. Szacki, *Spotkania z utopią*, op. cit., p. 28.

[57] Ibidem, pp. 30–31.

[58] Ibidem, p. 28.

[59] Ibidem, p. 31. Baczko is of a different opinion (see B. Baczko, *Utopian Lights*, op. cit., p. 30); so is Waldemar Voisé (see W. Voisé, "Wstęp", [in:] *Utopiści XVI i XVII wieku o wychowaniu i szkole*, intro., sel. and ed. W. Voisé, Wrocław 1972, p. XLIV).

[60] J. Szacki, *Spotkania z utopią*, op. cit., p. 23.

will"[61]. Furthermore, Szacki notes that they are not merely the result of intellectual speculation, for there is no shortage of examples of "utopias that grow out of the life experience of the masses and organize their collective actions"[62]. He does not claim, therefore, that utopias should be equated with pipe dreams, that they are defined by their misguided consequences; he points out both the permanent presence of utopias in social consciousness and the introduction and rooting of sets of their elements in the fabric of reality.

Bronisław Baczko, who together with Kolakowski and Szacki formed the circle of scholars referred to, after its breakdown in 1968, as the Warsaw school of the history of ideas, takes a somewhat different stance. As he points out, "Utopias are involved in historical realities and intervene in ways other than by foreshadowing the possible future"[63]. Nevertheless, and in his view, they constitute a very important element of social practice, for they create a place whose form enables social discussion about the construction of reality:

> The images of the New Society become the places, sometimes the most important, of the influence of the social *imagination*, the sphere in which social dreams are collected, elaborated upon and produced. These images, therefore, constitute a kind of system, with variable effectiveness, which makes it possible to create a uniform collective scheme of both interpretation and integration of the *field of social experience* and the *horizon of expectations*, as well as objections, fears and hopes that surrounds this field[64].

By crystallizing hopes, utopia allows us to measure the distance between the desire or longing for a better and the thorn-laden present, it creates the beginnings of the necessary political promise of a future. Similarly, the worlds depicted in subsequent published variations on the theme of utopia are not perceived, according to the scholar, or not primarily, as mock-ups to be replicated. Rather, according to this expert

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[61] Ibidem, p. 31.
[62] Ibidem, p. 30.
[63] B. Baczko, *Utopian Lights*, op. cit., p. 5.
[64] B. Baczko, *Wyobrażenia społeczne*, op. cit., p. 91 – original underline. See L. Koczanowicz, *Politics of Time. Dynamics of Identity in Post-Communist Poland*, New York – Oxford 2008, pp. 18–28, 67–74.

on the French Enlightenment: "Utopias are specific demonstrations and expressions of a particular era, showing its obsessions, haunting fears, and revolts; the scope of its expectations as well as the paths taken by. the social imagination; its way of envisaging the possible and the impossible"[65]. Consequently, it should also be recognized that this peculiar territory, whose form provides insight into social dreams and discussions about the construction of reality, is an essential component of civic education and political training.

In the view of Karl Mannheim, whose work was an important point of reference for Warsaw historians of ideas cited above[66], the utopian state of mind, which is an essential element in the dynamics of social conflict, is "when it is incongruous with the state of reality within which it occurs", as he claims. "This incongruence is always evident in the fact that such a state of mind in experience, in thought, and in practice, is oriented towards objects which do not exist in the actual situation"[67]. In the quoted excerpt from the classic of the literature on the subject, in addition to ignoring the issue of the collective striving for the incarnation of happiness in its universal or particular form, attention is drawn to the even stronger emphasis placed on the relationship between utopia and the practice of shaping social relations. The utopian state of mind stands in opposition to what the researcher calls ideological state of mind, which usually accompanies groups and their representatives interested in maintaining a social order favorable to their situation by available means. They usually emphasize those elements of their ideas about the situation and conditions which they wish to preserve in the future, while in "The concept of utopian thinking", as Mannheim points out, "reflects the opposite discovery of the political struggle, namely that certain oppressed groups are intellectually so strongly interested in the destruction and transformation of a given condition of society that they unwittingly see only those elements in the

[65] B. Baczko, *Utopian Lights*, op. cit., p. 5.

[66] A good example of the inspiration of Mannheim by scholars from the Warsaw school of the history of ideas in the context of their preferred category of 'worldview' (*Weltanschaung*) can be found in Walicki, see A. Walicki, *The Slavophile Controversy: History of a Conservative Utopia in Nineteenth-century Russian Thought*, Oxford 1975, pp. 1–8.

[67] K. Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia. An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge*, New York 1954, p. 173. See R. Levitas, *The Concept of Utopia*, op. cit., pp. 79–96.

situation which tend to negate it"[68]. In other words, the competing visions of the future, utopian and ideological, according to Mannheim's nomenclature, and the 'false consciousness' of relations and dependencies associated with their images are dictated by the current circumstances and different positioning in the social structure of individual groups and individuals, as well as their perceptions of those very circumstances. More importantly, however, which utopia becomes the policy reference point in the organism of the state will have a fundamental bearing on the condition and life opportunities of individuals, including their chances and course of education. Consequently, this means that the vision of a sufficiently perfect human and social condition, which expresses particular hopes, not only reflects certain values, aspirations and emotional background, but also the socio-economic conditions of the circles, organizations, groups and individuals who identify with it, as well as supports their reluctance and readiness to counteract the introduction of competing utopias, the will to undermine, marginalize, exclude or destroy them. The critical perspective of opponents thus activated is oriented towards analysis, interpretation, and evaluation of the rejected perspectives. It is not necessarily interested in either a diagnosis of its own claims, capabilities and perceptions, or the totality of the conditions of all parties to the articulated conflict. It can be said, then, that in this sense utopias, as derivatives of the two types of the state of mind distinguished by Mannheim, are an analytically separable part of ideology, in other words, as Lyman Tower Sargent says: "There is a utopia at the heart of every ideology, a positive picture – some vague, some quite detailed – of what the world would look like if the hopes of the ideology were realized"[69].

For Warsaw historians of the idea, oriented towards the issue of utopia, an important point of reference was also the work of Ernst Bloch, author of an original and important position in the theory and research of the phenomenon formulated initially at the beginning of the 20th century. The assumptions of this approach developed in *The Spirit of Utopia*, then in the subsequent volumes of *The Principe of Hope*, which place the foundations of utopian thinking in the nature of the human being and

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[68] K. Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, op. cit., p. 36.
[69] L. T. Sargent, *Utopianism*, op. cit., p. 124. See L. T. Sargent, "Ideology and Utopia: Karl Mannheim and Paul Ricoeur", *Journal of Political Ideologies* 2008, No. 13, pp. 263–273.

their way of functioning in the world[70]. The lecture given in Berlin by Bloch in 1965 is a synthesis of these findings. According to his findings, "utopianism is a characteristic feature of the human being"[71]. For they are, says the philosopher, "*per se ipsum* beings anticipating in thought"[72], marked by deprivation,

> The working will to satisfy needs is objectivized in planning, which operates with an increasingly conscious and rationalized calculation of the means needed to achieve the goal – means which have yet to be produced in order to achieve the goal, which is also still a matter of the future, and which, once achieved, usually changes its form, for the better, but often also for the worse[73].

In other words, utopia provides a way for people to have "a thoughtful attitude toward the future, rationalizing the content of hope – or *docta spes*. "What is utopian grows with the growth of what is human, Bloch argues, at all its obviously different degrees of intensity, with all its dangers and difficulties"[74]. For Bloch, the world of the future in

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[70] See A. Czajka, *Człowiek znaczy nadzieja. O filozofii Ernsta Blocha*, Warszawa 1991, pp. 83–133; R. Levitas, "Educated Hope: Ernst Bloch on Abstract and Concrete Utopia", *Utopian Studies* 1990, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 13–26.

[71] E. Bloch, "Rzeczywistość antycypowana, czyli jak przebiega i co osiąga myślenie utopijne", *Studia Filozoficzne* 1982, No. 7–8, p. 52.

[72] Ibidem, p. 49.

[73] Ibidem, p. 50.

[74] Ibidem, p. 52. As he observes in *The Principle of Hope*: "Only when reason starts to speak, does hope, in which there is no guile, begin to blossom again. The Not-Yet-Conscious itself must become *conscious* in its act, *known* in its content, as the process of dawning on the one hand, as what is dawning on the other" (E. Bloch, *The Principle of Hope*, Vol. 1, Cambridge 1996, p. 144). It should be added in the context of *docta spes*, the educated hope, that Bloch operates the distinction between abstract and specific utopia in order to distinguish what could be described as a kind of wishful thinking from what is realistically possible, the fulfilment of which he associates with an unorthodox or rather messianic understanding of Marxism, as he notes: "the only seemingly paradoxical concept of a concrete utopia would be appropriate here, that is of an anticipatory kind which by no means coincides with abstract Utopian dreaminess, nor is directed by the immaturity of merely abstract Utopian socialism. The very power and truth of Marxism consists in the fact that it has driven the cloud in our dreams further forward, but has not extinguished the pillar of fire in those dreams, rather strengthened it with concreteness" (ibidem, p. 146). See W. P. Goldstein, "Messianism and Marxism: Walter Benjamin and Ernst

its becoming is constantly, though with different intensities, foreshadowed in countless manifestations, in everyday dreams, daydreams, fairy tales, myths, ideologies, architecture, works of art, etc., in which hope working critically in man in the utopian function is capable of perceiving, recognizing, isolating, determining the proper nature of this foreshadowing and thus saving it. Critical correction is essential here. Bloch is convinced that utopian hermeneutics, in experiencing itself and the world, is capable of establishing the feedback effect between the subject and object as a potential of reality beyond the present. Moreover, in these many, countless manifestations of the "Not-Yet", a category referring "to a world in which projects and transformations are possible, a world that is itself still open, unready, processual, and thus fragmentary, in a word, to a world whose horizon is constantly expanding"[75], Bloch seems to see an expression of the longing, proper for the human being – "a being desiring to change, to whom the world is given as a potentiality"[76]. The longing, a desire for a better world, whose two most significant features, according to him, are dissatisfaction and hope. Although this anthropological assumption can be understood and justified in different ways, for example, the contemporary philosopher of education David Halpin claims that "the power of utopian thinking derives from its inherent ability to visualize the future in terms of radically new forms and values"[77], the orientation and scope of such approaches remains similar: "We face the world as an experiment, as a constantly active laboratory of the search for its own meaning"[78].

Thus, utopia can be understood as an image of a fragment, a part, or the whole of a sufficiently perfect, according to one's conviction, social order and interpersonal relations, which represents, growing out of dissatisfaction, a mature form of crystallization of collective hopes and may serve as a model of the future expected by a person or a group. It can be either a literary image or an image that underlies individual or collective

Bloch's Dialectical Theories of Secularisation", *Critical Sociology* 2001, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 246–249, 262–268.

[75] E. Bloch, "Rzeczywistość antycypowana", op. cit., p. 53.

[76] Ibidem.

[77] D. Halpin, *Hope and Education. The Role of the Utopian Imagination*, London – New York 2003, p. 34.

[78] E. Bloch, "Rzeczywistość antycypowana", op. cit., p. 56.

aspirations. It should be noted once again that 'literary fiction' can also lead people to action, fostering, for example, criticism, revolution or founding of new settlements, while the 'political promise' regarding the shape of future social relations can be perceived by certain social groups as a delusion or pipe dream, proof of blindness and naivety.

This broad understanding of utopia, which has its basis in the above--mentioned views, seems to avoid a reductive approach to the potential of its possible links with education. Links and potential whose interest in the theory and practice of education has been growing again for more than two decades. Consequently, as Darren Webb points out, also for educational studies "the concept of utopia is slowly emerging from the shadows and losing its pejorative connotations"[79]. Moreover, Michael A. Peters and John Freeman-Moir have no doubt that "Education is intrinsically connected with the utopian"[80]. Nevertheless, Webb sees in the field of educational studies significant limitations to the noted rehabilitation of the phenomenon long regarded in the Western world as sufficiently discredited to proclaim its death. In the English-language literature on the subject, Webb notes the growing acceptance of utopianism as a kind of means to foster hope[81], opening to new possibilities or being a catalyst for change, except that this openness is accompanied by "a concern to avoid its more fantastic and doctrinaire associations". In other words,

[79] D. Webb, "Where's the Vision? The Concept of Utopia in Contemporary Educational Theory", *Oxford Review of Education* 2009, Vol. 35, No. 6, p. 744. A revival of less than a decade-long interest in utopia in the theory and practice of education in four trends (anarchist, critical reaction to 'future studies' and transformational and reformist) was noted at the same time by Marianna Papastephanou, see M. Papastephanou, *Educated Fear and Educated Hope. Dystopia, Utopia and the Plasticity of Humanity*, Rotterdam 2009, p. xxii.

[80] M. Peters, J. Freeman-Moir, "Introducing Edutopias: Concept, Genealogy, Futures", [in:] *Edutopias: New Utopian Thinking in Education*, ed. M. Peters, J. Freeman-Moir, Rotterdam 2006, p. 3.

[81] According to Webb, not every notion of hope, as is the case with Bloch's approach, has a positive relationship with utopia, for example, in Gabriel Marcel's view, hope "resists and negates utopianism in all its forms" (D. Webb, "Exploring the Relationship between Hope and Utopia: Towards a Conceptual Framework", *Politics* 2008, Vol. 28, No. 3, p. 198). Pedagogy of hope, which can be considered more prominent in the theory and practice of education of the last few decades than pedagogical utopianism, is therefore a separate issue, see D. Webb, "Pedagogies of Hope", *Studies in Philosophy and Education* 2013, Vol. 32, No. 4, pp. 397-414; D. Halpin, *Hope and Education*, op. cit., pp. 10–30.

"While utopianism is increasingly being welcomed, the welcomes are hesitant and restrained"[82], and some of its pejorative connotations for the Western pedagogical imagination appear to remain significant.

A number of solutions to educational problems proposed by theoreticians and practitioners connecting them with the notion of utopia, Webb, clearly identifying himself with the tradition of radical pedagogy, perceives as a kind of 'domestication' thereof. For him, this means that the essential features of the phenomenon are lost in these projects, such as operating with a holistic vision, radically different from the current conditions of social reality[83]. These projects, evoking directly or only indirectly the notion of utopian realism, seem to refer to Edward Hallett Carr's concept proposed in the late 1930s, as well as to Anthony Giddens developing a "third way" strategy in the context of the left-wing crisis after the fall of the Berlin Wall. In some of these, Webb recognizes the essential features of this kind of realism, noting that

> they are immanent (grounded in real practices, processes, trends), partial (eschewing totalising visions in favour of localised exercises of the utopian imagination) and processive (not positing a rational blueprint to which reality must conform but operating rather to highlight prefigurative institutions and practices)[84].

For example, the editors of the volume *Utopian Pedagogy*, in discussing in their introduction the subject matter and theoretical contexts of the works contained therein, explain their understanding of utopia "utopia not as a place we might reach but as an ongoing process of becoming" As they declare, "The utopian impulse that interests us does not lead to a promised land. It knows that domination and exploitation can only be minimized, never eliminated [...]". Furthermore, "no blueprint could ever survive the passage from conception to implementation without

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82 D. Webb, "Where's the Visions?", op. cit., p. 744.

83 See D. Webb, "Educational Studies and the Domestication of Utopia", *British Journal of Educational Studies* 2016, Vol. 64, No. 4, pp. 437–439, 441–443; D. Webb, "Where's the Visions?", op. cit., pp. 753–755; D. Webb, "Critical Pedagogy, Utopia and Political (Dis)engagement", *Power and Education* 2013, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 280–290.

84 D. Webb, "Educational Studies and the Domestication of Utopia", op. cit., p. 434. See D. Halpin, *Hope and Education*, op. cit., pp. 59–73.

becoming something entirely other than what it was. Thus it might be said that utopian experiments today share a point of *departure* much more than a point of arrival"[85].

In Webb's view, utopian realism, which brings to mind the tradition of liberal reformism and the politics of small steps, testifies to a kind of imagination overpowering by a common sense deeply rooted in the reality dominated by capitalism, an imagination incapable of delineating an alternative and of breaking its subordination to the reproduction of its order. In this way, a "The utopian is collapsed into the present and fixes its gaze on partial amelioristic reforms that anticipate or prefigure nothing beyond themselves"[86]. A holistic concept of utopia is an appropriate solution for educational theory and practice, which Webb explicitly advocates and which he refers to Paulo Freire's approach. Imagining a holistic vision of an alternative future has a pedagogically significant transformative potential, for it is about establishing a new emotional and cognitive relationship of the subject to reality: it is the holistic utopia as a method and practice that makes it possible to "defamiliarising the familiar, familiarising the strange, liberating the imagination from the constraints of common sense, throwing up new solutions to pressing contemporary problems, generating new patterns of desire and catalysing change"[87]. The notion of utopia established by Webb within the framework of radical pedagogy, capable in its development of outbidding any established or imagined order, does not cease to be particularistic as well as historically and socially relative. It is therefore arguable that the absence of an organized force or majority to support a given comprehensive vision will require educational work in competition for a gradually achieved further change in the attitude towards utopia in general and the very pattern of desire in relation to its concrete exemplification. Nevertheless, Webb's structuring of the discussion within educational studies of utopia around two distinct approaches seems to provide some

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[85] M. Coté, R.J.F. Day, G. de Peuter, "Introduction: What is Utopian Pedagogy?", [in:] *Utopian Pedagogy. Radical Experiments against Neoliberal Globalization*, ed. M. Coté, R.J.F. Day, G. de Peuter, Toronto 2007, pp. 13, 14 – original underline. See M. Coté, R.J.F. Day, G. de Peuter, "Utopian Pedagogy: Creating Radical Alternatives in the Neoliberal Age", *The Review of Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies* 2007, Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 328–329.

[86] D. Webb, *Educational Studies and the Domestication of Utopia*, op. cit., p. 444.

[87] Ibidem, p. 442.

insight into its characteristics and directions of development. On the other hand, the variety of edutopias, the diversity of research issues regarding the relationship between utopia and education, cannot be easily systematized. Not without significance are the discrepancies in the field of theories of utopia, as well as a clearly noticeable large amount of free associations connected by practitioners and researchers of education with utopianism.

BETWEEN THE UTOPIAN CONDITION OF EDUCATION AND THE EDUCATIONAL POTENTIAL OF UTOPIA

The crimes committed in Stalin's and Hitler's totalitarian states, in which those in power by means of arbitrary decisions, propaganda, extensive security apparatus, surveillance and terror strove to cover with their influence, organization and supervision all areas of society and every citizen according to a specific ideology, leaving no room for any opposition, pluralism or privacy, correspond to the meaning of negative utopias, dystopias and anti-utopias[88], which in twentieth-century literature outnumbered adaptations of optimistic images of more decent than existing societies. As Astrid Męczkowska-Christiansen notes, "as we have witnessed the degeneration of utopia in the modern world, we have noticed how thin the line between the dream of a better tomorrow and the politics of extermination has become". Hence she claims that "utopia has become for us a synonym of false prophecy, which, seducing us with unfulfillable promises, makes us blind to the «real» challenges [...]"[89], according to Baczko's observation that "The shadow cast by shattered

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[88] See G. Claeys, *Dystopia*, op. cit., pp. 3–18, 113–268; M. Głażewski, *Dystopia. Pedagogiczne konteksty teorii systemów autopojetycznych Niklasa Luhmanna*, Zielona Góra 2010, pp. 132–178; A. Juszczyk, *Stary wspaniały świat*, op. cit., pp. 91-103; G. Claeys, "The Origins of Dystopia: Wells, Huxley and Orwell", [in:] *The Cambridge Companion to Utopian Literature*, op. cit., pp. 107–131; F. Jameson, *Archaeologies of the Future*, op. cit., pp. 198–202.

[89] A. Męczkowska, "Ku utopijności pedagogicznego myślenia", *Kwartalnik Pedagogiczny* 2005, No. 3, p. 6. See M. Olssen, "Totalitarianism and the "Repressed" Utopia of the Present: Moving beyond Hayek, Popper and Foucault", [in:] *Edutopias*, op. cit., pp. 99–123. In this context, it is worth noting two interesting attempts to rehabilitate utopia written during the climactic periods of compromise of its significant contemporary incarnations, see Z. Bauman, *Socialism*, op. cit., pp. 114-141; K. Kumar, *Utopianism*, op. cit., pp. 79–85.

utopias obscures the contours of future utopias [...]"[90]. While anti-uto-
pias are polemical and demystifying in the estimation of some experts
on the subject, according to Jameson, "they are informed by a central
passion to denounce and to warn against Utopian programs in the po-
litical realm"[91], revealing at the same time how and to what extent the
costs of striving for a well-ordered society outweigh the promised or
desired profits, while dystopias, which some scholars distinguish as
a separate phenomenon, focus the reader's attention on the possible
consequences of the development into a dominant trend or even the
ground for an apocalypse, of destructive factors for the individual, hu-
man communities, and often also life on Earth, which can also be ob-
served in current social arrangements. Nevertheless, images of worlds
without hope of reorientation, worlds of extreme social inequality, envi-
ronmental pollution or overpopulation, worlds of total control, genetic
retouching and modification, overwhelming technology, and the ex-
tinction of the human race, just like anti-utopias and utopias, can fulfill
the functions proper to didactic literature, serving to convey to readers
useful truths, recommendations, instructions, warnings, models of life,
ideals, and role models. As Halpin states, "Utopian literature is a reposi-
tory of reflection on human nature – on its purposes, limitations and
possibilities. You cannot get closer to moral questions than that"[92]. It is
worth adding here that their significance goes beyond moralism, since
in their attractive form they provide insight into the nature of man, but
also into social relations, challenges, opportunities and threats, as well
as confront questions about the potential of natural and social reality.
The worlds presented in their distinctness from the environment of the
viewer in a particular way act on his/her imagination and teach him/
her to use it, they demand the unification in thought of many described
devices and principles organizing the life of societies largely different
from the one he/she is familiar with and experience directly, as well
as anticipating the possible consequences of their combination and
functioning. Moreover, utopias demand and serve the development of
critical thinking – supporters of the existing order are trained in the

[90] B. Baczko, *Światła utopii*, Warszawa 2016, p. 11.
[91] F. Jameson, *Archaeologies of the Future*, op. cit., p. 199.
[92] D. Halpin, *Hope and Education*, op. cit., p. 40.

ability to point out and analyze the naiveties and errors present in uto-
pias, opponents in the ability to point out and analyze the naiveties
and errors present in the existing order, in the case of skeptics they
teach how to stand at a distance from the naiveties and errors hidden
in both realities. Critical thinking skills can also be fostered by the fact
that usually such images of sufficiently perfect societies contain com-
ments and evaluations on other utopias; for example, in Campanelli's
The City of the Sun we find elements of polemic with the image of the
organization of society contained in More's work, and in More's work
there are references to Plato's *Republic*. In a more explicit manner, this
demanding confrontation is revealed in negative utopias, as in Fritz
Lang's *Metropolis* or Tarik Saleh's *Metropia*, in which the divergence of
the realized concept of social order from its intention creates a clear
contrast for the viewer. On a micro scale it can also be read in the nine
verses of the biblical myth about the builders of Babel.

The images of pedagogies, edutopias, and institutions of socialization
sketched not only in works within the literary genre, but in various other
expressions of utopian thought, such as philosophical treatises and poli-
tical programs, also seem to be relevant to the pedagogical perspective.
First, these are images present in different temporal orders and cultural
traditions of educational institutions, which by their influence contribute
to the maintenance of the social order assumed in a given utopia and to
the formation of citizens functional in relation to this system, peculiar
instruments of progress in the hands and guided by the "enlightened".
Second, these are images that can make us aware of the shortcomings
of our educational reality in its various aspects and dimensions, that can
trigger criticism, help us distance ourselves from the current educational
device, foster the expression and formation of new desires, and contri-
bute to social change[93]. Third, in utopias we can find projects of radically
innovative pedagogies, edutopias, which embody a discovered ideal of
education and a model of upbringing worthy of realization or imitation
for the transformation of the school, the family, religious associations
or other environments and institutions of socialization. Fourth, utopias

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[93] According to Levitas, the most important functions of utopia, also mentioned by re-
searchers, are: compensation, criticism, change, expression or education of desire and
produce estrangement (see R. Levitas, *The Concept of Utopia*, op. cit., p. 208).

from different times and cultures can show the principles of future education, education adequate to the changes and challenges, which are already outlined today, but which are characteristic of the world yet to come. Fifth, following the famous concept of "education of desire" proposed in Abensour's commentary on Morris' utopianism, "Desire must be taught to desire, to desire better, to desire more, and above all to desire otherwise"[94]. Sixth, it happens that "educational dreams of the collective imagination" are completely filled with utopias – according to Baczko, this was a frequent case in the period of the French Revolution – which are specific visions of educational societies:

> On the one hand, says the researcher, it is the dream of a pedagogical society that would fulfill its educational functions through all other institutions and would thus transform itself into a gigantic school of new life. On the other hand, it is the dream of a social pedagogy, as refined as it is systematic, encompassing by its efforts the folk-child. In the course of the Revolution, legislators and ideologists constantly extolled the beneficial effects that education would bring to the people and exulted in the vision of the rebirth of the people[95].

With regard to the period in question, it is worth adding, following Baczko, that the pedagogical utopias promoted by the new elites both expressed and obscured the complex relations and contradictions that existed between their expectations and experiences – the people had to be taught freedom, equality and fraternity, that is, "their own future", while at the same time their condition was of a completely different nature. In other words, it had to be recognized that "Only an educational action, conceived as a purification of the future from the past, can fully realize the great breakthrough against the continuity of generations, habits and customs"[96].

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[94] M. Abensour, "William Morris: The Politics of Romance", [in:] *Revolutionary Romanticism. A Drunken Boat Anthology*, ed. M. Blechman, San Francisco 1999, p. 145. See R. Levitas, *Utopia as Method*, op. cit., pp. 4–5, 113–116.

[95] B. Baczko, "Ukształcić nowego człowieka… Utopia i pedagogika w okresie Rewolucji Francuskiej", [in:] *Problemy wiedzy o kulturze. Prace dedykowane Stefanowi Żółkiewskiemu*, ed. A. Brodzka, M. Hopfinger, J. Lalewicz, Wrocław 1986, pp. 264–265.

[96] Ibidem, p. 267.

The utopian project of modernization of a given state implies in terms of education, which is worth emphasizing, not only the transformation of pedagogies or the reconstruction of schools, but also of the human being. Reading into utopias, we get to know the pedagogical dreams of society accumulated and elaborated in them, giving insight into its field of experience and the horizon of expectations, perceived dangers, difficulties and barriers, objections, fears, needs, desires and hopes related to education. But utopias are also visions of a desirable direction of development, inspiring concrete current actions, a target state of educational work. That is to say, educational practice not only bases its intentions on a desire to achieve partially or fully the specific human and social condition that is to be achieved in the future through its actions, but achieves its coherence through, among other things, the alignment of the past, present and future, the use of the existing resources of the individual, the group and their environment, in a succession of efforts aimed at approaching predetermined goals. However, when we draw a profile of a sociology, biotechnology, or medicine graduate and present it to the first years of our students, we cannot be sure what their professional sphere, social role, and private life will look like in the future, even in the near future. We do not know what changes will be reflected in the law, what dynamics the economy will acquire, how knowledge, the environment or the social structure will change. We do not know in which part of the world the female and male graduates of our universities will take up the challenge of co-creating everyday life. Nevertheless, we try to make sure that our actions are not accidental, we share the work to shape women and men, citizens, workers in the image and likeness of our ideas about their good life and the social relations that are to exist. Often they form a contrast with what the female and male students imagine in the course of our endeavors as useful for the future, interesting or giving hope for this good life. But even blind to the "state of goals" or spontaneous upbringing and education, effectively produce and thus define individual and social states of tomorrow, although in terms of utopia such crystallizations of hope are difficult or impossible to grasp.

Edutopias or utopias and their educational contexts that have come to fruition deserve separate attention. One frequently cited example involves the complex actions, concepts, and initiatives of the English industrialist and philanthropist Robert Owen. In 1799, Owen purchased

a cotton mill in New Lanark and through his reforms there, including improved housing and sanitation, introduction of Prohibition, ordering of the streets, regulation of the prices of basic products, and creation of a free school system, based on original principles and practices, in which the children of workers between the ages of 5 and 10 were educated instead of employed in the factory, he strove to transform the life of the local community into an exemplary, harmoniously coexisting community. According to a contemporary American historian and philosopher of education, Gerald L. Gutek, who distanced himself from the work of the utopian, "Developing the very modern argument that model cities will create model men and women, Owen's designs for planned communities anticipated the strategies of contemporary urbanologists and community planners"[97]. He also considers the curriculum and teaching methods he proposes as a peaceful means of bringing about change and seeking solutions to the ills of the age, in the context of the traditional forms of education of the time, as committing a kind of heresy[98]. On the one hand, Owen's assumption that an exemplary living environment would form exemplary women and exemplary men underpinned his concept of improvements made at New Lanark. On the other hand, it was his experiences there that formed the basis of the social theories he formulated and promulgated. Much is said about the nature of both his reforms and his concepts in a passage from Gutek's commentary, who notes that

> While Owen was a humanitarian, he was also a benevolent paternalist who invaded an individual's right of privacy. A pedagogical and social busybody, Owen's theory of the planned society interfered with the individual's freedom to choose his or her own lines of self-development and self-cultivation.

[97] G. L. Gutek, *Philosophical and Ideological Perspectives on Education*, Needham 1997, p. 209.

[98] Monika Humeniuk uses this category in relation to the theory and practice of education, see M. Humeniuk, "Między katechizmem a biblioteką – hermeneutyczne i krytyczne odsłony pedagogiki religii", [in:] *Między ekskluzją a inkluzją w edukacji religijnej*, ed. M. Humeniuk, I. Paszenda, Wrocław 2017, pp. 117-136; M. Humeniuk, "Hermeneutyka słabej myśli Gianniego Vattimo jako inspiracja dla pedagogiki religii", *Forum Pedagogiczne* 2019, Vol. 9, No. 2/1, pp. 119–132; M. Huemniuk, "Czy pedagogika religii daje się sekularyzować? O ortodoksjach, herezjach i religioznawczych perspektywach rozwoju subdyscypliny", *Ars Educandi* (in print).

He was a self-appointed prophet and social engineer who sought to shape people according to what he believed was in their best interests[99].

This observation seems to apply equally well to the position of teachers and students in today's Western educational systems, which embody past visions of tomorrow's schools, as Le Corbusier famously said, "today's reality is yesterday's utopia". It is important, therefore, to consider the important connection, in our everyday world, between past ideas about better education and schooling and their current forms, and to see them as derivatives of past utopias. In the context of the criticism and imaginings with which the educational system is confronted today, we can pose the question, following Michał Głażewski: "how to educate in times of dystopia?"[100].

Utopias occupy a special place, which is not difficult to distinguish, in pedagogical doctrines and, more broadly, in educational ideologies. Whether in the case of personalistic pedagogy, dialogic pedagogy, anti-pedagogy, feminist pedagogy, the concept of a society without schools or many others, their promoters and spokesmen operate with images of worthwhile and possible to achieve different from the current state, appropriate and successful shapes of the individual and social relations. Islands of educational resistance, to use a phrase coined by Bogusław Śliwerski, constituting an archipelago of alternative education immersed in the waters of education, a kind of counter-education, are supposed to aim at a set of ideals accepted in advance. Bringing hope and satisfaction to the sustained pursuit and approach, utopia dictates the means and sets the direction. At the same time, as part of the ideological complex[101] a given utopia does not have to be exclusively assigned to it, for example, the image of a de-schooled society devised during the French Revolution, i.e. the project of "the almost total suppression of any specialized and institutionalized school system"[102], and the contemporary one, proposed by Ivan Illich[103], are adapted to different historical contexts, social situations

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[99] G. L. Gutek, *Philosophical and Ideological Perspectives on Education*, op. cit., p. 209.

[100] M. Głażewski, *Dystopia*, op. cit., p. 15.

[101] See R. Włodarczyk, *Ideologia, teoria, edukacja. Myśl Ericha Fromma jako inspiracja dla pedagogiki współczesnej*, Kraków 2016, pp. 177–226, 282–289.

[102] B. Baczko, *Utopian Lights*, op. cit., p. 315.

[103] See I. Illich, *Deschooling Society*, New York 1971, pp. 1–23, 72–104.

and needs, just as the vision of the monastic community has different incarnations in medieval Eastern and Western Christianity or Buddhism.

What is still worth emphasizing is that in the pedagogical promises of schooling, revalidation, andragogy, and re-socialization, development means progress and a better tomorrow, or at least non-deteriorated condition. However, in late modernity Western societies of intense change, competition, and burgeoning populism, the merely non-deteriorated condition does not seem to work on the imagination of voters or consumers. Paradoxically, there is much to suggest that a kind of *signum temporis* of our civilizational circle is precisely the crisis of utopian thinking[104]. Such a crisis in the field of education itself may contribute to its inertia, as a result of the lack of faith in the possibility of significant improvement, and consequently stimulate the search and pedagogical imagination with utopian projects. Hence, the contemporary appeal of a British education researcher, resonating in this with Webb's radical demands, seems understandable: "while I am fully aware of the indifferent historic reputation of some utopias and utopians", Halpin writes, "I will insist that, currently, we need new utopian visions in education (as well as elsewhere), not their abandonment"[105]. If, then, one sees in liberal democracy not so much a mechanism for selecting elites as the promise of a decent society that we are in the process of creating, one must not only imagine that society itself, but also an education appropriate to that idea in order to be able to discuss it in the forum.

The demands placed on reality by utopians are perhaps proportional to the criticism they face. Knowing utopia's bad press, their architects do not like to be associated with it, the literary genre itself they may

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[104] Baczko divides eras into "hot", "when utopias flourish, when the utopian imagination penetrates the most diverse forms of intellectual", and "cold", in which utopian creativity wanes (see B. Baczko, *Utopian Lights*, op. cit., p. 6). Webb sees here a possible correlation between the mode or type of hope (he distinguishes between estimative, resolute, patient, critical and transformative hope) dominant in particular historically determined societies and their emotional orientations, and the place and role of utopianism in the social imagination of a given population in that period (see D. Webb, *Exploring the Relationship between Hope and Utopia*, op. cit., pp. 199–202). Bauman, on the other hand, argues that retrotopias are the current answer to the crisis of utopia (see Z. Bauman, *Retrotopia*, Cambridge 2017, pp. 4–11).

[105] D. Halpin, *Hope and Education*, op. cit., p. 2. See D. Webb, "The Domestication of Utopia", op. cit., pp. 437–439; D. Webb, "Where's the Vision?", op. cit., pp. 755–757.

consider worn out, which is not to say that utopian thinking knows only one medium. It would be a convenient simplification to point to utopianism, including pedagogical utopianism, as a harmful fantasy, but even leaving aside its value and persistence, it should be acknowledged that one of the basic tasks of philosophers and educational theorists is to establish the complexity of phenomena.

The two parts of the book include chapters, most of which have been published before. However, only some of them have retained their original form. The remaining chapters have, for various reasons, been reedited to the benefit, I hope, of the book, its subject matter, and those who wish to consult it. The work on *Utopia and Education* also required changes, additions and updates to its content and the sources used in order to avoid, or at least limit, possible inconsistencies and repetitions. Finally, some of the chapters, including those previously published, were written with this monograph in mind. As a result, they are all linked by the subject of the relationship between utopia and education, but in their realization they retain relative autonomy and independent cognitive value, according to the author's intention, which should be emphasized. In some places, some of them even seem to go beyond the problem area considered here from the perspective of philosophy and theory of education, already outlined in this introduction. They can be read as a supplement, however, due to the fact that individual chapters address only selected issues falling within this vast field and by no means exhaust the main theme of the book, they can also be seen as elaborations of contexts essential for its realization.

Nevertheless, from my perspective, the book brings together and summarizes a certain stage of research that has been going on for years, and I hope it will also become clear to the readers after or perhaps during reading, that such a work is necessary, given the potential of the topic and the development of utopian studies, in order to be able to continue them. Moreover, I believe that the very efficacy of utopia – how and in how many ways, in what forms, with what power and by what rationale, inspiring and disturbing people, shaping and defining their concepts, attitudes and actions, awakening desires and nightmares, utopia is able to permeate social reality – constitutes both the importance and complexity,

as well as the uniqueness and multithreading of the issue. Thus, in the first part of the book, I examine selected aspects and educational contexts of this efficacy, keeping in mind the philosophical and theoretical contribution of the results of my research to pedagogical knowledge, as well as to the broader humanities and social sciences, while in the second part, without abandoning my research aspirations, I try to shape the image of the utopia of asylum pedagogy, seeking inspiration from selected philosophers and theorists working on the boundaries of Western and Jewish thought and tradition[106].

As I have already indicated, the character and the way of solving philosophical and pedagogical problems proposed in this book determines the multiplicity of details and the diversity of its contents which would be difficult to describe here, and which I would like to encourage my readers to get acquainted with by reading both parts of *Utopia and Education*. At this stage of their announcement, I will only add that, as in the case of my previous works, also this one is accompanied by the idea of integrating the philosophy and pedagogy of dialogue with the theory and critical pedagogy, reaching to the experience of, among others, the so called two Frankfurt schools, but this time, because of the role of utopian studies[107] for the subject matter, I try to penetrate more deeply into their achievements, as well as the achievements of researchers from the circle of the Warsaw school of historians of ideas. I hope that this addition at least partly explains my approach to the issues discussed in the introduction as well as in both parts of the book.

However, this book would not have been written without people who were kind to the author and to his research, to whom he remains grateful. I will not manage to mention them all here, which does not diminish their role in my eyes. With full conviction I can repeat and express my

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[106] It is worth mentioning right away that all Hebrew Bible and Talmud quotation in English are from: https://www.sefaria.org/texts.

[107] At this point I would like to emphasize the importance and value of Polish studies on utopia, conducted for years in two research centers associated with the academic circles of Gdansk, Lublin and Krakow: Utopia Study Group and Facta Ficta Research Center (see A. Blaim, "Utopian Studies in Poland. A Preliminary Survey", *Utopian Studies* 2016, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 243–246). Also the seminars organized at the Institute of Pedagogy of the University of Wroclaw and subsequent editions of the conference "Utopia and Education" leave a permanent trace in the form of subsequent publications (see *Utopia a edukacja*, Vol. 1–4, Wrocław 2016–2020).

that, after many experiences with them, they could be mine. To those who gave them to me because the light they emit is pleasant.

All of them, though not all have been mentioned by me here, have made my inquiries, another part of which I have not without effort recorded here, and my life such a facinating adventure. I wish them to remember warmly their participation in these. Without them, nothing would have become comprehensible to me. True, not all loved ones are close today.

PART I

CHAPTER I

BETWEEN THE AUTARKY OF UTOPIA AND INTEGRITY OF IDEOLOGY. AROUND THOMAS MORE'S UTOPIA

We might therefore define
utopian novels the same way
More defined the cities visited
by Raphael Hythloday:
meet one, know them all

Bronisław Baczko,
Wyobrażenia społeczne

The infinity of responsibility
denotes not its actual immensity,
but a responsibility increasing in
the measure that it is assumed…

Emmanuel Levinas,
Totality and Infinity

In "Out of Utopia", Ralf Dahrendorf somewhat provocatively observes that "All utopias from Plato's Republic to George Orwell's brave new world of 1984 have had one element of construction in common: they are all societies from which change is absent". What is more, "Whether conceived as a final state and climax of historical development, as an intellectual's nightmare, or as a romantic dream, the social fabric of utopias does not, and perhaps cannot, recognize the unending flow of the historical process"[1].

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[1] R. Dahrendorf, "Out of Utopia. Toward a Reorientation of Sociological Analysis", *The American Journal of Sociology* 1958, Vol. 64, No. 2, p. 115. A similar observation which focuses in the characteristics of utopia on absence of change, was expressed 20 years later by Isaiah Berlin in his essay "The Decline of Utopian Ideas in the West": "The main characteristic of most, perhaps all, Utopias is the fact that they are static. Nothing in them alters, for they have reached perfection: there is no need for novelty or change; no one can wish to alter a condition in which all natural human wishes are fulfilled" (I. Berlin, *The Crooked Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas*, ed. H. Hardy, Oxford 2013, p. 21).

Dahrendorf seems to have been aware of the generalisation, uncomfortable for himself, which he expressed in the first sentences of the article referred to. Moreover, his intention was not to develop utopian research, but rather to criticise one line of sociological theory seen by him from the perspective of the late 1950s as employing what for him was a model of society far removed from reality[2]. This does not mean that his comments on utopianism are unfounded, and definitely he is not alone in his thinking. They are part of the typical post-World War II critique of utopianism, conducted from positions similar to those adopted by Dahrendorf. The essential features of this kind of criticism can be expressed in the words of Barbara Goodwin, who argued against him that "the essence of the liberal-democratic opposition to utopianism lies in the fear that the postulate of a *summum bonum* places ends above means, overlooks human differentiation and the need for variety, and imposes an unchanging harmony and uniformity on a heterogeneous and historically developing humanity. This approach would necessarily suppress individuals and minorities, who need democratic protection" and inevitably for these critics connect utopia with permanent violence and totalitarianism[3]. However, it should be added that, according to at least some of them, this can be avoided without abandoning the ambition to bring about social change. Thus, arguing in favour of the vision of an open society, Karl R. Popper sees opportunities for its realisation in that "We can interpret the history of power politics from the point of view of our fight for the open society, for a rule of reason, for justice, freedom, equality, and for the control of international crime. Although history has no ends, we can impose these ends of ours upon it; and *although history has no meaning, we can give it a meaning*"[4]. Still,

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[2] See R. Dahrendorf, "Out of Utopia", op. cit., p. 122.

[3] B. Goodwin, "Utopia and Political Theory", [in:] B. Goodwin, K. Taylor, *The Politic of Utopia. A Study in Theory and Practice*, London 1982, p. 110. See K. R. Popper, "Utopia and Violence", [in:] K. R. Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations. The Growth of Scientific Knowledge*, London – New York 2002, pp. 477–488; K. Rejman, "Miejsce cierpienia w urzeczywistnionej (?) utopii – rozważania na poły pedagogiczne", [in:] *Utopia a edukacja*, Vol. 1, ed. J. Gromysz, R. Włodarczyk, Wrocław 2016, pp. 55–65. Importantly, "anti-utopianism" is a time-honoured practice in Western culture; its core ideas, positions, opinions, and sentiments are discussed by George Kateb in *Utopia and Its Enemies* (see G. Kateb, *Utopia and Its Enemies*, New York 1972).

[4] K. Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, Princeton – Oxford 2013, p. 482 – original underline. See B. Goodwin, "Utopia and Political Theory", op. cit., pp. 113–114.

neither Popper, nor Dahrendorf, an active politician, a parliamentarian in the Bundestag, an EU commissioner for a few successive terms of office, would not consider their own commitment to liberal democracy in terms of engagement in a utopia; or an ideology.

Be that as it may, although Dahrendorf's remark on the relation of the utopia and change, on the insight into the historical process, remains tangentially related to the concern about sociology expressed in the cited article, I would like to follow up on this comment, bearing in mind against these concerns, the importance of utopia for social theory, especially the theory of ideology, and the philosophy of education. Hence, in this chapter, I use as my starting point the theme of change in utopia, its form and character as it was realised in Thomas More's classic work. This is a theme in its own right, which is why I devote more attention to it. Nevertheless, a detailed reconstruction of the form and nature of change, the images of which More provides in *Utopia*, is intended to reveal what the complexity and lability of the relationship between utopia and ideology may consist in. It should be noted here that in More's time, for obvious reasons, the latter element of this pair of concepts could not provide a reference point for thinking about the organisation and direction of change in politics and education. However, this does not diminish the importance of the phenomenon itself, but only makes it harder to discern. Therefore, in the third part of the chapter I turn to the concept of ideology, which I derive from Erich Fromm's sociology of religion. This multifaceted and comprehensive concept used to confront the results of More's analysis of the emergence of utopias offers a good insight into the properties of their relationship. Of course, the use of specific ways of understanding utopias and ideologies, chosen from among many others, also limits the significance of the insight gained to the assumptions made, but it seems to me that it would not be constructive enough without them.

UTOPIA AND ITS MALLEABILITY IN HYTHLODAY'S ACCOUNT OF THE IDEAL SYSTEM OF A STATE AND AN UNKNOWN ISLAND

The story of Raphael Hythloday, the protagonist of a Renaissance text published by More on the eve of the Reformation indicates that the island and state of Utopia, unknown to the European elites of the day, develop

their rather stable form, unsurprisingly, gradually and over a long time. More or less significant changes take place both in terms of the territory and its residents, and in terms of an admirable, if not enviable, social order. However, Hythloday, who is introduced to us in the text as a traveller from Portugal, philosopher, observer of everyday life of the Utopians, pays little heed to these two overlapping processes in his story, or else little attention to them is devoted in his description of the extraordinary meeting with him by his main interlocutor, in which role More casts himself[5].

We may safely say that *Utopia* is a literary game with convention, a social pastime inspired by the English author and active politician on a par with European humanists of the early 16th century[6], even if the history of the reception of the text demonstrates a duality interesting from the

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[5] The history of the work's reception makes it possible to determine which character from the pair of interlocutors, Hythloday or More, or both Hythloday and More, in their opposing statements expresses the author's views more fully, is really a matter of interpretation and is not without significance for the reading of the general meaning of *Libellus aureus nec minus salutaris quam festivus de optimo Reipublicae statu de que nova insula Utopia*. For example, in his influential commentary published in 1887, Karl Kautsky sees the author's porte-parole in the figure of Hythloday and, as it were, beatifies the English humanist, who a few years after the publication of his work begins his career as an influential and prominent politician, as the "first modern socialist", attributing a similar role to Thomas Münzer (K. Kautsky, *Thomas More and his Utopia*, 2002, pp. 93, 106–107, 140–141, 172–183, 198–199, https://www.marxists.org/archive/kautsky/1888/more/index.htm, available: 15.10.2021). Incidentally, Pope Leo XIII beatified Sir Thomas More a year before Kautsky's comment was made and the Catholic Church canonised him in 1935.

[6] See B. Baczko, *Wyobrażenia społeczne. Szkice o nadziei i pamięci zbiorowej*, Warszawa 1994, pp. 85–87; J. C. Davis, "Thomas More's Utopia: Sources, Legacy and Interpretation", [in:] *The Cambridge Companion to Utopian Literature*, ed. G. Claeys, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2010, pp. 51–78; J. M. Rodríguez García, "The Politics of Discourse in Thomas More's *Utopia*", *Cuadernos de Investigación Filológica* 2000, Vol. XXVI, pp. 81–87. The Latin text by the Englishman recognised by the humanist elite was originally published in Leuven and within three years had separate editions in Paris, twice in Basel and Florence. Still, it had to wait 35 years for its first English translation (London 1551), which appeared almost simultaneously with the Italian (Venice 1548) and French (Paris 1550) editions. The first Spanish edition came out in Madrid probably between 1519 and 1535, and the German edition dates from as early as 1524 (Basel), but was limited solely to *Book II*. The Polish translation by Kazimierz Abgarowicz was first published in 1947 (see list of editions of the text: R. I. Lakowski, "The International Thomas More Bibliography (U): *Utopia*, Part A: Editions and Translations", https://extra.shu.ac.uk/emls/01-2/lakoutop.html, available: 15.10.2021).

perspective of the subject matter at hand. As the author of *A Truly Golden Little Book, No Less Beneficial than Entertaining, of a Republic's Best State and of the New Island Utopia*, More skilfully uses adequately chosen means to concoct for the reader's intellectual fulfilment a sophisticated and credible image of a possible encounter, its participants, and social relations, overseas journeys and uncharted territories. We can safely say that for a text published in 1516, he does so in an ingenious way, evocative to a small group of readers, educated people of its time. Simultaneously, the text is not devoid of humour, irony and sophisticated language games[7]. What is more, for over five hundred years this literary world, its construction, the author's idea and the phenomenon of the work have been attracting the attention of readers, arousing both concern and contempt, as well as inspiring analysis and reading[8]. Let us therefore stick to the convention introduced by the author: during a meeting in Antwerp, a traveller he met shares with More with conviction and competence, between meals, his observations from a few years' stay on a distant, singular island. In two books of a modest text, More reconstructs and explains the context of their meeting and the discussion that preceded Hythloday's

[7] The language games, comic and ironic elements obscured in the reading mediated by translation and possible to identify in the Latin original with an additional mastery of Greek, might have affected the character and course of the reception of the text. Still, utopias in general, as e.g. Craig Brinton has observed, are usually a product of the creative minority and intellectual elites (see C. Brinton, "Utopia and Democracy", [in:] *Utopias and Utopian Thought*, ed. F. E. Manuel, Boston 1966, pp. 51–55). To illustrate this problem, researchers often cite examples of proper names, such as: Hythlodaeus ("speaker of nonsense"), the principal river of Utopia, The Anydrus ("no water"), or the capital of Amaurotus ("hazy place" or "the city of phantom") (see L. T. Sargent, *Utopianism. A Very Short Introduction*, New York 2010, pp. 22–23).

[8] This diverse reception and development of utopian studies is reflected in the articles in the following two special issues of *Utopian Studies* (2016, No. 2 and 3), commemorating the 500th anniversary of the publication of *A Truly Golden Little Book, No Less Beneficial than Entertaining* (see also R. Levitas, *The Concept of Utopia*, Oxford 2011, pp. 179–205; R. Levitas, *Utopia as Method. The Imaginary Reconstruction of Society*, New York 2013, pp. 103–126). With respect to the situation in Poland, see R. A. Tokarczyk, "Zarys historii polskiej myśli utopijnej", and "Recepcja *Utopii* Tomasza Morusa w Polsce", [in:] R. A. Tokarczyk, *Polska myśl utopijna. Trzy eseje z dziejów*, Lublin 1995, pp. 14–104; K. Pisarska, "More's *Utopia* in Poland: Translations and Impact – An Overview", *Utopian Studies* 2016, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 346–362; A. Blaim, "Utopian Studies in Poland: A Preliminary Survey", *Utopian Studies* 2016, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 230–249; R. Włodarczyk, "Utopia w perspektywie pedagogiki współczesnej", [in:] *Utopia a edukacja*, Vol. 1, op. cit., pp. 66–86.

detailed tale, concerning the socio-political crisis of England and other European powers, and then, like the journalist-interviewer, impartially conveys to the reader interested in the unknown world of *The Age of Discovery*[9] a comprehensive account of the traveller's story. We, too, are the readers interested in the unfamiliar way of life and development of the island, especially their remodelling and susceptibility to change.

As for the first of these issues, i.e. the gradual shaping of the territory and its population, we learn from Hythloday only a few details about the very creation of Utopia. Before the arrival of Utopus with his troops, Abraxa was a peninsula. Having taken over its territory, the soldiers and the natives made an extensive ditch which isolated the land they occupied from their neighbours. Their territory thus came to be a federation of 54 cities and numerous villages. As for the indigenous population, we learn that they were "rude, uncouth inhabitants", and that it was only the new ruler who brought them "to such a high level of culture and humanity" that today, i.e. after more than seventeen centuries, in the opinion of the Portuguese they "surpass almost every other people"[10].

We do not know where Utopus came from and why he decided to stay. Nor do we know who exactly he brought with him and who his soldiers were. We do not learn the dates of the landmark events, the names of the protagonists, their contribution to the gradual shaping of the places and inhabitants. Instead, in the yearbooks which Hythloday had access to according to More, and whose "records began 1,760 years ago with the conquest of the island, were diligently compiled, and are carefully preserved in writing", we read that

> the first houses were low, like cabins or peasant huts, built slapdash out of any sort of lumber, with mud-plastered walls. The roofs, rising up to a central point, were thatched with straw. But now their houses are all three storeys high and handsomely constructed; the outer sections of the walls are made of fieldstone, quarried rock or brick, and the space between is filled up with gravel and cement. The roofs are flat and are covered with a kind of plaster that is cheap but formulated so as to be fireproof, and more

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[9] See J. Osterhammel, *Kolonialismus. Geschichte – Formen – Folgen*, München 1995; M. Ferro, *Colonization: A Global History*, London – New York 1997.

[10] T. More, *Utopia*, ed. G. M. Logan, Cambridge 2016, p. 44.

weather-resistant even than lead. Glass (of which they have a good supply) is used in windows to keep out the weather [...][11].

The details of Hythloday's story consistently illustrate civilisational progress, nearly a leap forward initiated by Utopus himself. According to the traveller's account, "from the beginning the whole city was planned by Utopus himself, but that he left to posterity matters of adornment and improvement such as he saw could not be perfected in one man's lifetime"[12]. Somehow, based on an algorithm, a pattern or a standard undisclosed to us, this general city plan is supplemented over time by anonymous demiurges with countless specific solutions and components.

Thus, Utopia is a colony created by conquest[13]. Hythloday does not describe any struggle. The advantage of one side from the moment it enters Abraxa seems obvious. This is not only a military edge. Or, to put it another way, the military edge doesn't matter much from the storyteller's point of view. The indigenous people seem, without exception, submissive to the invader and its plans and, more importantly, they can be educated. In Hythloday's account, one can discern a picture of a social structure that resembles the stratification assumed by Plato in his plans for an ideal polis from the dialogue *Politeia*[14]: Utopus turns out to be an enlightened ruler. He may actually be surrounded by creative advisors. Another layer are the soldiers who came with him, probably some of them with their families, and the natives can be identified as craftsmen and peasants. However, it is not only the distribution of the population, but also the social structure which gets transformed with the progress of civilisation: subsequent inhabitants of the island are, without exception,

[11] Ibidem, p. 49.
[12] Ibidem, pp. 48–49.
[13] See M. Sommer, "Colonies – Colonisation – Colonialism: A Typological Reappraisal", *Ancient West & East* 2011, No. 10, pp. 183–193. On the affinities between utopia, colony and colonialism, see L. T. Sargent, *Utopianism*, op. cit., pp. 50–64.
[14] See L. Strauss, "Plato", [in:] *History of Political Philosophy*, ed. L. Strauss, J. Cropsey, Chicago and London 1987, pp. 33–89. The utopia from *The Republic*, apart from its other variations in Plato's *Timaeus*, *Critias* and *Laws* should be seen in the context of the various familiar ways of addressing this subject and similar ones in Hellenistic Greece, western culture or beyond (see M. Winiarczyk, *Utopie w Grecji hellenistycznej*, Wrocław 2010, pp. 24–36, 195–204; L. T. Sargent, *Utopianism*, op. cit., pp. 10–19, 66–101; K. Kumar, *Utopianism*, Minneapolis 1991, pp. 1–19).

familiar with farming and specialised in some craft and, excluding slaves, systematically take part in decision-making, the delegation and control of powers, and the filling of all positions in the state. In this way they avoid tyranny and constitutional change for centuries; the initial form of the state, absolute monarchy, is transformed[15]. The splendour obtained by the Utopians with their joint efforts turns the island into a metropolis with ever new colonies which, following the model, repeat the achievements of the metropolis.

This brings us to the second issue that opens up to analysis, namely the progressively achieved social order. Before we focus attention on its formation, let us define the effect itself. It is its principles and the presently prevailing rules of organisation and coexistence that make up the essential content of the apology delivered by Hythloday. He provides a wealth of detail, passionately yet methodically discussing a number of brilliant devices, initiatives and ready-made prescriptions. For example, as regards the population of each of the 54 cities, it should consist of 6,000 families, exclusive of the members of the senate. The size of these families is also predetermined: from 10 to 16 adults. The number of children is only seemingly indefinite, as their "excess" in one family is transferred to a family with fewer offspring[16]. The same happens in the case of excessively growing cities; the surplus population moves to where there is a shortage. On this basis it is possible to imagine an impressive population of over 5 million adults living in the agglomerations of Utopia alone, as the number of minors, the number and population of villages cannot

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[15] See T. More, *Utopia*, op. cit., p. 50. Referring to the system of Utopia, Paweł Rutkowski mentions representative democracy with elements of patriarchate (see P. Rutkowski, "Polityczne korzenie *Utopii* Tomasza Morusa", *Odrodzenie i Reformacja w Polsce* 2001, Vol. XLV, p. 35). For Krishana Kumara the democratism, which seems idealised, is a unique value and property of the world depicted in More's text (see K. Kumar, *Utopianism*, op. cit., pp. 48–53). However, following Lyman Tower Sargent it is worth addressing this rather neutral picture of the way political power operates and its relationship to the social environment. Sargent draws attention to the contrast with the contemporary perception of a political regime as articulated by Hythloday: "When I got around to reading More's *Utopia*, I struggled with it, finding its authoritarianism, hierarchy, and patriarchy dystopian, and today I would add its colonialism. While I still find these things deeply problematic, at some point I began to wonder how my sixteenth-century self might have responded to *Utopia* if I had been aware of it" (L. T. Sargent, "Five Hundred Years of Thomas More's *Utopia*", *Utopian Studies* 2016, Vol. 27, No. 2, p. 187).

[16] See T. More, *Utopia*, op. cit., p. 57.

be estimated (naturally, the term impressive is used here in relation to the reality of early 16th c.). Other, basically randomly selected examples can give an idea not only of the organisation of life on the island, but also of the way in which the text spins a story, directs attention and selects data. Here is how More refers to fragments of the order of everyday life, bringing out the pedagogical and pragmatic justifications characteristic of Hythloday's stories:

> Next to the marketplaces of which I just spoke are the food markets, where people bring all sorts of vegetables, fruit and bread. Fish, meat and poultry are also brought there from designated places not far outside the city, where running water can carry away all the blood and refuse. Bondsmen do the slaughtering and cleaning in these places: citizens are not allowed to do such work. The Utopians feel that slaughtering our fellow creatures gradually destroys the sense of compassion, the finest sentiment of which our human nature is capable. Besides, they don't allow anything dirty or filthy to be brought into the city, lest the air become tainted by putrefaction and thus infectious[17].

In Utopia, where "Wives act as servants to their husbands, children to their parents, and generally the younger to their elders"[18], and the senior is invariably the head of the family, there is no place for idleness and sloth. What is more, "there are no wine-bars, or ale-houses, or brothels; no chances for corruption; no hiding places; no spots for secret meetings. Because they live in the full view of all, they are bound to be either working at their usual trades or enjoying their leisure in a respectable way"[19]. Hythloday's field of social experience and his horizon of expectations is rather distant from our contemporary Western ethical and political sensibilities, but that is probably not the point. The world portrayed does not oblige us to anything. Yet it means something to us and perhaps says something about us. About us here and now.

As the quoted passages clearly illustrate, every sphere of Utopian everyday life and all its more important aspects turn out to be regulated,

[17] Ibidem, p. 58.
[18] Ibidem, p. 57.
[19] Ibidem, p. 62.

rationalised and controlled. According to Hythloday, this appears to be accepted and understood by the inhabitants of the island, even though maintaining such an order requires a lot of energy, discipline, constant cooperation, sacrifice, not giving in to passions, and acknowledging the primacy of reason and the common good. In a way, this unforced complacency of theirs is justified by Hythloday himself. He is confident that "unless private property is entirely abolished, there can be no fair or just distribution of goods, nor can the business of mortals be conducted happily"[20]. He can therefore convincingly claim that he admires "the wonderfully wise and sacred institutions of the Utopians, who are so well governed with so few laws. Among them virtue has its reward, yet everything is shared equally, and everyone lives in plenty"[21]. It is precisely "well-governed people" of Utopia, whom he left after five years only "to make that new world known to others"[22], offers hope for restoring the social body to permanent health and powers, which according to this philosopher and traveller are evidently absent from countries in crisis in this part of the world he himself comes from and which he now returns to.

However, Hythloday does not explain how a similar effect could be obtained here, too. Somewhat surprisingly in the context of the traces of Utopia's evolutionary, dynamic and directed path to a satisfactory perfection, he certainly does not believe in and rejects the strategy of gradual reform, favoured by More, its proponent and apologist, who remains unconvinced by Hythloday's rationale. As an interlocutor and opponent, it is not only for this reason that Hythloday has many doubts and stays clear of the solutions pursued in Utopia. As he confesses to the reader, to whom he turns at the end of his extensive account of the meeting:

> When Raphael had finished his story, I was left thinking that not a few of the laws and customs he had described as existing among the Utopians were really absurd. These included their methods of waging war, their religious practices, as well as other customs of theirs; but my chief objection was to the basis of their whole system, that is, their communal living and their

[20] Ibidem, p. 40.
[21] Ibidem, p. 39.
[22] Ibidem, p. 41.

moneyless economy. This one thing alone utterly subverts all the nobility, magnificence, splendour and majesty which (in the popular view) are the true ornaments and glory of any commonwealth[23].

AROUND THE VISION OF STABLE POLITICS, A-IDEOLOGICAL *UTOPIA* AND THE PEDAGOGY OF INERTIA

Regardless of what Hythloday himself claims or how More relates his story, it is reasonable to assume that the conquest of Abraxa marked the onset of a social revolution of sorts, except that the text provides little information on how the vision of Utopus was introduced and transformed. In addition to those previously indicated, the traveller's references noted by More to the transmission to the islanders of Greek and Roman works fascinating to Renaissance humanists, as well as the general principles of Christianity, may be considered a clue. Thus Hythloday and his companions unexpectedly contribute to the awakening of a spontaneous interest of the Utopians in the works of philosophers, scholars and writers, while the Utopians, for their part, almost immediately delegate to the learning of ancient languages and the study of texts a group of persons selected from among the most gifted scholars on the island. These take less than three years to reach a level of understanding adequate for independent reading. During this time, the Portuguese traveller hands over to the islanders part of his extensive book collection which accompanied him on his journey, e.g. "most of Plato's works and more of Aristotle's, as well as Theophrastus' book *On Plants*"[24], as well as Plutarch, Lucian, Aristophanes, Herodotus, Hippocrates, Galen, and many others. Hythloday is not only fascinated by the Utopians' openness to unfamiliar ideas, medicine, works of natural science, philosophy and poetry, but also by their innovativeness. Having listened to his and his companions' general explanations about papermaking and the art of printing, the Utopians quickly move away from writing on parchment, papyrus or bark. They develop their own technology of book reproduction on the basis of the pattern illustrated to them, and admittedly, as the traveller states, "now

[23] Ibidem, p. 113.
[24] Ibidem, p. 79.

they have no more than those I mentioned – which, however, they have reprinted in thousands of copies"[25].

Not only in the face of the knowledge and written experience of the ancient Greeks and Romans and the new technologies, the attitude of the islanders seems to fulfil the ideals of intercultural pedagogy and education. The Utopians react similarly vigorously and openly to knowledge about Christianity and the practice of this devotion. Hythloday is evidently surprised by the many conversions. He enthuses:

> you would not believe how eagerly they assented to it, either through the secret inspiration of God or because Christianity seemed very like the sect that most prevails among them. But I think they were also much influenced by the fact that Christ approved of his followers' communal way of life, and that among the truest groups of Christians the practice still prevails[26].

Enlivened with More's imagination, the Portuguese had far more to say about the small changes he himself initiated or effected, and which were passively accepted by the Utopians, than about the process and stages of implementing the comprehensive vision of the legendary ruler of the island. We see through his eyes the details of regular everyday life, but how the predetermined aggregate effect has been achieved vanishes from the readers' attention too.

At the same time, it seems that the very susceptibility to change, the malleability of Utopia and Utopians also remains unclear to Hythloday. His story as conveyed by More only occasionally reveals selected aspects of the dynamics of how this society is constituted. Moreover, he makes himself known as intellectually inspired but otherwise unmoved, unchanged and constant. That is not all, however. Hythloday witnesses cultural diffusion, but its depiction is even more naive than the colourfully rendered life forms of the world depicted. He takes us straight to the edge of the horizon of expectations and, like a tourist photographer with exaggerated enthusiasm and a penchant for insignificant details, he merely reproduces the current state of transformation as the end result, which flattens the dimension of the modernisations taking place

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[25] Ibidem, p. 81.
[26] Ibidem, p. 98.

from generation to generation and erases from the picture of social organisation the binders of politics, which include pedagogies. It is hard to believe in an essay in political philosophy, foreshadowed by Hythloday's discussion with More in Book One and the explicit and frequent references to the authority of Plato, in which essay the apotheosis of politics consists of images of its scattered, uncoordinated remnants in the form of creations of administration, professional preparation of citizens, or reluctant wars.

Perhaps this was the intention of the author and the initiator of the Renaissance humanists' social game. Nevertheless, the image of political community constructed by More in *Utopia* aims at exposing separately the scope of the transformations achieved and its pace rather than the manner in which they were carried out. In other words, the issue is at what moderate or radical pace and following which model Europeans are to change and improve their systems, as argued within More's literary convention with Hythloday, rather than how the Utopians achieved the well-being described in Book Two. The ontology of expectation itself, created in the traveller's statements as a universal good, remains relative, an awareness of which is clearly in More's distancing himself from it. In this respect, *The Prince* by Niccolo Machiavelli, written around the same time but published as late as 1532, creates a peculiar contrast with *Utopia* by focusing the reader's attention on the autonomy of politics and the competence of effective action[27]. As Isaiah Berlin observes, it is evident that "there is no trace of Platonic or Aristotelian teleology, no reference to any ideal order [...]"[28]. This is not all; as he adds,

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[27] See L. Strauss, "Niccolo Machiavelli", [in:] *History of Political Philosophy*, op. cit., pp. 296––317; I. Berlin, "The Originality of Machiavelli", [in:] I. Berlin, *Against the Current. Essays in the History of Ideas*, ed. H. Hardy, Oxford 2013, pp. 33–100.

[28] I. Berlin, "The Originality of Machiavelli", op. cit., p. 46. See also C. Holman, "Machiavelli's Two Utopias", *Utopian Studies* 2018, Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 88–108. Importantly, Christopher Holman, proceeding from assumptions different from Berlin's, argues that in the case of the philosopher from Florence we can speak of two separate conceptions of utopia, of which the less obvious account is particularly interesting and resonant. He writes as follows: "Machiavelli reveals the potential of institutionalize the persistent utopian impulse, his ideal republic affirming not a static organization of political being but, rather, an orientation toward the interminable reorganization of the form of the republic, a reorganization grounded in the continuous expulsion of creative desire" (ibidem, p. 93). In the comment quoted, Holman refers to the concept of Miguel Abensour, who in his

Plato and the Stoics, the Hebrew prophets and Christian medieval thinkers, and the writers of Utopias from More onward had a vision of what it was that men fell short of; they claimed, as it were, to be able to measure the gap between the reality and the ideal. But if Machiavelli is right, this tradition – the central current of Western thought – is fallacious[29].

Politics, broadly construed as "any kind of *independent* leadership in action"[30], or an art of governance and seeking solutions, making within a specific set of social relations decisions on the production, distribution and use of resources, as a desire to reign, conquer, preserve, consolidate and nurture power and to construct a sufficiently perfect society are two irreconcilable moral worlds.

In the case of both influential texts, therefore, we deal with a kind of separation of utopia and politics, a separation that seems to have systematically intensified over time in the Western world[31]. From the perspective of five centuries, we observe how, taking advantage of More's *licentia poetica*, utopia recedes from the realm of political philosophy and philosophy of education and, over time, takes the form of a relatively autonomously developing genre of didactic literature. Here it becomes the domain of ideas about definitively developed, already complete and sufficiently perfect social orders, in which politics is reduced to a function of governance and education to a kind of inertia, and thus exhausts its potential. Western revolutionaries, reformers and social activists confronted this positioning; *Pampaedia* by Jan Amos Comenius and Charles Fourier's phalanxes would be easier to put side by side *Gulliver's Travels* by Jonathan Swift than *Leviathan* by Thomas Hobbes and *Two Treatises of Government* by John Locke.

texts applies the dichotomy "eternal utopia" and "persistent utopia" (see M. Abensour, "Persistent Utopia", *Constellations* 2008, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 406–421).

29 I. Berlin, "The Originality of Machiavelli", op. cit., p. 86.

30 M. Weber, "Politics as a Vocation", [in:] *From Max Weber. Essay in Sociology*, ed. H. H. Gerth, C. W. Mills, New York 1946, p. 77 – original underline. See A. Heywood, *Politics*, London 2013, pp. 3–12.

31 The case of Francis Bacon's political philosophy in the context of his utopia *New Atlantis* may be instructive here, see H. B. White, "Francis Bacon", [in:] *History of Political Philosophy*, op. cit., pp. 366–385.

Nevertheless, we may consider another evident tendency of a return to utopia tied with social practice in the realm of politics and its theory. This approach is gaining ground in the notion of ideology, rising in significance since the early 19th century[32]. Still, the term utopia does not appear directly, as exemplified in a contemporary, textbook work by Lyman Tower Sargent. The author opines:

> An ideology is a system of values and beliefs regarding the various institutions and processes of society that is accepted as fact or truth by a group of people. An ideology provides the believer with a picture of the world both as it is and as it should be, and, in doing so, it organizes the tremendous complexity of the world into something fairly simple and understandable[33].

[32] See T. Eagleton, *Ideology. An Introduction*, London – New York 1991, pp. 63–70; A. Heywood, *Political Ideology. An Introduction*, London 2014, pp. 1–14; R. Włodarczyk, *Ideologia, teoria, edukacja. Myśl Ericha Fromma jako inspiracja dla pedagogiki współczesnej*, Kraków 2016, pp. 195–222. For the record, the relationship between utopia and ideology is far from clear in the literature, as exemplified by the classic solution proposed by Karl Mannheim in his sociology of knowledge, which confronts the concept of utopia with the total and specific notion of ideology (see K. Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia. An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge*, New York 1954, pp. 49–96, 173–190). Another widely-discussed approach, albeit referring to Mannheim's conclusion (see R. Levitas, *The Concept of Utopia*, op. cit., pp. 89–90; L. T. Sargent, "Ideology and utopia: Karl Mannheim and Paul Ricoeur", *Journal of Political Ideologies* 2008, No. 13, pp. 263–273) and also based on the confrontation of ideology and utopia, is Paul Ricoeur's concept. According to it, both phenomena play a significant if opposite function in the activity of social imagination linked to the acquisition and transformation of its integration and identity, competitive ways of power distribution (see P. Ricoeur, *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia*, ed. G. H. Taylor, New York 1986, pp. 1–18; G. Lubowicka, "Ideologia i utopia w wyobraźni społecznej i w samorozumieniu jednostek", [in:] *Utopia a edukacja*, Vol. 1, op. cit., pp. 122–132).

[33] L. T. Sargent, *Contemporary Political Ideologies. A Comparative Analysis*, Belmont 2009, p. 2. See A. Heywood, *Essentials of Political Ideas*, London 2018, p. 4; G. L. Gutek, *Philosophical and Ideological Perspectives on Education*, Needham 1997, p. 152. Also in other definitions the utopian component can be recognised, but it is sometimes far more disguised. For example, according to Martin Seliger, the concept of ideology "covers sets of factual and moral propositions which serve to posit, explain and justify ends and means of organized social action, especially political action, irrespective of whether such action aims to preserve, amend, destroy or rebuild any given order. According to this conception, ideology is as inseparable from politics as politics from ideology" (M. Seliger, *The Marxist Conception of Ideology. A Critical Essay*, Cambridge 1979, p. 1).

If we accept Sargent's definitions and then the statement of providing a "picture of the world", "as it should be", if we identify the periphrasis of the utopia he deems as an inherent component of ideology[34], then from the perspective of its theory we may re-examine More's *A Truly Golden Little Book, No Less Beneficial than Entertaining* as a treatise on political philosophy and philosophy of education, in order to discern its post-political character and the determinants of a pedagogy of inertia. In other words, we can turn to the theory of ideology to gain insight into its other components and, through their prism, shed light on the complexity and lability of the relationship between utopia and ideology revealed in More's text, which testify to the nature of this treatise's divergence from the Western tradition of classical political philosophy and, by extension, the tradition of philosophy of education.

UTOPIA AND THE CONCEPT OF IDEOLOGY IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF ERICH FROMM'S SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION

More's mimeticism does not ignore the dynamics of social reality; in his sketches of everyday life, devices, and relationships of the Utopians, the writer captures them so that the variability and routine that characterise them appear to the Renaissance reader in their course as transformed, but at the same time as consistent as possible, corresponding to his experience of human behaviour, the functioning of institutions, and interactions with the environment. By focusing attention on the accomplished vision of the 'good life', a model of the desired order achieved several centuries after the death of its founder, he marginalises images of the targeted formation of the island and the state, of all that actually brought the Utopians to the expected state of affairs. Certainly, it is possible to speculate from discrete observations on the ways in which political change

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[34] Sargent refers to the meaning of utopia as a "vision of the good life" (see L. T. Sargent, "Utopia", [in:] *New Dictionary of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 6, ed. M. C. Horowitz, New York 2004, pp. 2403–2409). From this perspective he convincingly argues that "it is clear that an image of what constitutes the good life lies at the heart of every ideology" (see L. T. Sargent, *Contemporary Political Ideologies*, op. cit., p. 10). See also L. T. Sargent, "Ideology and Utopia", [in:] *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies*, ed. M. Freeden, L. T. Sargent, M. Stears, Oxford 2013, pp. 515–529.

underpinned the achievement of the desired order, but it seems clear that these inquiries will be dominated by our current conceptions of ideology, its anatomy and potential. The point, however, is not that ideology has no place in the reality of the Utopians discussed by Hythloday, but that it is not, excluding utopia itself, at the root of the change that has occurred. It cannot be reconstructed, which among others contributes to the literary nature of More's *Utopia*. In other words, treating *A Truly Golden Little Book, No Less Beneficial than Entertaining* as a recipe for an effective generation of a sufficiently perfect society, we may be certain that Utopia will remain beyond our ken, both geographically and mentally. For there is no road, except a symbolic sea voyage, that leads to it. We come across Utopia as accidentally and unintentionally as Hythloday, followed by More. Moreover, it is a world in which neither politics nor education can do anything anymore. The inhabitants of the island invented by More know only one utopia and desire nothing beyond it in fact. In this sense, it is a world based on the paradox of the maximum accumulation of utopian elements and at the same time, with regard to its other components, almost entirely a-ideological. What links, then, are "missing"? An answer, one of the possible ones, calls for some clarification.

Ideology is one of those categories to which the humanities and social sciences attach a particularly high degree of importance yet see in a host of different ways[35]. Although it came into use relatively recently, the concept it refers to can be considered a permanent factor in politics and social life [36]. As in the case of utopia, the emergence of this term can be precisely established. Researchers have found that the French philosopher Antoine Destutt de Tracy, author of the five-volume *Eléments d'idéologie*, first used the word in 1796[37]. As a member of the then National

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[35] See A. Heywood, *Political Ideology*, op. cit., pp. 3–5; T. Eagleton, *Ideology*, op. cit., pp. 1–2; M. Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory. A Conceptual Approach*, Oxford 2006, pp. 15––23, 40–46. This is perhaps one of the reasons why, in their search for a basis for effective and credible social criticism, scholars and intellectuals marginalised the term of ideology in the second half of the twentieth century, turning more frequently to concepts such as myth, discourse, paradigm or utopia, among others.

[36] See S. N. Eisenstadt, "Cultural Traditions and Political Dynamics: The Origins and Modes of Ideological Politics", [in:] S. N. Eisenstadt, *Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities*, Part I, Leiden – Boston 2003, pp. 219–247; D. Hawkes, *Ideology*, London – New York 2004, pp. 15–37.

[37] See D. Hawkes, *Ideology*, op. cit., p. 60.

Institute, he and his colleagues spent many years developing the study of ideology, which according to Emmet Kennedy was understood by them as

> genealogically the first science, since all sciences consisted of different combinations of ideas. But it was specifically the basis of grammar or the science of communicating ideas, logic, or the science of combining them and reaching new truths, education, or the science of forming men, morality, or the regulation of desires, and finally 'the greatest of arts, for the success of which all others must cooperate, that of regulating society...[38].

The sense of ideology which comes close to that espoused by researchers at the National Institute does not seem too far removed from that established by Sargent. This is not to say that the general theory of ideology is blind to the divergent ways of understanding the phenomenon, definitely due to the considerable interest in it during the period when it noticeably became one of the main sources of the dynamics of change and conflict in Western societies. Similarly to utopia, ideology, especially in the public perception, with time began to be negatively perceived, among other things, as a factor or force disturbing development or progress, or which, without exception, contributes to the exploitation and enslavement of part or almost all of the population of a given political entity, or as in the case of capitalism, communism or fascism – to a degree exceeding its limits[39]. However, as announced, it is necessary to shift attention from the discussion of the concept itself to that part of the theory of ideology which relates to the conception of its constituent parts, which I would like to do further on by referring to my earlier research and findings[40]. In addition, the distinction of the constituent parts of ideology depends to a large extent on the understanding

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[38] E. Kennedy, *Destutt de Tracy and the Origins of "Ideology"*, The American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia 1978, p. 47, quoted after: Z. Bauman, *Legislators and Interpreters*, Cambridge 1989, p. 99.

[39] It is worth pointing out the ambiguity that also applies to utopias. In relation to particular ideologies, their valuation will polarise enthusiasts and opponents, provided they are to some extent aware of their existence, manifestation and operation. Similar difficulties arise in attempts to unambiguously qualify the state of a desired social order as utopia or dystopia.

[40] See R. Włodarczyk, *Ideologia, teoria, edukacja*, op. cit., pp. 195–226, 261–276, 282–289.

of the phenomenon. Furthermore, not every conceptualisation of ideology proposed in the literature makes an analytical effort to identify them. At least for these two reasons, the conceptualisation discussed below does not in any way preclude further discussion on the issue, but it does provide insight into both the 'gaps' in Hythloday's story of Utopia coming into being, and consequently into the complexity and lability of the relationship between utopia and ideology revealed in More's text, as well as one of the possible sources of the contemporary crisis of utopian consciousness, which also casts a shadow on the condition of education, creating conditions of, among other things, its inertia.

Erich Fromm's theory of ideology, to which I refer here, is an important part of his sociology of religion. We can trace its origins in the philosopher's first publications, written still before he began close collaboration in the 1930s with other members of the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt[41]. After leaving the team of the Institute, Fromm independently and systematically developed the issue he was interested in, devoting attention to it practically in all his subsequent publications, hence the reconstruction of his theory of ideology proposed here is based on his entire intellectual legacy.

In the light of the solutions presented by Fromm in numerous texts, it is not unreasonable to apply his definition of religion, according to which it is "any system of thought and action shared by a group which gives the individual a frame of orientation and an object of devotion"[42] to a whole spectrum of various ideologies. The characteristics of the phenomenon considered by the researcher allow us to conclude that every developed, full-fledged ideology[43] is composed of analytically distinguishable and interrelated components

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[41] See L. J. Friedman, *The Lives of Erich Fromm: Love's Prophet*, New York 2014, pp. 28–54; M. Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination. A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research 1923–1950*, London 1973, pp. 86–106.

[42] E. Fromm, *Psychoanalysis and Religion*, New Haven 1955, p. 21 – original underline. See E. Fromm, *To Have or To Be?*, London – New York 2008, pp. 110–114; S. Lundgren, *Fight Against Idols. Erich Fromm on Religion, Judaism and the Bible*, Frankfurt am Main 1998, pp. 17–76, 159–163.

[43] I use the term complete ideology with a view to the historically formed integrity of its components gradually appearing and being incorporated into the whole, and thus in a manner approximating Michael Freeden's understanding of it (see M. Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory. A Conceptual Approach*, Oxford 2006, pp. 485–487).

of the system of orientation and devotion. One of them is the object of devotion, transcending sensory immediacy, which, being precious, important and worthy, often sacred, to the members of the group, releases their energy, focuses their feelings and actions, permeates, binds and organises the other components of the ideology. This role can be fulfilled by utopia as an image of a sufficiently perfect society, structuring distance, criticism and desire, or it can be its separate component. Important from the point of view of the construction of ideology is not so much the separable content of the object of veneration or ideal, but its function of liberating and directing faith, the human inner experience of devotion, hope, trust and fidelity. According to Fromm, faith and the structure of a person's character, formed in the processes of socialisation and upbringing, as a particular form of channelling energy in the process of his life, are interrelated and determine the quality, manner and degree of a person's commitment to the object of devotion and, in the community context, to the ideology. In other words, the object of devotion, the form of belief and the structure of the dominant social character in the community are among the essential elements of the system of devotion and orientation that is to guide thinking and acting within the group.

The individual ritual, as a fixed collective action operating with symbols, in which the inner experiences of people's shared distinctive, feelings, ideas, thoughts, and values find their external expression, confirmation and basis for understanding, forms, together with the others, a recurrent set of practices responsible for giving life to the aforementioned experiences and incorporating them into the current operation of individuals and communities. In this sense, it is an embodied and performed ideal, its transposition. It marks the continuity and defines the sustainability of aspirations. It makes the distant past and future gain a common denominator, triggering the interpenetration of myth and utopia. Thus, it can be said that it is not so much the concordance of consciousness among the members of the community that creates and comprises their unity, but the very ritual performed. This distribution of emphasis allows room for reflexivity and a critical perspective, as well as individual regulation of the level of commitment or degree of devotion of the cultivators of a given ideology. In other words, in this case they maintain a readiness for critical distance when they achieve communal unity in the ritual performed.

However, not all strategy or tactics for directing action towards the realisation of utopia, the image of a desired more or less distant future and a sufficiently perfect social order, most often qualitatively different from the current situation, which corresponds to the moral and organisational expectations and aspirations of the group or its elites, can be reduced to ritual or habitual gesture and behaviour. Strategies include many related group practices that serve as means and resources, such as specific methods of upbringing or teaching, for example. However, their particular selection will differ depending on the nature of the other components of a given ideology, and therefore they need to be distinguished, treated and described separately.

On the other hand, a myth, also fixed in the community of values and operating with symbols, is located on the opposite side of the temporal spectrum to utopia. The seemingly accessible and easy-to-assimilate account told in myth, based on its original logic, when confronted with parallel versions and its own metaphors, creates space for alternative, competing readings, hypotheses and uses. The space of particular myths or a number of them, i.e. mythology, being strongly rooted in experiences, feelings, ideas, thoughts and values of the community, comes to the fore when reaching into the past, looking back. It leaves in the background what is admittedly studied by historians, but still less socially attractive and reliable for them, the real course of events extending into the endless past of history. It creates a kind of firmly anchored nodal points where the collective retrospection stops treating them as the root causes and origins, the genesis of the present situation. In other words, mythology marks in the social imagination an uneven and clearly delineated horizon line of the past. Hence the dispute over the interpretation of myth and the very way of reading it is an essential part of the current struggle for ideological hegemony. A single myth, then, as in the case of regional variations of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, may be differently read and understood and become part of another set of narratives, representing expected ideas and experience significant for a particular place and time for the group that identities with them. Moreover, alternative sets of established narratives and their readings may also operate within these particular variants of ideology.

At this point, it is in order to emphasise that one of the major consequences of the interconnectedness, relatively coherent integration within

a given ideology, of its elements such as myth, ritual and utopia, is that they are a temporal frame of reference[44], indicating also general differences between them as to the length of the course of expected changes or the distance in time to the date of their expected accomplishment.

All the aforementioned elements or only a selected part of them may find their synthesised linguistic picture of connections and meanings in the form of a doctrine. Through it, a leader or a critic, an organic or transformative intellectualist, as well as a demagogue, are able to manage it, which seems indispensable when we wish to monitor a group and motivate it to take action. A doctrine is a theoretical elaboration of an ideology, offering a sketch or a comprehensive summary of the interrelationships and hierarchies of elements within the ideology. It provides explanations and justifications, as well as a tangible platform of integration for its adherents, a clear reference point for their own reflection, and instruments for criticising other ideologies or their individual components, such as utopias.

Some of the experiences and ideas that make up a given relatively complete ideology cannot be reduced to its other interrelated elements described above, such as symbol, value, mythical statement, ritual, utopia, object of veneration, strategy, shape of faith, and structure of the social character functioning in the group. It will nevertheless be possible to

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[44] This temporal structure is made prominent in his theory of ideology by Gerald L. Gutek, who observes that one of its roles entails that it "explains its past, examines its presents, and points to its future" (G. L. Gutek, *Philosophical and Ideological Perspectives on Education*, op. cit., p. 152). In addition, he stresses that for a group to be able to achieve the goals set for itself in this way, "the ideologue recommends political or educational actions" (ibidem). Zvi Lamm's concept comes close to the features of the phenomenon proposed by Gutek (see Z. Lamm, "Ideologies and Educational Thought", [in:] *Psychology and Counseling in Education*, ed. D. Bar-Tal, Jerusalem 1986, pp. 19–50). The starting point for him, as for the philosopher of education quoted above, is the general concept of ideology. Any cognitive system of this kind, which helps people to discover and assign meanings to their reality so that they can provide landmarks for their actions, contains, in his opinion, four components. The first is a diagnosis of the present condition, the second, eschatological one, is an answer to the question of how things should be, the third is a strategy for achieving the desired goal, while the fourth one is a definition of the group that is to be the vehicle of change. The aforementioned components, according to the author of the concept, are individually part of various other forms of knowledge, but only their combination and integration can be called ideology.

place and find them in the doctrine. Moreover, it should be assumed that due to the fact that ideology each time adapts to the historical and social conditions of action or life of a given group and is dynamic and often incomplete, the theory of ideology reconstructed here operates with an ideal type and points to a combination of components distinguished on the basis of family resemblance, as in the case of related people, when we can speak of repetition and overlapping of a certain constellation and configuration of visual or character traits, but it is impossible to indicate a person among them who would possess them all at the same time and to the same degree. Therefore, one might expect that in a particular case, such as the world depicted in Hythloday's account, captured at a certain point in its history, the combination of the constituent ideologies would form a somewhat unique configuration, which would make credible to the reader the shape of a sufficiently perfectly organised society, achieved through a communal effort. This would probably be the case if one followed the treatises on political philosophy and philosophy of education, but the conventions adopted by More gave him more freedom; in time, he was not alone in this regard.

In the context of reflection on utopia and ideology, Henry A. Giroux's comment that "every present is incomplete"[45], inspired by Ernst Bloch, may be read with increasing ambivalence. It is heightened when the "dystopian hope of neoliberalism" will be challenged, as part of the same world, "hope as a form of militant utopianism"[46]. Disregarding this polarity helps us find that its different components move in diverse directions almost simultaneously. Meanwhile, the islanders in the Hythloday story recognise only one utopia. Even if it does not recognise private property and climate crisis and condones the dogmatic organisation of everyday life, slavery and patriarchy, which are inconsistent with them in

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45 H. A. Giroux, "Utopian Thinking in Dangerous Times: Critical Pedagogy and the Project of Educated Hope", [in:] *Utopian Pedagogy. Radical Experiments Against Neoliberal Globalization*, ed. M. Coté, R. J. F. Day, G. de Peuter, Toronto – Buffalo – London 2007, p. 32.

46 Ibidem, p. 33; H. A. Giroux, "Dystopian Nightmares and Educated Hopes: The Return of the Pedagogical and the Promise of Democracy", [in:] *Edutopias: New Utopian Thinking in Education*, ed. M. Peters, J. Freeman-Moir, Rotterdam 2006, p. 54.

the eyes of some contemporary readers, it remains fundamentally unaffected. This does not mean that we are dealing with a society in which change is absent, as Dahrendorf claimed. Rather, it is about its political and educational malleability and the fact that it is not permeated by the desire for a different, superior way of life[47], which must have informed Utopus's project and win or muster strength and social resources capable to intentionally transform the world in a coordinated manner, from the way it was towards the way it should be. The Utopia we get to know is defined by its impressive a-ideological autarky. Hence, we may even be inclined to recognise, after David Halpin, that "the core of utopian writing is the triumph of reason over circumstance"[48]. This has since Renaissance been the primary focus of the desire determined by the literary convention, which separates social imagination and hope from their practice beyond longing. The roads leading to Abraxa have been cut off.

In *A Truly Golden Little Book, No Less Beneficial than Entertaining*, More gives utopia both its name and shape. For us, ideological mobilisation is forever going to be utopian.

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[47] See R. Levitas, *The Concept of Utopia*, op. cit., pp. 209–211.
[48] D. Halpin, *Hope and Education. The Role of the Utopian Imagination*, London – New York 2003, p. 35.

CHAPTER II

FUNDAMENTALISM IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF ERICH FROMM'S CONCEPT OF THE AUTHORITARIAN IDEOLOGIES CRITIQUE

We do not need new ideals or new spiritual goals. The great teachers of the human race have postulated the norms for sane living. To be sure, they have spoken in different languages, have emphasized different aspects and have had different views on certain subjects. But, altogether, these differences were small; the fact that the great religions and ethical systems have so often fought against each other, and emphasized their mutual differences rather than their basic similarities, was due to the influence of those who built churches, hierarchies, political organizations upon the simple foundations of truth laid down by the men of the spirit

Erich Fromm, *The Sane Society*

Certainly, no religion excludes the ethical. Each one invokes it, but tends also to place what is specifically religious above it, and does not hesitate to 'liberate' the religious from moral obligations

Emmanuel Levinas, *Beyond the Verse*

Erich Fromm did not consider ideologies and religions as two separate groups of phenomena. His broad definition of the latter, according to which we deal with a peculiar organization of views, beliefs and imagery shared by a given group or community, which underlies the integration

of patterns of thinking, involvement and action, and which provides the members of these communities with an object of worship along with a framework for orientation in the world, may indicate totemism, Buddhism or Judaism, as well as humanism, the cult of the individual or consumerism. Moreover, analysis and interpretation of the Frankfurter's works classified as the sociology of religion, shows findings which can be applied to the results of research on fundamentalism. The effectiveness of this research requires looking for and checking new theoretical approaches to this phenomenon. Hence, one can ask what Fromm's conception of religion and criticism of ideology helps us to say precisely about fundamentalism. In his works, from the late 1920s to the late 1970s, this psychoanalyst and neo-Marxist concentrates in particular on the phenomenon of the fusion, the merging into one of the ethical and ideological dimensions of an individual's functioning in an organized group, a situation in which conscience is replaced by internalized authority. As a counterpoint, he develops the concept of radical humanism, according to which striving and taking care to maintain a distance between the two creates the conditions for the maturation of humanity, the development of love and reason, necessary for the consolidation of decent small communities, collectives and entire societies. We can say that the typology of authoritarian and humanistic religions (ideologies) proposed by him constitutes an interesting platform for studying the relevant issues. To do so, however, it is necessary to recall and explain selected details of Fromm's concept, which form the basis of the preliminary findings revealed here.

FROMM AND TWO FRANKFURT SCHOOLS

Frankfurt am Main, early 1930s. Fromm is officially employed at the Institute for Social Research (Institut für Sozialforschung), led during the illness of its director Carl Grünberg by Max Horkheimer[1]. The latter introduces changes at different levels of the Institute's operation so that when in January 1931 Horkheimer is appointed to replace Grünberg, the

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[1] See M. Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination. A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research 1923–1950*, London 1973, pp. 3–40.

Marxist-oriented research centre, thanks to earlier efforts, is prepared in terms of its staff and expertise to fuse Karl Marx's and Sigmund Freud's theories. Thus, fundamental studies carried out in the Institute, linked with the University of Frankfurt, begins to shift towards phenomena and issues related to ideology, which will a few years later lead Horkheimer to a preliminary presentation and publication of his program of critical theory.

Fromm, who only just celebrated his thirtieth birthday in March, is well positioned to be one of the principal authors of the endeavour of combining these two orientations, an absolute novelty at that time[2]. That very year, 1930, he completes his studies of psychoanalysis at the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute. For years he has been reading the writings of the architects of the dynamic movement and has been involved in psychoanalytic societies, practicing the psychotherapy he himself experienced a few years earlier at the Heidelberg Therapeutikum, founded and run by Frieda Reichmann, a medical doctor. Also in Heidelberg, eighty kilometres from his hometown Frankfurt, where he interrupted his law studies, Fromm graduates in sociology, psychology and philosophy and earns his doctorate at the age of twenty-two on the basis of a dissertation *Das jüdische Gesetz. Ein Beitrag zur Soziologie des Diasporajudentums* (*The Jewish Law: A Contribution to the Sociology of Jewish Diaspora*), written under the supervision of Alfred Weber[3]. When he married Reichmann four years later, in June 1926, like her, he had already distanced himself from Orthodox Judaism, until then an important reference point for his spiritual formation and intellectual development. He came from a family whose members included many renowned rabbis. He himself also received a proper Talmudic education, which Salman B. Rabinkow helped to solidify before Fromm discontinued the practice of Judaism[4]. Under the supervision of this learned and enlightened rabbi, Fromm studied intensively the Talmud for about five years, beginning in 1920. Rabinkow helped him prepare his dissertation and it was probably also him who introduced Fromm to Marxism, although it is possible that Fromm owed his intimate knowledge of the subject only to the closer contacts

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[2] See ibidem, pp. 86–106; R. Funk, *Erich Fromm: His Life and Ideas*, New York – London 2000, pp. 50–101.

[3] See L. J. Friedman, *The Lives of Erich Fromm: Love's Prophet*, New York 2014, pp. 12–18.

[4] See ibidem, pp. 12–18.

he developed in the second half of the 1920s with his colleagues professionally or informally associated with the Institute for Social Research.

Until he distanced himself from Orthodox Judaism, his relationship with it went beyond rabbinical training[5]. As of 1919, he was involved in the activities of the Society for Jewish Education in Frankfurt, especially in the related Free Jewish House of Learning (Freie Jüdische Lehrhaus)[6]. He was committed to the promotion and dissemination of knowledge about the culture, religion and lives of the Jews, working hand in hand with many renowned rabbis, scholars and young activists who made lasting contributions to science, literature and philosophy: Nehemiah A. Nobel, Richard Koch, Ernst Simon, Eduard Strauß, Samuel J. Agnon, Rudolf Hallo, Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber, Leo Löwenthal, Siegfried Kracauer, Gershom Scholem, and Rabinkow. Out of the aforementioned, the person who united and integrated this diverse community at the time was Rabbi Nobel, a charismatic student and friend, secretary to Hermann Cohen, the Marburg neo-Kantian, ethical socialist, and author of a 1919 text fundamental for Jewish intellectuals of the next few generations, including Fromm: *Religion of Reason, Out of the Sources of Judaism*. Another major representative of this circle, closely linked to Cohen, was his friend and disciple Rosenzweig, the author of *The Star of Redemption* (1921), founder of the Free Jewish House of Learning, which would later be called sometimes the Second Frankfurt School. As of the early 1920s, he was working with Buber on a new translation into German of the Hebrew Bible and was instrumental for the formula of the philosophy of dialogue put forth in Buber's essay *I and Thou*[7]. Furthermore, Rosenzweig offered Buber, who at that time moved with his family to nearby Heppenheim, on the way between Frankfurt and Heidelberg, a series of lectures of the Free Jewish House of Learning, where he discussed the components of his famous essay. Fromm, who in the 1920s migrated between the Freie Jüdische Lehrhaus, closer in fact to the Haskalah, or Jewish Enlightenment, than rabbinical orthodoxy, and the circle of the Institut für Sozialforschung with its revision of Marxism and psychoanalysis, absorbs the Frankfurt impulses of both

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[5] See R. Funk, *Erich Fromm*, op. cit., pp. 6–49.
[6] See ibidem, p. 6–30; L. J. Friedman, *The Lives of Erich Fromm*, op. cit., pp. 8–12.
[7] See G. Wehr, *Martin Buber. Leben – Werk – Wirkung*, Gütersloh 2010, pp. 135–157.

dialogical thinking and critical philosophy. This is not to say that the two communities, by their nature and area of interest, do not share interests.

The staff of the Institute for Social Research are also Jewish intellectuals, yet only Fromm and Löwenthal were closely connected to Judaism and the Society for Jewish Education in Frankfurt (Frankfurt Gesellschaft fur jüdische Volksbildung). The other members and collaborators, such as Horkheimer, Friedrich Pollock, Franz Neumann, Theodor W. Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, Walter Benjamin, Otto Kirchheimer, Olga Lang, Karl A. Wittfogel, and Henryk Grossmann, later assigned to the first generation of the Frankfurt School, which included academic experts in a wide range of disciplines "from musicology to sinology"[8], did not practice Judaism. Jewishness for them was a social issue and, as in the case of Benjamin, a philosophical inspiration. Still, after the success of the NSDAP in the 1932 election and the appointment in January 1933 of Adolf Hitler as German Chancellor, and in the course of his gradual taking over of full power, the Institute for Social Research, which earlier proved in its studies of workers of intensifying authoritarianism, will be seen as a threat, closed down and its staff dismissed[9]. On 13 April 1933, Horkheimer would be among a group of scholars at the University of Frankfurt, along with e.g. Paul Tillich and Karl Mannheim, some of the first academics dismissed from academia in the Nazi Reich. During this time, the Institute, operating under a changed name, would be based in Geneva, and shortly thereafter at Columbia University in New York.

Meanwhile, it is 1930 and Fromm publishes his first major treatise "The Dogma of Christ. A Psychoanalytic Study of the Social-psychological Function of Religion". His style recalls the posthumous studies on the sociology of religion by Max Weber, the famous brother of the supervisor of his dissertation. In "The Dogma of Christ", Fromm defines a complex process, in which one can see the beginnings of his later theory, the transformation of the revolutionary potential of early Christianity, the formation of the hierarchical order of the Church, and the regression to the stage of matriarchal worship, by which term he refers to a concept not very popular today by Johann J. Bachofen. The change of early Christianity "from the religion of the oppressed to the religion of the

[8] M. Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination*, op. cit., p. xvi.
[9] See ibidem, pp. 29–31.

rulers"[10], of the castes of the Roman Empire, corresponds to the division he would develop in more detail a few years later, into humanistic and authoritarian religions[11]. In other words, in "The Dogma of Christ" Fromm expresses a view on religion aligned with the psychoanalytical and Marxist orthodoxy and points out that

> It has the task of preventing any psychic independence on the part of the people, of intimidating them intellectually, of bringing them into the socially necessary infantile docility toward the authorities. At the same time it has another essential function: it offers the masses a certain measure of satisfaction that makes life sufficiently tolerable for them to prevent them from attempting to change their position [...]. Therefore, [...] religion has a three-fold function: for all mankind, consolation for the privations exacted by life; for the great majority of men, encouragement to accept emotionally their class situation; and for the dominant minority, relief from guilt feelings caused by the suffering of those whom they oppress[12].

While his views on this issue will evolve as to details, we may safely say that at the time of his employment at the Institute for Social Research and on the eve of the Nazis' coming to power, Fromm has a concept that integrates his sociology of religion with his critique of ideology, in which one can legitimately see an expression of his life and intellectual experience of Judaism, psychoanalysis and Marxism.

THE CONCEPT OF IDEOLOGY AND THE FUNDAMENTALISM

How does Nazism compare to religious fundamentalism? Addressing such questions in the context of solutions developed by Fromm requires that the issues of ideology and fundamentalism be discussed separately

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[10] E. Fromm, "The Dogma of Christ", [in:] E. Fromm, *The Dogma of Christ, and Other Essay on Religion, Psychology and Culture*, New York – Chicago – San Francisco 1963, p. 60.

[11] See E. Fromm, *Psychoanalysis and Religion*, New Haven 1955, pp. 48–50.

[12] E. Fromm, "The Dogma of Christ", op. cit., pp. 16, 20. See E. Fromm, "The Method and Function of an Analytic Social Psychology. Notes on Psychoanalysis and Historical Materialism", [in:] E. Fromm, *The Crisis of Psychoanalysis. Essay on Freud, Marx, and Social Psychology*, New York 1976, pp. 137–162.

beforehand. Perhaps the content and scopes of these concepts are not so obvious after all.

Meanwhile, in the second half of the 1930s Fromm, like the other employees of the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt, did not directly observe the escalation of anti-Semitism in Germany and the consolidation of the totalitarian state. After leaving the country when the Nazis rose to power and going into exile, he eventually moved to the United States, where he continued working with members of the Institute who were in New York. When three or four years later the relations gradually cooled down and the scholars drifted apart[13], Fromm will continue research on the authoritarian personality by himself, referring to his earlier findings and intensifying the integration of Marx's theory with Freud's one. The studies will lead to the publication in 1941 of one of his major texts, *Escape from Freedom*[14], something more than just an insightful study of Nazism. That very year a decision about the "final solution" (*Endlösung*) was made in Europe, a turning point in the complex history of the continent.

While Fromm was working on his *Escape from Freedom*, the notion of fundamentalism was no longer a hot topic among scholars. The notion of ideology was completely different, though. However, despite Mannheim's much-discussed efforts taken more than a decade earlier to exploit the analytical potential of this concept within the sociology of knowledge he was promoting, it was quite commonly perceived as valorising. It expressed unequivocal disapproval of the more or less skilful political deception to which one blindly succumbs, and of the ploys in the camp of the opponent, or, as in Marxism of government party members, it functioned as essentially synonymous with the term "false consciousness" introduced by Friedrich Engels[15]. It was at the same time clear that such a disparaging term in relation to the direction of a collective's actions is more often used

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[13] See M. Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination*, op. cit., pp. 98–106; E. Fromm, *For the Love of Life*, New York 1986, pp. 96–98.

[14] See M. Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination*, op. cit., pp. 98–100. A year after publication in the United States, the book is published in the United Kingdom under the title *The Fear of Freedom*.

[15] The history of the notion of ideology is meticulously and broadly reconstructed by David Hawkes in his *Ideology* (London – New York 2004); to a limited extent the history of this idea is addressed in Chapter V of: R. Włodarczyk, *Ideologia, teoria, edukacja. Myśl Ericha Fromma jako inspiracja dla pedagogiki współczesnej*, Kraków 2016, pp. 195–226.

by someone who believes that he or she has the right knowledge, while Mannheim assumed that every possible position of knowledge, which is the basis of action, is flawed to a greater or lesser degree in this way[16]. The persistence of this label, detrimental to any reputation, may be evidenced by a dictionary definition, coined more recently, which seems to combine the two aforementioned tendencies – disapproval of demagogy and the attribution of masked misrepresentations to someone's orientation in the elements of reality. According to this definition, an ideology is "a set of historically, culturally and socially conditioned beliefs shared by members of a given social group, offering them a comprehensive and simplified view of the world, facilitating the manipulation of collective consciousness"[17].

Perhaps, were it not for the pejorative overtones of the above definition, it would be possible to identify an ideology understood in this way with a doctrine or worldview, but a question arises as to what term to use in a situation where the individual actions of people are an expression, independently of their state of consciousness, of collective aspirations and drives, as was the case in Nazism? Can we credibly assume that the resources of consciousness of the members of this violent movement constitute the central point of its dynamics? Is not the central issue here the intersection of socially shared ideas, intentions, and actions, the interface between theory and practice, the resources of the individual and the collective? In other words, one might reasonably suspect that the concept of ideology has something more to communicate to us. Marx's observation that this notion refers to social praxis, including the intriguing cases of individuals, groups and entire populations unaware of their active participation and place in the realization of their distinctive ideas about the proper shape of the future, is also consistent with an earlier if inconsistent tradition of understanding the phenomenon itself, even though it differs from the meaning attached to the term at the turn of the nineteenth century by its author Antoine L. C. Destutt de Tracy[18]. Because without knowledge of a doctrine or worldview adequate to reality, an individual is able to realize their assumptions in reasoning, feeling and

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[16] See R. Włodarczyk, *Ideologia, teoria, edukacja*, op. cit., pp. 241–248.
[17] M. Zięba, "Ideologia", [in:] *Słownik społeczny*, ed. B. Szlachta, Warszawa 2004, p. 399.
[18] See D. Hawkes, *Ideology*, op. cit, p. 60; R. Włodarczyk, *Ideologia, teoria, edukacja*, op. cit., pp. 196–198.

acting, then the concept of ideology should not be reduced to consciousness, which does not mean that this use is fundamentally excluded. As in many other cases, it is a matter of deciding on what conceptual grid to use. The claim of a "false consciousness" is perhaps a reflection of the all too common cases in which ideology expertly "circumvents" human consciousness, manifests itself in the habit of thought, action or feelings, experience and ritual of everyday life, as if man were a puppet guided by the hand of overwhelming and unknown forces, in other words, as Zvi Lamm puts it, ideology controls thinking and acting to a greater extent than individual members of the collective subject to it are able to control[19].

On the opposite side of the semantical spectrum, there are cases in which ideology is used to deliberately achieve predetermined goals in an environment that is indifferent, resistant and hostile to the propagated endeavour. Such an approach to it is reflected in Andrew Heywood's definition, according to which it is "a more or less coherent set of ideas that provides the basis for organized political action, whether this is intended to preserve, modify or overthrow the existing system of power". In Heywood's opinion, all ideologies "(a) offer an account of the existing order, usually in the form of a 'worldview' (b) advance a model of a desired future, a vision of the 'good society' (c) explain how political change can and should be brought about – how to get from (a) to (b)"[20]. In the view of the contemporary British political scientist, the emphasis on openness and awareness of ideology and the emphasis on the importance of its proper fusion of theory and practice is accompanied by the elucidation as essential of the role that utopia plays in it.

That very author links fundamentalism to "a style of thought in which certain principles are recognized as essential 'truths' that have unchallengeable and overriding authority, regardless of their content"[21]. In this sense, for him, fundamentalism is not an ideology, but a certain mode of its operation, which is further specified in his proposed detailed description. In his opinion,

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[19] Z. Lamm, "Ideologies and Educational Thought", [in:] *Psychology and Counseling in Education*, ed. D. Bar-Tal, Jerusalem 1986, pp. 19–25.

[20] A. Heywood, *Political Ideology. An Introduction*, London 2014, p. 11. See L. T. Sargent, *Contemporary Political Ideologies. A Comparative Analysis*, Belmont 2009, p. 2.

[21] A. Heywood, *Political Ideology*, op. cit., p. 289.

Substantive fundamentalisms therefore have little or nothing in common, except that their supporters tend to evince an earnestness or fervour born out of doctrinal certainty. Although it is usually associated with religion and the literal truth of sacred texts, fundamentalism can also be found in political creeds. Even liberal scepticism can be said to incorporate the fundamental belief that all theories should be doubted (apart from its own). Although the term is often used pejoratively to imply inflexibility, dogmatism and authoritarianism, fundamentalism may also give expression to selflessness and a devotion to principle[22].

Is this perception of fundamentalism, which links it to the aesthetic aspect of the functioning of religion and its secular counterparts, shared by other researchers of the issue?

The discussion around the notion of fundamentalism, which has already lasted several decades, has not concluded to this day, although one can notice a certain regularity resulting from the fact that the researchers are confined to a specific topology[23]. Nevertheless, the features emphasized by Heywood are confirmed in other texts. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, in the concluding chapter of *Fundamentalism Observed*, the first volume of an interdisciplinary international research project initiated in the late 1980s, assume in their portrayal of fundamentalism that it appears precisely

as a tendency, a habit of mind, found within religious communities and paradigmatically embodied in certain representative individuals and movements, which manifests itself as a strategy, or set of strategies, by which beleaguered believers attempt to preserve their distinctive identity as a people or group. Feeling this identity to be at risk in the contemporary era, they fortify it by a selective retrieval of doctrines, beliefs, and practices from a sacred past[24].

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[22] Ibidem.
[23] See R. Włodarczyk, "Wymiary fundamentalizmu religijnego w perspektywie teoretycznej", [in:] *Między ekskluzją a inkluzją w edukacji religijnej*, ed. M. Humeniuk, I. Paszenda, Wrocław 2017, pp. 15–36.
[24] M. E. Marty, R. S. Appleby, "Conclusion. An Interim Report on a Hypothetical Family", [in:] *Fundamentalisms Observed*, ed. M. E. Marty, R. S. Appleby, Chicago 1991, p. 835.

In line with Marty's findings from his later work, it can be assumed that most such movements grow out of the gradual and isolated development of traditional cultures as a reaction to a threat that disrupts the nurtured equilibrium, a reaction that is directed by their leaders to innovation, defence, resistance or retaliation that draws widespread attention. According to the American scholar of religion, these movements are characterized by selective recourse to the resources of their own cultural heritage, which helps them to base their activities on a univocally understood authority, accompanied by the creation of an oppositional "us versus them" mentality, which can be isolated within a particular community. As Marty observes,

> Fundamentalists resent being left out, deprived, displaced, scorned, marginalized. They feel their cultures penetrated. They must take action against the infidel. There is almost always a polity implication, whether constitutional, revolutionary, or designed to stabilize a hegemony of fundamentalists[25].

Marty focused attention on the characteristics of the presence of fundamentalism in Christian denominations, Islam, Judaism, and Confucianism, Sikhism, and Hinduism, which is undoubtedly his main study area. However, Shmuel N. Eisenstadt's findings are in line with Heywood's approach. Eisenstadt also saw a number of affinities between individual types of modern political movements and religious fundamentalism. He sees its roots in antiquity, when major social and political changes created a space for the emergence of proto-fundamentalist movements[26]. Rooted in utopian heresies, they sought, in reaction to the degeneration of particular religious traditions, to renew them, to restore their authentic versions, and to rebuild the existing social order according to a clear

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[25] M. E. Marty, "The Fundamentals of Fundamentalism", [in:] *Fundamentalism in a Comparative Perspective*, ed. L. Kaplan, Amherst – Massachusetts 1992, p. 22.

[26] See S. N. Eisenstadt, "The Jacobin Component of Fundamentalist Movements", [in:] S. N. Eisenstadt, *Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities*, Part I–II, Leiden – Boston 2003, pp. 938–944; S. N. Eisenstadt, "Cultural Traditions and Political Dynamics: the Origins and Modes of Ideological Politics", [in:] S. N. Eisenstadt, *Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities*, op. cit., pp. 219–247; S. N. Eisenstadt, "Heterodoxies, Sectarianism, and Utopianism in the Constitution of Proto-Fundamentalist Movements", [in:] S. N. Eisenstadt, *Fundamentalism, Sectarianism, and Revolution. The Jacobin Dimension of Modernity*, Cambridge 1999, pp. 25–38.

organizational pattern. In doing so, they emphasized the construction of their own clear symbolic and institutional boundaries. The context of modernity, of course, changes the meaning of the set of features that the sociologist indicated and that bind the activities of the sects he analysed. They became clearly anti-modern, or more precisely anti-Enlightenment, nevertheless they are distinguished, what Eisenstadt considers a decisive factor, by a strong Jacobin component inherent in the totalistic components of the political program of modernity. What are its characteristic features? Eisenstadt indicates that "Jacobin orientations emphasize the belief in the primacy of politics and of the ability of politics to reconstitute society according to a totalistic vision and through highly mobilized political action"[27]. According to the Israeli sociologist, they share such features as a drive to create a new social order via political action rooted in revolutionary universalist ideological convictions, which as a rule transcend all national and ethnic groups as well as those based on primordial ties and the new socio-political communities. They moreover share the perception of politicians as major transformers of societies[28]. In other words, the present-day state, modernist in its assumptions, has at its disposal a number of instruments attractive to fundamentalists in terms of the potentially total impact on the reality of all human relations. Their "utopian-sectarian critique of modernity", their compactness, their discipline, their conviction that they are right and that they have the right model for organizing communal life, make these movements feel predisposed in almost every case to use these tools immediately in order to carry out radical transformations of the public and private orders.

The excerpts from the discussion of fundamentalism cited here, just as in the case of ideology, certainly are not a comprehensive overview of the phenomenon, but they do provide a preliminary picture of their relationship, as announced at the beginning of this subsection. To emphasize it further, we can refer to the observation of British sociologist

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[27] S. N. Eisenstadt, "The Jacobin Component of Fundamentalist Movements", op. cit., p. 940.

[28] See S. N. Eisenstadt, "Transformation and Transposition of the Thematic of Multiple Modernities in the Era of Globalization", *ProtoSociology. An International Journal of Interdisciplinary Research* 2007, Vol. 24, No. 4, p. 115; S. E. Eisenstadt, "Fundamentalism as a Modern Jacobin Anti-Modern Utopia and Heterodoxy – the Totalistic Reconstruction of Tradition", [in:] S. E. Eisenstadt, *Fundamentalism, Sectarianism, and Revolution*, op. cit., p. 94–97.

of religion Grace Davie, according to whom "religious movements are not the only ones that succumb to fundamentalist tendencies [...]"[29]; their rivalry can be seen as a normal rather than a unique feature of the social landscape of late modernity.

ETHICS, RELIGION AND THE IDEOLOGY CRITIQUE ACCORDING TO FROMM

The very end of the 1940s. Fromm moves to Mexico with his second wife Henny Gurland[30]. The spontaneous relocation turns out to be a failed attempt to seek help for Henny, who less than a decade before suffers a spinal cord injury while fleeing the Nazis from Germany through France, Spain, and Portugal to the United States. She dies in 1952.

In the meantime Fromm has been recognised as an author of two books in English. The second one, *Man for Himself: An Inquiry into the Psychology of Ethics*, comes out six years after *Escape from Freedom* and is a major insight into the author's studies on the ethics of Aristotle and Spinoza. Despite living in Mexico, he is not giving up his activities in the States. Not only does he give guest lectures at many American universities, institutes and colleges, but is also involved in the training of a group of Mexican psychoanalysts, which will probably have the effect of settling in Mexico for a longer period of time; it will take another 25 years before he moves back to Europe in the mid-1970s. The semester of lectures he gives at Yale University during the 1948/1949 academic year will result a few months later in the publication of *Psychoanalysis and Religion*, a book of interest in the context of the issue of ideology.

After parting ways with the Institute for Social Research, Fromm, unlike his colleagues, seems to devote more attention to Freudian theory and psychotherapy. Jay, commenting on the effects of a dispute that played out in the mid-1930s between Institute staff, notes that

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[29] G. Davie, "Demanding Attention: Fundamentalisms in the Modern World", [in:] G. Davie, *The Sociology of Religion*, Los Angeles – London – New Delhi – Singapore 2007, pp. 279–280. See R. Włodarczyk, "Wymiary fundamentalizmu religijnego w perspektywie teoretycznej", op. cit., pp. 30–34.

[30] See L. J. Friedman, *The Lives of Erich Fromm*, op. cit., pp. 135–150.

Whatever the cause of Fromm's departure, his work became anathema to his former colleagues in the 1940's. After his break, the Institute did not spend much time in its publications discussing the theoretical problems of psychoanalysis. [...] Although psychoanalytic categories were used in much of the Institute's work during and after war, it appears that Horkheimer and the others were less than anxious to publicize their involvement with Freudian theory[31].

This does not mean that Fromm abandoned the integration of psychoanalysis with Marx's theory or departed from formulating his own concept of the critique of ideology. Considering the different directions taken by the two Frankfurt scholars as a result of the split, it is clear that the path Fromm followed from then on must have led him to different solutions than those that lay behind the programmatic article published by Horkheimer in 1937 "Traditional and Critical Theory"[32].

In *Man for Himself*, Fromm develops the foundations of his anthropology and ethics. In his view, humans, in creating their world to suit their species-specific biological conditions and needs, as well as subject to socio-cultural influences and transformations, must also take into account the potential and limitations of their internal predispositions. In other words, he writes in his 1947 text, "Human evolution is rooted in man's adaptability and in certain indestructible qualities of his nature which compel him never to cease his search for conditions better adjusted to his intrinsic needs"[33]. According to Fromm, it is as a result of evolution, development of self-consciousness, reason and imagination that man has lost contact with his instinctive ability to adapt to the surrounding environment. This does not mean that he has ceased to be a part of it, but that the very situation of his alienation from the world

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[31] M. Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination*, op. cit., pp. 101–102.

[32] See M. Horkheimer, "Traditional and Critical Theory", [in:] M. Horkheimer, *Critical Theory. Selected Essays*, New York 1972, pp. 188–243. In the context of Horkheimer's article that marks the origins of the critical theory of the Frankfurt School, it is in order to invoke Fromm's "The Method and Function of an Analytic Social Psychology" from five years before (op. cit.), published in a periodical of the Institute for Social Research: *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*. See R. Włodarczyk, *Ideologia, teoria, edukacja*, op. cit., pp. 232–260.

[33] E. Fromm, *Man for Himself: An Inquiry into the Psychology of Ethics*, London 2002, p. 23.

of nature has been accompanied since that breakthrough by an internal split in human nature that creates its own insurmountable contradictions that take the form of existential dichotomies[34]. That is, as Fromm defines these dichotomies, man is aware that he must die and that life and death are incompatible. That he belongs to the natural world and at the same time is separated from it. That while he is the vehicle of many possibilities for every human being, he is able to realize very few of them during his given time. That being someone separate, he vainly desires to escape the feeling of loneliness in close relationships with others. That he feels himself to be someone powerful and yet experiences again and again his own powerlessness in the face of the insurmountable circumstances of life. According to the Frankfurter, "The disharmony of man's existence generates needs which far transcend those of his animal origin"[35]. In other words, non-physiological human needs, according to the researcher, are not innate, but result from the situation and location in the world in which human beings found themselves as a result of evolution, and the situation and location are precisely what is common and characteristic of all people. As he enumerates in another text, *The Sane Society*, from the mid-1950s, these are the needs for connectedness with others, for transcendence of the status of a passive being, for rootedness and belonging, for a sense of integrated identity, and for having a system of orientation and an object of worship, a need that will come to the fore in his later research and texts[36]. On the other hand, the way a person reacts to the needs gradually revealed in the process of development will vary depending on the course of that development, knowledge and experiences, socialization and upbringing, as well as the social and cultural context. Nevertheless, Fromm is aware that the underlying existential dichotomies mentioned above are socially and individually masked and inadequately neutralized, which is what motivates his criticism. As he notes, "To harmonize, and thus negate, contradictions is the function of rationalizations in individual life and of ideologies (socially patterned

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[34] See ibidem, pp. 40–43.
[35] Ibidem, p. 46.
[36] See E. Fromm, *The Sane Society*, London – New York 2008, pp. 28–64; M. Pekkola, *Prophet of Radicalism. Erich Fromm and the Figurative Constitution of the Crisis of Modernity*, Jyväskylä 2010, pp. 167–170.

rationalizations) in social life"[37]. This statement is symptomatic of his synthesis of Freud's and Marx's findings. Additionally, he notes that individual and collective ways and concepts of realizing these needs can take both a constructive form, when they foster the optimal development of the potential of knowledge, love, and reason that man possesses, and a destructive one, when they inhibit or prevent the development of this potential. Thus, an individual's or collectively formed rationalization and the way and concept of realization of needs, which is destructive for the developmental and educational potential of man, inform Fromm's evolving notion of ideology.

One can trace an affinity between Fromm's analysis of the evolution of early Christianity in "The Dogma of Christ", the critique of Nazi authoritarianism in *Escape from Freedom* and his criticism of capitalism in *The Sane Society*. In these works, Fromm shows the results of social studies of rationalization and the ways and concepts of fulfilment of needs promoted by particular religions or ideologies. Moreover, in *Man for Himself* he addresses the issue of the social character, which develops within and via a particular environment, and which demonstrates the efficiency of the mechanism of an internal adjustment of the individual to the external conditions. Fromm owes the notion of the social character to Freud, yet it is worth viewing this element of his philosophy via the use of the habitus category by Max Weber. In *Economy and Society*, a comprehensive lecture on sociology edited posthumously, Weber addresses the rationalisation of the religious methodology of salvation, revealing itself throughout history in various traditions. Its objective, "as the process of rationalization went forward" is the transformation of ritual activity of the involved individual, aiming for an inner transformation. This activity serves the incarnation of the supranatural being into man himself, "into a milder hut more permanent *habitus*, and moreover one that was consciously possessed"[38] and the acquisition of the religious features required by a given God. In this way, the religious methodology of salvation

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[37] E. Fromm, *Man for Himself*, op. cit., p. 44.
[38] M. Weber, "Religious Groups (the Sociology of Religion)", [in:] M. Weber, *Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, ed. G. Roth, C. Wittich, Berkeley – Los Angeles – London 1978, p. 536. See R. Moore, *Education and Society: Issues and Explanations in the Sociology of Education*, Cambridge 2004, p. 126.

acquires an ethical and otherworldly orientation. A good example of this are the religious virtuosos who, according to Weber, are not only to be found among Buddhist monks, ascetic Protestants or Hindu yogis, but who by means of self-improvement achieve the highest degree of control over bodily and spiritual events as well as over thinking, with the aim of concentrating on what is essential from the point of view of a given virtuoso in the doctrine he professes[39]. This enduring effect in the form of an integrated inner predisposition to undertake activities in everyday life in such a way that each such action remains consistent with the assumptions of a particular doctrine can be understood as an implicit pattern of personality. In the case of ascetics, as Weber calls them, it is the effect of commitment and work on oneself. Fromm, in turn, shifts the emphasis to the unconscious cooperation of the individual and the environment to achieve a certain conformity of operation. In other words,

> It is the function of the social character to shape the energies of the members of society in such a way that their behaviour is not a matter of conscious decision as to whether or not to follow the social pattern, but one of *wanting to act as they have to act* and at the same time finding gratification in acting according to the requirements of the culture[40].

In *The Sane Society*, from where the quote comes, and in his earlier texts, Fromm's critique concentrates on the adjustment to the environment which is detrimental for the individual; the environment in a covert way undermines the individual's constitution, growth and education. In addition, religions or ideologies, which promise a way out of the impasse, seem to embroil the individual in illusions and disintegrating practices.

In his text *Psychoanalysis and Religion*, Fromm addressed his attitude to this unique phenomenon. First, following his earlier findings on the dichotomy of existential and non-physiological human needs, he offers a broad definition of religion according to which it is "any s y s t e m of thought and action shared by a group which gives the individual a frame of orientation and an object of

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[39] See M. Weber, "Religious Groups (the Sociology of Religion)", op. cit., pp. 540–541.
[40] E. Fromm, *The Sane Society*, op. cit., p. 77 – original underline.

d e v o t i o n ”[41]. Secondly, he abandons a differentiation into religions and secular ideologies, recognizing that in studying their various forms, one basically examines the same universal phenomenon, which is the realization of one of the non-physiological human needs, to have a system of orientation and an object of devotion. In his view, man

> may be aware of his system as being a religious one, different from those of the secular realm, or he may think that he has no religion and interpret his devotion to certain allegedly secular aims like power, money or success as nothing but his concern for the practical and expedient. The question is not *religion or not* but *which kind of religion*, whether it is one furthering man's development, the unfolding of his specifically human powers, or one paralyzing them[42].

Therefore, thirdly, he makes a differentiation to which the last sentence of the above quote refers, into humanistic and authoritarian religions (ideologies). They differ in the preferred type of conscience and authority, requiring submission and obedience to a feared or dreaded authority. This dichotomy is not about assigning a given phenomenon with a fixed name, e.g. Buddhism, Judaism or Marxism, psychoanalysis, to any of the distinguished ideal types, but about their internal dynamics, as a result of which in a given place and time a given humanistic religion (ideology) transforms into an authoritarian one. He realizes that there have been religions that have consistently remained authoritarian from their very beginning, and it is in their context that Fromm most often uses the category of ideology (however, it should be emphasised that he uses the terms interchangeably). In the context of the general human need to have a system of orientation and an object of reverence that he distinguishes, he notes that

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[41] E. Fromm, *Psychoanalysis and Religion*, op. cit., p. 21 – original underline. See E. Fromm, *To Have or To Be?*, London – New York 2008, pp. 110–114.

[42] E. Fromm, *Psychoanalysis and Religion*, op. cit., p. 26 – original underline. See E. Fromm, *For the Love of Life*, op. cit., pp. 26–32, 54, 103–104, 123–125; M. Humeniuk, "Between Secularization and Post-Secularism – On Disenchantment of the World from the Perspective of the Sociology of Religion", [in:] *Hermeneutics, Social Criticism and Everyday Education Practice*, ed. R. Włodarczyk, Wrocław 2020, pp. 159–186.

Submission to a powerful authority is one of the avenues by which man escapes from his feeling of aloneness and limitation. In the act of surrender he loses his independence and integrity as an individual but he gains the feeling of being protected by an awe-inspiring power of which, as it were, he becomes a part[43].

The effect of submission is, next to the process leading to becoming part of the object of worship, the principal point of reference, as indicated above in passing, of his concept of the critique of ideology. According to him, its task is not to denounce ideals, but to show how humanistic religions (ideologies) transform themselves into authoritarian ones, how, transforming themselves, they betray and lose their ideal[44]. The very course of their degeneration, which Fromm recognizes as the rule rather than the exception of the historical process, is connected to Marx's notion of alienation and Freud's notion of transference. At the same time, Fromm sees in them components of the concept of idolatry that grew out of the Jewish tradition, connected in it to the demand to reject in favour of monotheism all practices aimed at worshipping false idols. As he explains this understanding of the critique of idolatry,

God, in the monotheistic concept, is unrecognizable and indefinable; God is not a 'thing.' If man is created in the likeness of God, he is created as the bearer of infinite qualities. In idolatry man bows down and submits to the projection of one partial quality in himself. He does not experience himself as the centre from which living acts of love and reason radiate[45].

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[43] E. Fromm, *Psychoanalysis and Religion*, op. cit., p. 35. See ibidem, pp. 34–54; I. Paszenda, "Everyday Life – Between Rationality of Actions and Authority. An Example of Social Diagnosis by Erich Fromm", [in:] *Hermeneutics, Social Criticism and Everyday Education Practice*, op. cit., pp. 99–120.

[44] See E. Fromm, *Beyond the Chains of Illusion. My Encounter with Marx and Freud*, London – New York 2009, p. 100; E. Fromm, *Marx's Concept of Man*, New York 1961, pp. 62–63.

[45] E. Fromm, *The Sane Society*, op. cit., pp. 118–119 – original underline. See E. Fromm, *You Shall Be as Gods. A Radical Interpretation of the Old Testament and Its Tradition*, New York 1966, pp. 36–43, 88–91; S. Lundgren, *Fight Against Idols. Erich Fromm on Religion, Judaism and the Bible*, Frankfurt am Mains 1998, pp. 136–142; D. Hawkes, "Idolatry", [in:] D. Hawkes, *Ideology*, op. cit., pp. 15–19.

As he indicates in another text referring to rabbinical sources, "Man, the prisoner of nature, becomes free by becoming fully human. In the biblical and later Jewish view, freedom and independence are the goals of human development, and the aim of human action is the constant process of liberating oneself from the shackles that bind man to the past, to nature, to the clan, to idols"[46].

Transference and alienation are not, of course, the same thing, but despite the fundamental differences, as Fromm emphasizes, between Marx's and Freud's approaches to social problems and the concept of man, they remain so closely related that an integrated understanding of them becomes possible, which creates convenient conditions for a comprehensive critique of Western society[47]. In *Beyond the Chains of Illusion*, a 1962 text which is a veritable intellectual biography, there is a passage that exemplifies Fromm's understanding of the three relevant categories:

> In the widest sense, every neurosis can be considered an outcome of alienation; this is so because neurosis is characterized by the fact that one passion (for instance, for money, power, women, etc.) becomes dominant and separated from the total personality, thus becoming the ruler of the person. This passion is his idol to which he submits even though he may rationalize the nature of his idol and give it many different and often well-sounding names. He is ruled by a partial desire, he transfers all he has left to this desire, he is weaker the stronger 'it' becomes. He has become alienated from himself precisely because 'he' has become the slave of a part of himself[48].

Fromm's findings outlined above lead him to further clarify the relationship between human character and ideological conditioning, and consequently offer a critical perspective on religion (ideology) both from the side of doctrine and group coordination and, more broadly, the whole practice, as well as compensation and human passions, the construction of the emotional core. In his opinion, "Without the need for idols one could not possibly understand the emotional intensity of nationalism,

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[46] E. Fromm, *You Shall Be as Gods*, op. cit., p. 57. See ibidem, pp. 26–28, 75–90.

[47] See E. Fromm, *Beyond the Chains of Illusion*, op. cit., pp. 45–47, 86; E. Fromm, *The Sane Society*, op. cit., pp. 76–201; R. Włodarczyk, *Ideologia, teoria, edukacja*, op. cit., pp. 160–165.

[48] E. Fromm, *Beyond the Chains of Illusion*, op. cit., p. 43.

racism, imperialism, or the 'cult of personality' in its various forms"[49]; possibly, this also refers to fundamentalism.

FROMM AND RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM

The last days of the summer of 1974, Locarno. Fromm and Annis Freeman, his third wife, decide not to return to Mexico[50]. This is their second summer spent here. A few years earlier, Fromm suffered his first heart attack; two more are to come. He will die without symptoms of agony a few days before his eightieth birthday. The last two decades were a time of very intense involvement in the training of psychoanalysts, therapeutic practice, field research, and many and varied scholarly activities, lecturing and publishing, co-creation with other intellectuals of the concept of humanistic socialism. His political activity included the presidential campaign of Eugene McCarthy, followed by a gradual withdrawal from his responsibilities, and finally retirement. Fromm does breathing exercises every morning for an hour. This is part of the practice of Buddhism, which in various forms has accompanied him for almost fifty years[51]. He himself regards ritual as one of the most important elements of religious experience, on which he increasingly concentrates his research. He is seconded in this by Master Eckhart and Marx. In the background are the results of his studies of the Hebrew Bible, the pages of the Talmud and rabbinic commentaries. The concept of his *opus magnum*: *To Have or to Be?* is coming to fruition.

One such frequent reference, through which he continually enters into dialogue with the tradition of Judaism, concerns the biblical myth of Adam and Eve's life in and departure from the Garden of Eden. Contrary to the dominant interpretations, according to which it is a story about the transgression of insubordination, "original sin" and the fall of man, he sees in it the story of an act of disobedience, which does not demoralize man, but frees him, and which marks the beginning of human history[52]. In his

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[49] E. Fromm, *The Revision of Psychoanalysis*, 1992, p. 43 – original underline.
[50] See L. J. Friedman, *The Lives of Erich Fromm*, op. cit., pp. 330–337.
[51] See ibidem, p. 163–170; E. Fromm, *For the Love of Life*, op. cit., p. 105.
[52] See E. Fromm, *To Have or To Be?*, op. cit., pp. 99–101; E. Fromm, *On Disobedience and*

reading, the effect of the transformation taking place the moment the human couple violate the ban of eating the fruit from the tree of knowledge is the loss of primordial harmony and the experience of estrangement:

> Adam and Eve at the beginning of their evolution are bound to blood and soil; they are still 'blind'. But 'their eyes are opened' after they acquire the knowledge the original harmony with nature is broken. Man begins the process of individuation and cuts his ties with nature. In fact, he and nature become enemies, not to be reconciled until man has become fully human. With this first step of severing the ties between man and nature, history – and alienation – begins. As we have seen, this is not the story of the 'fall' of man but of his awakening, and thus, of the beginning of his rise[53].

This awakening to the consciousness of good and evil, to the consciousness of oneself as separate and alien beings, is not yet accompanied by the ability to cure alienation with love, as Fromm believes is evidenced by the fact that "Eve does not try to protect Adam, and Adam avoids punishment by denouncing Eve as the culprit rather than defending her". They then met "as separated, isolated, selfish human beings who cannot overcome their separation in the act of loving union"[54]. What is more, they are not yet able to rely on their own strength, the authority of their reason, the voice of their heart, and their freedom to consequently create the conditions and achieve a state of new harmony with themselves, their fellow human beings, and nature. According to Fromm, this is a long process that occurs in stages and requires an environment that is favourable for development, a social environment and a commitment to a humanistic ideology that opposes the promotion of obedience as a virtue.

Fromm is far from acknowledging that every act of insubordination is a virtue and that compliance is transgression. However, he clearly emphasizes that

Other Essays, The New York 1981, pp. 16–18, 45–47; E. Fromm, *You Shall Be as Gods*, op. cit., pp. 21–22, 57–58, 70–71; E. Fromm, *Escape from Freedom*, New York 1969, pp. 49–50; E. Fromm, *For the Love of Life*, op. cit., pp. 24–25.

[53] E. Fromm, *You Shall Be as Gods*, op. cit., p. 57 – original underline. See M. Buber, *Good and Evil. Two Interpretations*, New York 1953, pp. 67–80.

[54] E. Fromm, *To Have or To Be?*, op. cit., p. 100.

Man has continued to evolve by acts of disobedience. Not only was his spiritual development possible only because there were men who dared to say no to the powers that be in the name of their conscience or their faith, but also his intellectual development was dependent on the capacity for being disobedient – disobedient to authorities who tried to muzzle new thoughts and to the authority of long-established opinions which declared a change to be nonsense[55].

According to Fromm, this development is accompanied by a strengthening of the voice of conscience, which becomes obscure for the individual along with the internalisation of views and impulses of external forces. These forces are at variance with man's needs and what is conducive to life yet offer instead a soothing if virtual sense of security and protection. Naturally, for such a process to be efficient it calls for a proper set of external factors and adequate mental background. According to Fromm's findings, the human condition undergoes a kind of gradual unification under the impact of a particular religion (ideology) and the individual thus loses the inner distance. Man displaces his otherness, and with it his independent ethical sensitivity, trying to replace it by striving in the spirit of asceticism to recreate in its place the constellation of the proper unity of theory and practice promoted within a given orientation, instead of developing the ability to create relations between this otherness and religion (ideology), in which their harmonisation does not mean melting into one. As a result, conscience and the axio-normative system, distinguishable analytically or doctrinally within a given religion, become indistinguishable for the individual. Man loses the ability to evaluate the politics in which his movement or group participates other than from the position of that system, an external authority, and the loss of control and freedom is accompanied by the disappearance of the ability to take responsibility for engagement other than through a sense of guilt or shame. According to the Frankfurter, it is humanistic religions (ideologies) that keep and strengthen the distance. In *To Have or To Be?*,

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[55] E. Fromm, *On Disobedience and Other Essays*, op cit., p. 17. See E. Bielska, *Koncepcje oporu we współczesnych naukach społecznych. Główne problemy, pojęcia, rozstrzygnięcia*, Katowice 2013, pp. 25–67, 141–227; M. Kaczmarczyk, "Nieposłuszeństwo obywatelskie a demokracja", *Studia Socjologiczne* 2013, No. 1, pp. 21–40.

Fromm discusses the above alternative via dichotomies of generalised life orientations, from whose perspective violation of external conjunctions, bans and expectations is understood differently:

> in the having mode, and thus the authoritarian structure, sin is disobedience and is overcome by repentance → punishment → renewed submission. In the being mode, the nonauthoritarian structure, sin is unresolved estrangement, and it is overcome by the full unfolding of reason and love, by atonement[56].

Fromm's general findings precede detailed extended studies, such as those accounted for in *The Art of Loving* and *The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness*[57].

Despite the fact that Fromm does not use the term fundamentalism, his sociology of religion and his concept of the critique of ideology make it possible to include his pursuits in the research of this phenomenon. In line with Eisenstadt's findings, we should assume that the term used today should not obscure the centuries-long significant political and social presence of the phenomenon, so its characteristics would take precedence. For Marty it is importantly connected with identity issues and attitudes within a community. Heywood's position, on the other hand, creates conditions for further research on the relation between ideology and fundamentalism. It is worth noting that these three aspects, which are elements of extended concepts, are not located on the margins of the theoretical discussion, but are more widely shared and explored[58]. In this context, Fromm's approach can be assumed to be comprehensive. On the one hand, psychoanalytic theory and practice allow him to observe and describe the details of the anatomy of the authoritarian personality. On the other hand, Marx's sociology allows him to focus attention on the social functions of religion. The combination of these two approaches creates the potential for a critique that recognizes in

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[56] E. Fromm, *To Have or To Be?*, op. cit., p. 101. See E. Fromm, *You Shall Be as Gods*, op. cit., pp. 125–140.

[57] See E. Fromm, *The Art of Loving*, New York – Evanston 1962; E. Fromm, *The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness*, New York – Chicago – San Francisco 1974.

[58] See M. Ruthven, *Fundamentalism. A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford – New York 2007.

the revealed characteristics of authoritarian ideologies the features of fundamentalism, broadly defined. On the other hand, if we consider its narrower understanding, Fromm's study of idolatry and the authoritarian personality allows us to distinguish an important dynamic that the movement and the individual undergo as alienation deepens, in which we can see his own version of critical theory. Fundamentalism, in this view, would be one of the extreme positions, a position within authoritarian ideologies of which Weber's religious virtuoso would be a good example. At the same time, it is worth noting the evolution of Fromm's approach to religion. Fromm's starting point is to think of religion as an inhibitor of social and individual development, but the development of the concept of humanistic religions (ideologies) points to a revision. Referring to the common human need for a system of orientation and an object of worship, he not so much asks "religion or not?", but "which kind of religion?". He defines his own religion as non-theistic humanism, on which he pins his hopes as for the imminent transformation of humanity[59]. In other words, he seems to understand his social engagement as practicing the ideology of radical humanism, which he simultaneously promotes. That is, both in the field of practiced theory and practice, he considers the integration of thought, commitment, and action to be the domain of religion (ideology). The emotional core, whose weakness is the tendency to gravitate towards reduction under the auspices of an individual's characteristic or a set of them, is just as important here as the social and historical conditions, which are at the same time both the field of socialization and the field of subjective and collective activity seeking to bring about change, or the content of doctrine with its implicit resources. With some unfavourable configuration of these components for the constitution, development and education of man, his ethical sensitivity with a distinguished role of conscience, which has a critical potential, becomes dominated by the authority of religion. Fromm diagnoses such a situation as a loss of health, resulting in a gradual disintegration of an individual in the personal plan and of a given community in the social plan. The manifestations can be very different forms of increasing aggression and self-destruction of the individual, from apathy to sadism, which can find an outlet in authoritarian ideologies accepted or tolerated

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[59] See E. Fromm, *The Sane Society*, op. cit., pp. 343–344.

in a given society, or individual practices that make up another kind of whole, which Fromm could define as the culture of death. Such external and internal conditions constitute, in his perspective, a powerful factor in the preservation of thinking, engagement and action adverse to the individual and the group. Fundamentalism fits within this pattern.

March 1980. Erich Pinchas Fromm dies in his sleep. Looking at his life and work, one cannot but be struck by his surprising productivity, coherence and consistency. This is somehow alluded to by a quote that his long-time secretary, Reiner Funk, used as the motto of his biography of his master:

> First of all, I would like to say that I cannot actually consider myself a professional philosopher. Nor can I consider myself a rabbi in the sense of a Jewish scholar with the kind of knowledge I would expect from a rabbi. In fact, I can only say that my deepest inclination was a combination of all these factors, even if the details here and there lack some knowledge or competence[60].

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[60] R. Funk, *Erich Fromm*, Wrocław 1999, p. 5.

CHAPTER III

SCHOOLS 'DETACHED' FROM REALITY. ON THE ARCHITECTONICS AND DYNAMICS OF CONTEMPORARY EDUCATIONAL SPACE

*In our days we receive three
different or contrary educations;
namely, of our parents, of our
masters, and of the world.
What we learn in the latter effaces
all the ideas of the former*

Montesquieu,
The Spirit of Laws

The statement in the title can be read as a metaphor used primarily for persuasion, but it also reflects a phenomenon important for pedagogy, namely the gap between school education and social reality. It is justified in the sense that each social practice, especially institutionalised one, is subject to regionalization, takes place in a separate, appropriate time, spatial and situational context, so that, undisturbed, it can unfold at its own pace[1]. However, our pedagogical anxiety is aroused when school education, contrary to expectations and assumptions, is not compatible with social reality, and when we see that rather than being bridged, the gap is growing; so is dissonance. This anxiety is not a *signum temporis* of a particular period. The history of pedagogical ideas suggests that it has accompanied pedagogies present in schools for a long time. Contemporary research indicates individual processes that are responsible for this state of affairs, while the aim of this chapter is to organize them by distinguishing three dimensions of '*detachment* of school from reality'.

[1] See A. Giddens, "Time, Space and Regionalisation", [in:] *Social Relations and Spatial Structures*, ed. D. Gregory, J. Urry, London 1985, pp. 265–295.

SCHOOLS AND *DETACHMENT* FROM THE REALITY OF THE INNER WORLD OF EXPERIENCE

In his *Essays*, Michel de Montaigne often expresses his unfavourable opinion of teachers and schools. As can be deduced from his scattered remarks, he was irritated by the cult of superficial knowledge, the underestimation of the role of experience, genuine engagement, and personal involvement. As he observes in his essay "On Schoolmasters' Learning": "I dislike the borrowed and begged for wisdom. Learned we may be with another man's learning: we can only be wise with wisdom of our own"[2]. In addition, there is waste of time, spoilage of character, emphasis on unproductive effort and learned helplessness. This is what he writes about classes taught at school:

> If our souls do not move with a better motion and if we do not have a healthier judgement, then I would just as soon that our pupil should spend his time playing tennis... But just look at him after he has spent some fifteen or sixteen years of studying: nothing could be more unsuited for employment[3].

In Montaigne's work teachers, focused on linguistic precision and providing instruction, seem to symbolise the type of school's *detachment* from the everyday reality of the world. This looks similar to the currently oft-repeated accusation that the staff of the education system prepare pupils to "gather encyclopaedic knowledge", and thus separate them from the realm of personal experience of the world. He claimed that: "They have learned the theory of everything: try and find one who can put it into practice"[4].

The voice of the Renaissance humanist, despite the passage of time and civilizational changes, still sounds familiar, hence the assumption that what we are complaining about at present, given some weaknesses of school education, is not only relevant to the present time. Nor is the

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[2] M. de Montaigne, *The Complete Essays*, London 2003, p. 155.

[3] Ibidem.

[4] Ibidem, p. 157. See also: ibidem, pp. 163, 182–183. "Our soul acts, directed solely by others' authority, bound and given to others' illusions, enslaved and subdued by the seriousness of their teaching. We are so much used to walk in the treadmill that we are no longer able to walk freely; our power and our freedom are gone [...]" (ibidem, p. 132).

awareness of the school's mission, which Montaigne seems to include in the following statement: "the most vital thing is to awaken willingness and love; otherwise one produces fools only burdened with books [...]"[5]. These intuitions may be confirmed both in the writings of the precursors and leaders of the New Education movement active in the era of dominance of the ideology of Modernism, and in contemporary representatives of humanistically-oriented pedagogics, such as Benjamin M. Spock, Paulo Freire, Ivan Illich, Carl R. Rogers, Alice Miller, Marshall B. Rosenberg, Henry A. Giroux, Jan Masschelein, and Martin Simons[6].

In his book published almost a century ago, *Democracy and Education*, John Dewey notes:

> There is the standing danger that the material of formal instruction will be merely the subject matter of schools, isolated from the subject matter of life-experience. [...] Those which have not been carried over into the structure of social life, but which remain largely matters of technical information expressed in symbols, are made conspicuous in schools[7].

Recognizing reflective experience as the fundamental component of effective education, Dewey expected that its conscious use in the processes of upbringing and education would not only result in the integration of theory with practice, school space with social space, but also in the alignment of the school curriculum with the student's inner world. In the second half of the 20th century, a similar concept of personally-centred teaching was developed by Carl R. Rogers. Opposing traditional school education, i.e. the one which "There is no place for whole persons in the educational system, only for their intellects" with the concept of education aimed at a holistic development of the human person, i.e. one thanks to which "the learning tends to be deeper, proceeds at a more rapid rate, and is more pervasive in the life"[8], he expected its effects to be both the

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[5] Ibidem, p. 152.

[6] See K. Sośnicki, *Rozwój pedagogiki zachodniej na przełomie XIX i XX wieku*, Warszawa 1967; B. Śliwerski, *Współczesne nurty i teorie wychowania*, Kraków 2010; J. Masschelein, M. Simons, *In Defence of the School. A Public Iusse*, Leuven 2013.

[7] J. Dewey, *Democracy and Education. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education*, New York 2009, p. 8.

[8] C. R. Rogers, *A Way of Being*, New York 1995, pp. 297, 300.

merger of the pupil's passion, feeling and intellect and his or her school and extracurricular experience.

Despite repeated criticism and recurring demands for change, the problem seems to be still present in the late modern era. The pupil, his world of experiences and experiences connected with social reality and school education function as *detached* from one another. However, this is not the only dimension in which the claim made in the title takes on meaning.

SCHOOLS AND RATIONAL-FUNCTIONAL *DETACHMENT* FROM THE REALITY OF THE EVERYDAY WORLD

One can moreover refer to 'schools *detached* from reality' also in the sphere of organization. Analyses offered by Max Weber at the close of the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th one about the expansion of bureaucracy, so characteristic of modernity, ushered in studies on the impact of this kind of organizational changes on the process of school upbringing and education. From this perspective, when teachers become officials of an institution managed in a modern manner, they are subject in their work to the same rules as other employees in other sectors of state administration, in private companies and the corporate world.

Weber identified several of the most important features specific to bureaucracies, such as: a clear hierarchy of power, formally codified rules of conduct and responsibilities defined for each position and level of functioning of the organization, permanent employment, fixed working hours and remuneration, separation of the domain of an official's work from his personal life, property and private matters[9]. This type of order, on the one hand, promotes transparency, stability and predictability of the system. In this sense schools, just like factories operating at the mass production level, are subject to standardization, which enables

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[9] See M. Weber, "Bureaucracy", [in:] M. Weber, *Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretative Sociology*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London 1978, pp. 956–1005; R. Sennett, "Bureaucracy", [in:] R. Sennett, *The Culture of the New Capitalism*, Yale 2007, pp. 15–83; P. Zamojski, "Simulating Education. The Bureaucratisation of Schooling as a Production of the Simulacra", *Problemy Wczesnej Edukacji* 2014, No. 2, pp. 25–38.

long-term planning and quality control. Yet on the other hand, it generates oppositions and conflicts between what is general and what is individual, between the promoted and somewhat rigid and limited offer and the intrinsically unstable group and individual aspirations, between the statics of the institution and the dynamics of life, between predictability and the need to evolve and adapt to changing conditions and needs, between the sustainability of the organization and the tasks for which it was originally set up, between procedure and exception, security and creativity, formal education and learning, etc.

The antinomies generated by the institutional order survived modernity and became one of the main causes of the crisis of the ideologies of modernism, determining the directions of development of western societies[10]. However, before it happened, it was widely accepted that the inability to remove contradictions or resolve conflicts was a temporary weakness of the time of social transformation. It was widely accepted that the search for the right proportions and equilibrium of the system carried out by researchers and philosophers is coming to an end, and that the numerous changes in the organization of institutions and the social division of labour made by politicians and social engineers signify civilizational progress[11]. The same happened in the field of education, as evidenced, for example, by the concepts, utopias and educational practice of numerous reformers and alternative centres operating at the turn of the twentieth century[12].

These contradictions and their effects can be related to the functioning of a school and at the same time define the conditions of its policy, as a result of which it was necessary to achieve internal consolidation and separation of the sphere of the educational system, including its specific

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[10] See A. Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, Cambridge 2004; Z. Bauman, *Legislators and Interpreters*, Cambridge 1989; Z. Bauman, *Liquid Modernity*, Cambridge 2000See also Z. Melosik, *Postmodernistyczne kontrowersje wokół edukacji*, Poznań – Toruń 1995, pp. 31–46

[11] See W. Lepenies, "Lęk a nauka", [in:] W. Lepenies, *Niebezpieczne powinowactwa z wyboru*, Warszawa 1996, pp. 32–51; A .Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, op. cit., pp. 1–54.

[12] See S. Sztobryn, "Pedagogika Nowego Wychowania", [in:] *Pedagogika. Podręcznik akademicki*, Vol. 1, ed. Z. Kwieciński, B. Śliwerski, Warszawa 2006, pp. 278–292. See also R. Leppert, "Uczony i pedagog: od Manna do Baumana", *Przegląd Badań Edukacyjnych* 2011, No. 1, pp. 25–40; B. Pietkiewicz-Pareek, *Analfabetyzm w Indiach. Źródła, dynamika, programy przemian i działania naprawcze*, Wrocław 2021, pp. 49–59, 75–119.

institutions, from other social spheres. However, separation is not the same as detachment, although – importantly – it enables it to a large extent. The formation and separation of institutions, the definition of their borders and domains is symptomatic of modernism, striving for the ideal of a well-ordered society, while *detachment* in this case should be understood as a side effect of the social transformation process initiated as early as the Enlightenment.

The working environment of modern officials, dominated by bureaucratic rules, was conducive to the formation of patterns and criteria for assessing behaviour, which would guarantee the required optimal efficiency achieved within the imposed framework of action. Inspired by the research conducted by the Weber brothers, in his book published in the 1940s *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction*, Karl Mannheim called this type of efficiency a functional rationality and defined as follows:

> a series of actions is organized in such a way that it leads to a previously defined goal, every element in this series of actions receiving a functional position and role. Such a functional organization of a series of actions will, moreover, be at its best when, in order to attain the given goal, it co-ordinates the means most efficiently. It is by no means characteristic, however, of functional organization in our sense that this optimum be attained or even that the goal itself be considered rational as measured by a certain standard[13].

Of course, it is not that this type of action occurred with the emergence of an industrial society. This is, as Mannheim explained, rather a difference in degree:

> The more industrialized a society is and the more advanced its division of labour and organization, the greater will be the number of spheres of human activity which will be functionally rational and hence also calculable in advance. Whereas the individual in earlier societies acted only occasionally and in limited spheres in a functionally rational manner, in contemporary society he is compelled to act in this way in more and more spheres of life[14].

[13] K. Mannheim, *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction. Studies in Modern Social Structure*, London 1960, p. 53.
[14] Ibidem, p. 55.

Adaptation to bureaucratic rules is not tantamount to their internalization. Still, the long-term impact of the environment has socialization value, is not limited to the acquisition by an official of a routine and relevant habits but leads to significant changes in personality and adoption of particular attitudes. Mannheim addresses these changes briefly as follows:

> Modern society attains perhaps its highest stage of functional rationalization in its administrative staff, in which the individuals who take part not only have their specifications prescribed – this sort of rationalization of tasks may possibly be more advanced in the Taylorization of workers in an industrial plant – but in addition have their life-plan to a large extent imposed in the form of a 'career', in which the individual stages are specified in advance. Concern with a career requires a maximum of self-mastery since it involves not only the actual processes of work but also the prescriptive regulation both of the ideas and feelings that one is permitted to have and of one's leisure time[15].

As evidenced by the study of both the overt and hidden school curriculum, the mechanisms and processes observed by Mannheim have found and continue to find their realizations also in education[16]. Both teachers and students adapt to the bureaucratic rules, thus giving them priority not only over the objectives for which the institution or a specific unit was created, but also over their own aspirations and potential. In the act of adapting to the rules of the school, they internalise the existing order and accept it as their own.

The effect observed in the above-mentioned studies on education seems to be in line with the observation made by Robert Merton, another

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[15] Ibidem, p. 56. In this context it is worth mentioning Erving Goffman's research and the theory of total institutions, which seem to correspond and at the same time illustrate the theses put forward by Mannheim (see E. Goffman, *Asylums. Essays on the social situation of mental patients and other inmates*, London 2017).

[16] See R. Moore, *Education and Society: Issues and Explanations in the Sociology of Education*, Polity Press, Cambridge 2004; M. J. Szymański, *Studia i szkice z socjologii edukacji*, Warszawa 2000, pp. 100–162; W. Żłobicki, *Ukryty program w edukacji. Między niewiedzą a manipulacją*, Kraków 2002.

sociology classic, on the dysfunctionality of modern bureaucracy[17]. Lack of flexibility of officials and avoidance of basing decisions on one's own judgements, resulting from the habit of adhering to established rules, may make the organization somehow sabotage the realization of its own goals. Moreover, it may be unable to react to cases requiring special treatment and care. Such dysfunctionality is an acute problem for the functioning of the educational system in accordance with humanistic values. It is also an argument in favour of the assertion presented in the title.

When talking about 'schools *detached* from reality' in organizational terms, another important factor should also be taken into account, which has already been mentioned in a way. The coherence of the internal structure, coordination of stakeholders and activities, as well as orientation and regulation of the dynamics of the educational system and its individual institutions depends on their educational ideology[18]. Awareness of the impact and nature of this factor, as Zvi Lamm emphasizes, did not play a major role in the educational spheres of traditional society, but gained in importance in modernity[19]. It determines the legitimacy of the order established for a given educational space, its uniqueness and specificity, as well as the policies and directions pursued within it. In modern societies, in contrast to traditional ones, the reconstruction of the whole social order, including the educational one, required in each case the adoption of an ideal, setting goals and creating a project that would meet the criterion of progressiveness – elimination of risk and superstition and improvement and, consequently, change for the better. However, more than once its implementation triggered unexpected side-effects, which were contrary to expectations. It was often acknowledged after some time that the new reality deviates from the initial project assumptions and that such a state of affairs is often due to the deficiencies of the project itself,

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[17]　See R. K. Merton, "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality", [in:] R. K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, New York 1968, pp. 249–261; S. Czepińskyj, "Przyczynek w sprawie klasycznej teorii biurokracji: Robert King Merton i Max Weber", *Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska* 2004, Vol. XI, pp. 237–243.

[18]　See Z. Lamm, "Ideologies and Educational Thought", [in:] *Psychology and Counseling in Education*, ed. D. Bar-Tal, Jerusalem 1986, pp. 19–50; M. J. Szymański, "Ideologie edukacyjne", [in:] M. J. Szymański, *Studia i szkice z socjologii edukacji*, op. cit., pp. 62–86; G. L. Gutek, "Ideology and Education", [in:] G. L. Gutek, *Philosophical and Ideological Perspectives on Education*, Needham 1997, pp. 166–193.

[19]　See Z. Lamm, "Ideologies and Educational Thought", op. cit., p. 19.

which distorts the envisaged ideal. In other words, the 'betrayed ideal' should be regarded as one of the factors contributing to 'schools being *detached* from reality'. This seems to be borne out, too, by Bogusław Śliwerski's diagnosis about the reasons for the aspirations of a few generations of educators to create alternative schools and educational projects:

> The secret of [...] permanent reformatory ambitions stems not only from 'wishful thinking', i.e. the ideology of pedagogical individualism, neo-romanticism or the pedagogy of resistance, but also from the need, more and more strongly felt by the broadly understood educators, to abandon depersonalizing educational structures and practices in favour of real rather than declarative humanization of these processes[20].

The experience of the dissonance between the way the school operates and the ideals that guide it does not necessarily lead the educators to reject the latter, but in many cases it becomes an important impulse for them to find a way to implement it and to connect the school with the reality of everyday life around it.

Like Montaigne, who writes about traditional society, teachers focusing their own and their students' attention on theories of reality, abstract and thus move away from reality and their personal experiences. In modern institutions this distance is enlarged by the fact that they tend to submit to the forms and schemes appropriate to the institution in accordance with the way educational processes are organised. Moreover, by internalizing the imposed order, they risk alienation from students' expectations, goals and tasks of humanism, as well as their own aspirations and needs. If one considers that the teacher's involvement in the educational relationship with pupils and the creation of optimal conditions for their development plays a fundamental role in the process of school learning, one can see in the above trends the beginnings of the process of teachers' and pupils' distancing themselves from external and internal reality, but also more broadly – schools that are *detached* from the reality of everyday life, Husserl's *Lebenswelt*.

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[20] B. Śliwerski, "Pedagogika alternatywna", [in:] *Pedagogika*, Vol. 4, ed. B. Śliwerski, Gdańsk 2010, p. 447. See P. Rudnicki, *Pedagogie małych działań. Krytyczne studium alternatyw edukacyjnych*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe DSW, Wrocław 2016, pp. 23–54, 73–83.

SCHOOLS AND THE ASYNCHRONY OF TRANSFORMING INTERDEPENDENT SOCIAL REALITIES

There is one more aspect of 'schools being *detached* from the reality of everyday life'. although the phenomenon seems unique for the late modern era, its sources must actually be sought in the preceding period. In order to skilfully grasp the unique character of this *detachment*, we may return to Karl Mannheim's reflections on bureaucracy and stability of the social structure.

Mannheim assumed that social order may be at risk due to the disproportion between the progress of technological and natural sciences and the incomparable development of knowledge about social and moral forces, which are unequally distributed among different social groups and classes. While traditional societies, as he believed, could afford some degree of disparity and imbalance in the integration of their structures, the growing democratization and complexity of the division of labour in modern Western societies, and with it the growing and increasing interdependence of individual elements and individuals on one another and on the whole as such, necessitates a control of the overall process based on rational and moral criteria, and the equitable distribution of mental and moral dispositions in social structure[21]. The emergence of numerous small tensions, which, in principle, would not have an impact on the stability of the functioning of traditional societies, in the context of modern consolidation of the social structure gains a previously inaccessible potential for influencing the state and functioning of other elements of it. In other words, because of the close interdependence and the numerous links between the various factors that make up society and the actions of individuals and groups, the effects of even small shifts in the various parts of society's structure occur in a way that is difficult to predict and control and affect the entire society. The network of dependencies is so compact, complex and multifaceted that, according to Mannheim, it resonates easily at even a slight vibration within any social space. Therefore, the prevention of such tensions and disorderly

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[21] See K. Mannheim, *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction*, op. cit., pp. 42–44. See also K. Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia. An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge*, New York 1954, pp. 1–48.

displacements requires a stricter control of behaviour on the part of particular individuals. Functional rationalization in this case is not an adequate reaction to this type of interference. It does not suppress it. At the same time, Mannheim noticed that the form internalized by the individual is not the last stage of the rationalization process. As he says:

> self-rationalization […] it so far does not represent the most radical form of the rationalization of the acting subject. Reflection and self-observation, as distinguished from sheer self-rationalization, are an ever more radical form of it[22].

The reflectiveness of the subject, about which Mannheim wrote, becomes in this case a necessary component of participation in heterogeneous social spaces, so that the individual is able to mitigate the tensions resulting from the unsynchronised displacements generated by the transforming individual institutions and social segments, which are independent of each other and according to their own internal logic. In the 1980s, Urlich Beck drew attention to this problem, recognizing that this is the dominant late modernity trend which, in his opinion, creates the formation of a "risk society"[23]. He pointed out that risks and threats cannot be removed by existing methods, i.e. by reforming and transforming the inherited institutions, since these reforms alone are the cause and transmission of further tensions within the social structure. In addition, they cannot be identified and assessed without recourse to expertise, which is itself responsible for generating risk, as it is neither certain nor static, but rather evolving and fragmented. Therefore, the most appropriate reaction of individuals is a declining confidence in institutions and the development of individual strategies for dealing with the contradictions and tensions of human collective organizations, for which reflective rationality seems to be essential[24]. Beck is followed by

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[22] K. Mannheim, *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction*, op. cit., p. 56.

[23] See U. Beck, *Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity*, Los Angeles 1992; A. Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity. Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*, Stanford 1991.

[24] See U. Beck, W. Bonss, Ch. Lau, "The Theory of Reflexive Modernization. Problematic, Hypotheses and Research Programme", *Theory, Culture& Society* 2003, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 1–33; U. Beck, A. Giddens, S. Lash, *Reflexive Modernization. Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order*, Cambridge 1994.

Zygmunt Bauman: "one's life becomes a *biographical solution to systemic contradictions*"[25]. While modernism retained faith in the legitimacy of the pursuit of the utopia of a well-ordered society, in which accidentally generated vibrations will threaten neither its stability nor the security of individuals, insofar as crisis situations are part and parcel of social life as its inextricable component to be managed to minimise or deliberately redistribute the effects of vibrations and tensions appearing in the social structure. In this sense, not only the individual, but also society as a whole should become reflective, so that in their emergence they can cushion the tensions created on the thresholds between relatively autonomous, evolving social spheres[26].

An example of such asynchronization and school's *detachment* from social reality may be its relation to the labour market. The dynamics of this sphere has its own logic; the changes depend on current trends and technical possibilities and must respect consumers' unstable needs and desires. Chance and risk cannot be ruled out. Similarly, the educational system has its own internal logic and dynamics, but the changes within it take place at a different pace, characteristic of this institution, thus creating an insurmountable gap. In other words, the school, using several-year periods of pre-planned education, is not able to reliably and exhaustively prepare students for active participation in the labour market, where trends not only cannot be predicted in advance, but occur in cycles of several months or even weeks (e.g. advancement of technical knowledge, the emergence of new professions and an atrophy of existing ones, changes in the employment structure, circulation of capital, relocation of production, migration, etc.).

This dimension of school's *detachment* from social reality can also be viewed from the perspective of criticism of ideology. First of all, the twilight of the era of "great narratives" did not bring about a decline in the demand for ideologies; the place of the powerful monopolists was taken by a number of different micro-stories and regional utopias. Democracy, human rights, rationalism, consumerism, postmodernism, technopoly, ecology, vegetarianism, paidocentrism, feminism, laissez-faire, corporations, Facebook, autonomy, state, further alter-globalism, Islam,

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[25] Z. Bauman, *Liquid Modernity*, op. cit., p. 34 – original underline.
[26] See U. Beck, A. Giddens, S. Lash, *Reflexive Modernization*, op. cit., pp. 5–13, 112–119, 184–197.

Buddhism, Christianity, anarchy, race, nation, social justice, art, etc. – have become unconnected systems of orientation that mobilize action, each of which develops in a separate domain. Hence the image of a liberal democracy engaged in multiplying the common good of a citizen as modelled by the school is in conflict with the way in which students participate in civil society organizations, each of which legitimizes its actions by an ideology that is appropriate to its own group.

Secondly, as Zvi Lamm proves, the modern school, which was obliged to serve "three clients" with different, incompatible interests – society, culture and the individual – favoured the processes of socialization and acculturation in an attempt to reconcile the contradictions arising from the equal treatment and co-existence of these clients[27]. At the same time, experimental schools with a humanistic orientation, setting themselves in opposition to the tendencies dominating in education, opted for the priority of neglected individualism. The educational space of late modernity inherited this state of affairs, but a new era offered the Western society a ferment of the "revolution of subjects"[28], with cultural plurality and extreme individualism being its two major reference points. As a consequence, this throws new light on the current role of orientations prevalent in the education system. In this sense school, subordinating education to the interests of society and culture, is not compatible with the everyday life of Western societies, in which the majority of people devote themselves to the politics of private life and group particularisms.

The content of the chapter does not exhaust the list of manifestations of '*detachment* of schools from reality'. Nevertheless, it is sufficient to justify the separation of its three historically shaped dimensions. They

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[27] See Z. Lamm, *Ideologies and Educational Thought*, op. cit., pp. 19–50.

[28] See A. Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity*, op. cit.; A. Giddens, *The Transformation of Intimacy: Sexuality, Love, and Eroticism in Modern Societies*, Stanford 1992; Z. Melosik, *Tożsamość, ciało, władza. Teksty kulturowe jako (kon)teksty pedagogiczne*, Poznań – Toruń 1996; Z. Melosik, T. Szkudlarek, *Kultura, tożsamość, edukacja. Migotanie znaczeń*, Kraków 1998; A. Gromkowska-Melosik, *Kobieta epoki wiktoriańskiej: tożsamość, ciało i medykalizacja*, Kraków 2013; L. Witkowski, "Podmiot jako humanistyczne wyzwanie dla pedagogiki. Przeciw skrajnym 'podmiotowcom'", [in:] L. Witkowski, *Edukacja wobec sporów o (po)nowoczesność*, Warszawa 1998, pp. 127–140.

are different, but the processes taking place within them overlap, thus strengthening the ultimate effect of the gap created between the educational system and other social spheres and their practices. In the micro dimension, it is the gap appearing within individual experience, where school's orientation on theory displaces the connection with everyday life and social practice. The organizational dimension of *detachment*, mezo, is related to the adopted form of institutionalization of the school, while macro – to the dynamics and consolidation of the social structure. We can try to eliminate the gap created in this way, looking for individual answers to the situation and counting on the effectiveness of the trial and error method. On the other hand, from the point of view of critical pedagogy, it seems much more important to ask what strategies and tactics – collective, individual and institutional – accompany the attempts to bridge the gap according to each of the distinguished dimensions? We can assume initially that there is no single line of action that would shorten the distance as much as possible in each of the indicated dimensions. Thus, the emerging sphere of research concerns the issue of how strategies and tactics enabling shortening the distance in one of its dimensions change the nature of the relationship between school and social reality in the other two aspects.

CHAPTER IV

DEMOCRACY, UTOPIA, EDUCATION.
THE POLYSEMOUS IDEAL OF
A POLITICAL SYSTEM VERSUS
ITS PEDAGOGIES

The power of religion depends,
in the last resort,
on the credibility of the banners
it puts in the hands of men as
they stand before death

Peter L. Berger, *The*
Sacred Canopy

A utopian society without
criminals cannot be achieved,
but only by striving for an unattainable
utopia can one achieve anything

Piotr Sztompka, *Socjologia.*
Analiza społeczeństwa

"Every discussion of democracy", says Giovanni Sartori, "basically revolves around three concepts: popular sovereignty, equality, and self-government"[1]. In these discussions, the credible linkage of this ideas and their full development, that is to say, adequate to the needs, complexity of functioning and size of a modern nation-state, it creates the image, and at the same time, the political promise of a sufficiently perfect society, that will be possible in the future through effective education. This chapter aims to develop an understanding of the relationship between selected democratic theories, the concept of utopia and education. It seeks to show that different understandings of what constitutes the essential foundation of democracy are linked to different images of the education

[1] G. Sartori, *The Theory of Democracy Revisited*, Chatham, New Jersey 1987, p. 58. See A. Antoszewski, *Współczesne teorie demokracji*, Warszawa 2016, pp. 11–46.

required to realize it. It cannot be excluded that in a given society these different images of educational practices, supposed to contribute to the realization of the democracy as it should be, coexist with each other, despite the irremovable differences between them.

INTRODUCTION

In April 1831, Alexis de Tocqueville, a twenty-six-year-old aristocrat embarked on a voyage to the United States on a mission entrusted to him by Louis-Filip, the French king in charge of the government of the July monarchy. Tocqueville was to investigate US prisons. His friend Gustave de Beaumont, also designated for this task, accompanied him both during the ship's voyage and during the several months of wandering around America. On the spot, Tocqueville's attention was absorbed not so much by the US prison system as by the whole way of organizing social life, in which he saw the direction of evolution of the modern world. On his return to France, in addition to his report *Du système pénitentiare aux Etats-Unis, et de son application en France*, he published two volumes of an equally comprehensive dissertation on *Democracy in America*, which will make him famous as one of the most insightful researchers in Western societies. In the *Introduction* to the first volume, published in 1835, he expresses with undisguised passion the feelings that accompany him in creating his narratives and analyses. In a prophetic tone, the philosopher and future politician confesses:

> The whole book which is here offered to the public has been written under the impression of a kind of religious dread produced in the author's mind by the contemplation of so irresistible a revolution, which has advanced for centuries in spite of such amazing obstacles, and which is still proceeding in the midst of the ruins it has made[2].

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[2] A. de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, Hazleton 2002, p. 16. In the Foreword to the twelfth edition, which appeared after the fall of the July monarchy in 1848, Tocqueville in a way repeats his earlier declaration: "This book was written fifteen years ago under the influence of one thought: the imminent, inevitable and universal advent of democracy".

What Tocqueville means here is the progress of equality and the spread of democracy. As he accounts for his interest in the situation in the United States:

> I have acknowledged this revolution as a fact already accomplished or on the eve of its accomplishment; and I have selected the nation, from amongst those which have undergone it, in which its development has been the most peaceful and the most complete, in order to discern its natural consequences, and, if it be possible, to distinguish the means by which it may be rendered profitable[3].

The enthusiasm of the descriptions and images of the first volume can be compared with the passion with which in chapter two of *A Truly Golden Little Book, No Less Beneficial than Entertaining, of a Republic's Best State and of the New Island Utopia* Raphael Hythlodaeus shared with his Thomas More the organisation of its residents' lives. Their country was also the work of the newcomers and the incarnation of ideas as well as the result of violence against the natives, which was mentioned by the interlocutor of the Renaissance thinker. Tocqueville excitedly develops the first element of this parallel:

> The emigrants who fixed themselves on the shores of America in the beginning of the seventeenth century severed the democratic principle from all the principles which repressed it in the old communities of Europe, and transplanted it unalloyed to the New World. It has there been allowed to spread in perfect freedom, and to put forth its consequences in the laws by influencing the manners of the country[4].

Both travellers, having traversed the ocean and having scrutinised with their foreigners' eyes American laws, customs, beliefs, upbringing, economic life, etc., bring in a model of a political system written down in full detail in images of everyday life. It is true that the organization of Utopian life from Hythlodaeus' story is fictional, as is the figure of the

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[3] Ibidem, p. 23–24. See M. Zetterbaum, "Alexis de Tocqueville", [in:] *History of Political Philosophy*, ed. L. Strauss, J. Cropsey, Chicago – London 1987, pp. 761–783.

[4] A. de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, op. cit., p. 23.

traveller himself. However, with respect to the United States as accounted for by Tocqueville, one can say that the country was subjected to insightful, factual research and sober analysis. Still, the United States is idealised. In other words, both overseas countries in their book versions resemble what their contemporary readers knew, but are more efficiently and sensibly arranged. In both cases, they provide the imagination with a pretext to compare the imaginary visions to the current condition of indigenous political communities and to create a vision of a possible future. In the *Introduction* to the first volume, the young aristocrat gives vent to this dream of sorts:

> I can conceive a society in which all men would profess an equal attachment and respect for the laws of which they are the common authors; in which the authority of the State would be respected as necessary, though not as divine; and the loyalty of the subject to its chief magistrate would not be a passion, but a quiet and rational persuasion. Every individual being in the possession of rights which he is sure to retain, a kind of manly reliance and reciprocal courtesy would arise between all classes, alike removed from pride and meanness. The people, well acquainted with its true interests, would allow that in order to profit by the advantages of society it is necessary to satisfy its demands. In this state of things the voluntary association of the citizens might supply the individual exertions of the nobles, and the community would be alike protected from anarchy and from oppression [...]. If there be less splendour than in the halls of an aristocracy, the contrast of misery will be less frequent also; the pleasures of enjoyment may be less excessive, but those of comfort will be more general; the sciences may be less perfectly cultivated, but ignorance will be less common; the impetuosity of the feelings will be repressed, and the habits of the nation softened; there will be more vices and fewer crimes[5].

The image of what Tocqueville believed to be a perfect social order and exemplary interpersonal relations, a mature form of crystallization of collective hopes, growing out of dissatisfaction with the present situation and which can function as a model for the future,

[5] Ibidem, p. 19.

is not devoid of reflection on the conditions and ways in which it can become a reality. In the first book of *Utopia*, More – the interlocutor of Hythloday – considers in the context of criticism of current social relations, the possible ways of reform and at the same time does not hide his scepticism:

> while I can hardly agree with everything he said (though he is a man of unquestionable learning and enormous experience of human affairs), yet I freely confess that in the Utopian commonwealth there are very many features that in our own societies I would wish rather than expect to see[6].

Similarly, the French aristocrat in the *Introduction* of his book puts forth a path of the right and proper conduct of the local government:

> The first duty which is at this time imposed upon those who direct our affairs is to educate the democracy; to warm its faith, if that be possible; to purify its morals; to direct its energies; to substitute a knowledge of business for its inexperience, and an acquaintance with its true interests for its blind propensities; to adapt its government to time and place, and to modify it in compliance with the occurrences and the actors of the age[7].

The image of a decent society that grew out of Tocqueville's business trip thus reveals a clear link between the utopia of democracy and education. The accumulated excess of expectations that Tocqueville confronts and becomes accustomed to, introduces into the hopes of an era understood by us from the perspective of a distant and unfamiliar history, which knows no repetitions. Nevertheless, the events of the July Revolution and the predictions of the young philosopher bring to mind the situation of the Polish political transformation of the 1990s, along with its horizon of expectations towards democracy, education and upbringing, in which the United States was an important point of reference. In both cases, the utopia was created by the image of a model of an order which had already been embodied and achieved.

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[6] T. More, *Utopia*, ed. G. M. Logan, Cambridge 2016, p. 113.
[7] A. de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, op. cit., pp. 16–17.

ON TWO NOTIONS OF UTOPIA

Utopia as a literary genre, frequently practiced by the intellectual elites of Europe since the publication in 1516 of More's *A Truly Golden Little Book, No Less Beneficial than Entertaining* through to the 20th century, does not seem to produce too many images of sufficiently perfect societies with a democratic system, and those nominally democratic ones are based on many undemocratic practices and solutions. The link between the two phenomena is therefore not obvious. But the notions of utopia and democracy are not clear and indisputable, either.

In common understanding, the first of them is taken as a synonym for a fantasy, caprice or delusion, which comes close to one of the possible etymologies of the word, according to which the name of the island in More's work refers to a non-existent place (Greek *ou-tópos*). On the other hand, an essential distinguishing feature of the literary genre should be the depiction of fictitious societies developed by their authors in order to imagine the perfect organisation of their entire lives. In this sense, utopia is a peculiar continuation of the main issue of classical political philosophy, developed since the times of Plato and Aristotle, i.e. the shape and conditions of the ideal of the political system. Within this genre, as well as within the tradition of political philosophy, the reported subject of education took a form similar to one of three ideal types: the ideal of upbringing as a factor enabling social reproduction of expected patterns of behaviour and models of social organization, radically innovative pedagogies and elements of education organisation and the principles of education of the future, of revolutionary impact on society. Aristotle's concept from his *Politics* of upbringing conducive to the needs and aspirations of the citizen of the *polis* to optimally serve the proper good of the political community, Salomon's House in Bensalem from Francis Bacon's *The New Atlantis*: a university focused on learning through experience and technical progress, or finally a vision of folk education serving the goals of all humanity from Janusz Korczak's "Szkoła życia" (*School of Life*)[8] are exemplary cases of implementation of each of

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[8] See Aristotle, *The Politics*, books VII, VIII, London 1992, pp. 359–450; F. Bacon, *The New Atlantis*, New York, 1914; J. Korczak, "Szkoła życia", [in:] J. Korczak, *Pisma wybrane*, Vol. III, Warszawa 1985, pp. 63–199.

the above types, although we must bear in mind that in many texts they successfully co-exist.

Since utopian thinking goes far beyond the convention and form of the literary genre developed since the Renaissance, the term itself is also used more widely to accentuate the link between utopia and political practice[9]. According to Jerzy Szacki, "It is born when a gap appears in human consciousness between the world that exists and the world that is conceivable"[10]. According to the findings of this scholar, in order for the phenomenon to attain its idea, in which the second etymologically--based reading is enclosed i.e. the land of happiness (Greek *eu-tópos*), the split must be radical:

> There is a difference between a utopist and a reformer, i.e. someone who improves the existing world, instead of creating a new one in its place. [...] The utopist does not need to know what to do. His affair is to question the old world in the name of the vision of another one. The reformer accepts the old world as the basis of the new world, seeing in it only another phase or another form of the same order. In the depths of his soul, the latter may sometimes cherish a utopia, but he does not identify with it. His element is compromise, which the utopist flatly rejects[11].

Therefore, utopian thinking is predicated on a strong tension based on the contrast between what Irena Pańków terms the critical and destructive moment and the positive and constructive one[12].

This does not mean, of course, that utopia is a kind of action plan with a predetermined effect, but that it plays an important role in the formation of a social object of aspiration. According to Bronisław Baczko, in their various forms,

> Imaginary visions of a New Society become one of the places, sometimes the most important, of the influence of social imagination. They are a sphere

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9   See R. Włodarczyk, "Utopia w perspektywie pedagogiki współczesnej", [in:] *Utopia a edukacja*, ed. J. Gromysz, R. Włodarczyk, Wrocław 2016, pp. 66–70.
10   J. Szacki, *Spotkania z utopią*, Warszawa 1980, p. 28.
11   Ibidem, pp. 31–32.
12   See I. Pańków, *Filozofia utopii*, Warszawa 1990, pp. 171–174.

in which social dreams are collected, developed and produced. Thus, these imaginary visions constitute a kind of arrangement of variable effectiveness, enabling the creation of a uniform collective scheme of both interpretation and integration of the field of *social experience* and the *horizon of expectations*, as well as objections, fears and hopes that surround this field[13].

After Karl Mannheim we can say that utopia is a component of a political conflict, escalating towards the transformation of reality, and its participants can be described as those who, reacting to oppression and orienting themselves to factors that are currently outside this reality, in experiencing, thinking and acting manifest an interest in abolishing and rebuilding the existing social order, perceive at the same time mainly those elements of the situation that they wish to negate. They have to confront those who, in an effort to maintain an arrangement that is beneficial to them, mostly emphasize the links of the vision of the location and circumstances that they wish to preserve in the future[14]. In this way utopias are analytically separate part of political ideologies which, as Lyman Tower Sargent notes, offer "a picture of the world both as it is and as it should be", and that's "an image of what constitutes the good life lies at the heart of every ideology"[15]. Therefore, the alternative communities or political and pedagogical experiments follow reactions inspired by utopia; this applies to both whole states[16] and bigger and smaller communities, all kinds of religious orders, associations and all kinds of islands of educational resistance[17]. Ernst Bloch offers a devel-

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[13] B. Baczko, "Utopia", [in:] B. Baczko, *Wyobrażenia społeczne. Szkice o nadziei i pamięci zbiorowej*, Warszawa 1994, p. 91 – original underline.

[14] See K. Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia. An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge*, New York 1954, pp. 173–190. It should be noted that Mannheim, unlike in the further parts of this article, presents the relation between ideology and utopia, which is justified in his theory of political conflict (see ibidem, pp. 49–96), but this is not a subject of our interest here.

[15] L. T. Sargent, *Contemporary Political Ideologies. A Comparative Analysis*, Belmont 2009, pp. 2, 10.

[16] J. Szacki, *Spotkania z utopią*, op. cit., pp. 136–151; B. Baczko, "Utopia", op. cit., pp. 135–157; Z. Bauman, *Socialism. The Active Utopia*, London 2009.

[17] On the current examples of societies organised around utopian visiions: see H. Cyrzan, *O potrzebie utopii. Z dziejów utopii stosowanej XX wieku*, Toruń 2004; T. Jones, *Utopian Dreams. In Search of a Good Life*, London 2007; W. Okoń, *Dziesięć szkół alternatywnych*, Warszawa 1999.

opment of this category towards its broad understanding. The author sees "utopia as a characteristic feature of the human being"[18], who is, according to the philosopher, "*per se ipsum* an anticipatory being", marked with insufficiency whose "working will of meeting needs becomes objectivised through planning". In other words, utopia is for human beings a way of "a sensible approach to the future, a rationalization of the content of hope"[19].

ON THE NOTIONS OF DEMOCRACY AND THEIR PEDAGOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE

The image of Tocqueville's decent society, created after his return from a business trip, placed in the above reconstructed framework of political thinking about utopia, prompts us to recognize the notion of democracy, and then to outline more clearly the role of upbringing in this context. It cannot be denied that all three categories are far from being unambiguous. For the purposes of this article, while escaping from simplifications that go too far, it is enough for us to dispose of their deep and critical understanding.

A. PASSIONS OF ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE AND JOHN DEWEY – DEMOCRACY AS A WAY OF BEING AND ACTING IN ASSOCIATIONS

The concept used by Tocqueville is the result of readings, interviews, many months of observations and reflections. At the centre of the phenomenon there is the equality of opportunity provided to citizens. He then discusses how it is used by them in everyday life and what the potential risks might be. According to Martin Zetterbaum, who comments on the researcher's achievements:

> Tocqueville's purpose in the *Democracy* is to show men how they might be both equal and free, and by not equating democracy with any institutional

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[18] E. Bloch, "Rzeczywistość antycypowana, czyli jak przebiega i co osiąga myślenie utopijne", *Studia Filozoficzne* 1982, No. 7–8, p. 52.
[19] Ibidem, pp. 49, 50, 52.

form associated with it – government of the people, representative government, separation of power – Tocqueville underscores his fear that the real driving force of democracy, the passion of equality, is compatible with tyranny as well as with liberty. Tyranny may very well coexist with what appear to be democratic institutions. Unlike some of his contemporaries who believed that the gradual development of equality went hand in hand with final destruction of the possibility of tyranny on earth, Tocqueville understood that the democratic principle was prone, if left untutored, to a despotism never before experienced[20].

This worrying consequence is related to the observation of a young aristocrat that a characteristic feature of this type of society is atomisation, loosening social ties. Equality makes everyone become the centre of the private world with his or her aspirations for prosperity, concern for individual success and the tendency to plunge into mediocrity. At the same time, this is accompanied by the softening of morals and the development of a spirit of compassion and empathy. Still, according to Zetterbaum: "The gentleness, softening of manners, and air of humanity which characterize democratic societies are apt to be felt most strongly within the family unit rather than between citizens"[21]. Tocqueville demonstrates that "Democracy loosens social ties, but it draws the ties of nature more tight; it brings kindred more closely together, whilst it places the various members of the community more widely apart"[22]. Freedom can be threatened because equality and individualism – by pushing people towards the satisfaction of material needs to which access has been opened to them – open humans up to competition, which prevents them from reaching the expected level of satisfaction comparable to the satisfaction of others. The growing frustration about the failure to achieve wealth, giving rise to envy and attrition of mutual respect, is offset by passing the burden of ensuring comfort and prosperity to the authorities. The authorities, in turn, who developing their caring powers, accept a kind of new oppression and a new pedagogy. At the end of the second volume, published in 1840, Tocqueville evocatively writes:

[20] M. Zetterbaum, "Alexis de Tocqueville", op. cit., p. 763.
[21] Ibidem, p. 768.
[22] A. de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, op. cit., p. 660.

The supreme power then extends its arm over the whole community. It covers the surface of society with a net-work of small complicated rules, minute and uniform, through which the most original minds and the most energetic characters cannot penetrate, to rise above the crowd. The will of man is not shattered, but softened, bent, and guided: men are seldom forced by it to act, but they are constantly restrained from acting: such a power does not destroy, but it prevents existence; it does not tyrannize, but it compresses, enervates, extinguishes, and stupefies a people, till each nation is reduced to be nothing better than a flock of timid and industrious animals, of which the government is the shepherd[23].

According to Tocqueville, citizens of a democratic society, in the name of maintaining equality, are willing to give in to this kind of pedagogy and sacrifice their freedom. Their persecutors are becoming stronger and stronger, while they themselves cannot find any consolation.

In the face of these possible dangers arising from the acceptance of the administrative despotism of the caring authorities, which oscillate towards centralisation, as well as the tyranny of the majority over the opinions, intelligence and wealth of those less numerous, the French philosopher notes that the democratic society has recourse to certain remedies, which include "local self-government, the separation of church and state, a free press, indirect elections, an independent judiciary, and the encouragement of associations of all descriptions"[24]. They act in different ways but are linked by the fact that they awaken in citizens the awareness of the needs of others, mutual assistance, create conditions in which it is possible to exceed their own interest, help to counteract tyranny and overcome mediocrity. In other words, "men must be taught that out of an enlightened regard for themselves they need constantly assist one another and sacrifice some portion of their time and wealth to the welfare of the state or community", since, as Zetterbaum writes about Tocqueville's approach, "The problem of

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[23] Ibidem, p. 771.

[24] M. Zetterbaum, "Alexis de Tocqueville", op. cit., p. 773. See also: L. Koczanowicz, R. Włodarczyk, *Współczesna filozofia społeczna. Rozmowy i eseje o społeczeństwie obywatelskim i etyce demokracji*, Sopot 2009; *Ani książę, ani kupiec: obywatel. Idea społeczeństwa obywatelskiego w myśli współczesnej*, sel. J. Szacki, Kraków 1997.

democracy is to re-create a sense of public morality on the basis of equality and individualism"[25].

John Dewey read the issue of democracy in the first decades of the 20th century along similar lines, seeing it primarily as a way of being a citizen, who is to be provided security by legal and political frameworks[26]. Starting from the classical pluralistic theory and taking the concept of comprehensive growth as a fundamental value and measure as a progressive realisation of human capabilities, he saw the role of the state in improving the operation and regulation of relations in situations of conflicting goals or mutual conflict between various communities: families, neighbourhoods, schools, associations, clubs, companies, enterprises, thanks to which the development expected by the state is achieved by people in general. Moreover, in the case of possessive, criminal and destructive communities which constrain growth as well as inefficient communities, the state should retain the prerogative to evaluate these associations and intervene[27]. In other words, as the critic of Stalinism observes:

> An undesirable society, in other words, is one which internally and externally sets up barriers to free intercourse and communication of experience. A society which makes provision for participation in its good of all its members on equal terms and which secures flexible readjustment of its institutions through interaction of the different forms of associated life is in so far democratic. Such a society must have a type of education which gives individuals a personal interest in social relationships and control, and the habits of mind which secure social changes without introducing disorder[28].

It is true that the state and shape of democracy depend on the level of education and involvement of citizens, but according to the concept of growth, every generation can and should create better conditions for its functioning than before. Therefore, Robert Horwitz notes that

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25 M. Zetterbaum, "Alexis de Tocqueville", op. cit., pp. 776, 778.
26 See R. Horwitz, "John Dewey", [in:] *History of Political Philosophy*, op. cit., pp. 851–869.
27 See J. Dewey, "The Democratic Conception in Education", [in:] J. Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, Hazleton 2001, pp. 85–104.
28 Ibidem, p. 104.

Uncooperative men would threaten the democracy of Dewey's dream, as would men inclined to grasp coldly for wealth or power and men who do not wish to grow in every direction. Therefore, in their impressionable years children should be conditioned by life in their classrooms to strive without 'competing' to study and work cooperatively in groups, and to acquire the expansive habits of self-expression that will fit them for life in ever more perfect democracy[29].

The understanding of democracy, both by Tocqueville and Dewey, emphasizes the special way of life of citizens, shaped and strengthened by participation in associations – families, unions, religious groups, schools, and companies. It seems that in particular their properly organized voluntary forms, as highlighted especially by the 20th century supporters of participatory or association democracy[30], have a major educational potential. They teach cooperation, collective opposition to the will of the majority, the needs of others, the sense and ways of exceeding one's own interest, overcoming mediocrity, developing non-material interests, devoting a part of one's wealth and free time to public matters, understanding and protecting equality and freedom. They moreover develop a habit of mutual assistance, which, according to Tocqueville, is particularly needed by citizens in a democracy. At the same time, he sees the educational role of the state in the fact that by counteracting the atomisation characteristic of this system, it is to create favourable conditions for the restoration of social ties. Both the state acting through its institutions and public associations of civil society can build on and deepen the sensitivity, benevolent customs, humanitarianism and trust generally developed by families. This is because there is a need for educational activities which will help to reduce the focus on satisfying one's own material needs, competition and individualism, as indicated in this concept, and to strengthen cooperation, respect and tolerance towards differences. However, according to Tocqueville, the administration of the state as a provider of services and assistance to citizens and the very development of citizens' demands create a danger of a kind of tyranny,

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[29] R. Horwitz, "John Dewey", op. cit., p. 866.

[30] See D. Held, *Models of Democracy*, Cambridge 2008, pp. 209–216; M. Saward, *Democracy*, London 2003, pp. 86–96, 163–166.

which should also be counteracted. Essentially, a number of Dewey's works, especially his book *Democracy and Education*, published in 1916, can be treated as his vision of the role of education in this type of political system. The American philosopher focuses on what is conducive to individual and collective development of experience, its communication and ability to cooperate. In other words, educational activities are to support the creation of conditions for the emergence of a democracy that is yet to come.

B. THE CORSET OF JOSEF SCHUMPETER – DEMOCRACY AS A PROCEDURE FOR THE EMERGENCE OF ELITES AND A CULTURE OF POLITICAL STRUGGLE

In 1942, Josef Schumpeter, an eminent Austrian economist who had for over a decade been in the United States, far from the totalitarianisms ravaging Europe, published his influential text *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*. He preceded his findings on the understanding of democracy in the fourth part of the book with a one-sentence description and extensive commentary on the eighteenth-century model of the political system, rooted, as he suggested, in the theoretical foundations of utilitarian rationalism, which, according to his critics, is an awkward mixture of approaches of philosophers really important for the development ideas, such as Jeremy Bentham, James Mill and Jean Jacques Rousseau[31]. Schumpeter observes that the "democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good by making the people itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will"[32]. The economist considers the model to be inadequate for the current conditions; moreover, he expresses doubts about the distribution in a given population of the competence to define the common good, to translate it into problems resulting from everyday life and current politics, and about the relationship between compromises, decisions, opinions, reactions and

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[31] See D. Held, *Models of Democracy*, op. cit., pp. 146–157; M. Saward, *Democracy*, op. cit., pp. 56–61, 77–86. See also: A. Heywood, "Democracy and Legitimacy", [in:] A. Heywood, *Politics*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, pp. 80–107.

[32] J. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, New York 2008, p. 250.

intentions of voters and the "will of the people"[33]. Still, he believes that the rationality of decisions concerning political matters is debatable, as he finds these matters often outside the immediate field of observation of the voters, their professional or everyday life, where they gain hands-on knowledge, a guarantee of their independence and intellectual prowess. Furthermore, as David Held notes when commenting on the concept of the Austrian economist living in the US,

> First, irrational prejudice and impulse govern a great deal of what passes for the average citizen's contribution to politics, second, the 'public mind' becomes highly vulnerable to groups with 'an axe to grind': self-seeking politicians, business interests or 'idealists of one kind or another'[34].

Schumpeter reverses the order of the "classical theory" he has indicated, making "the deciding of issues by the electorate secondary to the election of the men who are to do the deciding". As a consequence, he puts forth a definition differing from the "classic" one presented earlier: "the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote"[35]. The concept of competition for leadership and the cyclical exchange of elites in elections, proposed by the Austrian economist, reminiscent of the competition for consumers between producers, is indicative, in his opinion, of the procedure that exists in every democracy. The criterion obtained on this basis is so clear that, in the opinion of its author, it makes it possible to effectively distinguish democratic governments. As Held points out,

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[33] See ibidem, pp. 250–256. On another occasion he writes: "the will of the majority is the will of the majority and not the will of 'the people'. The latter is a mosaic that the former completely fails to 'represent'" (ibidem, p. 272).

[34] D. Held, *Models of Democracy*, op. cit., p. 144.

[35] J. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, op. cit., p. 269. See A. Heywood, "Democracy and Legitimacy", op. cit., p. 101–103. In the assumptions adopted by Schumpeter, we can see the continuation of Max Weber's diagnosis of a modern representative democracy called by him a "plebiscitary leader democracy". According to Weber, it is mainly based on a competitive political struggle between parties that become bureaucratic and struggle for their qualified leaders to be mandated to exercise power (see M. Weber, "Politics as a Vocation", [in:] *From Max Weber. Essay in Sociology*, ed. H. H. Gerth, C. W. Mills, New York 1946, pp. 77–128; D. Held, *Models of Democracy*, op. cit., pp. 125–141.

Far from democracy being a form of life marked by the promise of equality and the best conditions for human development in a rich context of participation, the democratic citizens lot was, quite straightforwardly, the right periodically to choose and authorize governments to act on their behalf. Democracy could serve a variety of ends [...][36].

Recognising the dependence of his method on the personal freedom of voters, Schumpeter stresses the fragility of the link between politics and the ability of citizens to influence it.

One could think that the voters both elect to an office and control. Since, however, electorates normally do not their political leaders in any way except by refusing to re-elect them or the parliamentary majorities that support them, our ideas concerning the control could be reduced in a manner shown in our definition[37].

The Austrian economist shifts the focus to the functioning of political elites, parliament, leadership, creating external and internal party policy, which includes e.g. the impact on the choices made by the electorate, awakening group acts of intent and their development. He is aware that the democratic method he indicated does not exclude "the cases that are strikingly analogous to the economic phenomena we label «unfair» or «fraudulent» competition or restraint of competition"[38].

Establishing a feature common to industrial democracies is not yet the "realism" of the concept that Schumpeter is striving for. He therefore points to four conditions which, in his opinion, allow democracy to flourish in social systems and, in principle, enable it to continue despite the consecutive successions of power and crises[39]. The Austrian émigré stresses the importance of creating a quality political stratum, which is a matter of feeling rather than measuring the extent to which the democratic process entails recruitment by means of selection[40]. Its existence

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[36] D. Held, *Models of Democracy*, op. cit., p. 142.
[37] J. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, op. cit., p. 272.
[38] Ibidem, p. 271. "A party is a group whose members propose to act in concert in the competitive struggle for political power" (ibidem, p. 283).
[39] See ibidem, pp. 289–296.
[40] See ibidem, pp. 290–291.

and level, he claims, "it will also increase their fitness by endowing them with traditions that embody experience, with a professional code and with a common fund of views"[41]. At the same time, Schumpeter is aware that in a competitive environment, politicians must first and foremost take into account the principles of career, the interests of their own social stratum and the rules of political struggle in which they participate in order to win and defend the positions, while in the selection process, intellectual and character issues are not basic criteria. In other words, on the one hand, "a politician who is a good tactician can successfully withstand any number of administrative errors", but on the other hand, "It is not quite true that in the average case political success proves nothing for a man or that the politician is nothing but an amateur"[42].

The Austrian mentions as a second condition for the success of democracy is that "the effective range of political decision should not be extended too far"[43]. He points out that there are areas of state functioning and problems, such as autonomy of judges from political agendas, supervision of central banks, universities, which cannot be dispensed with without independent expert opinions, but which cannot be guaranteed in advance by law. "a rational treatment of it requires that legislation in this matter should be protected from both the fits of vindictiveness and the fits of sentimentality in which the laymen in the government and in the parliament are alternatingly prone to indulge"[44]. In matters of this kind, politicians should make decisions only formally, but this depends on the patterns of political culture.

Another condition for the success of democracy, in which the decisive factor is the difference in the degree, difficult to measure, is related to the administrative base. According to Schumpeter, it is important whether a democratic government in a modern industrial society can have at its disposal "the services of a well-trained bureaucracy of good standing and tradition, endowed with a strong sense of duty and a no less strong *esprit de corps*"[45]. What is more, "It is not enough that the bureaucracy

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[41] Ibidem, p. 291.
[42] Ibidem, p. 289.
[43] Ibidem, p. 291.
[44] Ibidem, p. 292.
[45] Ibidem, p. 293.

should be efficient in current administration and competent to give advice. It must also be strong enough to guide and, if need be, to instruct the politicians who head the ministries"[46].

The last condition is "democratic self-control" of both the electorate and politicians, with the aim of limiting any kind of hasty reactions, disintegration of the division of labour between them, fierce attacks against opponents, disregard for opposing opinions and for the situation in the country. This condition reveals, more than any other, the reversal of roles announced by Schumpeter, indicating the position of the "will of the people" (in which he doubts) vis-à-vis the success of democracy; this reveals as well the utopian nature of its model:

> But even the necessary minimum of democratic self-control, he notes, evidently requires a national character and national habits of a certain type which have not everywhere had the opportunity to evolve and which the democratic method itself cannot be relied on to produce [...] democratic government will work to full advantage only if all the interests that matter are practically unanimous not only in their allegiance to the country but also in their allegiance to the structural principles of the existing society[47].

Translating the notion of the political system indicated by Schumpeter into educational issues, the forefront of the list seems to be occupied with the task of shaping a proper democratic culture and preparing three types of actors to participate in it in terms of their respective roles: electorate, professional administration and experts, as well as politicians embedded in the political parties. At the core of his concept are decision-making elites, which are only periodically influenced by the voters, and their selection. According to Schumpeter, however, it is not external pressure that is the main factor in increasing the competence of the political class, but its existence and relatively stable membership of individual activists, which enable them to learn through the exchange of experience and the acquisition of professional ethos and may promote intelligence and character among candidates for offices within individual parties. According to the Austrian economist, a test of the internal policy

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[46] Ibidem.
[47] Ibidem, pp. 295–296.

of a party, which shapes electoral lists, does not necessarily mean career advancement; it can create more demanding conditions for learning to make politics than the general public of the electorate. However, voters' understanding of their role and raising their political competence is an important goal of civic education. Above all, it is supposed to reduce as much as possible the submission to superstitions, impulses, demagogues and public sentiments. It can moreover foster the development of positive models and customs of political practice, especially important conditions, which, according to Schumpeter, are patriotism and fidelity to the ideals of democracy. On the other hand, as in the case of politicians, the particular value of experts and employees of public administration is their professionalism, ability to cooperate and influence the decision-makers. Preparation of competent personnel and experts requires access to specialist training, a system of personnel selection and implementation of professional ethos standards. The future of democratic systems – different from the fate of the Weimar Republic, as can be deduced – therefore, according to the Austrian emigrant, requires the creation, support and development in this type of modern nation state by means of education of a proper political culture and an appropriate political division of labour of their citizens.

C. ROBERT A. DAHL'S POLYARCHIES – DEMOCRACY AS A PROCESS AND THE INSTITUTIONS WHICH FOSTER IT

American political scientist Robert A. Dahl, believes that the four most important historical sources which significantly contributed to the shaping of the contemporary practice of democratic states include e.g. the concepts of the idea and institutions of the classical Greek period, the tradition of the Republican Rome and Italian medieval and Renaissance city-states, then the modern idea and institution of the representational government, as well as the logic of political equality[48]. In his book *Democracy and its Critics*, published at the end of the Cold War, in which he collects his theoretical experiences accumulated since the 1950s, he highlights the nature of these sources and the two profound

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[48]   See R. A. Dahl, *Democracy and its Critics*, New Haven 1989, pp. 13–33. See also: D. Held, *Models of Democracy*, op. cit., pp. 11–95.

transformations that they underwent before being applied in the context of nation states. After the 'unquestionable view that democracy must be representative', which greatly increased the distance between the *demos* and the government, and also brought with it a new and complicated system of political institutions, which we are only just beginning to understand[49], such as the division of powers described by John Locke and Montesquieu, for example, it is hard not to notice that the same term refers to phenomena very distant from each other. According to the American political scientist, the application of these ideas to large nation states requires their re-development.

Dahl focuses his attention, on the one hand, on indicating the criteria of the democratic process and, on the other hand, on the institutions necessary for its functioning. The model of decision-making in a democratic association or a state as proposed by Dahl assumes[50] that a prerequisite for effective participation in the process is that, firstly, all citizens should be able to participate effectively – expressing preferences for future decisions, influencing the setting of the agenda and making their voices heard. Secondly, while recognising the equality of all votes that will make up the outcome, at the settlement stage, every entitled citizen should be able to benefit without hindrance from this means of expression of preference. Thirdly, the criterion of enlightened understanding requires that each of the parties involved in the decision-making process must be able to obtain information about their subject matter and likely consequences within certain time limits. Fourthly, supervision of the tasks undertaken, control of the agenda requires that the way in which the agenda is set should be a right which belongs exclusively to the entire assembly of citizens. Fifthly, in connection with the temporary acquisition of full rights as a result of the requirements mentioned above, the criterion of adult inclusion is still necessary. Dahl recognises that the five criteria he sets out define precisely which procedure can be considered democratic:

> A political process that meets only the first two criteria, I have suggested, might be regarded as *procedurally democratic in a narrow sense*. In contrast,

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[49] See R. A. Dahl, *Democracy and its Critics*, op. cit., p. 29.

[50] See ibidem, p. 106–131; R. A. Dahl, *On Democracy*, New Haven 1998, pp. 37–40.

one that also meets the criterion of enlightened understanding can be regarded as *fully democratic with respect to an agenda and in relation to a demos*. At a still higher threshold, a process that in addition provides for final control of the agenda by its demos is *fully democratic in relation to its demos*. But only if the demos were inclusive enough to meet the fifth criterion could we describe the process of decision making as *fully democratic*[51].

Like Schumpeter's theory, Dahl's apology of democracy also contains indications as to the conditions necessary for the organisation of the democratic process in large nation states. Introducing the term polyarchy, he distinguishes only those of modern countries where the institutions necessary for the democratic process function above a certain minimum threshold of efficiency. Yet, as he points out, they are the highest achievement of democracy from a practical, but not from a theoretical point of view[52]. According to him, they enable the exercise of the rights of a relatively large population, as well as opposing the highest officials and overturning them in the vote.

Thus, "polyarchy is a political order distinguished by the presence of seven institutions, all of which must exist for a government to be classified as a polyarchy"[53]: elected officials – it is a constitutional institution entitled to exercise control over government decisions; free and fair elections during which representatives are elected and where "coercion is comparatively uncommon"; an inclusive suffrage, entitling virtually all adults to participate in them; the right of citizens to run for office; freedom of expression – an institution granting the right to air views on political subjects and criticise the system and the government without fearing punishment; alternative information – an institution granting access to alternative and independent news from legally protected sources; associational autonomy – to exercise one's rights. Pointing out that he means real rather than nominal rights, institutions and mechanisms, Dahl recognises the possibility of creating a ranking of the degree of their satisfaction in individual countries, which makes

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[51] R. A. Dahl, *Democracy and its Critics*, op. cit., p. 131 – original underline.
[52] See ibidem, p. 194.
[53] Ibidem, op. cit., p. 221. See also: R. A. Dahl, *On Democracy*, op. cit., pp. 83–99 (the list of institutions in the later publication differs from that in *Democracy and its Critics*).

the above institutions the criteria for proving which of these countries is a polyarchy[54].

Furthermore, the US political scientist provides and discusses in his book five conditions that must be met by a polyarchy that is additionally stable[55]. According to the author, it becomes stable when leaders do not take advantage of the apparatus of coercion – the military and the police – to gain and retain power; there is a modern, dynamic pluralist society; potential conflicts between subcultures do not exceed a certain level of intensity; the political culture of the population, and in particular of the politically active strata, favours democracy and the institutions of the polyarchy; finally, external influences are negligible or, possibly, promote democracy[56].

Although the end of Dahl's work published in 1989 is dominated by the tone of prophecy, the spirit of utopia, as we have seen before, of a decent, sufficiently perfect society is also present in it. He states that the idea of a democratic process which he described in the book sets maximum requirements and may actually be beyond human capacity[57]. In various sections of the book one sees the reiterated motif of opposing authoritarianism by democracy. Defending the moral superiority of the latter, Dahl observes that "Imperfect democracy may lead to failures yet perfect authoritarianism may result in a calamity", yet "At its best, only the democratic vision can offer the hope, which guardianship can never do, that by engaging in governing themselves, all people, and not merely a few, may learn to act as morally responsible human beings"[58]. In his book *On Democracy*, published 8 years later and summarising and extending the selected elements of the previous work, when responding to the question why we should support it, he indicates that it helps to avoid tyranny, the government of cruel and vicious autocrats, guarantees to citizens many fundamental rights, which are hard to come by in non-democratic systems, helps to further their fundamental interests, ensures a broader scope of individual freedom, moral independence,

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[54] See. R. A. Dahl, *Democracy and its Critics*, op. cit., pp. 221–222.
[55] See ibidem, p. 232–264. See also: R. A. Dahl, *On Democracy*, op. cit., pp. 145–159.
[56] See R. A. Dahl, *Democracy and its Critics*, op. cit., p. 314.
[57] See ibidem, p. 322.
[58] Ibidem, p. 79.

and development[59]. Furthermore, as he observes, modern states of representational democracy do not wage wars on one another and fare better than others economically.

The question of civic education in line with his theory and expectations is addressed by Dahl only in the concluding sections of *On Democracy*[60]. He makes the starting point one of its basic criteria, i.e. an enlightened understanding. For the sake of commitment and effective action, it requires citizens to be able to know what political decisions are important to them and what their consequences are. Thanks to the foundations acquired at school, the mass media, the information campaigns of their parties, associations and interest groups in which they are involved, and the gradual adoption of serious governmental decisions, the citizens of democratic countries, according to the American political scientist, have so far achieved a level of awareness that is generally appropriate to the political challenges. However, the increasing internationalisation, the increase in the number and complexity of public matters requiring knowledge beyond the pace at which the educational system assimilates it, and the development of means of communication, which increase the information resources, according to Dahl, require going beyond these typical solutions. He is convinced that "in the years to come these older institutions will need to be enhanced by new means for civic education, political participation, information, and deliberation that draw creatively on the array of techniques and technologies available in the twenty-first century"[61]. Taking into account also the specific nature of Dahl's theory of democracy, civic education should focus on knowledge of procedures, knowledge of institutions and rights and the development of the skills needed for self-governance and participation in the democratic process, including knowledge of procedures and preferences, preparation for shaping the agenda and involvement in political struggle, presenting and discussing arguments, criticism, defending freedom, pluralism and power, information on public affairs and their possible consequences, preferable and acceptable ways to control the authorities and participate in a democratic culture. The polyarchy that Dahl expects, which is

[59] See R. A. Dahl, *On Democracy*, op. cit., pp. 44–61.
[60] See ibidem, pp. 185–188.
[61] Ibidem, p. 188.

the highest practical achievement also from a theoretical point of view, assumes the education of citizens who benefit responsibly and honestly from the institutions that determine the proper course of the democratic procedure and their participation in it.

CONCLUSION

Contemporary democratic-liberal societies, which tend to mythologize their ancient sources rather than derive their political practice from them, assume as their main characteristic their orientation towards the change that creates them and their possible participation in it. They put forth a vast number of ideas rationalising the hopes placed in its preservation and improvement, which is reflected in the theories of the political system and the education supporting it, inherited by the 21st century, which however has adopted a different focus. For pedagogy, the important link is that related to education within a given model of democracy, with its specific features. These two dimensions of social practice must be aligned. It should be emphasized that depending on the way in which democracy is referred to, there is a different image of what is required to make its educational assumptions come true. In addition to the aforementioned theories, closely tied with the political practice in the US, there are also theories of radical, social, participatory, deliberative or cosmopolitan democracy, which have been widely discussed and criticized for many years[62]. We cannot exclude at the same time that all of them are practiced by different groups, regardless of the model prevailing in state bodies, and that different educational ideologies, such as critical, type, humanistic, ecological or personalistic pedagogy, are oriented towards different visions of democracy, and the activities of the groups implementing them, although they cannot achieve the state of the imaginary system, significantly contribute to the democratization of society

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[62] See A. Gutman, "Democracy", [in:] A *Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy*, Vol. 1, ed. R. E. Goodin, P. Pettit and T. Pogge, Oxford 2007, pp. 521–531; A. Heywood, "Democracy and Legitimacy", op. cit., pp. 80–107; M. Saward, *Democracy*, op. cit., pp. 58–83, 116–139, 144–151; A. Antoszewski, *Współczesne teorie demokracji*, dz. cyt., pp. 106–138; G. Agamben et all., *Democracy in what State?*, New York 2011.

and its institutions. In the context of the Polish political transformation, a change initiated almost thirty years ago, a question arises about the gap between utopias – the images of democracy and the plexus of pedagogy that creates the future of society – which is special for pedagogy, which informs the future of the society. As a result, it seems that the created democratic reality is socially highly unsatisfactory, so much as that one should expect an eruption of images of a decent, sufficiently perfect society, and of the democracy that is to come.

The dreams of Tocqueville, as well as those of Dewey, Schumpeter or Dahl, were accompanied by a long shadow of tyranny – attempts to re-install absolutism, thwarted by the July Revolution, an ominous murmur of Stalinism, echoes of the Nazi blaze, and the cold war rivalry. Morus failed to maintain his independence in the face of Henry VIII's political plans, was accused of treason, tried and sentenced to death, and his head was stuck on the only bridge over the Thames at the time. The first volume of *Marie ou l'escclavage aux États-Unis*, written by Beaumont after his return from a business trip, published in 1835 as an essay-novel and describing racial segregation and conditions of slavery in America, the love of a Frenchman and an American girl with an African background who find a haven from prejudice, humiliation and violence among the Cherokees, was not met with an interest commensurate to that created by the book of his friend, published in the same year.

CHAPTER V

UTOPIA, POPULISM, EDUCATION. BETWEEN HOPE AND RISK OF FULFILLING THE PROMISE OF DEMOCRACY

*The welfare of the people
shall be the supreme law*

Marcus Tullius Cicero,
De Legibus

*...it may well be that the most important
thing people learn in civil society
is how to live with the many
different forms of social conflict*

Michael Walzer, *Politics
and Passion*

The topic of populism is hardly alien to the theory and philosophy of education, although it sometimes becomes alien in their understanding as a threat that can be thought of negative externality that should and can be excluded. When Gert Biesta and Carl Anders Säfström refer in *A Manifesto for Education* to assaults on education which "come from two different directions: populism and idealism", they link to them the risk "of taking the educational dimension out of education altogether", oriented towards freedom. They pledge that their manifesto "aims to speak for education in a way that is neither populist nor idealist"[1]. Significantly for the issue addressed in this chapter, the manifesto somewhat naturally links the question of populism with utopia, which, however, should be

[1] G. Biesta, C. A. Säfström, "A Manifesto for Education", *Policy Futures in Education* 2011, Vol. 9, No. 5, p. 540. See. G. Biesta, "Time Out: Can Education Do and Be Done without Time?", [in:] *Educational and the Political*, ed. T. Szkudlarek, Rotterdam – Boston – Taipei 2013, pp. 75–77.

avoided because of another risk. In their view, "To keep education away from pure utopia is not a question of pessimism but rather a matter of not saddling education with unattainable hopes that defer freedom rather than making it possible in the here and now"[2].

It is possible that populism is another education, but education itself is heterogeneous, and therefore hospitable. For some reason, its spectre, like that of utopia, which time and again sneaks out of its crypt, permanently reappears and circulates within the boundaries of education, so that there is no end to exorcisms. While it also seems to be true for the theory and philosophy of education that it does not pay to ignore the dangers of both populism and utopianism, overlooking the specifics of utopia in utopian thinking can be just as risky as uncritical attempts to implement it. Perhaps in some sense this also applies to populism. To find out, it would be necessary to return to the philosophical and theoretical understandings of these phenomena and what they might have in common, and then read them from a pedagogical perspective. In other words, illuminating what is the hope and what is the threat of education in its relationship to populism and utopia requires both examining them and rethinking the relationship between them, which makes up the core content of this chapter.

UTOPIA, THE AMBIGUITY OF EVERYDAY LIFE, MODERNITY AND THE DANGERS OF DEMOCRACY

Based on a statement by Raphael Hythloday recorded by the most distinguished and learned man, master Thomas More in a sort of report of their alleged meeting, which he published in 1516 under the title *Libellus aureus nec minus salutaris quam festivus de optimo Reipublicae statu de que nova insula Utopia*, one can only determine a single name of a dweller of the island he made famous. The name of its mythical ruler, who arrived with his own army to colonise the lands and people of Abraxa, creator of a state with the best system. Apart from the reverberations of Utopus's past rule, echoing in the extensive, detailed description of illustrious institutions, customs and laws, and lost in the plethora of issues raised by Hythlodeus,

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2 G. Biesta, C. A. Säfström, A *Manifesto for Education*, op. cit., p. 541.

the lives and work of its other numerous inhabitants – past or present to the two interlocutors – remain anonymous for the reader of *A Truly Golden Little Book, No Less Beneficial than Entertaining, of a Republic's Best State and of the New Island Utopia*. The same is true of individual days, which also do not stand out and, in More's narrative, merge into a well--ordered everyday routine of ordinary people, regardless of their social standing. This existence is stable, balanced and orderly. It proceeds in an atmosphere of friendly care and while it is free from extremes, passions and crimes, private property and exploitation, but not devoid of everyday worries, efforts, challenges and paradoxes. More's depiction of life on the island of Utopia reconciles the best state system with slavery, patriarchy, an authoritarian social order, wars, punishments and prisons, which, according to Lyman Tower Sargent, may offend contemporary Westerners, but need not have been at odds with the sensibilities of 16th-century Europeans. On the contrary, for many of them "Utopia would have seemed like paradise"[3]. It might have been a promise of fulfilment close to their ideas of a good enough life, and what they have learned to desire. In Krishan Kumar's eyes, on the other hand, what is characteristic of the Utopia invented by Morus is precisely its democratic spirit, which in his view "separates *Utopia* from all previous versions and visions of the good society". *A Truly Golden Little Book* by More "announced that the modern utopia would be democratic, not hierarchical. The good life would extend to everyone, in all their pursuits – politics, work, family life, leisure and the arts. In doing this, More democratized reason"[4], observes Kumar.

Perhaps Sargent is right here and it should be recognised that in a world unlearned to focus on the ideas of liberalism and a democratic regime, the relative well-being of the state's citizens is the yardstick of the best state system. Indeed, we should not be surprised that the distance between socialisation in accepted violence and the idea of a good society, as well as the very content of these reference points, are culturally and historically conditioned, different for the European educated elites of the Renaissance era and the Western intellectuals of late modernity fluent in social criticism. Kumar, too, does not seem so much preoccupied with the political framework announced in the original title of More's work as with his depiction of

[3] L. T. Sargent, *Utopianism. A Very Short Introduction*, New York 2010, p. 23.
[4] K. Kumar, *Utopianism*, Minneapolis 1991, p. 50.

egalitarian access to good life. The secret of this good life is not linked by More to the sense of fulfilment and prosperity of specific, individual people, but rather to the specific quality of everyday life of the Utopian population, different in this from European societies, too, as Hythloday's interlocutor notes in his closing reflections, that as a community "it utterly subverts all the nobility, magnificence, splendour and majesty which (in the popular view) are the true ornaments and glory of any commonwealth"[5].

It should be added, however, that this admirable and desirable quality achieved by the Utopians consists in the ordinariness of their everyday life, contrasted in the story of Hythlodeus with the extraordinariness, better grasped by the reader and belonging to this everyday life, of the numerous modernisations adopted and practised by the islanders in all spheres of their activities. Hence, Henri Lefebvre's understanding of everyday life, which sees his contemporaries' everyday life and modernity as interdependent if co-dependent "realities", seems to characterize well also the main focus of More's interlocutor's narrative. According to the French sociologist,

> The quotidian is what is humble and solid, what is taken for granted and that of which all the parts follow each other in such a regular, unvarying succession that those concerned have no call to question their sequence; thus it is undated and (apparently) insignificant; though it occupies and pre-occupies it is practically untellable, and it is the ethics underlying routine and the aesthetics of familiar settings[6].

Seen in this way, the quotidian according to Lefebvre is closely linked to modernity. For him, the term "stands for what is novel, brilliant, paradoxical and bears the imprint of technicality and worldliness; it is (apparently) daring and transitory, proclaims its initiative and is acclaimed for it [...]"[7]. Therefore, "The quotidian and the modern mark and mask, legitimate and counterbalance each other"[8].

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[5] T. More, *Utopia*, ed. G. M. Logan, Cambridge 2016, p. 113.

[6] H. Lefebvre, *Everyday Life in the Modern World*, New York – London 1971, p. 24.

[7] Ibidem.

[8] Ibidem, p. 25. See L. Koczanowicz, *Wspólnota i emancypacje. Spór o społeczeństwo postkonwencjonalne*, Wrocław 2005, pp. 74–76.

Lefebvre's account can be considered convincing and applicable to the world depicted by Hythlodeus, but it should not be forgotten that the ambiguity of the quotidian seems to be part of its nature. Norbert Elias's findings suggest that everyday life in the perspective of social research is both the antinomy of a holiday, the lifestyle of mass society, the working day, as well as routine, private life, the area of spontaneous experiences and actions, or the domain of naïve ordinary thinking, the construction of meanings and related behaviour[9]. It is worth adding here that modernity, as we see it today, not only discovers everyday life, but also gradually uncovers and adopts its norms.

More's *Utopia* may then be read as a kind of foreshadowing of the process of unifying the two "realities", which seen from a different angle reveals itself as a process of transferring the quotidian towards the centre of modern Western democracies. This aspect of this unification seems to correspond with Alexis de Tocqueville's observations from *Democracy in America*. The French aristocrat saw his trip to the United States in the 1830s as a chance to experience first-hand the results and consequences of a modern democratic revolution, which seemed to him inevitable also in Europe[10]. As well as the implications of the introduction of democracy, which he was enthusiastic about, he was also able to see in the context of the French Revolution, and over time better articulate those which concerned him, such as the emergence and development of conditions conducive to the emergence of a new kind of despotism[11]. He associated egalitarian tendencies, the conformity of people, focusing attention on private lives and their own interests, indifferent to public affairs as interacting factors which despotism both exploits and reinforces. In the middle of the next century, Tocqueville's observations and concerns seemed to be shared by Hannah Arendt, given

9   See N. Elias, "On the Concept of Everyday Life", [in:] *The Norbert Elias Reader*, ed. J Goudsblom, S. Mennell, Oxford 1998, pp. 166–174; L. Koczanowicz, R. Włodarczyk, "Education for Critical Community and the Pedagogy of Asylum: Two Responses to the Crisis of University Education", *Studies in Philosophy and Education* 2021 (online).

10 See A. de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, Hazleton 2002, pp. 23–24; C. Lefort, *The Question of Democracy*, [in:] C. Lefort, *Democracy and Political Theory*, Cambridge 1988, pp. 12–16.

11 See A. de Tocqueville, *Ancien Régime and the French Revolution*, Cambridge 2011, pp. 1–7, 80–92; M. Zetterbaum, "Alexis de Tocqueville", [in:] *History of Political Philosophy*, ed. L. Strauss, J. Cropsey, Chicago – London 1987, pp. 761–783.

the triumph and criminality of totalitarian tyrannies that escalated in 20th-century Europe[12]. Arendt's understanding of the political significance of the quotidian can be read as a generalisation of the intuition of the author of *Democracy in America*. In *The Human Condition*, this was expressed via a claim of the modern transformation of the public realm under the impact of the encroaching private domain, separated earlier; of the social and related primarily to economy and satisfaction of life's principal needs and the formation in the West of a new type of society, a mass one, susceptible to totalitarianism[13].

The details of the concept of conditions and causes of totalitarian tyrannies are, of course, debatable. Nevertheless, looking from the perspective outlined here, we can follow Leszek Koczanowicz in his conclusion that "Threats to democracy are not imported from outside by ideologies hostile to it, but are its structural element, which can be updated at any time"[14]. Inspired by Claude Leforte's concept of "an empty place of power", which the author sees as "the revolutionary and unprecedented feature of democracy"[15], and his understanding of the logic of development of totalitarianism, Koczanowicz observes that totalitarianism in both the Nazi and communist versions is a "counter-revolution against democracy; it intends to materialise 'the people', i.e. creating a society which would not be in conflict with itself". Moreover, this threat, not the only one, is also "inscribed in the very essence of democracy, as well as in the very nature of modernity"[16]. Importantly, Koczanowicz, too, links democracy and everyday life, referring to the conclusions of the classics of American pragmatism. John Dewey and George H. Mead saw it, as Koczanowicz believes, as a "system of habits that regulate social life on various levels,

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[12] See H. Arendt, "On the Nature of Totalitarianism: An Essay in Understanding", [in:] H. Arendt, *Essay in Understanding 1930–1954. Formation, Exile, and Totalitarianism*, ed. J. Kohn, New York 1994, pp. 328–360; M. Canovan, *Hannah Arendt. A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought*, Cambridge 1995, pp. 17–62.

[13] See H. Arendt, *The Human Condition*, Chicago – London 1998, pp. 22–78; H. Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, San Diego – New York – London 1976, pp. 305–326.

[14] L. Koczanowicz, *Lęk nowoczesny. Eseje o demokracji i jej adwersarzach*, Kraków 2011, p. 80.

[15] C. Lefort, *The Question of Democracy*, op. cit., p. 17. See M. Kowalska, "Demokracja i totalitaryzm w filozofii politycznej Claude'a Leforta", *Przegląd Filozoficzno-Literacki* 2009, No. 4, pp. 529–543.

[16] L. Koczanowicz, *Lęk nowoczesny*, op. cit., p. 102.

rather than only a system of institutions that safeguard the participation of all citizens in political decisions". He moreover observes that

> By linking democracy with everyday life, pragmatists have added a third value to the equation that links modernity with the quotidian. Politics, as we understand it today, seems to be an effect of modernity, as much as everyday life is. In most general terms, the distinguishing feature of the modern notion of politics is its mass character and the penetration by politics of the entire social life[17].

It is, of course, difficult to say to what extent More's illustration of a state with the best possible system and an unknown island accurately reflects or anticipates the unification in Western societies and the correlation between the orders of everyday life, democracy and modernity. Nevertheless, another affinity is also noticeable: contemporary critics of utopia project on *A Truly Golden Little Book, No Less Beneficial than Entertaining*, among others, associations with 20th-century totalitarianisms[18]. As Ruth Levitas sees and explains this long-held dominant interpretation, "Public discourse and political culture are profoundly anti-utopian, portraying utopia as an impossible quest for perfection whose political consequences are almost necessarily totalitarian". She explains that

> This position is predicated on the climate of the Cold War and the later capitalist triumphalism that accompanied the fall of communist regimes after 1989. It contains two implicit equations: 'utopia equals totalitarianism equals communism equals Marxism equals socialism', and 'communism equals totalitarianism equals fascism'[19].

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[17] L. Koczanowicz, *Wspólnota i emancypacje*, op. cit., p. 77. See L. Koczanowicz, *Politics of Dialogue. Non-Consensual Democracy and Critical Community*, Edinburgh 2015, pp. 6–41.

[18] See B. Goodwin, "Utopia and Political Theory", [in:] B. Goodwin, K. Taylor, *The Politic of Utopia. A Study in Theory and Practice*, London 1982, pp. 92–98; R. Levitas, *Utopia as Method. The Imaginary Reconstruction of Society*, London 2013, pp. 7–11; G. Claeys, *Dystopia: A Natural History. A Study of Modern Despotism, Its Antecedents, and Its Literary Diffractions*, Oxford 2017, pp. 3–10.

[19] R. Levitas, *Utopia as Method*, op. cit., p. 7.

However, in Utopia itself, it is not the system of state institutions that evokes associations with totalitarianism, but precisely the predominantly authoritarian regulation of the everyday life of the island's inhabitants, which, if we follow More's narrative, probably goes back seventeen centuries.

However, it is difficult to see totalitarianism as the only threat inherent in the essence of democracy and the nature of modernity. Today, alongside authoritarian regimes and religious fundamentalisms, populisms are attracting particular attention of scholars and Western public opinion, especially in view of their European progress over the last two decades[20]. Political populisms, the way Margaret Canovan sees them, should also be considered inherent to modern democracies, due to the fact that the source of their legitimacy is the sovereign people (*demos* or *populus*). Hence we have references to the crisis of popular rule, the claims of taking power away from the elites and giving it back to the sovereign proper put forward by parties, social movements and their leaders can be understood as a demand for the renewal of democracy[21]. In other words, the mechanism of legitimation of populist movements comes, according to Canovan, from politicians' disregard for the paradox at the heart of democracy:

> The paradox is this: democracy is the most inclusive and 'popular' form of politics, taking politics to ordinary people, giving them political rights and access to multiple channels of influence. For that very reason this is by far the most complex form of politics, so bafflingly tangled and opaque that the vast majority of its supposed participants can form no clear picture to help them make sense of it[22].

This paradox can therefore be seen, as Canovan argues, as a contradiction between engaging people in politics and bringing politics closer to

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[20] See C. Mudde, C. Rovira Kaltwasser, *Populism. A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford – New York 2017, pp. 32–37, 79–96.

[21] See M. Canovan, *The People*, Cambridge 2005, pp. 10–39; A. Antoszewski, *Współczesne teorie demokracji*, Warszawa 2016, pp. 47–90.

[22] M. Canovan, "Taking Politics to the People: Populism as the Ideology of Democracy", [in:] *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, ed. Y. Mény, Y. Surel, Basingstoke 2002, p. 28.

people[23]. Consequently, the steadily advancing democratisation is accompanied by a steady increase in the opacity of the ordering of the political system, which may go some way to explaining the persuasive power of the main populist slogan that "politics has escaped popular control"[24]. One possible collective response to this state of affairs is the reaction of the growing social movements and their leaders, the essential determinants of which are a radical critique of the alienated, corrupt elites exercising power in the name of the people but not for the people and not by the people, seeing themselves as the exclusive and proper exponents of the will of the people This is the will of a righteous and morally pure nation in its entirety, and it seeks to maintain a clear distinction between those who rightfully belong to it and those who, for various reasons, cannot be identified with it. This, according to Jan-Werner Müller, is the danger of populism[25].

Still, the relevant literature accumulated around this controversial phenomenon since the late 1960s book edited by Ghita Ionesco and Ernst Geller, shows populism as far more socially and historically diverse, ambiguous and structurally complex[26]. The ways of understanding it within academic discourse, including its evaluation, are sometimes surprisingly different. To confirm this and, more importantly, in relation to the issues raised earlier, one can recall Koczanowicz's interesting interpretation of the conditions for the development of populism in Poland and other post-communist countries. He claims that "the most important factor is the sense of losing control of one's own life, as it indicates everyday life as the source of the political triumph of populism". Therefore, he recognises that "Only if we understand the role of everyday life in politics will we be able to identify the reasons for the populist success and to find the ways of preventing it in the future"[27]. Consequently, it should come as no surprise that, in view of the important affinities perceived by

[23] See ibidem, pp. 42–43.
[24] Ibidem, p. 27.
[25] See J.-W. Müller, *What Is Populism?*, Philadelphia 2016, pp. 1–6.
[26] See Y. Mény, Y. Surel, "The Constitutive Ambiguity of Populism", [in:] *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, op. cit., pp. 1–17; C. Mudde, C. Rovira Kaltwasser, *Populism*, op. cit., pp. 1–20.
[27] L. Koczanowicz, "Toward a Democratic Utopia of Everydayness: Microphysics of Emancipation and Somapower", *History of European Ideas* 2020, Vol. 46, No. 8, p. 1123.

scholars between both More's Utopian society and populism and everyday life, as well as democracy and modernity, it is possible to ask about the educational significance of populism itself, with a view to its relation to utopia in general. However, this relationship itself is not obvious; nor is the phenomenon of populism.

UTOPIANISM WITHIN THE LIMITS OF POPULISM. BETWEEN PATHOLOGY AND HOPE FOR THE RENEWAL OF DEMOCRACY

Among commentators on contemporary populism, perceived as an element of the politics of protest, organising citizens around the idea of articulating the real will of the people and mobilising them to act in social movements that avoid normativity, there is no shortage of those who see in it a threat to the historically established Western variant of democracy consolidated with liberalism. Among them are those who, like Pierre Rosanvallon, speak of a form of its pathology: "It is a perverse inversion of the ideals and procedures of democracy"[28]. In his reading, populism in relation to the structural tensions of the representative system seemingly resolves

> the problem of representation by conjuring up an image of a unified, homogeneous people. It radically rejects whatever it assumes to be inimical to such unity and homogeneity: foreigners, enemies, oligarchy, elites. With ever more vehement attacks it seeks to drive a wedge between the people and its supposed enemies. Populists denounce 'otherness' in moral terms (by vilifying the 'corrupt' and 'rotten'), in social terms (by condemning 'elites'), and in ethnic terms (by attacking 'foreigners,' 'immigrants,' 'minorities', etc.).

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[28] P. Rosanvallon, *Counter-Democracy. Politics in an Age of Distrust*, Cambridge 2008, pp. 265. Importantly, Rosanvallon's observation that populism is a pathology of democracy, is shared by many scholars; see Y. Mény, Y. Surel, *The Constitutive Ambiguity of Populism*, op. cit., pp. 3–7. Still, the assault on populism is also countered; see L. Goodwyn, "Rethinking 'Populism': Paradoxes of Historiography and Democracy", *Telos* 1991, No. 88, pp. 37–56; Y. Papadopoulos, "Populism, the Democratic Question, and Contemporary Governance", [in:] *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, op. cit., pp. 45–61; M. Stambulski, "Populizm a konstytucjonalizm", [in:] *Nowy konstytucjonalizm. Polityczność, tożsamość, sfera publiczna*, ed. A. Czarnota, M. Paździora, M. Stambulski, Scholar, Warszawa 2021, pp. 53–80.

By contrast, they celebrate 'the people' as unified and pure, undivided so long as outsiders are kept out[29].

However, Rosanvallon believes that populism, considered only at the level of institutionalised democracy, belongs in the same category as "the various forms of totalitarianism [...], since they, too, depend, albeit in a more radical way, on imagined social unity and incarnation of the people"[30]. In order to sufficiently differentiate two, he proposes to focus on the characteristics and aspects of populism that are revealed at a different level of democratic functioning and linked to the activity undertaken within civil society.

Rosanvallon has in mind here a democracy of dispersed intermediate powers, a type of clearly manifested distrust of democracy in Western societies, which has in the post-totalitarian era acquired a historically established, sufficiently organised form, whose "purpose is to make sure that elected officials keep their promises and to find ways of maintaining pressure on the government to serve the common good"[31]. The political form he distinguishes, which he calls counter-democracy, and which is not so much the opposite of democracy as one form of democracy opposed to another, can oscillate towards pathology, such as populism, among others. In such cases, it manifests itself in all three dimensions of the functioning of counter-democracy. Firstly, it is the monitoring of the government by society, whose main modalities are vigilance, denunciation and evaluation of electoral legitimacy, secondly, various forms of prevention, a kind of veto exercised by social groups, political and economic forces or other actors, and finally, the people as judge, who by means of trials and judgments verifies the conduct of those in power and the institutions they run[32]. In this sense, according to Rosanvallon,

[29] P. Rosanvallon, *Counter-Democracy*, op. cit., p. 266.

[30] Ibidem, p. 267. See P.-A. Taguieff, "Political Science Confronts Populism: From a Conceptual Mirage to a Real Problem", *Telos* 1995, No. 103, pp. 10–16.

[31] P. Rosanvallon, *Counter-Democracy*, op. cit., p. 8. See ibidem, pp. 76–103. In this perspective, the works of Jacques Rancière can serve as major examples of the counter-democratic distrust of democracy: *Hatred of Democracy* (see J. Rancière, *Hatred of Democracy*, London – New York 2006, pp. 71–97) and Giorgio Agamben's *Homo Sacer* (see G. Agamben, *Homo Sacer. Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, Stanford 1998, pp. 119–188).

[32] See P. Rosanvallon, *Counter-Democracy*, op. cit., pp. 1–27.

populism "radicalizes the three forms of counter-democracy [...]: the democracy of oversight, negative sovereignty, and politics as judgment [...] to the point where they end up in what I have called 'the unpolitical'"[33]. As a result, part of counter-democracy "becomes a compulsive and permanent stigmatization of the ruling authorities, to the point where these authorities are seen as radically alien enemy powers"[34]. Populists catalyse social anger; "they warn of decadence and pose as guardians of purity, saviors of the nation from political extremes, and prophets of an apocalypse from which they will emerge victorious"[35], as the judge-people they only wish to deal with "the justice of repression, punishment, and stigmatization"[36], aimed against a broad category of 'undesirables' and 'parasites'.

Rosanvallon seems to stand out among scholars critical of populism, limiting its scope to degenerate symptoms of institutionalised and indirect democracy, while appreciating its very historical evolution towards the development and consolidation of a form of social control of elected authorities. In turn, Ernesto Laclau, as well as Chantal Mouffe, see value in populism itself, "because it shows a particular logic of articulation of [...] contents - whatever those contents are". In other words, in their view "its meaning is not to be found in any political or ideological content entering into the description of the practices of any particular group, but in a particular *mode of articulation* of whatever social, political or ideological contents"[37]. We should therefore consider this understanding of populism as "a strictly *formal* one"[38]. Laclau points out that unsatisfied social claims, despite their diverse character and content, can be combined with each other, and thus unite their exponents by means of a series of political-discursive practices within the scope of their negativity, co-creating a potential for the mobilization of radical

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[33] Ibidem, pp. 267–268.

[34] Ibidem, p. 268.

[35] Ibidem, p. 271.

[36] Ibidem, p. 272.

[37] E. Laclau, "Populism: What's in a Name?", [in:] *Populism and the Mirror of Democracy*, ed. F. Panizza, New York 2000, pp. 33, 34 – original underline. See E. Laclau, *On Populist Reason*, London – New York 2005, pp. 67–171; Ch. Mouffe, *For a Left Populism*, London – New York 2018, pp. 9–24.

[38] E. Laclau, "Populism: What's in a Name?", op. cit., p. 44 – original underline.

protest that is consolidated and directed to the extent that one of the broad set of claims can assume the function of the symbolic expression of the others, and at the same time there exists an object that, on the principles of binary opposition, can be cast in the function of an enemy antagonized towards the given movement. According to Laclau, the parts of this dynamic system can be identified as socially constructed, demarcated 'people' and 'power', and the logic of its operation can even be treated as synonymous with politics, since populism, as he points out, "means putting into question the institutional order by constructing an underdog as an historical agent – i.e. an agent which is a *other* in relation to the way things stand. But this is the same as politics"[39]. As a consequence, he acknowledges that, firstly "no political movement will be entirely exempt from populism" but can only be free from it up to a point, and secondly, "the end of populism coincides with the end of politics"[40].

The notion of populism proposed by Laclau is capacious enough to describe the process of identity formation of most political actors. It is difficult to point to a class, a social movement, a party, a trade union, a religious group, an ethnic group, etc. engaged in activities aimed at the realisation of postulated needs or interests through attempts to influence the processes of governance that would not be defined by internal alignment and difference to the other. However, the author focuses in particular on those political actors who, in the context of competition and conflict, display a greater openness to inclusion and a higher degree and extent of antagonism and contestation of the status quo. Nevertheless, the two different understandings of populism cited here seem to show how dissimilar the designates of the term can be. This does not mean that these divergent approaches within competing theories of populism do not have points in common. However, in such a context, it should not be surprising that some of them do not show any connection between populism and utopia and thus the link escapes attention.

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[39] Ibidem, p. 47 – original underline. In the context of the issues addressed in this chapter, it is worth adding that in this approach Laclau's notion of populism comes close to Karl Mannheim's understanding utopian state of mind as opposed to ideological state of mind (see K. Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia. An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge*, New York 1954, pp. 173–236).

[40] E. Laclau, "Populism: What's in a Name?", op. cit., pp. 47, 48. See C. Mouffe, *For a Left Populism*, op. cit., pp. 59–78.

Paul Taggart adopts a different position and defines populism as a "re-action against the ideas, institutions and practices of representative politics which celebrates an implicit or explicit heartland as a response to a sense of crisis"[41]. Populists' propensity to identify with a "heartland", belonging to an unidentified past and representing "an idealised conception of the community they serve", is according to Taggart one of the six elements of the ideal type populism[42]. It is this very element which may be linked to utopia, which the political scholar and researcher of populism realises with concern. He is aware that while "Ideologies have ideal societies", to him this is usually a vision of a future world; "Ideal societies are usually those forward projections by ideologues of the world as it would be constructed if it embodied the key values that they advocate"[43].

The heartland as an imaginary territory embodies for Taggart the customs and wisdom of 'the people' who live there, a uniform and virtuous population which embodies "the positive aspects of everyday life"[44]. As

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[41] P. Taggart, *Populism*, Buckingham – Philadelphia 2000, p. 5.

[42] See P. Taggart, "Populism and the Pathology of Representative Politics", [in:] *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, op. cit., pp. 66–71. The other elements pointed out and discussed are: a hostile attitude towards the representative model of politics and a preference for simplicity and directness; a lack of commitment to the fundamental values that could constitute its own ideological core; becoming visible in periods of acute social crisis; the self-limiting and short-lived nature of mobilisation and action, resulting from an avoidance of the complex forms and institutions of the political system and a preference for charismatic leaders; being essentially determined by the context in which the populism in question appears. According to Taggart, "each populist movement perceives itself in terms of its own specific features rather than as part of a wider populist phenomenon. [...] Its lack of core values, and its self-limitation and chameleonic features, partially explain why populism is so episodic and therefore why, as a subject of study, it is both rather esoteric and difficult. However, taken together, the six features also illustrate why populism is a potential barometer of the health of representative politics" (ibidem, pp. 70, 71).

[43] P. Taggart, *Populism*, op. cit., p. 95.

[44] Ibidem. Naturally, the understanding of populism as ideology has its followers (see M. Canovan, *Taking Politics to the People*, op. cit., pp. 25–44; C. Mudde, "The Populist Zeitgeist", *Government & Opposition* 2004, No. 3, pp. 543–545), yet is still problematic (see P.-A. Taguieff, *Political Science Confronts Populism*, op. cit., pp. 24–40), which Taggart observes, too. He indicates that "Populism's natural position is as an adjective attached to other ideas that fill the space at the empty heart of populism" (P. Taggart, *Populism*, op. cit., p. 4), This can be related to the fact that the heartland image characteristic of populism is, as a rule, indeterminate, to use Roman Ingarden's term, but in the specific case of a given movement it can be gradually filled in by content specific to a given ideological orientation.

it defines also what is seen as normal and ordinary for the undifferentiated 'people', we may say that "the heartland is made as a justification for the exclusion of the demonized" by populists, including "certain groups as not part of the real 'people'"[45]. At the same time he indicated that the function played by this imaginary territory than the established and defined contents of this vision. This is by and large "a diffuse vision, blurred around the edges, and clearly a romanticised and profoundly ahistorical conception" and "indicates something that is felt rather than reasoned, and something shrouded in imprecision"[46]. According to Taggart, it is faith in the virtue of the heartland rather than a shared uniform vision that unites populists.

While Taggart makes a distinction between utopia and heartland, he claims that the key to its understanding "is not that of a utopia, but that there was a tried and tested 'good life' before the corruption and distortions of the present"; in other words, this "is a construction of an ideal world but, unlike utopian conceptions, it is constructed retrospectively [...]"[47]. However, this distinction can be problematised. First of all, it is based on the scholar's understanding of utopia, which remains only outlined in his account of populism and serves him as a context for exposing the heartland concept. We can achieve a certain demystification of this way of understanding by referring to one of Zygmunt Bauman's recent books.

In his *Retrotopia*, in which he tries to define how the past controls us, Bauman points to the accumulation of fears connected with tomorrow and explains the "epidemic of nostalgia" present in Western societies in which "The road to future turns looks uncannily as a trail of corruption and degeneration"[48]. How does he read the emerging social tendency of "the 'retrotopian' phase in utopia's history": "Perhaps the road back, to the past, won't miss the chance of turning into a trail of cleansing from the damages committed by futures, whenever they turned into a present?"[49]. 'Retrotopian' sentiments and practices Bauman is interested in

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[45] Ibidem, p. 96.

[46] P. Taggart, *Populism and the Pathology of Representative Politics*, op. cit., pp. 67, 68.

[47] Ibidem, p. 68, 67. See P. Taggart, *Populism*, op. cit., pp. 95–96.

[48] Z. Bauman, *Retrotopia*, Cambridge 2017, p. 10.

[49] Ibidem, pp. 12, 10. See D. Brzeziński, "Utopijne powroty do przeszłości: młode pokolenie wobec zwrotu nostalgicznego", [in:] *Utopia a edukacja*, t. 4, ed. R. Włodarczyk, Wrocław 2020, p. 59–76.

seem to correspond, perhaps not only in this single instance, with Taggart's understanding of 'new populism', as he calls the course taken in multiple contemporary liberal democracies by social movements and political parties that emerged alongside 'new politics' formations on the right side of the political spectrum in the period following the collapse of communist regimes and in connection with the crisis of legitimacy, the undermining of the post-war economic and political consensus and the progress of European integration[50]. Nevertheless, in both cases we deal with thinking about utopia in temporal terms, playing out the idea of a sufficiently perfect society not so much in relation to the organisation of the lives of people living on a remote island unknown to us, as was the case with More's Utopians, or some other place in the depths of the oceans, the Earth or outer space accessible to few of us, but in temporal relations. Taking into account the literary utopia itself, one can see that in the course of five centuries of transformations of its characteristics that took place in Western culture, the contrast of places metamorphosed into a divergence of times, in which the relation between the present and the future occupied a special place, and both Bauman and Taggart referred to it[51].

However, the question of the assignment of utopia to a particular time cannot be reduced to issues of literary genre. Even the Western imagination and social practice of the 16th c. alone operated in parallel with other versions and visions of the good society, such as, for example, prophetic messianism and Christian millenarianism, which incorporated aspirations and expectations of its accomplishment into the horizon of tomorrow[52]. In turn, the Garden of Eden, Atlantis and the myths of the golden age of ancient civilisations directed attention and the search for the ideal society towards the past. Some of them may have somehow inspired Plato, Aristotle or Augustine of Hippo in that part of their political

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[50] See P. Taggart, *The New Populism and New Politics. New Protest Parties in Sweden in a Comparative Perspective*, London 1996, pp. 32–35; P. Taggart, *Populism*, op. cit., pp. 73–76; P. Taggart, *Populism and the Pathology of Representative Politics*, op. cit., pp. 64–65.

[51] See R. Koselleck, "The Temporalization of Utopia", [in:] R. Koselleck, *The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts*, Stanford 2002, pp. 84–99.

[52] See K. Kumar, *Utopianism*, op. cit., pp. 6–11. More on this subject: F. Polak, *The Image of the Future*, Amsterdam 1973, pp. 24–95.

philosophy in which they oriented themselves towards the elaboration of the best state system. Moreover, it happens that a model drawn from the past, a vision of the good life serves as a paragon for realized or only imagined conservative revolutions. Taggart's heartland is part of this reading. Thus, if utopia is understood broadly, as the image of a fragment, a part or the whole of a sufficiently perfect social order and set of inter-personal relations, which constitutes a mature form of crystallisation of collective hopes and may serve as a model of the future expected by a person or a group, then heartland, although operating with an undefined image of a certain past reality, fits into this way of understanding utopia. The image of the past can determine the goals of aspiration and in this sense be prospective. Such a connection also seems to be justified if the heartland is looked at from the perspective of the functions utopia can perform. According to Levitas, the most important of these functions, and the one most often mentioned by researchers, are that of compensation, criticism, change, expression, uncovering desires, and creating a sense of alienation[53]. The heartland can successfully perform these functions. Furthermore, one of the principal references for utopia, for populism in general and for Taggart's heartland are ordinary people with their quotidian lives.

Taggart, however, is not the only scholar whose notion of populism shows its link with utopia. The same is true of Canovan, in whose approach this connection is equally pronounced. In order to reconstruct it, it may be helpful to characterise her approach to the phenomenon of populism. Canovan uses a classification according to which the seven types she distinguishes can be divided into two intrinsically divergent groups of populisms: agrarian and political[54]. This classification helps to exclude from the disputes about contemporary populism and the condition of democracy of historically significant, precursor forms of it, such as the US People's Party and Russian *narodnichestvo*[55], whose ideas,

[53] See R. Levitas, *The Concept of Utopia*, Oxford 2011, pp. 193–200, 208.

[54] See M. Canovan, *Populism*, New York – London 1981, pp. 7–16. He mentions the following agrarian populisms: farmers' radicalism, peasant movements, intellectual agrarian socialism. In turn, political ones include: populist dictatorship, populist democracy, reactionary populism, politicians' populism (see ibidem, pp. 3–16).

[55] See M. Canovan, *Populism*, op. cit., pp. 17–97; J. Held, *Antecedents*, [in:] *Populism in Eastern Europe. Racism, Nationalism, and Society*, ed. J. Held, New York 1996, pp. 1–20.

modus operandi and context of operation were so distinctive that one can indeed speak of their own specificity and separate types. As Canovan notes in the conclusion of a study from the early 1980s,

> Clearly, in the light of the evidence presented, it is no use trying to identify a definite ideology or a specific socioeconomic situation as characteristic of populism in all its forms. Nevertheless, two elements do seem to be universally present. All forms of populism without exception involve some kind of exaltation of and appeal to 'the people', and all are in one sense or another anti-elitist. Unfortunately these common characteristics do not go far toward proving the fundamental unity of populism, for they are themselves vague and ambiguous[56].

Above all, the useful and at the same time politically troublesome ambiguity inherent in the notion of people draws attention. Analysing from the perspective of the history of ideas the gradual, centuries-long formation in the Anglo-Saxon world of this concept, an essential and indelible component of each of the numerous ways in which we understand democracy in the West, Canovan points to the contemporary overlapping of its several distinct meanings[57]. The idea of the people as the sovereign, the society organized into a state, the ultimate source of legitimate authority, is superimposed on the idea of the people as governing themselves, the people as a particular nation and the people as ordinary people, originally the plebs, that is, the lower strata of society, in opposition to the privileged elite[58]. Furthermore, 'the people', also outside the Anglo-Saxon context, may simply mean population or humanity in general. However, we may emphasise here, with regard to democratic systems, that in a historical and political perspective one can speak at

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56 M. Canovan, *Populism*, op. cit., p. 294. Countering Laclau's concept, Canovan observes: "one important reason why the temptation to force all populist phenomena into one category should be resisted, is that the various populisms we have distinguished are not just different varieties of the same kind of thing: they are in many cases different *sorts* of things, and not directly comparable at all" (ibidem, p. 298).

57 See M. Canovan, *The People*, op. cit., pp. 10–39. See also G. Sartori, *The Theory of Democracy Revisited*, Chatham – New Jersey 1987, pp. 21–31.

58 See M. Canovan, *The People*, op. cit., p. 30; M. Canovan, "Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy", *Political Studies* 1999, Vol. 47, No. 1, pp. 4–5.

most of a gradual inclusion; the situation of the Athenians, who formed probably the most famous of the ancient democracies, in which a large proportion of adult men, women, children, slaves and foreigners were not included in the *demos*, is not an exception[59]. Thus the contemporary notion of the people and democratic theory clearly reveals an important tension between the degree of political empowerment and the population, between the status of full citizen and the entire population living or temporarily residing in a given territory, but also the part outside of it with attributes that make inclusion into this very political community possible.

However, in the appeal of political populists to the power of the people, recognised in a democracy, another tension comes to the fore, related to the ambiguity inherent in this concept. As Canovan points out, it is revealed in their claim to the right to vote based on the conviction that "they speak for *the people*: that is to say, they claim to represent the democratic sovereign, not a sectional interest such as economic class"[60]. On behalf of a people who are united and local, genuine and honest, on behalf of ordinary people with whom they have a simple and intimate living relationship. Canovan sees the impact of political populism as a democratic ideology, but he does not use the term in a sense that simply equates ideology with illusion or manipulation. Following Michael Freeden, he understands ideology as a type of political reflection that provides conceptual structures that furnish a simplified map of the political world and urge for collective action[61]. To his mind, political ideologies are "combinations of political concepts organized in a particular way", as they facilitate "a socially situated and partisan value-arbitrated choice among adjacent components [or a given political term – R.W.], by relying heavily on the notion of cultural adjacency, and the result will display various mixes of rational criteria, emotional inclinations, and cultural value preferences"[62]. In turn, the essence of political notions seen from the perspective of philosophy is their inherent susceptibility to questioning. In other words, the

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[59] See R. A. Dahl, *Democracy and its Critics*, New Haven 1989, pp. 13–33; D. Held, *Models of Democracy*, Cambridge 2008, pp. 11–123.

[60] M. Canovan, *Trust the People!*, op. cit., p. 4 – original underline. See P.-A. Taguieff, *Political Science Confronts Populism*, op. cit., pp. 24–31.

[61] See M. Canovan, *Taking Politics to the People*, op. cit., pp. 30–33.

[62] M. Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory. A Conceptual Approach*, Oxford 2006, pp. 75–76.

ideological use of concepts to build a map of the political world serving as a reference point for mobilisation for joint action is marked by a kind of determination of the meanings attributed to them, in this way "converting the inevitable variety of options into the monolithic certainty which is the unavoidable feature of a political *decision*, and which is the basis of the forging of a political identity"[63].

In addition, Canovan draws attention to the quasi-religious and motivational features of ideology and of populism, such as its ability to inspire belief and confer legitimacy. She also makes the distinction underlying Freeden's analysis of feminism and ecologism to describe it. Freeden points to their relatively limited scope in conceptually mapping the world compared to comprehensive ideologies such as socialism or liberalism, as they consist of a thin centre and either undermine the legitimacy of taking on additional ideological baggage, or "thicken by ingesting the patterns of other ideologies"[64]. Canovan sees here an analogy with populism, which comprises also other features indicated earlier and aspects of ideology. In this case, the thin centre, publicly promoted and treated as a priority and defended against any contestation, is according to Canovan the notion of "'the people', followed by 'democracy', 'sovereignty' and 'majority rule', each defined through its links with the others"[65]. In turn, the fact that ideologies according to Freeden "convert the inevitable variety of options into the monolithic certainty" explains how populism copes with the ambiguity inherent in the notion of the people. However, Canovan sees here one more significant perspective to use to consider the category of the people in the context of populism, i.e. political myth[66], and it is here that its connection with utopia emerges.

Canovan refers to Henry Tudor's concept of political myth and uses his distinction between foundation myths and myths of revolution or eschatological myths, i.e. stories about the past and stories about the

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[63] Ibidem, pp. 76–77 – original underline. Freeden sums up the three principal features of ideology as follows: "Because ideologies involve concerted action, they relate to the sphere of organization; because they involve decisions, they relate to control; and because they involve language, they relate to the attempted injection of certainty into indeterminacy" (ibidem, p. 77).

[64] Ibidem, p. 485.

[65] M. Canovan, *Taking Politics to the People*, op. cit., p. 33.

[66] See M. Canovan, *The People*, op. cit., pp. 122–138.

future[67]. He points to three of its essential features: dramatic form, connection to some political community and a practical political purpose. In developing her reconstruction of Tudor's established characteristics of political myth, Canovan states that

> As the collective story of a state, a nation, or some other political group it is neither pure fiction nor straightforward history, but it is invoked because it makes sense of political experience. In particular, it allows individuals to identify themselves with 'our' collective story and provides them with patterns of behaviour. It is practical in the sense that it either legitimizes existing political conditions or justifies political action' any particular myth can be told in many different ways and adapted to many different practical circumstances[68].

Canovan sees a link between the type of founding myths distinguished by Tudor, concerning the origins of the people and the power of the state, and the backward-looking myths of a sovereign people, and also sees in his proposed interpretation of the myths of revolution a supplement to them: "These backward-looking myths of the popular foundation of politics are complemented by forward-looking myths of political renewal, to come about when the People take hack their power and make a new start"[69]. According to her, it is "the story of how the people have been robbed of their rightful sovereignty, but we rise up and regain it"[70]; this has been the principal component of populist politics of the past two centuries.

Canovan does not refer here directly to the theory of utopia, but her understanding of the myth of redemption and renewal does. This seems to be further confirmed by her reading of Michael Oakeshott's concept of two styles of doing politics: faith and scepticism, for which Canovan proposes her own terms, redemptive and pragmatic, and which she applies to her analysis of populism[71]. Their confrontation in the context

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[67] See H. Tudor, *Political Myth*, London 1972, pp. 13–17, 91–92.

[68] M. Canovan, *The People*, op. cit., p. 124.

[69] Ibidem, p. 126.

[70] Ibidem, p. 127.

[71] See M. Canovan, *Trust the People!*, op. cit., pp. 8–14. Oakeshott seems to have no doubt about the relationship between faith politics and utopianism. He concludes: "In the politics of faith I am, it is true, delineating what are generally spoken of as utopian politics [...]" (M. Oakeshott, *The Politics of Faith and the Politics of Scepticism*, New Haven –

of democracy allows Canovan to expose the features of its salvific promise, a utopian moment that is particularly vulnerable to populism. As she points out,

> Inherent in modern democracy, in tension with its pragmatic face, is faith in secular redemption: the promise of a better world through action by the sovereign people. [...] When too great a gap opens up between haloed democracy and the grubby business of politics, populists tend to move on to the vacant territory, promising in place of the dirty world of party manoeuvring the shining ideal of democracy renewed[72].

Canovan's statement can be illustrated by Koczanowicz's observation on the development of populism in Poland. According to the latter,

> People, who fought against the communist regime in the name of democracy were driven by idealistic, utopian motivations. For them, democracy stood for an ideal: it was not so much a system of institutions but rather an existential challenge, a desire to live in truth and authenticity. The confrontation between the ideal and the reality of the working democratic system proved deeply disappointing to many people as they realized that instead of an ethical transformation, they were in for petty politics of personal ambitions, tug-of-war and egoism[73].

Unlike many other scholars, Canovan is able to see the bright side of populism; in her view, the saving promise of democracy need not be entirely illusory:

London, p. 26), but also notices that not every version of the politics of faith can be naturally linked to utopianism (see ibidem, pp. 23–30).

[72] M. Canovan, *Trust the People!*, op. cit., p. 11. Canovan distinguishes two more levels of confrontation between the salvific and the pragmatic face of democracy, leading to the contradiction that populism feeds on: first, the call for the exercise of power by the people opposed to a democracy that "is also a way of running a polity among other polities in a complex world" (ibidem, p. 12). Secondly, there is the discreditation of "institutions that come between the people and their actions, and a craving for direct, unmediated expression of the people's will" (ibidem, p. 13), overcoming alienation, contrasted with the condition of effectiveness and sustainability of democratic power achieved through institutions.

[73] L. Kocznowicz, *Toward a Democratic Utopia of Everydayness*, op. cit., p. 1122.

it really is the case that people who can manage to believe in the possibility of collective action and to unite behind it can exercise more power than if they give up and concentrate on their private affairs. [...] Unrealistic visions may be a condition of real achievements as well as being a recipe for disappointment. Democracy, it seems, is obliged to face in two opposite directions at the same time[74].

POPULISM AND COUNTER-EDUCATION: HOPE AND A RISK OF A PROMISE OF A RENEWAL OF EDUCATION

Populism, like two other degraded categories of social imaginary: utopia and ideology, seems to enjoy in public space a rhetorical utility inversely proportional to cognitive attention. The social imaginary clearly needs it to name the distinctive tendencies of the dynamics of Western liberal democracies, yet it is not without reason that Pierre-André Taguieff points out that both in the media and in politics its use is pejorative, delegitimating[75]. Furthermore, according to Taguieff "populism has become an all-purpose term, an all-encompassing category, which today is carelessly applied to very different phenomena". To his mind, it is significant that it "allows the stigmatization of emerging socio-political venues that do not conform to the liberal model of 'democratic transition'"[76]. In this force of negation one can see the influence of the traumatic memory of totalitarianisms, which in response to the sign of the presence of variants, substitutes or only the appearance of populism in the public space, raises the modern fears of this part of the world to the level of the activation of defence mechanisms, which makes it much more difficult to understand the hopes and risks lying at the basis of a phenomenon that normally remains of secondary significance The alternative is to become accustomed to its ambivalence, which is also a challenge for education. Populism does not appear to be a pure external phenomenon, just as it is not something imported into democracy: according to some researchers, its seeds are constantly present in it, from which it develops and shapes itself into new

[74] M. Canovan, *Trust the People!*, op. cit., p. 13.
[75] See P.-A. Taguieff, *Political Science Confronts Populism*, op. cit., p. 9.
[76] Ibidem, p. 17.

forms, which only at a certain stage of their manifestation in the public sphere arouse curiosity and concern. However, in order to recognise the possible content and validity of this premise, it is worthwhile to approach the findings on populism and its relation to utopia from the perspective of philosophy and educational theory and relate them to its practice, using reasoning by analogy and its heuristic function[77].

Firstly, it seems worthwhile, when drawing on the notion of counter-education[78], to read it from the perspective suggested by Rosanvallon as that which contributes to the politics of protest and simultaneously somewhat deepens democracy. In this perspective, counter-education is not the reverse of education; it retains the significance of its form opposing another form, which it distrusts. It can be said that this distrust was already evident at earlier stages of the evolution of Western democracies in the form of a critique of the traditional school or a number of advanced educational activities and initiatives undertaken within the new education movement, for example, reform pedagogy in Germany or progressivism in the United States. If one follows Rosanvallon's findings, one may venture to argue that also in education the post-totalitarian era brings about a significant change in the quality and consolidation of the form of social control, as exemplified by the formation, development and differentiation in the Western world of variants of critical pedagogy and education. A similar process of dynamic development and differentiation seems to be revealed in parallel by other educational ideologies and movements as well. However, the fundamental issue here is the growing number and activity of various types of entities interested in the state and quality of education and at the same time characterised by distrust of its dominant form, their consolidation and, consequently, a regionally perceptible increase in their importance.

However, regardless of whether we consider this way of understanding Western educational reality adequate, it can be reasonably assumed that nowadays we are dealing there with the activity of citizens who, within the framework of civil society, use the means available to them

[77] M. Koszowski, "Multiple Functions of Analogical Reasoning in Science and Everyday Life", *Polish Sociological Review* 2017, Vol. 197, No. 1, pp. 3–19.
[78] See I. Gur-Ze'ev, J. Masschelein, N. Blake, "Reflectivity, Reflection, and Counter-Education", *Studies in Philosophy and Education* 2001, Vol. 20, pp. 93–106.

to control it in all three dimensions of counter-democracy indicated by Rosanvallon: supervising the authorities in the field of educational policy, piling up obstacles or acting as a judge who acts upon the decisions made by the rulers and their staff and the activities of the institutions of socialisation. Assuming that populism means 'the radicalisation of surveillance democracy, negative sovereignty and politics as judging', as a result of which a certain part of the counter-democracy 'turns into an unrestrained and permanent stigmatisation of the established authorities', symptoms of this 'pathology' may also be found in certain components of counter-education.

The sense of loss of control of the subjects of education over their own lives, the sense of crisis and alienation is also significant for the formation of populism within counter-education. If one accepts Taggart's interpretation, here too we may encounter a sentimental and blurry image, a derivative of a 'heartland', of an education that embodies ordinary virtues of its undifferentiated people and serving an idealised community, an education that leads to a tried and successful 'good life' from before the collapse as well as, paradoxically, to resentment and exclusion of otherness. Understanding populism as a catalyst for more than just negative emotions and feelings ranging from fears, disillusionment, hostility to longing for better and hope, establishes a perspective providing insight into what is suppressed in education in this respect. This is all the more relevant if one considers the importance of feelings and emotions in the processes of learning, teaching and development.

However, it is not only in Rosanvallon's perspective that populists and their leaders operate with clichés and simple prescriptions that are capable of stimulating the power of mass mobilisation. They do not shy away from manipulation and abuse, reducing a complex social reality to a few graspable issues. First and foremost, these are the recovery of sovereignty by a decent people, i.e. ordinary citizens caught up in everyday problems. These are real members of the nation, and the removal of alienated corrupt elites and to act without the mediation of inertial institutions, and which antidotes do not create a climate for ideological commitment to carry out change on the principles accepted in liberal democracies of resolving social conflicts and accomplishing tasks through negotiation and compromise. In other words, they can be said to use utopia itself separated from the means of its concretisation, optimisation and incarnation.

An analogous deeper engagement with counter-education is not facilitated by its differentiation. On the one hand, this may be a problem for those who feel themselves to be the sole and legitimate exponents of the will and well-being of the educated masses, and on the other, for the leaders, animators and activists of educational movements and actions who have to compete with populism, and thus can relatively easily find themselves in the same positions as the elites or institutions burdened with suspicion, and in opposition to those they intended to support. However, if one adopts Laclau and Mouffe's perspective, one may argue that no education is free from a certain dose of populism. It is such only up to a point, a claim that needs to be problematised and put in its proper context, as discussed in more detail below. Moreover, Rosanvallon's findings, perhaps contrary to his intentions, seem to lead to the conclusion that populism is much easier to explicitly reject or ignore if one defines democracy at the level of its institutionalization as a political system. It is different, however, when we understand it, like Dewey, Mead or Koczanowicz, as a form of life that permeates the quotidian at its various levels. Counter-democracy and counter-education seem to have similar inclinations here.

Secondly, following Canovan, we should consider what hopes and risks are contained in the promise of the myth of the renewal of education, which can inspire and accompany both school reformers and animators of alternative and informal education, as well as many other people, especially students, parents and teachers directly interested in subjective participation in it. From the perspective of the assumptions and ideals of liberal democracy, it is the adults, adolescents and children participating in formal and non-formal education that are the proper subjects of this social practice intended to serve all ordinary citizens of a country. Memory of this seems to resurface periodically with a sense of the unfulfilled promise of educational renewal. In turn, 'schools detached from reality', like 'utopian dreams' or the state-like commercial 'soulless instrumentality' attributed to educatoriums and educational movements, is an ever-present and public-spirited accusation, a shadow cast by public, commercial and independent educational institutions under the conditions of mass society. However, with their democratisation and dissemination, the increasing complexity of the ordering of educational reality becomes noticeable, and consequently its opacity and intricacy

in the perception of the vast majority of those who participate in it and are unable to imagine it clearly enough to understand its functioning. The sense of dispossession, disillusionment, discouragement, anger and other strong emotions that come to the fore in the public sphere in response to the tensions indicated can be read as revealing potential for vulnerability to populism.

According to some of the researchers cited in this chapter, the analogous contradictions of liberal democracy create the conditions, as already mentioned, thanks to which the postulates and solutions promoting actions aimed at regaining power stolen from the people by elites, abolishing intermediary institutions that hinder the implementation of their will, or addressing the fundamental issues related to the problems of everyday life of ordinary people - gain in importance and popularity. When we adopt this perspective, we are faced with the question to what extent, in the social perception, the postulate of personalistic pedagogy of restoring in education the value of a person and respecting the real properties belonging to his nature, the orientation of education to everyday life and practical knowledge, characteristic for the pedagogy of pragmatism, the concepts of deschoolers, or the constantly updated expositions by the critical pedagogy of alienation, objectification and exploitation of the majority of people, which occur in the institutions of socialization used for the effective realization of their own particular interests by the power elites and socially privileged groups, are seen in their proper philosophical and theoretical context. Moreover, to what extent can the fundamental claims of these pedagogies gain popularity because they correspond to the idea and feeling that education has slipped out of the control of those it has been supposed to serve? It seems that many of these postulates can be translated into socially effective and relatively widely understood slogans of "school serving students", 'knowledge useful in everyday life', 'education free from indoctrination', 'school as a mainstay of the nation, not subject to eradication', 'opposition to school depersonalisation or dehumanisation', 'education as a value in itself', 'less theory and more practice', 'democratic education', 'school for the 21st century', etc., although socially resonant, are not always easy to understand, It is true that the general public can relate to them, yet without problematising the educational reality behind them. All too often in the related narratives, pupils, teachers and parents are essentially evenly

distributed undifferentiated collectives, masses really, captured in general terms, just as issues of the spatial arrangement of schools, the way they are organised and equipped, issues of their accessibility, the curriculum, overcoming successive thresholds in school careers, credentials, etc. Of course, the tendency towards generalisation is not only a feature of everyday language, politics or the mass media; it is rather an appearance of agreement when it comes to being united in action.

Undoubtedly, also the pedagogical imagination, developed for example within the sociology of education, is oriented towards inquiring into regularities and regularities in the architectonics of categorized phenomena and processes of education and the relations connecting them, nevertheless it is capable of acknowledging the areas of heteronomy and its own ignorance and the contingency of the assumptions and philosophical foundations made, of discussing and testing the results and findings, of respecting the limitations and plurality of theoretical perspectives and the conventionality of empirical research. It is difficult to move directly into action with such an extensive body of knowledge. Therefore, educational policies and educational ideologies necessary for the perpetuation of education in time as a practice that co-creates and sustains the world of everyday life, indicating goals and defining conditions and directions of action, make use of knowledge about education and the surrounding world so as to achieve complementarity of intentions and possibilities at the price of reducing the breadth, diversity and incoherence of this knowledge. There is also another cost and risk involved. From here it is close to transforming the inevitable diversity of options into a monolithic certainty or to other risks associated with the translation of knowledge from theory to practice

At this point, on the basis of the reconstructed theories and their proposed readings, it is possible to find a major condition for the emergence of populism in education. Unlike its researchers, whose decisions concern the choice of subject, perspective and way of knowing, the decisions of politicians, officials, educators and creators of pedagogy assume interference in educational reality and effective production of the future by changing the state of social practice. Hence, it can be assumed that they target such prepared knowledge that makes such decisions possible. In other words, the colonization of the future, an inalienable property of democratic or authoritarian education, and which it shares

with socialization, contains not only concepts based on solutions to issues that remain, from the point of view of educational theory and philosophy, still problematic and ambiguous, but also a utopian moment. It arises from the intentionality of human action, which for various reasons, especially when it comes to organised human collectives, does not leave the future alone. In this sense, the educational act should be seen as prospective. At the same time, it is not a question of conceiving of educational action as creating the shapes of the future by releasing and inhibiting in people their individual predispositions and negotiating with them the content of the deposit they carry with them through time as the sole causal force. Every future, such as that of our present day, can be analysed as a confluence of educationally and politically determined circumstances, utilising the subjective and objective resources and dynamics of a particular lifeworld. However, in none of these futures we have already achieved has the promise of educational renewal so far been permanently, universally and noticeably realised, at least in the eyes of those who believe in its power and still look to the arrival in themselves or others of this change.

Under modern liberal democracies, this is of vital importance. For in them the promise of educational renewal provides a thread of understanding between the various nominally egalitarian subjects of education under conditions where so much depends on it, its quality and access to it, and no area of ordinary people's daily lives can do without it. It seems understandable that the intense search for educational opportunity in late modernity may be accompanied by a conservative, progressive or other narrative of how the school community, or more broadly the collective participating in formal and informal education, has been robbed by elites and institutions of its rightful, attendant sovereignty, but will rise up and reclaim it. The point here is not that the promise, which in its various variants sees sense in reclaiming it by linking education to everyday life, practical application, usefulness, the well-being of the individual, with uncomplicated accessibility of knowledge and optimisation of learning effort and teaching effectiveness, without bureaucracy and the intermediation of institutions, etc., is unfeasible or undesirable, unworthy of mobilisation and aspiration. The point is, assuming the correctness of the theoretical underpinnings adopted here, what it can turn into by virtue of its utopian character, which overlaps with the utopian aspect of

educational practice. In other words, we might be able to get rid of the risk of populism if we were able to reduce the utopian content inherent in the act and practice of education. But even if such a reduction were possible, one would have to ask whether it is theoretically and practically justified, necessary, pedagogically valuable, socially attractive and desirable, what its price is, what it takes away from us and what it leaves us with. If not, every variant of the promise of educational renewal that meets social expectations updates and specifies what is utopian in education itself, triggering and embodying the risk of educational populism.

CHAPTER VI

TRANSGRESSION –TRANSDISCIPLINARITY – TRANSLATION.
PEDAGOGY AND KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER

Ad quã
quiſque
natu...
ſit appo
ſitus eã
diſcat
artem.

Cæterùm hæ V...
ctãt, lanã fere...
reliquæ magis
ma ex parte q...
tur: nam eò ple...
quem animus a...
ius capitur ſtud...
one traducitur...
ſed magiſtrati...
atq; honeſto pa...
ſi quis ʋnã perð...
piuerit, eodem...
nactus, ʋtrã ʋ...
uitas magis ege...
puum ac prope...

Ocioſi
pellẽdi
Rep.

proſpicere. ne...
ʋti ſuæ quiſq;...
ſommo mane t...
perpetuo labor...
nam ea plus qu...

Mode-
randus
opificũ
labor.

tamen ʋbiq; f...
Vtopienſibus,...
tuor æquales d...
dant, ſex dum...
te meridiem à...

*Limited in every respect, we find
this intermediate state between two
extremes reflected in all our faculties*

Blaise Pascal, *Pensées*

Subsequent parts of the article deal with the development of disciplinary, inter- and transdisciplinary research and its mutual relations and conditions in a new scientific and social context connected with reflexive modernization. In this chapter I would like to point to pedagogy as a discipline that can be a model of an institution of translation, a discipline located on the borderline of humanities and social sciences, integrating and studying the conditions for the transfer of disciplinary, inter- and transdisciplinary knowledge, and which can develop the knowledge necessary to educate in the field of inter- and transdisciplinary translation.

TRANSGRESSION. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY BETWEEN RISK REDUCTION AND ITS INTENSIFICATION

The phenomenon of dynamic development and wide dissemination of scientific and technical knowledge focuses the attention of sociology. In particular it determines the state of its self-awareness, of course solely its own. By providing successive readings, especially intriguing ones, it inspires researchers and philosophers of science to verify them, as well as to conduct further research, thus influencing the course and formation of processes of developing specialist knowledge. Such intriguing

impulses, which attract researchers' attention, include the issue raised by Wolf Lepenies in his essay "Angst und Wissenschaft" (*Fear and Science*). Lepenies looks at this modern phenomenon not only from the point of view of the successes of the industrial revolution and the processes characteristic of modernity, which have contributed to the growth of the importance of both fields and to their ordering and institutionalization, or philosophical efforts to examine their legitimacy, as well as the internal logic determining the appropriate ways of producing knowledge, division of labour and determining the tasks they should undertake in relation to this. The German researcher focuses his attention on science and technology in which western societies vest hopes to reduce or exclude fear of the forces of nature: "The view of science as a radical means of reducing fear, if not eradicating it altogether, develops in early modern Europe and is officially confirmed and promoted by seventeenth-century academies [...]"[1].

The cognitive enthusiasm forming the scientific mentality of modern researchers, which according to Lepenies culminated in the 19th century, seems to be not without significance for the promotion of scientific attitudes outside the narrow circle of scientists and constructors, as well as for the assignment of social functions to science and technology. In other words, the development of science and its social support should be perceived in their interplay:

> Such a scientific mentality is undeniably gaining in importance and is becoming a cultural given in western industrial societies, since science and technology are regarded here as the engines of the enlightenment and thus as the critical mechanisms which have liberated man from the forces of nature, which for centuries have been regarded as incomprehensible and which instill fear[2].

The progress of science and technology seen in this perspective, which gives hope and has a real impact on the remodelling of the organization of

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[1] W. Lepenies, "Lęk a nauka", [in:] W. Lepenies, *Niebezpieczne powinowactwa z wyboru*, Warszawa 1996, p. 36. See L. Koczanowicz, *Anxiety and Lucidity. Reflections of Culture in Times of Unrest*, London, New York 2020, pp. 143–178.

[2] Ibidem, p. 35.

western societies, numerous conveniences and an increase in labour productivity, builds up widespread belief in their effectiveness as a universal panacea. The development is mainly supposed to foster the growth of social sense of security. Therefore, it can be assumed that research-oriented institutions designated in the social division of labour that enjoy trust and are strengthened by it have taken on the role of a kind of defensive mechanism of society, a buffer protecting its members against "direct" confrontation with fear, enabling, the delegation of fear of the forces of nature outside the framework of a typical social practice in the world of everyday life. And if, as Lepenies observes: "Our time, more than the earlier periods, might be an era when large disputes about worldviews and politics evolve around the subject of fear"[3] Then it is so because "The revealed inability of science and the politics it directs to deal with even a distant catastrophe has its root cause in the inability of science to react appropriately to phenomena that cause anxiety"[4]. Currently, science and technology do not fulfil the function entrusted to them as institutions, which constitutes the social justification indicated here. Their development not only fails to reduce social anxiety, but also introduces numerous threats and problems, and thus intensifies it.

> Self-deception is not a problem as long as science and technology continue to make spectacular progress in understanding external nature and in combating exogenous fears. However, this progress has been halted: genetic technology and the splitting of the atom have consequences that no longer eliminate fears, but awaken fears of irreversible pollution of the environment and destruction of our world of life[5].

According to Urlich Beck, who studies the consequences of modernism like Lepenies, this new definition of the situation leads to a radical change in the way modern societies are organised: "we are eye-witnesses – as subjects and objects – of a break within modernity, which is freeing itself from the contours of the classical industrial society and forging

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[3] Ibidem, p. 47. See L. Koczanowicz, *Anxiety and Lucidity*, op. cit, pp. 3–15.
[4] W. Lepenies, "Lęk a nauka", op. cit., p. 49.
[5] Ibidem, p. 51.

a new form – the (industrial) 'risk society'"[6]. Beck places the re-evaluation of the relationship between science, technology and society in a broader perspective: the logic of the crisis of modernity and the emergence of its variant which is reflexive modernity; the crisis of this modernity, for which one of the main determinants was considered the planned and organized transformation of the conditions regarding functioning of western societies. Therefore, despite its revolutionary effects, such as the establishment of a new quality in the form defined by Beck as a 'risk society', the change itself should be seen as relatively fluid:

> When modernization reaches a certain stage it radicalizes itself. It begins to transform, for a second time, not only the key institutions but also the very principles of society. But this time the principles and institutions being transformed are those of modern society[7].

In other words, the threats posed by the modernisation process, hitherto of a local nature, as a result of the research progress and technological development, their intensity and systematic increase, have both increased and intensified, which has fundamentally changed their nature and, in Beck's opinion, resulted in the establishment of a separate 'sphere', not controlled by modern institutions, which generates risks that are difficult to define and assess on a global scale[8], the sphere requiring radical changes in the way in which fundamental sources and methods of threat functioning are perceived and counteracted, and thus continue the process of modernisation on new principles:

> Modernity has not vanished, but it is becoming increasingly problematic. While crises, transformation and radical social change have always been part

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[6] U. Beck, *The Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity*, London, New Bury Park, New Delhi 1992, p. 9.

[7] U. Beck, W. Bonss, Ch. Lau, "The Theory of Reflexive Modernization. Problematic, Hypotheses and Research Programme", *Theory, Culture & Society* 2003, Vol. 20, No. 2, p. 1. See also: U. Beck, "The Reinvention of Politics", [in:] U. Beck, A. Giddens, L. Scott, *Reflexive Modernization. Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order*, Stanford 1994, pp. 5–13.

[8] See U. Beck, "On The Logic Of Wealth Distribution And Risk Distribution", [in:] U. Beck, *The Risk Society*, op. cit, pp. 19–50.

of modernity, the transition to a reflexive second modernity not only changes social structures but revolutionizes the very coordinates, categories and conceptions of change itself. This '*meta-change*' of modern society results from a critical mass of unintended side-effects[9].

Modernization of modernism, therefore, presupposes a social division of labour in which the role of science and technology is no longer clear. On the one hand, science and technology are still modern tools for reducing fear of the forces of nature, but on the other hand, fear of the forces released in the process of modernization requires the development of new means and methods of social prevention of threats which "they also cannot be determined by science"[10]. Thus, the production of knowledge socially necessary to deal with new forms of threat exceeds the institutional order established as a result of modernisation and, as a social practice, ceases to be the domain of qualified researchers. As Beck writes, "In risk issues, no one is expert, or everyone is an expert, because the experts presume what they are supposed to make possible and produce: cultural acceptance"[11].

> In the risk society, the recognition of the unpredictability of the threats provoked by techno-industrial development necessitates self-reflection on the foundations of social cohesion and the examination of prevailing conversations and foundations of 'rationality'. In the self-concept of risk society, society becomes reflexive (in the narrower sense of the word), which is to say it becomes a theme and a problem for itself[12].

Reflexive modernisation therefore means the dissemination of research practices and the production of knowledge beyond the institutional framework sanctioned by certain procedures specific to academic, scientific and technical centres.

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[9] U. Beck, W. Bonss, Ch. Lau, "The Theory of Reflexive Modernization", op. cit., p. 2 – original underline. "This new stage, in which progress can turn into self-destruction, in which one kind of modernization undercuts and changes another, is what I call the stage of reflexive modernization" (U. Beck, "The Reinvention of Politics", op. cit., p. 2).

[10] U. Beck, "The Reinvention of Politics", op. cit., p. 6.

[11] Ibidem, p. 9.

[12] Ibidem, p. 8.

TRANSDISCIPLINARITY. TOWARDS NEW WAYS OF PRODUCING KNOWLEDGE

It is disputable to what extent the model of science identified with the ideals of modernity was implemented in the times of the hegemony of modernism, to what extent Western academies, research centres and institutions monitoring research and scientific careers absorbed it, thus incarnating a way of thinking about the production of knowledge taking into consideration such questions as: in which areas, at what modifications, social and moral costs, with what means, with what conviction or commitment, and with what resistance[13]. Nevertheless, from the point of view of the history of research institutions, it is possible to trace the processes of disciplinarization and institutionalization, emergence and location of new fields and specializations within the academic division of scientific work, in which it should be considered typical. As Krzysztof Michalski writes:

> Specific disciplines are governed by internal logic and have different patterns of rationality. They break down, or fragment the world into parts and layers, prepare their objects, adapt different methods to these preparations, define in their own way specific and non-specific terms that are to describe and explain them. The positive effect of this development is a rapid increase in knowledge and in the efficiency of science, while the negative effect is the problems of structuring, systematizing and integrating this knowledge and the resulting communication problems in the relations between science and science and science and society[14].

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[13] See e.g.: W. Lepenies, *Between Literature and Science. The Rise of Sociology*, Cambridge 1988; H. Schnädelbach, "Science", [in:] H. Schnädelbach, *Philosophy in Germany 1831––1933*, Cambridge 1984, pp. 66–107; J. Habermas, "Modernity. An Unfinished Project", [in:] *Habermas and the Unfinished Project of Modernity. Critical Essays on The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, ed. M. Passerin d'Entrèves, S. Benhabib, Cambridge 1997, pp. 38–55; J.-F. Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition. A Report on Knowledge*, Minneapolis 1984.

[14] K. Michalski, "Interdyscyplinarność, transdyscyplinarność, multidyscyplinarność. Nowy paradygmat w nauce i badaniach", *Ekonomia i Nauki Humanistyczne. Zeszyty Naukowe Politechniki Rzeszowskiej* 2007, No. 16, p. 85.

What cannot be underestimated is the fact that we are dealing with overlapping of two levels of functioning of the academia, i.e. the scientific and administrative ones, whose progressive rationalisations, in connection with different practices, tasks, objectives and procedures for the production of specialist knowledge and bureaucracy, are not easy to reconcile. Bureaucratisation, according to the concept proposed by Max Weber[15], introduces work division in which posts and tasks are interconnected whereas the criteria of verification of the conducted activities are included in rules and regulations. However, the practices and objectives of research conducted within particular disciplines are not clear and definite[16]. They depend on complex and changing research contexts, on the one hand, the growth of knowledge, which requires constant re-interpretation of assumptions and meanings of its components, and on the other hand, the current state of transformations of the world, the dynamics of which influences, among other things, the re-evaluation of tasks pursued by science, distinguishing among them the tasks oriented towards solving current social problems. The question arises, therefore, about the principle and significance of the cooperation of both planes. According to Jürgen Mittelstrass,

> certain problems cannot be captured by a single discipline. This is true, in particular, of those problems, as for instance rendered clear in the fields of environment, energy and health, which arise from issues not exclusively scientific. There is, and this not just in these fields, an asymmetry in the developments of problems and scientific disciplines, and this is aggravated as the developments of disciplines and science in general are characterised by an increasing specialisation[17].

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[15] See M. Weber, *Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretative Sociology*, ed. G. Roth, C. Wittich, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London 1978, pp. 217–226, 956–1005.

[16] See Z. Melosik, *Pasja i tożsamość naukowca. O władzy i wolności umysłu*, Poznań 2019; O. Szwabowski, *Uniwersytet – fabryka – maszyna. Uniwersytet w perspektywie radykalnej*, Warszawa 2014.

[17] J. Mittelstrass, "On Transdisciplinarity", *Trames* 2011, No. 15, p. 331. See J. Mittelstrass, "Transdisciplinarity – New Structures in Science", [in:] *Innovative Structures in Basic Research* (Ringberg-Symposium 4–7.10.2000), Max-Planck-Gesellschaft, Münich 2002, pp. 43–54.

It seems that at the level of functioning of an individual employed in a research institute, the asymmetry between the management of problems and disciplines overlaps with the tension with which the researcher is confronted, between the professional interest and the cognitive interest. Due to the clearly designated pulse to which the researcher is subject, and a strict division into bars containing components of a measurable value, the rhythm of professional duties (annual plans, research, publications, promotions, reports, verification, criteria for evaluation of individual actions) may take the initiative, direct and give concrete dynamics to the practice of the researcher, who occupies the position, regulated by a score of rules, and located in the order of the amphitheatre of an institution.

Administrative links, due to their formal nature, are easier to maintain and sustain than communication and cooperation between disciplines and researchers, which, without individual initiative, effort and commitment to integration on the part of individuals, can ultimately cease, thereby fostering the separation of disciplines and the isolation of researchers. Therefore, interdisciplinarity, as Mittelstrass points out, which is the proper result of cooperation between disciplines and researchers defining their competences on the basis of an academic division of labour, is not a common practice accepted within traditional research institutions, but as such it constitutes a philosophically and theoretically justified project for revitalising the idea of scientific disciplines, justified by the need to counteract the knowledge disintegration; interdisciplinarity, German philosopher points out,

> is neither something normal, nor something really new, nor the true essence of the scientific order. Where it works, it rectifies misguided developments of science, but also renders apparent that (scientific) thinking in larger disciplinary units has manifestly declined. A whole should again arise out of particularities, both in a systematic as well as in an institutional sense[18].

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[18] J. Mittelstrass, "On Transdisciplinarity", op. cit., p. 330. See also: S. Fuller, *Interdisciplinarity. The Loss of the Heroic Vision in the Marketplace of Ideas*, Virtual seminar *Rethinking interdisciplinarity*, 2003, https://www.academia.edu/1161664/Rethinking_Interdisciplinarity (available: 15.10.2021); D. Sperber, "Why Rethink Interdisciplinarity?", Virtual seminar *Rethinking interdisciplinarity*, 2003, https://www.dan.sperber.fr/?p=101 (available: 15.10.2021).

While administration is related to institutional space and develops within a specific territory, the specialist knowledge generated cannot be unequivocally attributed to just one space. After all, even though it derives from research related to a specific place or body, it aims at theoretical generalizations. Its abstract character eludes administration. As Helga Nowotny notes, bearing in mind especially the character of the present development of science and research,

> Knowledge seeps through institutions and structures like water through the pores of a membrane. Knowledge seeps in both directions, from science to society as well as from society to science. It seeps through institutions and from academia to and from the outside world[19].

The union of bureaucracy and science is not mandatory. Both Nowotny and Mittelstrass point out that the way in which dynamically developing research is practiced outside academic centres[20], also their dissemination does not lie within the boundaries of the structure of scientific disciplines, nor does it stick to methodological standards developed and adopted in traditionally practiced science. Therefore, as Nowotny claims,

> We need another language to describe what is happening in research. We identified some attributes of the new mode of knowledge production, which we think are empirically evident, and argued that, all together, they are integral or coherent enough to constitute something of a new form of production of knowledge[21].

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[19] H. Nowotny, "The Potential of Transdisciplinarity", Virtual seminar *Rethinking interdisciplinarity*, 2003, https://www.academia.edu/1161664/Rethinking_Interdisciplinarity (available: 15.10.2021).

[20] Mittelstrass gives examples of such research centres and organizations, see J. Mittelstrass, "Transdisciplinarity – New Structures in Science", op. cit. See also: S. Krimsky, *Science in the Private Interest. Has there Lure of Profits Corrupted Biomedical Research?*, New York 2003.

[21] H. Nowotny, "The Potential of Transdisciplinarity", op. cit, p. 1. Such new language seems to be proposed by John Urry in his work *Sociology beyond Societies* (see J. Urry, "Metaphors", [in:] J. Urry, *Sociology beyond Societies. Mobilities for the Twenty-first Century*, London – New York 2000, pp. 21–48).

From the positions adopted by both researchers, it can be deduced that the transdisciplinarity characteristic of the new type of knowledge development, which breaks the monopoly of the academia, is the result of the absence of organisational forms typical for traditional scientific institutions in the numerous spaces where such research develops. Therefore, it can be assumed that both types of knowledge development, i.e. disciplinary and transdisciplinary, will develop in parallel, but not independently of each other.

> transdisciplinarity, Nowotny writes, does not respect institutional boundaries. There is a kind of convergence or co- evolution between what is happening in the sphere of knowledge production and how societal institutions are developing. [...] What we see today is a resurgence, for instance, of NGOs and other ways in which various kinds of stakeholders organize in shaping social reality. This is why the transgressiveness of knowledge is better captured by the term transdisciplinarity[22].

Writing about the modern form of rational mass administration as the domination of knowledge, Weber pointed out that the development of bureaucracy, resulting from the need for 'stable, flexible, intensive and calculable administration', is inevitable, although to a large extent dependent on technical means of communication for its precision[23]. However,

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[22] Helga Nowotny, *The Potential of Transdisciplinarity*, op cit., p. 2. It should be emphasized that such terms as inter-, trans- or multidisciplinarity are not consistently used in the literature pertaining to the subject matter, which is partly connected with defining them, see K. Michalski, "Interdyscyplinarność, transdyscyplinarność, multidyscyplinarność", op. cit., pp. 87–90.

[23] See M. Weber, *Economy and Society*, op. cit., p. 224. George Ritzer in the book *The McDonaldization of Society* (Los Angeles-Melbourne 2019) adopts Weber's thesis on the development of a rational bureaucracy as a starting point and then points to his new model of macdonaldization, which, in his opinion, constitutes a contemporary radicalisation of the rationality of administration (see pp. 19–66). See also the observations on macdonaldization of tertiary education and the whole education system: pp. 74–75, 91–92, 126–127,132–134, 150, 175–179. See also: Z. Melosik, *Uniwersytet i społeczeństwo. Dyskursy wolności, wiedzy i władzy*, Kraków 2009, pp. 61–71, 105–145; A. Gromkowska-Melosik, *Edukacja i (nie)równość społeczna kobiet: studium dynamiki dostępu*, Kraków 2011, pp. 137–172; A. Gromkowska-Melosik, *Elitarne szkolnictwo średnie. Między reprodukcją społeczno□kulturową a ruchliwością konkurencyjną*, Poznań 2015, pp. 15–272.

he also pointed to two exceptions that are important in the context of
the topic we are dealing with:

> Only by reversion in every field – political, religious, economic, etc. – to
> small scale organization would it be possible to any considerable extent to
> escape its [bureaucracy –R.W.] influence. […] Superior to bureaucracy in the
> knowledge of techniques and facts is only the capitalist entrepreneur, within
> his own sphere of interest. He is the only type who has been able to maintain
> at least relative immunity from subjection to the control of rational bureau-
> cratic knowledge. In large scale organizations, all others are inevitably sub-
> ject to bureaucratic control, just as they have fallen under the dominance of
> precision machinery in the mass production of goods[24].

Weber's analyses of the nature of bureaucracy shed some light both
on the nature of the development of disciplinarity within traditional
scientific institutions as mass associations and on the transdisciplina-
rity for which associations, private initiatives and businesses, and thus
civil society actors, are the cornerstone[25]. However, if we also consi-
der that the interdisciplinary projects, studies and publications, both
collective and individual, arising within scientific institutions, have all
the characteristics of voluntary associations, activities and initiatives
specific to civil society[26], where personal involvement, going beyond

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[24] M. Weber, *Economy and Society*, op. cit., pp. 224–225. The development of bureaucracy
is connected with. Last chapters (part four, chapters 2–7) of the second volume of 1840
Democracy in America Alexis de Tocqueville devotes to insightful observations on the
concentration of power in the institutions of democratic societies (see A. de Tocque-
ville, *Democracy in America*, Hazleton 2002).

[25] See E. A. Shils, "Was ist eine *Civil Society*?", [in:] *Europa und die civil Society, Castelgan-
dolfo-Gespräche 1989*, ed. K. Michalski, Stuttgart 1991, p. 13–51; M. Walzer, "The Concept
of Civil Society", [in:] *Toward a Global Civil Society*, ed. M. Walzer, Providence, Oxford
1995, pp. 7–27.

[26] In this context, it is worth quoting the remarks made by Michalski: "Such a structur-
ing [disciplinary – R.W.] is only a result of scientific fashion, which in addition is very
difficult to revise methodologically. This is evidenced, among others, by the fact that
the ongoing change in the European model of science towards the synthesis and inte-
gration of research defined as inter- or transdisciplinarity is not a reaction of science
to internal scientific criticism, but a result of external social processes." (K. Michals-
ki, "Interdyscyplinarność, transdyscyplinarność, multidyscyplinarność", op. cit., p. 86)
"Contrary to popular definitions, the place of alternative, inter- and transdisciplinary

the rules and principles adopted is essential, we should perhaps recognise that both inter- and transdisciplinarity, although stemming from different experiences and contexts, are an important component of modern reflexion, resulting according to Beck's thesis, from the achievement by modernity of a critical mass of unintended side-effects. This would mean that not only can transdisciplinary research reinforce the interdisciplinary tendencies of traditional scientific institutions, but that interdisciplinary research, conceived as an antidote to the disintegration of knowledge, should extend its scope to include knowledge produced outside the disciplinary order in the integration agenda and lay the foundations for a two-way transfer of knowledge and research practices. Weber's analyses point to the fundamental limitations that can be placed on transdisciplinary research, which seems to be evidenced by the characteristics of transdisciplinarity given by Mittelstrass:

> transdisciplinarity is first of all an integrating, although not a holistic, concept. It resolves isolation on a higher methodological plane, but it does not attempt to construct 'unified' interpretative or explanatory matrix. Second, transdisciplinarity removes impasses within the historical constitution of fields and disciplines, when and where the latter have either forgotten their historical memory, or lost their problem-solving power because of excessive speculation. For just these reasons, transdisciplinarity cannot replace the fields and disciplines. Third, transdisciplinarity is a principle of scientific work and organization that reaches out beyond individual fields and disciplines for solutions, but it is no trans-scientific principle. [...] Last of all, transdisciplinarity is above all a *research principle*, when considered properly against the background I have outlined concerning the forms of research and representation in the sciences, and only secondarily, if at all, a *theoretical principle*, in the case that theories also follow transdisciplinary research forms[27].

research is not 'between' or 'over' disciplines, but 'beyond' the traditional disciplinary paradigm" (ibidem, p. 94).

[27] J. Mittelstrass, "On Transdisciplinarity", *Scripta Varia* 2001, No. 99, p. 498 – original underline.

According to Mittelstrass, transdisciplinarity being "a *scientific research principle* that is active wherever a definition of problems and their solutions is not possible within a given field or discipline", is not simultaneously "a *theoretical principle* that might change our textbooks"[28]. Practice-oriented transdisciplinary research, representing and prioritising public interest over scientific interest, does not place its projects in a broader theoretical plan and in the perspective of the ideal of unity of knowledge and thus does not go beyond the level of generalizations necessary for direct application and use of knowledge. Although they undermine the order of the structure of scientific knowledge by pursuing cognitive interests where necessary, they are neither an alternative nor an adequate level of general knowledge necessary to carry out the theoretical and practical integration that is autonomous of the existing scientific knowledge system and not mediated therein. Orientation towards such objectives would require the development of an organisational apparatus for research, which entails the difficulties signalled by Weber, and thus a loss of dynamism and independence characteristic of the activities carried out in small teams, which are not motivated by the development of bureaucratic rationality. However, the development of transdisciplinary research can have a significant impact on the scientific knowledge system, reinforcing the interdisciplinary trends potentially and practically present in its structure. As Mittelstrass notes:

> If research takes on increasingly transdisciplinary forms, then temporary research cooperatives are the appropriate organizational form, and not isolated component systems. [...] Transdisciplinarity would in this sense be the gadfly of the scientific order[29].

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[28] J. Mittelstrass, "Transdisciplinarity – New Structures in Science", op. cit. – original underline. Mittelstrass emphasizes that "This characterisation of transdisciplinarity points neither to a new (scientific and/or philosophical) holism, nor to a transcendence of the scientific system", as well as that "pure forms of transdisciplinarity are as rare as pure forms of disciplinarity" (J. Mittelstrass, "On Transdisciplinarity", *Scripta Varia*, op. cit., pp. 497, 498).

[29] J. Mittelstrass, "Transdisciplinarity – New Structures in Science", op. cit. See also: L. Witkowski, "Problem 'radykalnej zmiany' w nauce", [in:] L. Witkowski, *Tożsamość i zmiana. Epistemologia i rozwojowe profile w edukacji*, Wrocław 2010, pp. 41–88.

TRANSLATION. INTERDISCIPLINARITY AND MULTILINGUALISM IN PEDAGOGY AND THE TRANSFER OF KNOWLEDGE

The phenomenon of knowledge disciplinarisation as a result of complex and uneven processes of specialisation, institutionalisation and division of labour is also worth looking at from a historical perspective. The book by Wolf Lepenies *Three Cultures* can serve as an example of such an approach. As Lepenies announces in the first three units of "Introduction", he discusses in the book "connection between two groups of intellectuals: on one hand the men of letters, i.e. the writers and critics, on the other the social scientists, above all the sociologists".

> For the middle of the nineteenth century, Lepenies observes, onwards literature and sociology contested with one another the claim to offer the key orientation for modern civilization and to constitute the guide to living appropriate to industrial society. [...] This competing discloses a dilemma which determined not only how sociology originated but also how it then went on to develop: it has oscillated between scientific orientation which has led it to ape the natural sciences and a hermeneutic attitude which has shifted the discipline towards the realm literature. The connection between a literary intelligentsia and a intelligentsia devoted to the social sciences was thus an aspect of a complex process in the course of which scientific modes of procedure became differentiated from literary modes [...][30].

According to Lepenies, still at the end of the 18th century, the way in which knowledge on social research is practiced was not diversified. In the mid-19th century Karl Marx or later Hippolyte Taine point to Balzac's *Human Comedy*, which was originally intended to be called *Social Studies*, seeing it as an unprecedented document of human nature, and Henry James speaks of the French writer's opus magnum as a counterpart of what August Comte's sociology aspires to[31]. Gustave Flaubert and Emil Zola saw their achievements in a similar way. However, not only in

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[30] W. Lepenies, "Introduction", [in:] W. Lepenies, *Between Literature and Science*, op. cit., p. 1. In the book, the author follows the fate of sociology and its being 'in-between' three areas, discussing in turn the situation in France, England and Germany.

[31] See ibidem, pp. 4–5.

France, academic sociology, for which natural science is a model, tries to prove its scientific excellence by, among other things, dissociating itself from literature.

> Thus there was soon set in train an inner-disciplinary process of purification: disciplines such as sociology, which at first locked recognition within the system of knowledge and had to acquire it, sought to do so by distancing themselves from the early literary forms of their own discipline, whose purpose was rather to describe and classify than to analyse and reduce to a system. [...] The problem of sociology is that, although it may imitate the natural sciences, it can never become a true natural science of society: but if it abandons its scientific orientation it draws perilously close to literature[32].

Sociology is, of course, just an example. This fragment of Lepenies' analysis allows us to make some additional comments on the relationship between disciplinary, inter- and transdisciplinary research. We can assume that the consolidation of the academic system of sciences has been accompanied by transdisciplinary research since its inception, but as sociology shows, the growing distance between academia and non-academic forms of knowledge production and the institutionalization-related identity policies within individual disciplines have led to a gap between the two forms of research. The problem of relations, interdependencies and the flow of knowledge between disciplinary and inter- and transdisciplinary research is not so much something new as it is now returning on the wave of reflexive modernisation, the necessity to counteract the isolation of disciplines in the structure of the scientific system and the socially perceptible risk generated by the development of scientific research and modern technology.

The subject matter taken up by Lepenies, and especially the example of tensions between science and literature, allows us to see and distinguish the specific problem of translation, which is specific to the flow of knowledge. Two ways of producing knowledge not only create separate structures, but also languages characteristic of each other, between which the transfer of knowledge and practices requires translation-related competence. According to the assumptions of one of the hermeneutical

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[32] Ibidem, p. 7.

theories, we can assume that all understanding equals translation, and the increase in hermeneutical competence is related to translation practice[33].

Both the differences between numerous idiomatic languages in which we operate and which we use on a daily basis, as well as the differences between the order of thinking and the order of action require us to master and constantly develop our translation skills. The more often we use a language and its individual components, the easier, more efficient and, consequently, automatically and invisibly for ourselves, the process of translation takes place. Practicing the research within a given discipline develops our translational proficiency in this discipline, and thus deepens our understanding of related issues. At the same time, however, this specialist orientation does not increase or even decrease our chances of communicating with experts practicing in another field and of transferring knowledge on both sides. Translation problems can also arise between practitioners in the same field, but in different environments that are not isolated from local influences and shape the language of the researcher or their group. In other words, knowledge of the dialect developed in a given centre of cultural anthropology does not translate into proficiency in understanding political science texts, just as a good knowledge of French is not enough to understand medieval Latin texts, even though learning a foreign language of one's own may help to master another, especially a similar one, and also broaden the understanding of the language we speak every day. We are multilingual and need to understand, so we need to be able to translate.

In this context, the situation and the status of disciplines such as pedagogy, cultural studies and environmental protection should be highlighted. In pedagogy the auxiliary sciences such as psychology, sociology, anthropology, etc. should be taken into account. As they play the role of an essential component of the perspective adopted in the research on education, the conduct of which requires prior integration of knowledge from these disciplines and only with its participation the relevant pedagogical

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[33] See H.-G. Gadamer, "Lesen ist wie Übersetzen", [in:] *Gessamelte Werke*, Vol. 8, Tübinge 1993, pp. 279–285; G. Steiner, *After Babel. Aspects of Language and Translation*, Oxford 1992. See also M. Przanowska, *Listening and Acouological Education*, Warszawa 2019, pp. 201–231; R. Włodarczyk "Hermeneutics Of Translation – The Fundamental Aspect Of Dialogue. Around The Concept Of George Steiner", [in:] *Hermeneutics, Social Criticism and Everyday Practice*, ed. R. Włodarczyk, Wrocław 2020, pp. 27–46.

research problems can be identified[34]. In other words, the pedagogy has a lot in common with many disciplines, however, it does not overlap with any of them, nor does it function outside them. The same can be said of social psychology, cultural studies or environmental protection, taking into account their respective auxiliary sciences. The status of pedagogy can be described as interdisciplinary due to the fact that its self-determination requires the integration of knowledge from the scope of other scientific disciplines. Moreover, pedagogy, more closely than other disciplines, which are mainly cognitively oriented, is connected with social practice, and specifically with educational practice. The pedagogical studies that are to prepare for educational research and practice presuppose the development of competence in translation from the languages of auxiliary disciplines into the languages specific to pedagogy and its sub-disciplines and in mutual directions between educational theories and educational practice. Educational science studying pedagogies which are transdisciplinary, such as socially created knowledge and educational strategies[35], develops its integrative potential embracing with it the phenomena which are characteristic for non-academic social practice, i.e. development of knowledge in the area of functioning of civil society. Due to our potential and specific conditions, we can see in pedagogy the model of an institution of translation[36], a discipline located on the borderline of humanities and social sciences, integrating and studying the conditions for the transfer of disciplinary, inter- and transdisciplinary knowledge, and capable of producing the knowledge necessary to educate in the field of inter- and transdisciplinary translation.

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[34] See K. Rubacha, "Związek pedagogiki z innymi naukami", [in:] *Pedagogika. Podręcznik akademicki*, Vol. 1, ed. Z. Kwieciński, B. Śliwerski, Warszawa 2003, pp. 29–33; T. Hejnicka-Bezwińska, *Pedagogika ogólna*, Warszawa 2008, pp. 215–221, 241–246. It does not mean that we can talk about something as self-sufficiency of other disciplines, see L. Witkowski, *Problem 'radykalnej zmiany' w nauce*, op. cit., pp. 41–88; L. Witkowski, "Uwagi o interdyscyplinarności w pedagogice (z perspektywy epistemologii krytycznej)", [in:] L. Witkowski, *Ku integralności edukacji i humanistyki II*, Toruń 2009, pp. 392–403.

[35] Z. Kwieciński, "Pedagogika przejścia i pogranicza", [in:] Z. Kwieciński, *Tropy – ślady – próby. Studia i szkice z pedagogii pogranicza*, Poznań – Olsztyn 2000, pp. 11–33.

[36] In the context of the concept of pedagogy of asylum (see R. Włodarczyk, *Lévinas. W stronę pedagogiki azylu*, Warszawa 2009) we can talk about a particular area of research into education which have asylum-like qualities of an institution, organisation or translation practices.

CHAPTER VII

ON DISAPPOINTMENT WITH UTOPIA AND CRITICAL THINKING, IN THE LIGHT OF BRONISŁAW BACZKO'S RESEARCH ON SOCIAL IMAGINATION

*...always in this history, the product
has made us forget the one who
produced it, or it has forced its
producer to limit him/herself as
much as possible to a simple, albeit
expendable with the increasing
demands of consumption, reproduction
of his/her labor force – a reproduction
in the broadest sense of the term,
including circenses, entertainment
and ever-new intoxicants to drown
out the two most essential features
of longing – discontent and hope*

Ernst Bloch, *Rzeczywistość
antycypowana*

*Hope supplies the missing link
between practical and theoretical
interest because it is intrinsically
critical of the reality in chich it
is rooted. Again, it extends the
meaning of realism to encompass
the fullrange of possibile options*

Zygmunt Bauman, *Socialism.
The Active Utopia*

Two well-recognized tropes of the relationship between utopian and critical thought in the Western culture concern the desire to reshape the existing, yet unacceptable, social relations, in accordance with the principled expectations; and the constant suspicion of imaginative projections proclaimed as equivalent to the essence of collective and individual fulfillment. An example of the former can be found in the comprehensive analysis and harsh assessment of society during the Industrial

Revolution, developed in the nineteenth century by Charles Fourier and proposed by him the conception of phalansteries, in which the productive life would not know its degenerations. An example of the latter – supported by scientifically developed knowledge of the civilization progress, is the condemnation of such projects by Karl Marx and Frederic Engels, as manifestations of barely utopian socialism[1]. According to the uncompromising opinion of Engels:

> To the crude conditions of capitalistic production and the crude class conditions correspond crude theories. The solution of the social problems, which as yet lay hidden in undeveloped economic conditions, the Utopians attempted to evolve out of the human brain. Society presented nothing but wrongs; to remove these was the task of reason. It was necessary, then, to discover a new and more perfect system of social order and to impose this upon society from without by propaganda, and, wherever it was possible, by the example of model experiments. These new social systems were foredoomed as Utopian; the more completely they were worked out in detail, the more they could not avoid drifting off into pure phantasies[2].

On the other hand, in Western educational theory and practice of the last century, traces of the relationship between utopian and critical thought can be found in Paulo Freire's efforts to undermine the privileged status of the "banking" concept of education, which paved the way for a pedagogy of hope, and in Pierre Bourdieu's challenge to the illusion of equalizing social opportunities through the educational system[3]. Both tendencies, in the realizations of which one can identify the pattern of the relation-

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[1] See Ch. Fourier, *Selections from the Works of Fourier*, London 1901, pp. 82–108, 122–130, 137–154; K. Marx, F. Engels, "Manifesto of the Communist Party", [in:] K. Marx, F. Engels, *Selected Works in One Volume*, London 1977, pp. 53–62. See also R. Levitas, *The Concept of Utopia*, Oxford 2011, pp. 41–67.

[2] F. Engels, "Socialism: Utopian and Scientific", [in:] K. Marx, F. Engels, *Selected Works in One Volume*, op. cit., p. 398.

[3] See P. Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, London 1996, pp. 52–67; P. Bourdieu, J. C. Passeron, *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture*, London 1990, pp. 71–219. See also: D. Webb, "Where's the Vision? The Concept of Utopia in Contemporary Educational Theory", *Oxford Review of Education* 2009, Vol. 35, No. 6, pp. 743–760; D. Webb, "Process, Orientation, and System: the Pedagogical Operation of Utopia in the Work of Paulo Freire", *Educational Theory* 2012, Vol. 62, nr 5, pp. 593–608.

ship between the two varieties of thought, seem to intersect in the field of the contemporary crisis of utopian consciousness, contributing to its intensification. For the social imagination, also for education, this is not a marginal issue, if we accept, following Bronisław Baczko, that utopias are symptoms of a certain social situation and mental climate, but also influence them in turn[4]. The legitimacy of such understanding of what may cause the growing crisis of utopian consciousness in the Western world and, consequently, perceiving its meaning in the perspective of the philosophy of education seems to require addressing issues related to the connection between utopia and criticism.

UTOPIA AND CRITICISM, HOPE AND DOUBT

Utopia can be understood as a depiction, often detailed, of the desired triumph of the will and reason. The reason, because each time it depicts an action based on transparent mechanisms in a better way than other actions of an organized society[5]. The will, because effective and at the same time lasting intervention in the course of human affairs is in this depiction connected with the improvement of the whole range of human life capabilities[6]. The work of Thomas More, originally published in Latin in 1516, which is paradigmatic for the consolidation of the literary genre, can serve as an illustration of such an approach to this phenomenon. According to Raphael Hythloday, the character of *Libellus aureus nec minus salutaris quam festivus de optimo Reipublicae statu de que nova insula Utopia*, abolishing private property together with the need of possession paves the way for a just organization, prosperity and well-being of the society, which is exemplified by the order in the Utopia state known

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[4] See B. Baczko, *Utopian Lights. The Evolution of the Idea of Social Progress*, New York 1989, p. 6.

[5] See B. Baczko, *Wyobrażenia społeczne. Szkice o nadziei i pamięci zbiorowej*, Warszawa 1994, p. 106; B. Baczko, *Utopian Lights*, op. cit., pp. 15–16.

[6] See B. Baczko, *Job, mon ami. Promesses du bonheur et fatalité du mal*, Paris 1997, pp. 171––172; B. Baczko, "Ukształcić nowego człowieka… Utopia i pedagogika w okresie Rewolucji Francuskiej", [in:] *Problemy wiedzy o kulturze. Prace dedykowane Stefanowi Żółkiewskiemu*, ed. A. Brodzka, M. Hopfinger, J. Lalewicz, Wrocław 1986, pp. 263–273.

to him[7]. At the request of More, the porte-parole of the author of the text which is the account of their meeting, he describes the customs and daily life of this unique society, which he became very familiar with during his five-year stay on the island they inhabited. He discusses almost every aspect of the society and its institutions, and explains the solutions adopted. He is convinced that he describes the best-organized state and the only one that deserves to be called a republic, allowing for the full realization of the needs of its members[8]. More does not sympathize with his interlocutor's enthusiasm. Although he does not tell him so explicitly, he more or less doubts the effectiveness of the specific solutions introduced by the Utopians, and he regards the main principles of their state system, such as communal living and the abolition of private property, as really absurd[9].

The protagonists of this Renaissance work also differ in their assessment regarding the condition of England and other European countries at the time and the adoption of strategies for gradual social reform. More is credited with a moderate position, the gist of which is well captured by his assertion: "what you cannot turn to good, you may at least make as little bad as possible. For it is impossible to make everything good unless all men are good, and that I don't expect to see for quite a few years yet"[10]. According to Hythloday, More's preferred "indirect approach" may mitigate and relieve the impact of harmful actions on the state conducted by both the powerful and the ordinary, but it does not lead to

> a cure and restoring society to good health. While you try to cure one part, you aggravate the wound in other parts. Suppressing the disease in one place causes it to break out in another, since you cannot give something to one person without taking it away from someone else[11].

He openly criticizes social relations in the countries he knows as being commonly characterized by abuse and oppression, which, with regard to

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[7] See T. More, *Utopia*, ed. G. M. Logan, Cambridge 2016, pp. 39–42.
[8] See ibidem, p. 109.
[9] See ibidem, p. 113.
[10] Ibidem, p. 37.
[11] Ibidem, pp. 40–41.

the situation in Europe, leads him to the bitter conclusion that they are dominated by conspiracies of the rich, who have adopted the common good, i.e. the *res publica*, for their own benefit[12].

It would be fair to assume that the distinction clearly marked in More's text helps to make the attribute of radical difference in the social organization of the Utopians, the embodiment of the best system at the same time, a characteristic of a literary genre that was widely used in subsequent centuries. The world presented in More's Utopia only resembles the everyday life known to his characters and readers, only differently ordered. Hence a critical distance would be advisable, according to which one should assume that Utopia is just a pipe dream, a place that does not exist, an imagination fed by the illusion of fulfillment, a semblance of reality promising more than is possible to fulfill, and a Utopian is only someone "who wants to replace an absolutely evil reality with an absolutely good one"[13]. However, according to Bronisław Baczko, an expert on the French Enlightenment, this is only an "abstract scheme", which takes on this vivid form only in extreme cases, close to ideal types, while in reality the relationship between utopias and reforms is much more complex and nuanced[14], which, according to him, can be seen in the 18th century in particular. As argued by the co-founder of the Warsaw school of the history of ideas,

> In fact, the interaction between utopian dreams and reformist hopes contributes to the development of certain ideas that dominate the ideologies, if not the mentalities, of the 'enlightened' elites. Utopian representations, more or less carefully developed, heighten the expectations aroused by these ideas and thus give them a specific tone[15].

More's approach to utopia seems to coincide with the concluding statement that he finds much in the Utopians that he would rather wish

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[12] See ibidem, p. 111.

[13] J. Szacki, *Spotkania z utopią*, Warszawa 1980, p. 31.

[14] See B. Baczko, *Utopian Lights*, op. cit., p. 30.

[15] Ibidem, p. 32. See ibidem, pp. 22–40. See also: B. Baczko, *Rousseau: samotność i wspólnota*, Gdańsk 2009, pp. 269–401; B. Baczko, *Człowiek i światopoglądy*, Warszawa 1965, pp. 11–100; A. Blaim, "Wstęp", [in:] *Angielska utopia literacka okresu Oświecenia. Antologia*, ed. A. Blaim, P. Sørensen, Gdańsk 2018, pp. 7–22; W. Voisé, *Wstęp*, [in:] *Utopiści XVI i XVII wieku o wychowaniu i szkole*, ed. W. Voisé, Wrocław 1972, p. XLIV.

on modern states than expect from them[16]. The characters of *A Truly Golden Little Book, No Less Beneficial than Entertaining* do not discuss whether London is supposed to become another Amaurotum. Hythloday betrays his distance from the perspective of promoting change among European notables and serving the rulers with his experience, pointing to examples of servility among officials and the unquenchable ambitions of rulers, and citing the imprisonment of the author of *Politeia*, who was mentioned several times in the interview: "But doubtless Plato was right in foreseeing that unless kings became philosophical themselves the advice of philosophers would never influence them, deeply immersed as they are and infected with false values from boyhood on. Plato himself had this experience with Dionysius"[17].

The Utopians' peculiar weave of rules and conditions of daily life seems to belong to them alone. It took them over seventeen centuries to design, create, and transform them. Nevertheless, the image of the triumph of reason and will in the Hythloday story calls into question the intellectual favorite, skepticism, and stimulates imagination to examine conscience, recalculate assets, and calculate possibilities. The picture of a sufficiently perfect social order and social relations itself, hostage to the writer's invention and intuition, should not appear fantastic, but the essence does not lie in its details[18]. By crystallizing hopes, the image created allows us to measure the distance between the desire or longing for better and the present situation fraught with thorns, eclipses, and oppression, and creates the beginnings of the future promise necessary for politics. In this sense, the worlds presented in their successive variations exposing the unobvious possibilities of utopics are not, or not primarily, perceived as models to be reproduced. Their role according to Baczko lies in something else, as he argues: "utopias are one of the places, occasionally the privileged place, where the social imagination is put into practice, where individual and collective social dreams are welcomed, gathered, worked on, and produced"[19]. Consequently, as the

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[16] See T. More, *Utopia*, op. cit., s. 113.

[17] Ibidem, p. 29.

[18] See F. Jameson, *Archaeologies of the Future. The Desire Called Utopia and Other Science Fictions*, London – New York 2005, pp. 42–56.

[19] B. Baczko, *Utopian Lights*, op. cit., pp. 15–16. See B. Baczko, *Wyobrażenia społeczne*, op. cit., p. 91; J. Starobinski, "Jalons pour une histoire du concept d'imagination", [in:] J. Staro-

expert on French Enlightenment claims: "Utopias are specific demonstrations and expressions of a particular era, showing its obsession, haunting fears, and revolts; the scope of its expectations as well as the paths taken by the social imagination; its way of envisaging the possible and the impossible"[20].

Also More in *A Truly Golden Little Book, No Less Beneficial than Entertaining of a Republic's Best State and of the New Island Utopia* oscillates between the image of the perfect system of a foreign island and a critical discussion concerning conditions for successful native social change and the usefulness of the ideals therein, not so much between means and ends as theory and metatheory. Hence it can be said that the understanding of utopia as a pipe dream is grounded in the figure of the island, but it is acquainted with the critical thread that contributes to its description and More's text. In other words, *Utopia* is more than just Utopia, as the original title somehow expresses. Let us add, that the ever--present need to maintain a balance between these aspects was pointed out in the early 1980s by another protagonist of the Warsaw school of the history of ideas, Leszek Kolakowski, who treated them as opposing forces. "The Death of Utopia Reconsidered", an essay published on the eve of the collapse of the Eastern Block, is marked by the ambivalent attitude of the author of the three volumes of *Main Currents of Marxism* published only a few years earlier towards the phenomenon cited in the title. However, it can also be regarded as a moderate, cautious apology of utopian thought or a kind of praise for inconsistency, a reaction to the "anti-utopian spirit of our age", age in which "we witness the decline of utopian mentality"[21]. Hence, in the conclusion of the essay, certain elements of longing and hope can be discerned, as we read:

binski, *L'oeil vivant II. La relation critique*, Paris 1970, pp. 173–195; C. W. Mills, *The Sociological Imagination*, New York 2000, pp. 5–18.

[20] B. Baczko, *Utopian Lights*, op. cit., p. 5. See ibidem, p. 20; M. Turkot, "Dwuznaczność utopii. Bronisława Baczki życie i twórczość w świetle marzenia społecznego", [in:] *Warszawska szkoła historii idei. Tożsamość – tradycja – obecność*, ed. P. Grad, Warszawa 2014, pp. 206–208.

[21] L. Kolakowski, "The Death of Utopia Reconsidered", [in:] *The Tanner Lectures on Human Value*, Vol. 4, ed. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1983, pp. 236, 237. See L. Koczanowicz, *Anxiety and Lucidity. Reflections on Culture in Times of Unrest*, London – New York 2020, pp. 143–175.

Therefore it is likely that two kinds of mentality – the skeptical and the utopian – will survive separately, in unavoidable conflict. And we need their shaky coexistence; both of them are important to our cultural survival. The victory of utopian dreams would lead us to a totalitarian nightmare and the utter downfall of civilization, whereas the unchallenged domination of the skeptical spirit would condemn us to a hopeless stagnation, to an immobility which a slight accident could easily convert into catastrophic chaos. Ultimately we have to live between two irreconcilable claims, each of them having its cultural justification[22].

In More's rendition, utopia is only a possible pipe dream, and skeptical and utopian consciousness seem to be connected.

UTOPICS WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE SOCIAL IMAGINATION

The state in Hythloday's story is a separate, detached, alternative world, essentially uncorrupted and yet – from the point of view of the values of both interlocutors – essentially better. Only that the life of the Utopians is an invention, an illusion, just like the worlds in "The Library of Babel" by Jorge Luis Borges, "The Lost Ones" by Samuel Beckett or many others. Their counterfactuality can be easily recognized, it is not even disguised. It should be noted, however, that experts on the subject seem to be exceptionally unanimous on this point: not every description of a fictional society will be considered an expression of utopian literature[23].

[22] L. Kolakowski, *The Death of Utopia Reconsidered*, op. cit., p. 247. See L. Kolakowski, *The Presence of Myth*, Chicago 2001, pp. 15–18, 110–136. It is worth mentioning that the notion of utopia proposed by Baczko was formed in the 1950s and 1960s, among others, during a seminar devoted to this issue conducted by him at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw. In *Utopian Light* (op. cit., p. 326–327, footnote 14) he recalls the inspiration of the work of participants in these meetings and discussions (such as Leszek Kolakowski, Krzysztof Pomian, Jerzy Szacki, Andrzej Walicki, Jan Garewicz, or Barbara Skarga), who in time came to be associated with the so-called Warsaw school of the history of ideas (see H. M. Baiao, "On History and Liberty: The 'Revisionism' of Bronisław Baczko", *Hybris* 2017, No. 37, pp. 34–60; R. Sitek, *Warszawska szkoła historii idei. Między historią a teraźniejszością*, Warszawa 2000).

[23] See K. M. Maj, *Allotopie. Topografia światów fikcjonalnych*, Kraków 2015, pp. 15–76, 149–202.

However, controversy is aroused among them by repeated attempts to classify it along with the selection of criteria[24]. As in many other cases, it is impossible to establish satisfactory genre boundaries in retrospect. This is not only because the authors of this kind of literature have avoided the term, have often ignored the Renaissance pattern and accrued tradition, have sought originality through transgression, have drawn on other sources, or because of the conceptual revisions that make up the self-consciousness of dynamic modernity or have been overwhelmed by the periodic growth of exemplification. In retrospect and in relation to the situation in the Western world, Baczko assumes, given this accumulation of utopias, that epochs can be divided into those in which they constitute a marginal and isolated phenomenon, and those in which the number of such texts increases, and then

> a special relationship arises between utopias and the mental structures and key ideas of a given period. Utopia is then linked by numerous and complex relationships with philosophical concepts, literature, social movements, ideological currents, collective symbolism, and the collective imagination. The boundaries of utopia become increasingly mobile as it is itself subject to social and cultural dynamics[25].

Thus the terminological disputes go deeper. Literary genre is not the only domain of utopian thought and sensibility, at least depending on the era or cultural milieu, though it is certainly the best documented. That is not all, according to Baczko: "one of the greatest historical success utopia consists the fact that, beginning with a certain era, utopian discourse becomes essential as a way of speaking of and visualizing the future, by substituting itself to the former means of doing so, those of secular tradition, such as prophecy or astrology"[26]. This could be an

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[24] See K. M. Maj, "Eutopie i dystopie. Typologia narracji utopijnych z perspektywy filozoficzno-literackiej", *Ruch Literacki* 2014, Vol. 2, pp. 153–174; K. M. Maj, "Antyutopia – o gatunku, którego nie było", *Zagadnienia Rodzajów Literackich* 2019, Vol. 4, pp. 10–29.

[25] B. Baczko, *Wyobrażenia społeczne*, op. cit., p. 91. See ibidem, pp. 101–104; B. Baczko, *Utopian Lights*, op. cit., pp. 7–8, 14–21.

[26] B. Baczko, *Utopian Lights*, op. cit., p. 5. Baczko mentions other ways of 'talking about the future' distinguished by André-Clément Découflé, such as fortune-telling, futurology,

argument in favor of the restriction of the field of study to political-literary narrative texts alone, as postulated by some scholars. However, Baczko is not alone in claiming that the unique position of this intriguing phenomenon is due to its multiple participation in various forms of social practice:

> Scientific research, philosophical reflection, and sociological analysis discovered the complexity of the utopian phenomenon. The presence of the ideas-utopian images in the most diverse works and activities is noticeable in the major social movements, even if they claim to be distinct from and opposed to any utopian process[27].

It is not a question of imitating literature, of introducing its figures into the world of everyday life, of the primitiveness of the literary genre in relation to other forms of crystallizing collective hopes and expectations. Social movements are inspired by utopian thinking, just as political and pedagogical communitarian experiments base their development on images, springing from dissatisfaction, of a fragment, part, or whole of a sufficiently perfect social order and human relations. In other words, utopia can be distinguished as one of the major components of ideology which, as Gerald L. Gutek notes, in addition to examining the past which, when interpreted, forms the basis for the formulation of concepts of social change and which "provides an orientation for a group in time and in space", and moreover, "explains the group's present social, economic, political, and educational circumstances", it "is also policy generating in that it presents a blueprint for the future that indicates to the group what policies are needed to attain certain desired ends or goals"[28]. Hence utopia as a certain model of the future is not merely an object of desire but also of an aspiration[29]. Therefore, after Baczko, it can be maintained

planning, and science-fiction. But the content preferred by utopia also finds expression in myths, philosophical systems, religious doctrines or poetry.

[27] Ibidem, p. 8. See K. Kumar, *Utopianism*, Minneapolis 1991, pp. 64–85; L. T. Sargent, *Utopianism. A Very Short Introduction*, New York 2010, pp. 33–49. See also: R. Levitas, *Utopia as Method. The Imaginary Reconstruction of Society*, New York 2013.

[28] G. L. Gutek, *Philosophical and Ideological Perspectives on Education*, Needham 1997, pp. 144–145. See A. Heywood, *Essentials of Political Ideas*, London 2018, p. 4; L. T. Sargent, *Utopianism*, op. cit., p. 124.

[29] See R. Levitas, *The Concept of Utopia*, op. cit., pp. 9, 207–231.

that "utopias take on the most complex functions – they serve as relay stations between the practical application and the dream; they stimulate ideological commitments, like flights from realities, they clarify certain aspects of those realities, not without masking others"[30]. The credibility of the world presented in the novel does not require inventing and estimating the effectiveness of the chosen means for implementing utopia. The literary image of sufficiently perfect social relations, regardless of the state of saturation with contrast, can only remain a mirror reflection of the flaws and advantages of the current state of life organization in the community, which is reviewed in this transformation, it can convey "images of the societies established in the immobility of their outcome"[31].

From a political and pedagogical point of view, on the other hand, utopian thought is of particular importance if it can be integrated into an ideological whole, which as such allows for the effective production of certain social relations and human well-being, which presupposes that in living, thinking and acting a given group will undertake to create and verify the conditions for the possibility of its realization. Not as the only one. Even in a political system, including an educational space, which suppresses or fights against pluralism, the many differences that exist between people and their circumstances provide sufficient grounds for the formation of different visions of the desired future in the social imagination. This state of affairs can contribute to social tensions and the eruption of conflicts. In this context, it is worth highlighting another way in which utopian and critical thought meet in the social imagination. The will, burdened by its own preferences, to undermine, marginalize, exclude, or lead to the destruction of a competing utopia can manifest itself as a critically oriented analysis, interpretation, and evaluation of the challenged position. At the same time, it need not be interested in a diagnosis of its own claims, possibilities, and perceptions, nor in the totality of the conditions of all parties to the articulated conflict. The development of such an interest, however, would mean that it would come closer in a new way to utopian thinking.

In social practice, including education, the awareness of utopia thus creates the conditions for realizing one's own ideology. Motivated by

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[30] B. Baczko, *Utopian Lights*, op. cit., p. 19.
[31] Ibidem, p. 320.

the perception of the current socio-historical location, the desire and aspiration to change or preserve in the future the current configurations and dependencies in a given population can be triggered by mutually exclusive images of a fragment, part or the whole of a sufficiently perfect social order and human relations. The individual images of the future have at their disposal not only the dream of the place of their own reference group in the expected social order, but also the positioning of other movements and collectivities, often betraying resentment, ignorance or a polemical attitude towards their different utopias. This polemical stance, however, can be seen as the first step in moving beyond the particularist aspirations of one's own reference group to practicing a comprehensive critique that also verifies one's own expectations. Just as in the case of a literary genre, in social practice too, on many levels and in various configurations, criticism is opposed to, or subtly merges with, the hope crystallized in utopia.

DISAPPOINTMENT WITH UTOPIA AND THE CRISIS OF UTOPIAN CONSCIOUSNESS

"Utopia burst, shattered, the dreams broken"– a formula that could serve as a key to the study of the Western social imagination at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries, including the reading of the contemporary crisis of utopian consciousness. It has already been somewhat discussed,

> There are 'hot' eras when utopias flourish, when the utopian imagination penetrates the most diverse forms of intellectual, political, and literary activity; eras when opposing points of view and divergent main themes seem to rediscover their point of convergence in the very invention of descriptions of utopias. But there are other 'cold' eras, when utopian creativity is weakened and cut off from social, intellectual, and ideological activities[32].

According to Baczko, these rotations also brought about another important change – the transformation of utopia into uchronia, as a result of which "the *social elsewhere*, a different society, is placed no longer in an

[32] Ibidem, p. 6.

imaginary *space*, but in an equally imaginary time"[33]. The tendency to describe a sufficiently perfect social order occurring on a distant, essentially unattainable island gives way to a tendency to establish it in the future, as an effect of the forces of progress. Perhaps it is not the first such transformation, however, if one considers prophetic messianism and Christian millenarianism[34].Consequently it can be assumed that utopia is a variant of uchronia, and that the contemporary crisis of utopian consciousness, although socially and historically conditioned, is a cyclical phenomenon. It could also mean that there are times when criticism, examining the anatomy of illusion and the contours of utopia, takes away or violates to a greater extent than at other times the hope necessary for human life and development. And also that it is not the capacity of skepticism, the ally of utopian thinking, that plays a decisive role in its crisis.

According to Baczko, one of the most important reasons for the contemporary doubt in utopia is related to the reception of the rise, development, and decay of Nazism and Soviet communism. After the period of fashion for demanding the impossible during the events of '68, there came a wave of its simplifying identification with the Gulag. It is believed that:

> Since the end of the seventies, it is no longer fashionable to delight in utopia, but to find in the same texts a negation of the individual or even a crime against the individual in the name of a rationalistic and artificial system that destroys spontaneity and vitality. Utopia is not liberating and subversive at all; on the contrary, it is precisely the enemy of freedom, all the more dangerous because it is hidden behind deceptive charms. Utopia would be the anticipation of a totalitarian, not to say concentration, world[35].

To this characterization it is worth adding that precise dating here presents some difficulty, for as George Kateb points out "The antiutopianism [...] is a cristallization of a number of ideas, attitudes, opinions, and sentiments that have existed for centuries"[36]. Nevertheless, it can be

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[33] B. Baczko, *Wyobrażenia społeczne*, op. cit., p. 117 – original underline.

[34] See K. Kumar, *Utopianism*, op. cit., pp. 6–11; L. T. Sargent, *Utopianism*, op. cit., pp. 86–101.

[35] B. Baczko, *Wyobrażenia społeczne*, op. cit., p. 136. See ibidem, pp. 135–149; B. Baczko, "Przedmowa do wydania z 2001 roku", [in:] B. Baczko, *Światła Utopii*, Warszawa 2016, pp. 11–12; F. Jameson, *Archaeologies of the Future*, op. cit., pp. 194–198.

[36] G. Kateb, *Utopia and Its Enemies*, New York 1972, p. 3. See B. Goodwin, "Utopia and

taken that at the beginning of the 1990s, the unexpected transformation of regimes, nominally only creating conditions for the development of social justice in the socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, gave a broad insight into the scale of real discrepancies with regard to the expectations among inhabitants of that part of the world. Depriving them of an alternative, it put them on a one-way road to follow a model of organization of life far from the utopian ethos, and yet – from the perspective of the experience with authoritarianism – promising a much more decent society. The collapse of the communist countries seems to have reinforced the disillusionment with utopia, and the efforts to build a better society and to implement the principles of liberal democracy and the hopes and expectations associated with them have surprisingly not diminished this tendency. Perhaps it was also important in this case that the spectacular failure of the idea in the Central and Eastern Europe became part of the colloquial understanding of this category as synonymous with a pipe dream or delusion, while the social model implemented as part of the transformation had already been successfully pursued in other parts of the world, thus not conforming to the widespread understanding of the phenomenon. In other words, the fate of the two ideologies, the unimaginable nightmare of human brutality and cruelty, becomes, by the end of the twentieth century, a universal measure for the phenomenon and a specter constituting "a real threat to the goods already achieved by society"[37]. According to Baczko, the equation of utopia with totalitarianism is misleading insofar as it removes the responsibility for actions, projects undertaken, their implementation and consequences from people and transfers it onto an impersonal phenomenon.

Following the researcher's trail of contemporary doubt in utopia, he points out how he characterizes the current condition of its most prominent form:

> One notes, first of all, the attrition of the literary genre under the effect of an excessive paradigmatic rigidity. But there is more: the desire to deny

Political Theory", [in:] B. Goodwin, K. Taylor, *The Politic of Utopia. A Study in Theory and Practice*, London 1982, pp. 92–115; L. T. Sargent, "In Defense of Utopia", *Diogenes* 2006, Vol. 53, No. 1, pp. 11–14.

[37] J. Szacki, "Posłowie do wydania polskiego", [in:] B. Baczko, *Światła utopii*, op. cit., p. 457.

reality, to give proof of an unfettered social imagination can lead to the paradoxical effect of repetition and uniformity. The utopians [...] always find themselves attracted to the same themes. Whence the inflexibility of spirit which hinders and even paralyzes the enterprise of the social imagination[38].

At the same time, the vision of a world without conflicts and contradictions that require resolution may seem not only monotonous but also implausible, if not attractive. But surely it is not without significance that "utopias more frequently anticipate other utopias than they do realities-proposals"[39]. In other words, it is possible that the conventional framework of the genre may constrain thinking about the future and contribute to the reification and decay of hope. Moreover, the way in which this form of utopian thought functions, in which the images of sufficiently perfect societies and their meta-theory, which co-occur in A *Truly Golden Little Book*, are developed separately, seems important. Moreover, it is a certain paradox, as Baczko notes, that "scholarly discourse *on* utopias, meta-discourse, now prevails over utopian creativity itself"[40]. The accompanying development of critical tools seems disproportionate to the growth of the potential for apology of articulated expectations and anticipatory future promises. Moreover, the very process of articulation usually exposes not only the particular social and historical position of the subject of hopes and desires, but also the partisan partiality of the expectations expressed.

A connection to the contemporary disillusionment with utopia may also be found in the fact that its elaborated forms belong to the culture of the elite in the Enlightenment, but in a sense also later. According to Baczko "The rare exceptions to this learned or scholarly character of utopian discourse only prove the rule"[41]. The historian of social thought does not rule out latent or unspoken utopias associated with political actions, such as peasant revolts, although these are difficult to capture and usually fade with the movement they emanate from. In contrast,

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[38] B. Baczko, *Utopian Lights*, op. cit., p. 335. See F. Jameson, *Archaeologies of the Future*, op. cit., pp. 182–210.

[39] B. Baczko, *Utopian Lights*, op. cit., p. 316.

[40] Ibidem, p. 12 – original underline.

[41] Ibidem, p. 39. See C. Brinton, "Utopia and Democracy", [in:] *Utopias and Utopian Thought*, ed. F. R. Manuel, Boston 1966, pp. 51–55.

elaborate literary images and draft constitutions are not widely discussed. Contemporary anti-utopias and dystopias, which warn against authoritarianism and praise the current state of social relations, seem to be more popular these days. It is hard to imagine, however, that satisfaction with the shape and state of affairs achieved is widely shared by populations that are excluded, marginalized, or exploited. Nevertheless, they too are influenced by the anticipations and images of future social relations set in motion by the machinelike practices and promises of Western consumerism and technopols. These, however, not only seduce, but also seem to evoke mixed feelings in different circles.

To this list, which is not intended to be complete, we should add the fear of disappointment with utopia and regression, which does not have to result in submission to the dominant currents anticipating the future. It can contribute to taking hope beyond the territories of this world, motivating the surrender to private addictions and the realization of dreams of individual salvation, moving away from grand narratives towards micro-stories. Nevertheless, disillusionment may be a possible consequence of confronting the inflated expectations of which utopia is an accumulation. Astrid Męczkowska-Christiansen indicates that the time of crisis of utopian thinking currently affecting pedagogy in its ideological aspect, is preceded by two major shifts in the character of this thinking, taking place successively in modernity and post-modernity. In the former, "utopia, in line with the general tendency of modernity to de-mythologise the world, is stripped of its poetry and regarded as a purely technological project of the world's improvement […]". The implementation of this project is intended "via targeted rational activity, controlled by institutional means, including mass education". As a result, according to the researcher, "This logic, by replacing dreams and hopes with a rational plan, led towards replacing a desire for meaning with an expectation of effect. Due to this shift, the *utopian* element has been reduced and hidden beyond the façade of the *rational*"[42]. Pedagogy of the age of modernity, having defined itself as scientific, takes this initiative, participating in the plan of creating a new man and social renewal. Męczkowska-Christiansen sees this state of affairs as a sign of degradation of

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[42] A. Męczkowska, "Ku utopijności pedagogicznego myślenia", *Kwartalnik Pedagogiczny* 2005, No. 3, p. 8, 9 – original underline.

utopian thinking, whose next stage, developed in postmodernity, "leads to a radical unmasking of utopia as utopia". In other words, the discovery that "the thinking of the modern era was based on the presence of utopia under the guise of rationalism" seems to "depreciate the significance of utopian thinking as such"[43].

Among the causes and conditions of the contemporary crisis of utopian consciousness, which also generates numbness in education and contributes to the consolidation of a pedagogy of inertia, the motif of critical thinking does not come to the forefront. It is noticeable that the fabric of hope for the existence of sufficiently decent societies has been damaged by images of shocking human atrocities under totalitarian regimes and by prejudices about the nature of utopian thinking more than by skepticism, by the fear of regression and failure, by attachment to the achieved standards, by the seduction offered through the possibilities of consumption and technology, or by the conviction that only private access to prosperity and fulfillment is possible. Critical thinking has not buried utopia, just as it has not buried naive and fantastic imaginations, variants of Cockaygne, populism, or self-satisfaction in the eyes of the general public; rather, it acts as its ally. Disseminated through education, gaining influence, it can measure itself against the public imagination, thus anticipating a sufficiently perfect society of conscious inhabitants of critical communities[44] wary of dogmatism, fundamentalism, and their utopias at the price of accepting a place in the array of competing ideologies. By contrast, criticism that separates itself from utopian thinking leaves with a nonchalant understatement about its own hopes and expectations.

Nevertheless, utopia, which need not be devoid of reason, but utopia as we know it, as we have learned to know it, is in crisis – in different strata of society and depending on their situation. Disillusionment with it, in essence, is disillusionment with the human being, except that it is not with oneself but with others. It is not clear, however, whether the crisis concerns all existing and possible forms of utopian thinking. And

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[43] Ibidem, p. 11.
[44] See L. Koczanowicz, *Politics of Dialogue. Non-Consensual Democracy and Critical Community*, Edinburgh 2015, pp. 91–170; L. Koczanowicz, R. Włodarczyk, "Education for Critical Community and the Pedagogy of Asylum: Two Responses to the Crisis of University Education", *Studies in Philosophy and Education* 2021 (online).

if only some selected ones, for example the literary genre, then which of the remaining forms currently constitutes a mature space for uniting the field of social experience and the horizon of expectations?

Certainly from the educational perspective "Utopian literature is a repository of reflection on human nature – on its purposes, limitations and possibilities"[45], moreover, accepting the claim that "the power of utopian thinking derives from its inherent ability to visualize the future in terms of radically new forms and values"[46] can lead to the question about its important consequences for the educational practice organized in the schooling system, to which social expectations are delegated for the positive course of the process of adapting new members of society to the world that does not yet exist. Also, whether the inability to create a decent society is a permanent characteristic in human beings? And of course it can trigger questions about the shape, place and role of the ideal organization of the human world in educational practice. And also how to balance utopian thinking with criticism? Or, how to avoid disillusionment in education anticipating the future? Today there are reasons to doubt utopian thinking. But this doubt lies only partly in the power of critical thought; the human being as a whole is defined by many other factors. Given the totality of man's faculties, it is reasonable to conclude that the modern crisis of utopian consciousness is to some extent, also responsible for the reification of the will[47]. This way of addressing the crisis provides a worthwhile context for pedagogical discussion around alternative education, educational ideologies, attempts to reform the educational system and counteract its inertia, as well as the tasks delegated to education by society to implement models of the world and humanity. Moreover, deepening the understanding of both the phenomenon itself and its crisis can contribute to the effort to regain for utopian and critical thinking the place where social dreams are produced, "Education for the realization of its social challenges needs" – as Astrid Męczkowska-Christiansen postulates – "such a plane of *resistance to the*

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[45] D. Halpin, *Hope and Education. The Role of the Utopian Imagination*, London – New York 2003, p. 40.

[46] Ibidem, p. 34.

[47] See K. Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia. An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge*, London – Henley 1979, p. 236. See F. Polak, *The Image of the Future*, Amsterdam 1973, pp. 194–198.

present, which «leans» towards the future, outlining visions of a better world"[48]. In other words, "The thing is", Tomasz Szkudlarek insists, "that criticism should be accompanied by the courage to think utopian [...]"[49].

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[48] A. Męczkowska, "Ku utopijności pedagogicznego myślenia", op. cit., p. 16 – original underline.

[49] T. Szkudlarek, *Wiedza i wolność w pedagogice amerykańskiego postmodernizmu*, Kraków 1993, p. 120.

PART II

CHAPTER VIII

MANSLAUGHTERS, AVENGERS OF BLOOD AND CITIES OF REFUGE. ON HOSPITALITIES AND ASYLUMS IN EMMANUEL LEVINAS AND JACQUES DERRIDA

*There is not a single thing
in great spirituality
that would be absent from
another great spirituality*

Emmanuel Levinas,
*Of God Who Comes
to Mind*

For at least two decades, Emmanuel Levinas's concept of a radically understood responsibility for the Other and justice, arising with the appearance of another human being around the Self, whose subjectivity constitutes its reception, as well as Jacques Derrida's related ethics of hospitality, have been an inspiration and constant reference point for contemporary philosophy of education[1]. The potential of the former is clearly revealed by Sharon Todd in her perspective, pointing out that in Levinas:

> the ethical relation is modulated through the way in which the I welcomes the Other, receives from the Other, and is taught by the Other. What is truly extraordinary about his ethics, and consequently what is highly relevant for readers in the field of education, is that this ethical welcoming takes on the characteristics of a pedagogical relation. Levinas describes welcoming the Other as the self's capacity to learn from the Other as a teacher. At the core of his philosophy, then, lies a theory of learning – one that is not so much

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[1] See *Levinas and Education. At the Intersection of Faith and Reason*, ed. D. Egéa-Kuehne, London – New York 2008; G. Zhao, "Levinas and the Philosophy of Education", *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 2016, Vol. 48, No. 4, pp. 323–330; *Derrida & Education*, ed. G. Biesta, D. Egéa-Kuehne, New York 2001; E. Bojesen, "Derrida and Education Today", *Studies in Philosophy and Education* 2021, Vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 117–120.

concerned with how the subject learns content, but with how the subject learns through a specific orientation to the Other[2].

This brief description, in turn, seems to be an apt introduction to the issue of hospitality in education, considered in the context of the second concept cited by Caludia W. Ruitenberg, who notes that "Education guided by an ethic of hospitality does not aim to cultivate any particular type of moral subject. It is education that is offered hospitably, so children can find and make their own place in the world"[3].

Undoubtedly, education understood in this way is the bright side of human relationships, which can also be seen as the negative of variously inhospitable places in the world of everyday life. Such a distinction corresponds to the notion of counter-education, which

> as a negative to institutionalised education, is committed to dialogue, negation and transcendence, and against normalisation. Therefore it answers to the challenge of a prevailing educational practice which serves and represents the current order of things. Counter-education reacts against the closure of possibilities enacted by the prevailing educational formation, in its formal and informal practices, in schools and also in social interaction and within culture at large. Counter-education seeks to defend and empower the reflective potentials of the subject against the self-evidence of the order of capitalism, against those practices of normalisation which secure and develop the present order and present critique, resistance and hope for essential change as irrational[4].

However, neither for Levinas nor for Derrida is the awareness of such a distinction commonly and simply given to us in everyday life. In this

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[2] S. Todd, "Welcoming and Difficult Learning. Reading Levinas with Education", [in:] *Levinas and Education*, op. cit., p. 171. See G. J. J. Biesta, *The Beautiful Risk of Education*, London – New York 2016, pp. 19–23; K. Maliszewski, *Bez-silna edukacja. O kształceniu kruchego*, Katowice 2021.

[3] C. W. Ruitenberg, *Unlocking the World: Education in an Ethic of Hospitality*, New York 2015, p. 32.

[4] I. Gur-Ze'ev, J. Masschelein, N. Blake, "Reflectivity, Reflection, and Counter-Education", *Studies in Philosophy and Education* 2001, Vol. 20, p. 101. See I. Gur-Ze'ev, *Diasporic Philosophy and Counter-Education*, Rotterdam 2010, pp. 11–28.

respect, reality is not transparent to us, among other things, as a result of our socialization into ordinary social violence, naturalization and sanctioning of inhospitable practices, our desires and handicaps. Hence the question is not only how to awaken such awareness, how to learn to open up to the Other, how to make room for the student, how to educate in a hospitable or non-violent way[5], but what are the conditions of its possible occurrence. In this context, it is worth referring once again to the notion of counter-education and, following Ilan Gur-Ze'v, to see also the moment of transition between the opaqueness of everyday life and the distinction between hospitalities.

> And yet, Love of Life as the tension between the 'desert' and the 'oasis', the *ehical I* and the *moral I*, the self and the co-*poiesis*, is the *Orcha* of the Diasporic in the Socratic sense of Eros as an attracting absence of the beautiful as a new friendship with Being and with the Other and with meaninglessness. Counter-education should invite the Diasporic nomad to the hospitality of Love of Life. Such hospitality challenges the absence of non-consensual creativity: it calls for overcoming conventional morality and the other imperatives of ethnocentric-oriented 'we', its self-evidence, its normality, its counter-resistance of the oppressed and its normalized patriotic citizenship[6].

Invite – but where to? Like Gur-Ze'ev, who intertwines dialogical and critical thought in his following Levinas and the Frankfurt School rooted in two traditions, Western and Jewish, in this chapter I would like to address

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[5] See I. Gur-Ze'ev, "Toward a Nonrepressive Critical Pedagogy", *Educational Theory* 1998, Vol. 48, pp. 463–486; C. W. Ruitenberg, *Unlocking the World*, op. cit., pp. 1–15, 90–115; H. Alexander, "Education in Nonviolence: Levinas' Talmudic Readings and the Study of Sacred Texts", *Ethics and Education* 2014, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 58–68.

[6] I. Gur-Ze'ev, *Diasporic Philosophy and Counter-Education*, op. cit., p. 42 – original underline. Gur-Ze'ev observes: "In the Hebrew language 'Orcha' means a convoy of camels and humans with their belongings moving in an endless desert towards their destiny. The *Orcha* is an improvised movement that is to find/create its own destiny" (ibidem, p. 38). To his mind, "In the *Orcha*, l o v e , as the opposite of violence, stands along with hope, imagination, and improvising creativity in contrast to fear, self-forgetfulness, greed, and conquest. Diasporic Philosophy represents *Orcha* as a kind of hospitality in face of homelessness that is opposed to the *self-forgetfulness* manifested in the quest to be swallowed in the immanence and «home-returning» into the nothingness" (ibidem, p. 40 – original underline).

the question of the asylum, understood by me as a place conducive to the awakening to hospitality and the fusion of conscience and knowledge.

THE GROVE OF THE EUMENIDES, ERINYES AND OTHER BLOOD AVENGERS

Led by Antigone, fleeing Thebes, their former ruler Oedipus stops at the sacred grove of the Eumenides near Athens.

His investigation reveals the name of his father's murderer. It is his own. Oedipus. The one who, in the past, in good faith, unaware of obstacles, succeeded him on the throne of Thebes by the side of his wife Jocasta. Even before he comes to the centre of Beotia and takes power there, he accidentally, without any intent and without any malice, kills a traveller on the road in a scuffle. This traveller, as is only revealed by the investigation undertaken because of the plagues that fall upon Thebes many years later, this traveller turns out to be his father, Laius. Laius, ordered, along with his wife, that Oedipus be abandoned as an infant in the mountains to certain death after an oracle revealed that the child would contribute to the death of his parents in the future. Indeed, the destiny revealed in advance was not averted, despite their strenuous attempts and efforts. Laius dies at the hands of Oedipus, who grew up in Corinth and prudently abandoned that city in the mistaken belief that, according to the prophecy recalled to him by the oracle, the lives of his adoptive parents were in danger. The mother, Jocasta, hangs herself, having learned the truth about herself and her son, the murderer of her first husband, father and brother of their four children. One of them, Antigone, leads Oedipus out of Thebes, after, aware of the scale of his misdeeds, he found the body of the suicidal woman and blinded himself with her brooch or silver pins, banished and broken. "O mortal generations, / lives passing so quickly and / equalling nothing" – seems to sound still in the wake of them the famous choral song written by Sophocles – "Show me / a man who thinks he is happy / and I will show you a man deluded – / his life means nothing". And more, "Your fate, O wretched Oedipus, / is the example I take, / to prove the gods bless nothing"[7].

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[7]   Sophocles, *Oedipus the King*, [in:] Sophocles, *The Theban Plays*, Baltimore 2009, p. 52.

This part of the history of the Labdacid family is still very well familiar to him, also thanks to the Greek tragedian. His elaboration of this poignant myth[8] gave us the image of the daughter and sister of the king of Thebes entering the grove of Eumenides, a persistent inspiration for European visual artists of the 19th century, such as Friedrich Rehberg, José Ribelles, Karl Bryullov, Jean-Baptiste Hugues, and Marcel-André Baschet, which features the Job-like figure of the blind old man, with the drama of Antigone in the background, if noticeable at all. This is where Sophocles set the action of *Oedipus at Colonus*, his final, unusual tragedy. It is in Colonus that the fate of Oedipus, as foretold by the oracle, is to be fulfilled. A fate which, until his last moments, seems to arouse compassion and a sense of fragility, fear and enlightenment in the spectators heading for catharsis.

In Sophocles' view, the grove of the Eumenides is a kind of asylum for Oedipus. It is possible that the former king of Thebes, the parricide, is obliged to take vengeance for the shed blood in the family although the tragedian from Colonus adopts a different solution, i.e. his two sons, or rather brothers take revenge. In this they would resemble the Erinyes, the menacing, preaching goddesses of vengeance guilty of bloodshed

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[8] See Z. Kubiak, *Mitologia Greków i Rzymian*, Kraków 2013, pp. 514–527. In characterizing Greek mythology, the collection of all kinds of fabulous stories and legends that circulated in the lands belonging to the Greek linguistic area from the 9th or 8th century B.C. until the end of the "pagan" era, Pierre Grimal distinguishes between divine and heroic "cycles", as well as legends taking the form of "novellas" and "elementary" stories, in addition to myth in its narrowest sense, that is, stories concerning the creation of the world and the "birth" of gods (see P. Grimal, *Mitologia grecka*, Warszawa 1998, pp. 5–29). He says of cycles that they "constitute a succession of episodes or stories whose unity consists only in the homogeneity of the protagonist's character," and that their essential characteristic is their discontinuity. "A cycle is not born fully formed; its final form is the result of a long evolution in the course of which episodes, initially detached, fit together and merge into a common whole" (ibidem, pp. 23–24). These findings exposing the flexibility of this type of myth also apply to the "novellas" or "elemental" stories that Greek tragedians specifically crafted. In the context of Sophocles' work on the turn of the life of Oedipus, who in his account "in Colonos becomes a caring, benevolent hero", Grimal notes that "to express this, Sophocles had to transform the content of the old legends, to remove this or that episode, this or that version, incompatible with this unique destiny he was constructing. In his hands, the myth took on a definite form; from the shapeless clay provided by the traditional legends, he formed the immortal Oedipus" (ibidem, pp. 154–155). See also M. Buber, "Myth in Judaism", [in:] M. Buber, *On Judaism*, ed. N. N. Glatzer, New York 1967, pp. 95–107.

in the family, of which we are now familiar with the names of the sisters Alecto, Megaera and Tisiphone. Robert Graves described their appalling appearance – "are crones, with snakes for hair, dogs' heads, coal-black bodies, bats' wings, and blood-shot eyes" – as well as the fact that they relentlessly, "without rest or pause, from city to city and from country to country", pursue those responsible for breaking the taboo – "at first only the taboo of insult, disobedience, or violence to a mother" – and their victims perish in torment[9]. Oedipus, too, must expect their revenge, however his breaking of the taboo was not that "he killed his mother, but that he inadvertently caused her suicide"[10]. Although, in Graves's view, the Erinyes were the personification of remorse in that very limited sense concerning the maternal taboo, hence he argues that in Oresteia the first of the three great tragedians of ancient Greece, Aeschylus, "is forcing language when he speaks of Erinyes charged with avenging paternal blood"[11], he is aware of changes, variables and new elaborations of their functions. Perhaps this is why she associates the action of the goddesses of vengeance of Greek mythology with similar motifs found in Melanesia, also in modern times, in connection with the inadvertent breaking of taboos. In other words, the view according to which the Erinyes are dangerous and tireless avengers of the victims of murder, especially of the bloodshed in the family, and even much more broadly – of exceeding measure (Greek *hýbris* – 'excessive pride') towards the natural order, can be justified[12].

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[9] R. Graves, *The Greek Myths*, Vol. 1, New York 1988, pp. 122, 125.

[10] R. Graves, *The Greek Myths*, Vol. 2, New York 1988, p. 69.

[11] Ibidem, p. 63.

[12] See Z. Kubiak, *Mitologia Greków i Rzymian*, op. cit., pp. 69–70. The meaning of the custom of 'blood vengeance' In contemporary world is difficult to establish. It definitely survived in modernity (see E. A. Souleimanov, H. Aliyev, "Blood Revenge and Violent Mobilization. Evidence from the Chechen Wars", *International Security* 2015, Vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 158–180; K. Laskowska, "Karnoprawne regulacje krwawej zemsty w Związku Radzieckim", *Miscellanea Historico-Iuridica* 2015, Vol. XIV, No. 1, pp. 326–328), as well as being an important, globally understood plot motif in popular culture texts, comprising the topos of "revenge" (see F. Spina, "Stories of Revenge in Italian Popular Culture. A Narrative Study of Vigilante Films", *Italian Journal of Sociology of Education* 2019, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 218–252). Film literature seems to be full of avengers who, feeling a kinship with the victims and a duty incumbent upon them, pursue the culprit of the crime on the roads of lawlessness without a moment's rest. This is certainly a theme for the pedagogy of popular culture (see W. Jakubowski, *Edukacja w świecie kultury popularnej*, Kraków 2006, pp. 57–99, 103–139).

Whether, however, Oedipus should expect vengeance from his sons, Creon, that is, Jocasta's brother, his parents' other close relatives, or just Erinyes, he is not completely defenseless in light of the customs of Attica, to which Sophocles leads him from Beotia. As Graves states,

> The common Greek method of purging ordinary blood guilt was for the homicide to sacrifice a pig and, while the ghost of the victim greedily drank its blood, to wash in running water, shave his head in order to change his appearance, and go into exile for one year, thus throwing the vengeful ghost off the scent. Until he had been purified in this manner, his neighbours shunned him as unlucky, and would not allow him to enter their homes or share their food, for fear of themselves becoming involved in his troubles; and he might still have to reckon with the victim's family, should the ghost demand vengeance from them[13].

Graves points out, however, that the bloodshed of the mother "carried with it so powerful a curse, that common means of purification would not serve"[14].

In his account of the final episode of Oedipus's life, Sophocles brings him to the grove of Eumenides, by which name – that is, 'The Kindly Ones' – the Erinyes were called, so as not to mention them directly in conversation or to deflect their threats. However, these do not take revenge on him[15]. On the contrary, the place dedicated to them at Colonos, to which the supplicant arrives, guarantees him inviolability, and the body of Oedipus, dead and buried there, is about to become the refuge and defense of Athens, to which its ruler, Theseus, hospitable to the exiled sinner and foreigner, and the subordinate community, knowing the harrowing fate of the king of Thebes, agree[16].

Thus, the sacred grove of the Eumenides becomes a refuge for one who has committed violations of the taboos of the time and people,

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[13] R. Graves, *The Greek Myths*, Vol. 2, op. cit., p. 69.

[14] Ibidem.

[15] Graves notes that "According to Homer, he died gloriously in battle. According to Apollodorus and Hyginus, he was banished by Iocasta's brother, a member of the Cadmean royal house, and wandered as a blind beggar through the cities of Greece until he came to Colonus in Attica, where the Furies [Erinyes – R.W.] hounded him to death" (ibidem, p. 14).

[16] See Z. Kubiak, *Mitologia Greków i Rzymian*, op. cit., pp. 521–527.

crimes prosecuted by avengers for which no victim should propitiate Erynia, but whose gravest faults arose by accident, without intention and without malice. This alien newcomer gains the protection, moreover, of his own kind of recognition. Following in this footsteps, one can say after Zbigniew Kadłubek: "*genius loci* according to Sophocles is the spirit of hikesia, or unconditional hospitality granted to everyone who comes. The grove of Eumenides is filled with the mournful treble of larks, which cry with the weeping Oedipus"[17].

But that is not all. The exiled Oedipus, known for his impulsive anger, oblivious to Antigone's pleas, desires and will not give up his revenge. Thebans, but especially his sons. One of them reaches the grove of Eumenides, seeks the support of the former king in an armed dispute with his brother over the throne, which was lost to him. Oedipus is adamant: "for the rest of my life, always remembering that you / are the murderous one who made me live in such hardship. / You drove me out". His fate is sealed. He is in for a fraternal battle. Both will die. Polyneices and Eteocles. Oedipus is convinced about it and tells him in the face: "So go – I spit on you and deny I am your father, / you foulest of beings. Take these curses / I heap upon you: that you will not defeat / your native land by force of arms nor ever return / to the valley of Argos, but will die by a kindred hand / and slay the one who drove you out"[18].

Sophocles' Oedipus will die in exile, in the sacred grove of Eumenides. He will make sure that his body, hidden by Theseus, will not be found by anyone in his family and buried according to custom and duty. Breaking the taboo, the Erinyes will avenge him. Violence begets violence.

THE TRACES OF THE OTHER AND DECONSTRUCTION. BETWEEN UNCONDITIONAL AND CONDITIONAL HOSPITALITY

It is possible that it was this spirit, or perhaps the spectre of *hikesia*, that inspired Jacques Derrida and his reflections during the January 1996

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[17] Z. Kadłubek, *Święta Medea. W stronę komparatystyki pozasłownej*, Katowice 2011, p. 159.
[18] Sophocles, *Oedipus at Colonus*, [in:] Sophocles, *The Theban Plays*, op. cit., pp. 120, 121.

seminars on hospitality[19]. In any case, Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus* provides a reference point for them to address and rethink issues of hospitality, the arrival of a foreigner (*venue d'étranger*) as Other, openness and expectation, the oscillation between conditional and unconditional welcome, between the conditional hospitality of the law of hospitality and absolute or unconditional hospitality (*l'hospitalité absolu ou inconditionnelle*). In the context of what has been said so far about Oedipus obtaining asylum in the grove of Eumenides, as a foreigner and as a criminal, pursued by avengers enforcing the law, and an outlaw, his claim that "the absolute or unconditional hospitality I would like to offer him or her presupposes a break with hospitality in the ordinary sense, with conditional hospitality, with the right to or pact of hospitality"[20] seems justified. Thus, Derrida refers to Emmanuel Levinas and his concept of subjectivity as welcoming the Other, as hospitality, as a hospitable host and hostage[21]. This question regarding the imperative to embrace the Other and the incumbent demand for an unconditional and unattainable openness to otherness that unsettles and questions

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[19] In the autobiographical essay *Monolingualism of the Other, or, the Prothesis of Origin*, whose particular versions were created from 1992 to 1996, Derrida announces: "One day it will be necessary to devote another colloquium to language, nationality, and cultural belonging, *by death* this time around, by sepulchre, and to begin with the secret of Oedipus at Colonus: all the power that this 'alien' holds over 'aliens' in the innermost secret place of the secret of his last resting place [...]" (J. Derrida, *Monolingualism of the Other, or, the Prothesis of Origin*, Stanford 1996, p. 13 – original underline).

[20] J. Derrida, *Of Hospitality*, Stanford 2000, p. 25.

[21] See E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity. An Essay on Exteriority*, Pittsburgh 1969, pp. 27, 299; E. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*, Dordrecht 1991, p. 112; J. Derrida, *Of Hospitality*, op. cit., p. 109; J. Derrida, *Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas*, Stanford 1999, p. 110. In *Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas* written over several months after Levinas's death, Derrida points to what he considers to be the central theme of his work, published in 1961 and considered important for contemporary Western philosophy: "Has anyone ever noticed? Although the word is neither frequently used nor emphasized within it, *Totality and Infinity* bequeaths to us an immense treatise *of hospitality*" (ibidem, p. 21). In the referenced commentary he also draws attention to the tension between hospitality and hostility (ibidem, pp. 85–88), between the hospitality of subjectivity and being held hostage to the other, which he chooses to label as hostility, hence he creates the category 'hostipitalité', which combines hospitality (French *hospitalité*) and hostility (*hostilité*) (see J. Derrida, "Hostipitality", *Angelaki. Journal of the Theoretical Humanities* 2000, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 3–18). On the concept of hospitality in Lèvinas and Derrida, see. I. Noble, T. Noble, "Hospitality as a Key to the Relationship with the Other in Levinas and Derrida", *Theologica* 2000, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 47–65.

my at-home, refers back to Levinas's findings in *Totality and Infinity* and *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*, which will be developed further. However, regardless of how we view the solutions proposed by the eclectic commentator on Husserl and the Talmud regarding the construction of subjectivity, it is worth following Derrida and his focus on the logic, or rather the morphology, of questioning the conditional hospitality of custom or law when confronted with a stranger whom the accepted, defined order cannot accommodate. *Oedipus at Colonus* illustrates this challenge.

In Sophocles' account, Theseus, the ruler of Athens, in a way, puts absolute hospitality ahead of what the law, cultural pattern, social norm, or commonplace dictates. He takes the exile's side, protects him and his daughters, Antigone and Ismene, and counters Creon's wiles by exposing Athens to armed conflict with Thebes. The gesture of surprising hospitality that goes beyond what was conventionally considered hospitality there and then can be followed and understood thanks to the fact that otherness is cast in this tragedy, embodied by Oedipus, and confronted with the identity of Athenian society. For there is no single, proper figure of otherness that we can juxtapose with a model identity and predetermine the stakes of demands, hopes, and risks. In other words, the other is met in the encounter[22]. But according to Derrida, not without invention. Read from this perspective, the acts of deconstruction with the help of which, even before *Writing and Difference*, he began to uncover within the linguistic structures and accepted assumptions of the classical texts of Western metaphysics its suppressed heteronomies, displacements of meaning, aporias, binary hierarchies, and cultural arbitrariness, turn out to provide a possible starting point for a series of questions about how we perceive and accommodate otherness. Consequently, the author of *Psyche. Inventions of the Other* states that "To get ready for this coming of the other is what can be called deconstruction. It deconstructs precisely this double genitive and, as deconstructive invention, itself comes back in the step [*pas*] – and also as the step – of the other"[23]. And in other words: "Hospitality – this is

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[22] J. Derrida, *Psyche. Inventions of the Other*, Vol. 1, Stanford 2007, pp. 39–40. See D. Attridge, *The Singularity of Literature*, London – New York 2004, pp. 28–34, 123–138.

[23] J. Derrida, *Psyche*, op. cit., p. 39. See J. Culler, *On Deconstruction. Theory and Criticism after Structuralism*, Ithaca – New York 1982, pp. 85–225.

a name or an example of deconstruction. [...] Hospitality is the deconstruction of the at-home"[24]. Such an act can make visible the conditions, native conventions and individual decisions in which the exceptional is entangled, deprived in various ways of its right to otherness. Deconstruction as preparation for the arrival of the other bears the signs of a political act, oriented towards the unveiling, weakening or abolition of barriers and conventions established by the local power of defining meanings and borders, of political and cultural hegemony, an ethically motivated act: responsibility for the other and justice[25]. In his speech prepared for the first congress of "cities of refuge", which was held in March 1996, Derrida clearly defines existential-political implications of the duty of hospitality:

> Hospitality is culture itself and not simply one ethic amongst others. Insofar as it has to do with the *ethos*, that is, the residence, one's home, the familiar place of dwelling, inasmuch as it is a manner of being there, the manner in which we relate to ourselves and to others, to others as our own or as foreigners, *ethics is hospitality*; ethics is so thoroughly coextensive with the experience of hospitality. But for this very reason, and because being at home with oneself (*l'être-soi chez soi – l'ipséité même* – the other within oneself) supposes a reception or inclusion of the other which one seeks to appropriate, control, and master according to different modalities of violence, there is a history of hospitality, an always possible perversion of *the* law of hospitality (which can appear unconditional), and of the laws which come to limit and condition it in its inscription as a law[26].

In this sense, the case of Oedipus at Colonos is a 'hard case' that must be considered separately because of the peculiar conditionality of the

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[24] J. Derrida, "Hostipitality", [in:] J. Derrida, *Acts of Religion*, London 2002, p. 364.

[25] See J. Derrida, "Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism", [in:] *Deconstruction and Pragmatism*, ed. Ch. Mouffe, London – New York 1996, pp. 77–88; M. Kowalska, "Dekonstrukcja, czyli widmo sprawiedliwości", [in:] *Widma Derridy*, ed. A. Bielik-Robson, P. Sadzik, Warszawa 2018, pp. 45–68 .

[26] J. Derrida, *On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness*, London – New York 2005, pp. 16–17 – original underline. See R. Włodarczyk, *Lévinas. W stronę pedagogiki azylu*, Warszawa 2009, pp. 9–19.

encounter in the Eumenides grove, even though the general principle can be established:

> absolute hospitality requires that I open up my home and that I give not only to the foreigner (provided with a family name, with the social status of being a foreigner, etc.), but to the absolute, unknown, anonymous other, and that I *give place* to them, that I let them come, that I let them arrive, and take place in the place I offer them, without asking of them either reciprocity (entering into a pact) or even their names. The law of absolute hospitality commands a break with hospitality by right, with law or justice as rights[27].

THE SPIRITS, WITH WHICH WE MUST RECKON. SPECTRES OF VICTIMS, AVENGERS OF BLOOD, AND CITIES OF REFUGE

The Erinyes can be forgotten as long as Oedipus does not have to answer to them. Besides, they belong to the mythology we have disenchanted. However, but for them, the ghost of the murdered, as in William Shakespeare's Hamlet, may at any time demand that his relatives avenge the crime. The spectre of the King of Denmark, deceitfully poisoned by his brother Claudius, reminiscent, according to Derrida, of another spectre, that of *The Communist Manifesto* of Marx and Engels, appears to Hamlet on the terrace of Elsinore and, no longer able to await justice, casts the son as the avenger, skips the trial, identifies the murderer, and removes the blame from Gertrude, his own and then his brother's wife.

These two spectres permeating our modernity, along with many other spectres, dot the pages of the book published by the French philosopher in 1993. Here, too, the trail of the avenger of blood fades away, and the author's effort, motivated by the effects of the fall of communism in the Eastern Bloc countries, seems to focus primarily on rehabilitating at least some spectres of Marx in the face of their triumphant exorcism. In the spirit of *hikesia*, he postulates that "to learn to live *with*

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[27] J. Derrida, *Of Hospitality*, op. cit., p. 25 – original underline. See J. Derrida, "Hostipitality", *Angelaki*, op. cit., pp. 3–18; M. Paździora, "Experience and Community of Sense in Legal Education. A Pragmatic Approach", [in:] *Democracy, Legal Education and The Political*, ed. M. Paździora, M. Stambulski, Frankfurt am Main 2021 (in press).

ghosts"[28], take responsibility for the Other and justice, desire to end violence. For in the larger scheme of things, it is about

> *responsibility*, beyond all living present, within that which disjoins the living present, before the ghosts of those who are not yet born or who are already dead, be they victims of wars, political or other kinds of violence, nationalist, racist, colonialist, sexist, or other kinds of exterminations, victims of the oppressions of capitalist imperialism or any of the forms of totalitarianism[29].

It seems that each of these crimes could awaken, even after some time, waves of avengers who, by virtue of the ties that bind them to the victims within our more or less imagined communities in solidarity, fraternity, or through sisterhood, would rise up summoned by these spectres dismissed without sacrifice and without reparation. Viewed from the perspective of the rise of Eastern European populism, after all, the predominance of anger over attachment to the rule of law and democratic procedures gives food for thought. The indifference of the living in this part of the world to the spectres of the distant victims of crimes committed in North Korea, Afghanistan or India, or to the spectres of the victims of climate catastrophes, those who have not yet been born, is also food for thought. But it is not the violence that begets violence, much less the primitive form of the principle of retaliation, according to which a family member must defend the rights of a relative because their blood was shed, that attracts the attention of the author of *Specters of Marx*. Nor does he follow in the footsteps of Hamlet's enlightened conscience, like Dr. Faustus of the Wittenberg University student whose professor of biblical studies was once Martin Luther. Derrida's point of departure is clear enough when he states: "There is then *some spirit*. Spirits. And *one must* reckon with them"[30].

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[28] J. Derrida, *Specters of Marx. The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International*, New York – London 2006, pp. xvii–xviii – original underline. See M. Mendel, "Eduwidmontologia – przyczynki", [in:] *Eduwidma. Rzeczy i miejsca nawiedzone*, ed. M. Mendel, Gdańsk 2021, pp. 10–29; A. Bielik-Robson, P. Sadzik, "Widma Derridy. Przeżycie", [in:] *Widma Derridy*, op. cit., pp. 11–26.

[29] J. Derrida, *Specters of Marx*, op. cit., p. xviii – original underline.

[30] Ibidem, p. xx – original underline.

In the essay "A Word of Welcome" from the book *Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas* published in 1997, the spectre of the crime victim haunting the unwitting murderer through the avenger of blood returns for another moment. In its final parts, Derrida focuses his attention on one of Levinas's Talmudic commentaries, "Cities of Refuge", based on a passage from the Makkoth treatise and published in his *Beyond the Verse. Talmudic Readings and Lectures* [31]. The debate of the Jewish scholars described in the Talmud takes place in the context of questions about the shape and functionality of cities of refuge[32] (Hebrew *arei miklat*), whose establishment was mandated to the Israelites upon the entry to the land of Canaan, in order to, as the Hebrew Bible says in the Book of Numbers, "a manslayer [*roceach*], who has killed a person unintentionally may flee. The cities shall serve you as a refuge from the avenger [*go'el*], so that the manslayer may not die unless he has stood trial before the assembly" (Num 35: 11–12). Importantly, these places of asylum are meant for "the Israelites and the resident aliens among them for refuge, so that anyone who kills a person unintentionally may flee there" (Num 35: 15; Josh 20: 9). From the point of view of the Book of Numbers, protection against an 'avenger of blood' (*go'el hadam*) or, more exactly, a 'redeemer of split blood'[33], as Derrida also sees, related solely to non-premediated

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[31] See J. Derrida, *Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas*, op. cit., pp. 107–114; E. Levinas, *Beyond the Verse. Talmudic Readings and Lectures*, Bloomington – Indianapolis 1994, pp. 34–52; O. Eisenstadt, "The Problem of the Promise. Derrida and Levinas on the Cities of Refuge", *Cross Currents* 2003, Vol. 52, No. 4, pp. 474–482.

[32] In Tanakh, besides Book of Numbers (35: 11–28), about the cities of refuge speak Deuteronomy (4: 41–43, 19: 1–13) and Book of Joshua (20: 1–9) (see S. D. Sperling, "Blood, Avenger of", [in:] *The Anchor Bible Dictionary*, Vol. 1, ed. D. N. Freedman, New York 1992, pp. 763–764).

[33] See ibidem; P. Barmash, "Blood Feud and State Control: Differing Legal Institutions for the Remedy of Homicide During the Second and First Millennia B.C.E.", *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 2004, Vol. 63, No. 3, pp. 183–199; M. J. Lynch, *Portraying Violence in the Hebrew Bible. A Literary and Cultural Study*, Cambridge 2020, pp. 205–217. According to S. David Sperling, "The key to understanding the biblical notion 'avenger of blood' is the noun translated 'avenger' but perhaps more accurately rendered 'restorer'. Hebrew *gôʾēl* is derived from the verb *gaʾal* 'restored', a synonym of *pādā* – 'redeemed', 'ransomed' (Lev 27: 27, Jer 31: 11, Hos 13: 14); *hošîʾa* – 'saved' (Isa 61: 16); and *râb* – 'interceded legally in one's behalf' (Is 49: 25, Jer 50: 34, Ps 119: 154). [...] A *gôʾēl* therefore was one who effected restoration to an original, sometimes ideal, state. Such a restorer, usually a close relative (Ruth 3: 12), was expected to regain land sold by a family member (Lev 25: 25, Jer 32: 7–8, Ruth 4: 3–4) and to redeem a relative from slavery (Lev 25: 47–49).

manslaughter; manslaying is committed as an unwitting act of homicide or a murderer through negligence, accidently, with no ill intention, but still concerns only selected places. Therefore, "if the manslayer ever goes outside the limits of the city of refuge [...] and the blood-avenger kills the manslayer, there is no bloodguilt on his account" (Num 35: 26–27). In Levinas's discussion in "Cities of Refuge", the understanding of these special cities set forth in this and two other books of the Hebrew Bible overlaps not only with the opinions of Talmudic authorities recorded in the Makkoth treatise, but also with the generational, accumulated over hundreds of years, and territorially diverse experiences of communities of Jewish scholars incorporated into the literature and traditions of Judaism.

However, Derrida reading Levinas' commentary here does not follow the biblical or Talmudic text. He combines the findings recorded in the *Beyond the Verse* with the subject matter and solutions of the earlier works, such as *Totality and Infinity* and *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*, which are characterized by the language of phenomenology, i.e. the language of philosophical discourse coherent with its western tradition[34]. However, he is aware that Levinas speaks here, in "Cities of Refuge", in a different way, or rather through the voice of the Other, if one takes this tradition as a reference point and tries its hospitality.

'THOU SHALL NOT KILL' REVEALED IN THE FACE OF THE OTHER. THE WISDOM OF THE TALMUD TO TRANSLATE 'INTO GREEK'

In bidding farewell to Levinas on 27 December 1995 at the Pantin cemetery in Paris, Derrida referred, among other things, to his understanding of death as our experience of an unanswered state and incurable

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The 'blood avenger' was literally 'taker back of the blood', that is, a redeemer with a specialized function. The killing of one clan member was construed by the remaining members not only as a shedding of the group's blood but as misappropriation of blood which properly belonged to the entire group. The responsibility of the blood avenger was to win back that misappropriated blood by killing the original blood shedder" (S. D. Sperling, *Blood, Avenger of*, op. cit., pp. 763–764).

[34] See J. Derrida, *Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas*, op. cit., pp. 110–112; I. Noble, T. Noble, "Hospitality as a Key to the Relationship with the Other in Levinas and Derrida", op. cit., pp. 53–56.

remoteness. He also reminded us that "It is the murderer who would like to identify death with nothingness [...]. The face of the Other forbids me to kill; it says to me «Thou shall not kill», even if this possibility remains presupossed by the interdiction the makes it impossible"[35]. My freedom is questioned.

In this prohibition revealed to me in the face of the Other as a formula for Levinas's reflection on ethics, the two traditions of thought, Western and Jewish, to which his philosophy refers, seem to converge. In his intellectual activity and in his numerous publications, the first of which hark back to the late 1920s, one can distinguish a sizeable body of texts devoted to the debate with the Judaic tradition and thought, as well as modern Jewish culture. Of particular importance for this part of the phenomenologist's output seem the books published by him, which contain or collect his comments on selected sections of the Talmud[36]. However, as Catherine Chalier notes, "The fact that Levinas himself wanted to publish his philosophical writings and his Jewish writings with different publishers should not lead us to think that Jewish sources were foreign to his philosophy or that his questioning of the Hebrew word remained free of all contamination by Greek influences"[37].

He himself in the "Introduction" to *Four Talmudic Readings*, published in 1968, evoking the invoking the method of exegesis and the memory of his then deceased Talmudic teacher known as Monsieur Chouchani, with whom he studied from 1947 to 1952, observes "He has made a dogmatic

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[35] J. Derrida, *Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas*, op. cit., p. 6. See E. Levinas, *God, Death, and Time*, Stanford 2000, pp. 11–15.

[36] Such as *Quatre lectures talmudiques* (1968), *Du sacré au saint. Cinq nouvelles lectures talmudiques* (1977), *L'au delà du verset. Lectures et discours talmudiques* (1982), *A l'heure des nations* (1988), and *Nouvelles lectures talmudiques* (1996). Discussions with the tradition and thought of Judaism and modern Jewish culture are also included in his works such as: *Difficile liberté. Essais sur le judaïsme* (1963, revised and increased edition 1976), *Noms propres* (1975), *Hors sujet* (1987) – all these works have been translated into English and published. On the Jerusalem and Babylonian Talmuds as sources of knowledge about the revelation and will of God addressed to believers or those affiliated with Orthodox Judaism, see *The Encyclopaedia of Judaism*, Vol. IV, ed. J. Neusner, A. J. Avery-Peck, W. S. Green, Leiden – Boston 2005, pp. 2583–2613.

[37] C. Chalier, "Levinas and the Talmud", [in:] *The Cambridge Companion to Levinas*, ed. S. Crithley, R. Bernasconi, Cambridge 2002, p. 100. See S. Wygoda, "A Phenomenological Outlook at the Talmud, Levinas as Reader of the Talmud", *Phenomenological Inquiry. A Review* 2000, Vol. 24, pp. 117–148.

approach based purely on faith or even a theological approach to the Talmud altogether impossible for us. Our attempt must attest to this search for freedom even if it does not attest to a freedom already possessed [...]"[38]. Then he accounts for his deficient preparation for the role of a Talmud commentator, but nevertheless clearly defines his intentions:

> Our lessons, despite their weakness, would like to sketch the possibility of a reading of the *Talmud* which would limit itself neither to philology nor to piety toward a 'precious but outdated' past nor to the religious act of worship. It suggests a reading in search of problems and truths and that [...] is necessary for an Israel wishing to preserve its self-consciousness in the modern world [...]. But a modern formulation of Talmudic wisdom is necessary also for those who want to remain Jews outside the land Israel. Finally, it must become accessible to cultured human beings who, without adhering to the answers Judaism brings to the vital questions of the times, are eager to know about the authentic civilization of Israel[39].

It will remain debatable whether Levinas managed to go beyond the conventions of Orthodox Judaism and retain his authority as a commentator of the Talmud[40]. However, we should keep in mind declared in the "Introduction" the objective of the task embarked upon by Levinas, i.e. "to translate into a modern idiom", "to translate «into Greek» of the wisdom of the Talmud", since "Loyalty to a Jewish culture closed to dialogue and polemic with the West condemns the Jews to the ghetto and to physical extermination. Admission into the City makes them disappear into the civilization of their hosts [...]"[41].

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[38] E. Levinas, *Nine Talmudic Readings*, Bloomington & Indianapolis 1990, p. 8.

[39] Ibidem, p. 9.

[40] See S. Wygoda, "Un *Midrash philosophique. À propos de la lecture levinassienne du Talmud*", *Cahiers d'Études Lévinassiennes* 2005, No. 4, pp. 316–319. In this context, it is worth noting that the intriguing originality of Levinas's thoughts, recognised in Western humanities and social sciences, is also due to the fact that they are among the most prominent achievements of contemporary Jewish philosophy (see R. Cohen, "Postmodern Jewish Philosophy", [in:] *History of Jewish Philosophy*, ed. D. H. Frank, O. Leaman, London – New York 2005, pp. 777–784).

[41] E. Levinas, *Nine Talmudic Readings*, op. cit., p. 9. "My concern everywhere is precisely to translate this non-Hellenism of the Bible into Hellenic terms and not to repeat the biblical formulas in their obvious sense [...]" (E. Levinas, *Of God Who Comes to Mind*,

Levinas's ongoing pursuit of this task seems to be confirmed by his collections of Talmudic commentaries and philosophical works. Their complementarity is made possible, among other things, by the fact that the two relatively separate intellectual traditions in which his various publications are located strive both to preserve and to continually creatively transform the layers of their sources. As a result, we should not be surprised by the identifiable parallels that exist between these two types of Levinas's intellectual engagement, as exemplified by the answer he formulated in the year of the publication of *Totality and Infinity* to the question 'What does Jewish thinking concern itself with?':

> A whole host of things, no doubt, which we are not going to list. But its basic message consists in bringing the meaning of each and every experience back to the ethical relation between men, in appealing to man's personal responsibility – in which he feels chosen and irreplaceable – in order to bring about a human society in which men are treated as men. The realization of this just society *ipso facto* involves raising man up into the same society as God[42].

On the other hand, the phenomenological and at the same time dialogical model of the ethical relation between people, which Levinas employs in his philosophical works, can be regarded as a transformation of the dyad, in which the Self is in relation to the other recognized as analogous to the Self, into a dyad, in which the Self is in asymmetrical relation to the other as the Other, that is, in which the otherness of the Other cannot be reduced symmetrically to what is known and familiar, given in the experience of oneself[43]. According to the philosopher, the Self reacts to this visitation of the otherness of

Stanford 1998, p. 85). See E. Levinas, *Being Jewish*, *Continental Philosophy Review* 2007, Vol. 40, pp. 205–210. Ephraim Meir is not the only one to observe that "Levinas, a master in translating, was the first to disclose in modern times the relevance of Talmudic thinking for the world at large" (E. Meir, "Hellenic and Jewish in Levinas's Writings", *Veritas* 2006, Vol. 51, No. 2, p. 87).

42 E. Levinas, *Difficult Freedom. Essays on Judaism*, Baltimore 1990, p. 159.

43 See E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, op. cit., pp. 33–52. See also G. Biesta, "Pedagogy with Empty Hands: Levinas, Education, and the Question of Being Human", [in:] *Levinas and Education*, op. cit., pp. 203–207.

the Other, revealed by his Face, according to the philosopher, the Self responds with a core of ethical sensitivity that is primary in relation to acts of consciousness.

In Levinas's perspective, the approach of the Other traumatizes my Self. It breaks our separation and my peace of being at home, it undermines my apparent neutrality in relation to the Other, my freedom, my independence and innocence with a call to which a conscious response, attempting to grasp the subject of the disturbing urge, is a delayed reaction, like an attempt to evade with mental gymnastics that trusts in the credibility and power of self-justification. The Self, thus understood by Levinas, is passive in the sense that it involuntarily accepts the approach of the Other by virtue of my being near him. Consequently, every possible response of mine is subsequent to my yielding to the summons and every response is already a reaction to the phenomenon of the-one-for-the-other commitment inside of me, which makes me, according to Levinas, a hostage – the other's life, in a way I do not yet know, depends on me, regardless of my intentions, my present state and the result of previous actions and commitments[44]. In other words, if I concentrate well, I can hear within myself a concern for the Other prior to any request he makes to me and my awareness of that request and its content. Care that responds to his very palpable presence. Care that senses his misery and accuses me, which in itself is already painful. Hence, one might venture to say that most of us would like to diversify our sensitivity, for example, to remain faithful to the inner call in a limited way and hospitable towards loved ones, while keeping our distance and relating to strangers with carelessness. Meanwhile, the core of ethical sensibility is, according to Levinas, radically democratic and anarchic. Nevertheless, it is also worth noting that my assumption of responsibility for the Other, that is, my response to this sense of uncomfortable source commitment, can go in two directions: from closure, my isolation from the source of anxiety and all its manifestations to its destruction, or from my ever-widening opening up to the Other, conditional obedience to my concern for him and

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[44] See E. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*, op. cit., pp. 99–129; S. Todd, *Learning from the Other. Levinas, Psychoanalysis, and Ethical Possibilities in Education*, New York 2003, pp. 49–53.

his instructions to unconditional hospitality[45]. Anyway in the Levinas's concept of subjectivity as welcoming another human being, as hospitality, host and hostage, there is no escape to a neutral position from the moment of understanding that one is summoned by the Other. And as I open up to the Other my responsibilities grow. Radically conceived by Levinas, the extent of the Self's responsibility for the Other can only be limited by the responsibility for justice, for we must constantly consider and decide which other we should give priority to[46]. However, this does not mean that my responsibility for the Other, any Other, is suspended:

> in the relationship with another I am always in relation with the third party. But he is also my neighbor. From this moment on, proximity becomes problematic: one must compare, weigh, think; one must do justice, which is the source of theory. [...] If equity is necessary, we must have comparison and equality: equality between those that cannot be compared[47].

Establishing the intrigue of a relationship is primary to what actually happens in it, it is based on the Self that accepts the call, which for

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[45] Research themes from Levinas's later work, such as substitution and holiness, the idea of God as infinity can be seen as attempts to recognize the conditions of radical hospitality, see E. Levinas, *Of God Who Comes to Mind*, op. cit., pp. 55–78; M. de Saint-Cheron, *Conversations with Emmanuel Levinas, 1983–1994*, Pittsburgh 2010, pp. 41–110. Michaël de Saint-Cheron claims that "In this century opening *after him* – in these inhuman times, these times of «the barbarism of being» – Levinas's mad utopia of having wanted to believe in the irreducible possibility of the human being to choose holiness is testimony to an inordinate hope in humanity's capacity «to infinitely go beyond the human»" (ibidem, p. 9 – original underline). Miguel Abensour, on the other hand, in the context of Levinas's thought, states: "The relations to the Other is not ontology, it is utopia, the appearance of utopia, the moment toward the beyond of utopia. This is the sense in which we could say that man is a utopian animal, or an animal for-utopia" (M. Abensour, "Persistent Utopia", *Constellations* 2008, Vol. 15, No. 3, p. 411). See I. Gur-Ze'ev, J. Masschelein, N. Blake, "Reflectivity, Reflection, and Counter-Education", op. cit., pp. 99–101.

[46] See E. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*, op. cit., pp. 157–161; M. Wimmer, "Thinking the Other – the Other Thinking. Remarks on the Relevance of the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas for the Philosophy of Education", [in:] *Levinas and Education*, op. cit., pp. 117–119.

[47] E. Levinas, *Of God Who Comes to Mind*, op. cit., p. 82. See E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, op. cit., pp. 212–214, 240–247; E. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*, op. cit., pp. 127–128, 153–162.

Levinas is based on ethics, inspiring the consciousness to look for the answer to the question "what to do?", to reflect on morality. In other words, any request, thematizing the call, only intensifies the anxiety, already present in the subject on the basis of obligation, connected with the passivity of the Self, anxiety about the condition and the life of the other, in which he has acquired an immeasurable share without intention, casually, through the encounter. This is the source intrigue of unlimited responsibility in the subject, over which a dynamic social life is built which demands of him more than he can bear. This is why Levinas can say in one of his Jewish writings, giving an interpretation of the keynote of his philosophy:

> 'Thou shalt not kill' or 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor' not only forbis the violence of murder: it also concerns all the slow and invisible killing committed in our desires and vices, in all the innocent cruelties of natural life, in our indifference of 'good conscience' to what is far and what is near, even in the haughty obstinacy of our objectifying and our thematizing, in all the consecrated injustices due to our atomic weight of individuals and the equilibrium of our social orders. The entire Torah, in its minute descriptions, is concentrated in the 'Thou shalt not kill' that the face of the other signifies and awaits its proclamation therein. The life of others, the *being* of others, falls to me as a duty[48].

The condition of a hostage, which is worth emphasizing because of the theme explored in the chapter, implies an awareness of involuntary complicity in slow and invisible murders; the hostage is aware of his or her own non-culpable guilt. A just society would be for him, for them, a chance to live a life that chooses and serves life.

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[48] E. Levinas, *In the Time of the Nations*, Bloomington & Indianapolis 1994, pp. 110–111 – original underline. See E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, op. cit., pp. 197–201. "It is a pure self, in the accusative, responsible before there is freedom. Whatever be the ways that lead to the superstructure of society, in justice the dissymmetry that holds me at odds with regard to the other will find again law, autonomy, equality" (E. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*, op. cit., p. 127).

CITIES OF REFUGE, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR MANSLAUGHTERS AND JUSTICE. TOWARDS A PEDAGOGY OF ASYLUM

The issue of responsibility in the context of involuntary complicity in slow and invisible homicides, which can be said to be ordinary violence in a given society, is addressed by Levinas in his Talmudic reading of "Cities of Refuge", which he probably delivered in the late 1970s and early 1980s during one of the conferences of Jewish Intellectuals of France held annually in Paris[49]. Levinas's commentary, in which the philosopher focuses on a Talmudic page from the Makkoth treatise (10a), is complex, considers many detailed issues in their various aspects, and it is impossible to give attention to them all. Relevant to the subject matter of this chapter are the issues of how to understand the figures of the avengers of blood, the cities of refuge and the perpetrator for whom these cities, which Levinas considers after the Talmud, are also to be cities of exile[50], as well as the two themes discussed by the scribes in the commentary passage of the Makkoth treatise-the study of Torah by those going to the cities of refuge and Jerusalem that does not fall into this category. A way of understanding that makes it possible in the context of what has been reconstructed and interpreted so far to propose the idea of the pedagogy of asylum.

Levinas's reading and perspective results in a reinterpretation of the murder as an unwitting act of homicide, without intent or maliciousness, and the murder through negligence and help to pose critical questions on the development stage and status of present-day Western societies, questions about our individual responsibility for regional and global social inequalities, armed conflicts and their victims and perpetrators, about the side effects of our participation in everyday life. Levinas thus seems to place us in the role of the unconscious murderer or the murderer acting through negligence, and seems to be asking: "Does not the avenger or the redeemer of blood 'with heated heart' lurk around

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[49] See E. Levinas, *Beyond the Verse*, op. cit., p. xiv. In a section of this subchapter I use the findings an excerpts from the article "Hospitality, Asylum and Education. Around Emmanuel Levinas's Talmudic Readings" (*Ethics and Education* 2021, Vol. 16, No. 3, pp. 355–374).

[50] See E. Levinas, *Beyond the Verse*, op. cit., p. 39.

us, in the form of people's anger, of the spirit of revolt or even of de-linquency in our suburbs, the result of the social imbalance in which we are placed? [...] does not all this make our cities – cities of refuge or cities of exiles?"[51].

In the reading initiated by Levinas, subjective unintentionality and objective effect form the tissue of one of the planes of injustice and suf-fering generated by living in the urban crowding and noise. In this sense, our cities do not only provide shelter from blood avengers, they are also places of exile, if we consider the sensitivity of our consciences, in which, according to the biblical text and Talmudic interpretation, our encounter with one of the avengers may also happen by chance, al-though this one should wait at its gates. Thing is that as long as blood avengers move about and they do this because it constantly comes to the slow and invisible killing, invisible also as a result of socialization in ordinary violence, we are the accused.

In turn, the study of the Torah is referred in the passage of the treaty commented by Levinas in the context of the rabbis' discussion of the duty, nature and importance of involvement in its study and teaching by a well-versed master scholar who must go into exile to the city of refuge. Precisely because of this educational duty, he cannot go there alone. Likewise the student. As Levinas will emphasise, this aspect of Talmudical investigations, "True thought is not a 'silent dialogue of the soul with itself' but the discussion between thinkers". In other words, "Teaching is a method of research"[52]. Still, the study of the Torah, which, Levinas will point out, is the justice, "because, in its expressions and contents, it is a call for absolute vigilance"[53], does not quench the de-sire for justice – there is a city of refuge, and there is also an avenger of blood, and this one is circulating for a reason: "The ancient status of the city of refuge – the ambiguity of a crime which is not a crime, punished by a punishment which is not a punishment – is related to the ambiguity of human fraternity which is the source of hatred and pity"[54], observes Levinas. It can be considered that the avenger of blood is an

51 Ibidem, p. 40. See O. Eisenstadt, *The Problem of the Promise*, op. cit., p. 275.
52 E. Levinas, *Beyond the Verse*, op. cit., pp. 49, 50.
53 Ibidem, p. 46.
54 Ibidem, pp. 46–47.

epitome of unwitting and deliberate violations within a social reality yet is no yardstick of moral aberrations. This function seems to be fulfilled in this reading by the study of the Torah, through which the demand of justice permeates this social reality. In this sense, justice is no pre--established order or a normative point of reference helping to define the right choice, but an educational challenge, both part and parcel of social practice and its change and correction. One must compare, weigh, think, be vigilant, for one is responsible for the close and the distant, including manslaughters, hence for justice to the spectres of victims and avengers of blood.

The final part of the above passage from Tractate Makkoth refers to Jerusalem, yet there is no direct confrontation; one can speak about some contrast with respect to the cities of refuge. Just like studying the Torah in the excerpts of the treatise is seen by Levinas as study through dialogue, a discussion of the highest standards of justice deposited there, Jerusalem seems to be expressed via utopia, a place where the justice of the Torah is to be fulfilled[55]. Therefore,

> There are cities of refuge because we have enough conscience to have good intentions, but not enough not to betray them by our acts. Hence the manslaughters. Reality is not transparent to us; we take a confusion of feelings for a conscience and hatreds for fraternity. Before the stream of things, we lose our footing. In Jerusalem, the city of the authentic *Torah*, it is a more conscious consciousness, completely brought down to earth. It is the great awakening. We have a footing. We are no longer submerged by events, we no longer fear the avenger of blood, there is no longer an avenger of blood. We no longer risk committing the murders which give rise to the blood avengers. We escape the disorder where every person existing is concerned with his existence to enter into an order where the other man is finally visible[56].

One might argue that what is outlined here is a horizon of expectations and an image of the everyday world in which "we no longer risk

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55 See O. Eisenstadt, *The Problem of the Promise*, op. cit., p. 480; D. Epstein, "Contre l'utopie, pour l'utopisme", *Cahiers d'Études Lévinassiennes* 2005, No. 4, pp. 87–104.
56 E. Levinas, *Beyond the Verse*, op. cit., p. 50.

committing the murders which give rise to the avengers of blood", an image of a sufficiently perfect social order and interpersonal relations. However, for the phenomena of learning to open up to otherness, the nonviolent form of relations, the hospitality of the cities of refuge, read here from the perspective of educational philosophy, asylums also seem to be relevant. Asylums can be understood as alternatives with an important educational potential for everyday life, dominated by the effects of socialisation in ordinary violence. The asylum creates the conditions for realizing the existence, impact, and meaning of involuntary complicity in slow and invisible murders, through the cessation or weakening of their impact, and through the possibility of learning of opening to otherness it provides, avoidance of violence, and hospitality. As Ivana and Tim Noble point out also in Derrida's view "radical hospitality is a gift that transforms human nature and deconstructs self-interest"[57]. It should not be assumed that outside the asylum these experiences are unattainable. However, the reality of our slow and invisible killing, our innocent cruelties, the haughty obstinacy of our objectifying, the consecrated injustices makes our awakening to the education in nonviolence and practicing openness to otherness, the nonviolent form of relations, the hospitality much more difficult. Is the school established as the separate time and place[58] not conceived as an order that fosters the promise of an introduction to a knowledge other than the ordinary? Does not education in nonviolence, then, need the establishment of a hospitable place for its initiation? Is this about withdrawal and avoiding consequences? Rather, we deal here with a necessary combination of conscience and knowledge. Following the Talmudic discussion, Levinas's attention quickly shifts to the figure of a rabbi who seeks protection against an 'avenger of blood' in the study of the Torah[59]. The city of refuge is not Jerusalem but taking up this educational challenge in the spirit of other people's humanism, the ethics of hospitality, the refraining from violence and responsibility for justice, as expressed here

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[57] I. Noble, T. Noble, "Hospitality as a Key to the Relationship with the Other in Levinas and Derrida", op. cit., p. 61.

[58] See J. Masschelein, M. Simons, *In Defence of the School. A Public Issue*, Leuven 2013, pp. 27–87.

[59] See E. Levinas, *Beyond the Verse*, op. cit., pp. 43–45.

by the figure of the Torah study, taking up – as Levinas clearly points ut – teamwork, seems to give a utopian dimension to the asylum.

The critical orientation of Levinas' philosophy, on the other hand, seems to be based on the finding that education in nonviolence is a challenge to the world of everyday life, which is dominated by social and legal norms and customs inconsistent with its idea. Hence, it can be assumed that education in hospitality requires an asylum, since the basic institutions of socialization, such as family, school, media, religious associations, societies, peer and social groups, work environments and centres of power, do not guarantee the right conditions for the formation of experience and the habit of basing one's own decisions on the ethical core of subjective sensitivity. Moreover, one may venture to say that the social expectations that make up morality, law and custom present themselves in everyday life and are transmitted to the subject as the equivalent of his responsibility for others, world and justice. Appealing to the potential of education in this context presupposes not only a certain deficit of non-accidental places in social space in which the subject can safely and carefully confront the nature of his core of ethical sensibility, but that this deficit cannot be filled without a relatively organized, focused and intentional educational effort for developmental change. This does not mean, however, that the idea of the pedagogy of asylum outlined here can only be realised in educational venues specifically set up for this purpose. We should rather look for the potential characteristic for the pedagogy of asylum and the possibilities of its strengthening in existing groups, associations and institutions. For it is not so much the content of their interests and the aims of their activities, but the character and quality of the relations built there that determine the creation of conditions for the formation of habits and the acquisition of experiences in accordance with the assumptions of the ethics of hospitality. The habits and experiences formed in this way in the asylums can then serve individuals as points of reference for their activities in other social spaces and everyday life. This does not mean that the pedagogy of asylum contributes to the reduction or disappearance of the contradictions existing in society between socialisation in ordinary violence and the aims of education in nonviolence. On the contrary, it increases their awareness and at the same time the chances of avoiding inhospitable practices.

WHAT DO WE GAIN FROM THE ENCOUNTER WITH HOSPITALITY, DECONSTRUCTION, AND ASYLUM?

Perhaps we, too, would not pass by Oedipus indifferently, disregarding the relentless Erinyes pursuing him, dismissing with easy forgiveness the sufferings of those far away, giving him a place among our loved ones. The spirit of *hikesia* emerging from Sophocles' revision of this part of the history of the Labdakid family appears like Euripides' *deus ex machina* (Greek *apo mekhanes theos*). Nevertheless, it haunts the thought, or gives food for thought. Thanks to the hospitality of Theseus, going beyond what is prescribed by law or custom, the sacred grove of the Eumenides becomes a refuge for the son of Laius, a stranger and exiled sinner, but it does not result in his inner transformation. Sophocles' dictated response of Oedipus to his exile, to his torment, implies retaliation. Hamlet, on the other hand, cannot be deterred by his enlightened conscience, the troubles of which Shakespeare allows us to follow insightfully. Faced with the spectre of sacrifice, faced with a sense of duty, faced with the harm of the other, the Prince of Denmark will turn into an avenger of blood. Thus, there is a ghost, ghosts, to be reckoned with. By virtue of the fact that "Reality is not transparent to us; we take a confusion of feelings for a conscience and hatreds for fraternity"[60], both roles are there for us to play: we are unintentional perpetrators of slow and invisible murders, and we demand repayment in the name of the wronged and the harmed as avengers of blood. In other words, simply because of our socialization into violence accepted as ordinary, we are already in danger of a vicious cycle of manslaughters and blood avengers.

It is not the case, however, that Oedipus' fate was unavoidable for him this time as well. In one scene, Sophocles shows us the anger and resentment of a deeply wounded father who does not accept the thought of meeting his son, but Antigone convinces him:

and even if he were to wrong you / by the worst crime there is, father, / it would not be right for you to do the same to him. / Let him come [...] Forget these present troubles, but consider / all you suffered through your father and mother, / and when you do, I know you will understand / that evil rage

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[60] Ibidem, p. 50.

can only lead to further evil. […] Yield to us! / Those whose cause is just sho-
uld not be forced / to wait too long–nor is it right that a man treated well /
should not know how to repay that kindness[61].

The point may not be that forgiveness is a ready-made solution, but
that the experience of grace prompts the torn, drama-stricken Anti-
gone to seek alternatives to retaliation, not to give up hope. Polynices'
sister, like the rabbi and his student studying the Torah in the city of
refuge, seem to anticipate the educationally important encounter be-
tween hospitality, deconstruction, and asylum, between my responsi-
bility for the Other and justice.

So the pedagogy of asylum hopes to give us a chance to be able to
see and perhaps follow an alternative path to the old one taken by Oedi-
pus, trusting in the laws of the eternal Dike, and Hamlet acting out of
a sense of duty. A world without an alternative seems to be a prison. The
problem is my deafness and insensitivity, my violence, which may seem
right to me in a world in which we are constantly enmeshed in it, which
is unable to do without it. I would like to be able to find out, to know if,
how and when I can spare the suffering of others. If then, "To shun evil
is understanding" (Job 28: 28), including the avoidance of invisible and
slow murders and the annihilation of the Other, then the educational
awakening of everyone, including adults, to non-violence and the prac-
tice of welcoming the other can be pedagogically fostered by creating
the appropriate conditions for their possibilities. With that said, it is not
insignificant that learning itself is fundamentally an acceptance of the
other and a continually renewed deconstruction of one's own identity,
which inherently entails risk. Nonetheless, Levinas seems to see hope
for the "realization of just society" in every such time as this, "when
the eschatology of messianic peace will have come to superpose itself
upon the ontology of war"[62]. As you might guess, this is about a radical
thought put into the mouth of one of the prophets: "peace, to the far
and the near" (Is 57: 19). This order is of utmost importance for Levinas.

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[61] Sophocles, *Oedipus at Colonus*, op. cit., p. 116.
[62] E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, op. cit., p. 22.

CHAPTER IX

THE PEDAGOGY OF ASYLUM AS A UTOPIA OF HOSPITALITY. A REVIEW OF BASIC ASSUMPTIONS

For every man there are things he
cannot bear to happen to others

Mengzi

But the land must not be sold beyond
reclaim, for the land is Mine;
you are but strangers resident with Me

Leviticus 25,23

Global intensification of the migration movements by the end of the 20th century predicted further accumulation of this phenomenon and, therefore, announcement of the 21st century, the "Age of Migration", contribute to the increased significance of the phenomenon of "hospitality". In the perspective of global migration[1], one should also consider one of the aspects of a simultaneous rebirth of interest in locality, community and culture-specific for them in the democratic Western world. After a period of its twilight related to rapid industrialization and attendant urbanization, a limited significance of tradition and an increase in the role of state and nationalist ideologies in the collective life. It seems that this dimension of the life of democratically organized communities becomes crucial in the context of intensified migration, as not the political asylum, administratively provided by the state or individual efforts of particular individuals, but the hospitality of societies and local communities, in which everyday life international and intranational migrants must find their place, constitutes the right area of their necessary

[1] See M. Agier, *On the Margins of the World. The Refugee Experience Today*, Cambridge – Malden 2008, pp. 73–101.

support. In other words, the "Age of Migration" divides people into two roles: the migrant or the admitting side[2].

Preparation of groups and communities for hospitality and education for asylum becomes an initial condition for social integration that may prevent isolation and, consequently, take one of the models developed within the framework of intercultural pedagogy – assimilation, melting pot or cultural pluralism. The tragic experience of the first half of last century, the culmination of colonialism, totalitarianisms, world wars, ethnic cleansings and Holocaust, with a decisive influence over the nature of modern Western liberal democracies, showed that the metaphor of space is an inaccurate measure of social and individual distance. It is evident in the era of the global flow of information, ideas, goods, services, resources, men and women, where the comforting fact is that time and space are no longer the limits for our access to the world. Still, it also has consequences undermining an individual sense of ontological security – equally unlimited access to ourselves in the scale of the world as a whole.

In other words, the issue of hospitality announced in the title is accompanied by assumptions resulting from the theoretical perspective adopted in the chapter, indicating the asylum as an educationally significant base for involvement in civic society. While entering the asylum, the subject may co-participate differently from the one socially dominant, experience discontinuity of social space and different rules for defining a situation. Experience gained in this way may become an essential component of its practical awareness, allowing for recovery of ethical and practical orientation in the world, critical distance to dominant social relations and motivation for involvement in the democratic civic society. This peculiar therapeutic effect of asylum, enabling subjects to restore prudence, motivation and self-efficacy, constitutes an intermediate step, bizarre laboratory preparing for involvement in operation with others and among others.

Of course, the concept of the pedagogy of asylum is here an element of Utopianism. Actual realizations are in practice something more and something less than the assumptions of the idea, which has a research

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[2] See M. Agier, *Borderlands. Towards an Anthropology of the Cosmopolitan Condition*, Cambridge – Malden 2016, pp. 58–79.

and critical potential (an ideal to which we can refer specific realizations), a regulative potential (indicating the conditions for the possibility of asylum organization) and an emancipatory potential (a dawning of practical and discursive awareness of the subjective participation in the social life). Therefore, at the level of existence of particular groups we can talk about ersatz asylum. This chapter aims at the presentation of ethical and political grounds of the pedagogy of asylum as the Utopia of hospitality, which, in its assumptions, refers to concepts of such thinkers as Emmanuel Levinas, George Steiner, Hannah Arendt, Michael Walzer, Avishai Margalit, Jacques Derrida and Janusz Korczak. The utopia of hospitality, in its basic assumptions, is a look at the social life, life of individuals and communities, as concentrated in asylums, which may be a response to modern challenges to Western democracies, education and politics in the "Age of Migration".

UTOPICS AND EDUCATION

The phenomenon of Utopia owes its name to a text of 1516 by the Renaissance humanist Thomas More. The contents of the text, alongside a social discussion about the potential and the appropriate way to realize political and social ideals, consist of an extensive account by one of the discussants, Raphael Hythloday. The narrative concerns an island far from Europe, unknown to the inhabitants of the old world, which has been the most daring embodiment of the above ideals for several centuries. This detailed and enthusiastic way of discussing the ultimate social organization and the devices to keep it at the expected level, of ideas of a world of everyday life that is as improved as can be and achievable, have become widespread and assumed the form of a literary convention. However, the problems related to the history of the organization of the community on the island of Utopia, invented by More, should not be reduced to a mere literary convention. The recognition of a tradition well-rooted in Mediterranean culture, to which Thomas More deliberately alluded and unwittingly gave it a name and viability, as well as the equivalents of this phenomenon created and developed outside the Western world, has contributed to defining the complex subject of interdisciplinary research, which is utopics, well-developed today, the topics of Utopia. In

other words, according to Ruth Levitas, the constructions of imaginary worlds, free from the anxiety of everyday life, can be found in one form or another in numerous cultures.

Furthermore, a view that Utopia is not escapist nonsense but rather a constitutive part of the legacy of humanity should be regarded as a foundation of a vibrantly developing, already well-established direction of research, known as *utopian studies*[3]. The very value of images of sufficiently perfect possible worlds increases with technological achievements, the development and expansion of education and the democratization of societies, whose citizens gain, among others, the chance to discuss the expectations of their future through interactive media. In addition, we seem to be increasingly aware of living in a world of excesses of competing utopias that colonize the world around us. At any rate, it is to stress that utopias are not merely literature or remote, hard-to-reach places, but the horizon of tomorrow as well as the social and political aspirations and expectations that activate human ambitions and offer a sense of achievement.

Nevertheless, the 'stigma' of Utopia is evident. Since, in common parlance, Utopia is nothing but an unrealistic ideal, an illusion, a fantasy, and clear evidence of naivety, its creators try to avoid associating their works with this very meaning. For example, in his essay *Utopistics, Or, Historical Choices of the Twenty-first Century*, Immanuel Wallerstein observes that his studies do not address a perfect and imminent future yet try and indicate an alternative and, arguably better and historically feasible, one. this future will be made possible by a simultaneous use of scientific knowledge about politics and ethics[4]. This is, in his opinion, a sober, rational and realistic assessment of social systems, their limitations and capacities, which is why, to preserve the above significant difference, he describes his research as utopian. Today, similar measures, caveats and certificates of credibility are contained in the famous publications of Rutger Bregman and Youval Noah Harari. In other words, in the context of the collapse of Eastern European communism and the immensity of

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[3] See R. Levitas, *The Concept of Utopia*, Oxford 2011, pp. 1–9, 179–205; L. T. Sargent, "The Three Faces of Utopianism Revisited", *Utopian Studies* 1994, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 1–37.

[4] See I. *Wallerstein, Utopistics: Or, Historical Choices of the Twenty-first Century*, New York 1989.

crimes committed over the centuries in the name of particular utopias, it is not easy to openly admit to it. Especially that too many people find it convincing to say that dystopia is our most probable historical capacity, one we may already have put into life, and the very pursuit of utopia only brings us closer to this point on the horizon of history.

THE RIGHT OF HOSPITALITY

In the philosophical treatise *Toward Perpetual Peace*, written more than 200 years ago and slightly forgotten but now frequently invoked, Immanuel Kant foresees that in the future, the only chance to keep peace will be the subordination of particular sovereign states to common law, to which the republican state, as he expressly indicates, is best suited. Kant makes the right of hospitality one of the more essential elements of this project. As he says:

> *hospitality* (a host's conduct to his guest) means the right of a stranger not to be treated in a hostile manner by another upon his arrival on the other's territory. If it can be done without causing his death, the stranger can be turned away, yet as long as the stranger behaves peacefully where he happens to be, his host may not treat him with hostility. It is not the *right of a guest* that the stranger has a claim to (which would require a special, charitable contract stipulating that he be made a member of the household for a certain time), but rather a right to visit, to which all human beings have a claim, to present oneself to society by the right of common possession of the surface of the earth. Since it is the surface of a sphere, they cannot scatter themselves on it without limit. Still, they must rather ultimately tolerate one another as neighbours, and originally no one has more of a right to be at a given place on earth than anyone else[5].

However, while extending this issue, Kant reserves that:

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[5] I. Kant, *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History*, ed. P. Kleingeld, New Haven – London 2006, p. 82 – original underline. J. Derrida, "Hostipitality", *Angelaki. Journal of the Theoretical Humanities* 2000, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 3–18.

The right of hospitality, that is, the right of foreign arrivals, pertains, however, only to conditions of the possibility of *attempting* interaction with the old inhabitants.—In this way, remote parts of the world can establish relations peacefully with one another, relations which ultimately become regulated by public laws and can thus finally bring the human species ever closer to a cosmopolitan constitution[6].

Then, the short remark made by Kant somehow gives away how this project is far from the observed state of affairs and simultaneously far-sighted:

If one compares with this the *inhospitable* behaviour of the civilized states in our part of the world, especially the commercial ones, the injustice that the latter show when *visiting* foreign lands and peoples (which to them is the same as *conquering* those lands and peoples) takes on terrifying proportions[7].

Hospitality as a central theme of the philosophical project returns in the 20th century in the concept of Emmanuel Levinas. Levinas is also a witness to the frightening consequences of inhospitable practices of the West. Just like Kant, although about a different – Jewish – intellectual tradition, he contrasts the ontology of war with the eschatology of messianic peace. More importantly, for Levinas, hospitality, differently than for Kant, constitutes the very foundation of subjectivity, the basic structure of the individual's ethical sensitivity. Thus, in the Preface to the *Totality and Infinity*, his main work published for the first time at the beginning of the 1960s, promises: "This book will present subjectivity as welcoming the Other, as hospitality"[8].

In his research of ethical phenomena, establishing subjectivity defined in this way, i.e. responsibility, freedom and justice, he problematizes interpersonal relations. He starts from the fact that even when belonging to one group, community, society, culture or tradition, we remain

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[6] I. Kant, *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History*, op. cit., p. 82 – original underline.

[7] Ibidem – original underline.

[8] E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity. An Essay on Exteriority*, Pittsburgh 1969, p. 27.

inherently separated from each other and as a result are endlessly distinct for each other. As he says:

> The other is the Other. He and I do not form a number. The collectivity in which I say 'you' or 'we' is not a plural of the 'I'. I, you – these are not individuals of a common concept. Neither possession nor the unity of number nor the unity of concepts links me to the stranger (*l'Etranger*), the stranger who disturbs the being at home with oneself (*le chez soi*). [...] But I, who have no concept in common with the stranger, am, like him, without genus. We are the same and the other[9].

For Levinas, the dialogical relation is initiated by recognition of the order "thou shalt not kill" by the Same as its duty. Originally, in the form of resistance to the desire to kill the Other, it manifests itself to the Same in contact with the testimony of otherness, i.e. with the occurrence of the Face of the Other on the horizon of sensual experience. Consequently, the Same gives way, thus self-limits its freedom. Ever since, the relation between subjects is unsymmetrical and pedagogical. The Same becomes a student when he recognizes the Master in the Other, a teacher of its hospitality, and respect for the Other's life is an ethical rather than a legal duty[10]. Eventually, according to Levinas, responsibility for the Other appears to be much more far-reaching. Levinas explains it by referring to the biblical tradition:

> 'Thou shalt not kill' or 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour' not only forbids the violence of murder: it also concerns all the slow and invisible killing committed in our desires and vices, in all the innocent cruelties of natural life, in our indifference of 'good conscience' to what is far and what is near, even in the haughty obstinacy of our objectifying and our thematizing, in all the consecrated injustices due to our atomic weight of individuals and the equilibrium of our social orders[11].

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[9] Ibidem, p. 39.

[10] See S. Todd, *Learning from the Other. Levinas, Psychoanalysis, and Ethical Possibilities in Education*, New York 2003, pp. 1–41.

[11] E. Levinas, *In the Time of the Nations*, Bloomington – Indianapolis 1994, pp. 110–111.

The Same learns responsibility from the Other, from every Other who is also the Other for the Other, which again requires justice, answering the question: who of them has priority? How to keep balance, peace? According to Levinas, the need for knowledge – moderation and prudence – originates from the need for justice[12].

Not settling for the concept of subjectivity, Levinas develops his philosophy multilaterally and consequently. Having into regard the presentation of main assumptions only, we should settle for the statement that Kant's placement of the right of hospitality in the centre of the international order design impresses the real potential and scope of the concept of Levinas, in which the pedagogy of asylum is included as the general framework.

ASYLUM AND RITUALS OF SMALL GROUPS

In many of his writings, Erich Fromm criticizes the typical alienation of modern societies, one who diagnoses lost humanity and an apologist for radical humanism. Like Lévinas, he draws on the Jewish intellectual tradition; this is evidenced by his numerous references to the Sabbath ritual and the related concept of Messianism[13].

Fromm sees the Sabbath as the original contribution of Judaism to global culture and considers its concept to be one of the major ones offered in the Bible. As an element of Jewish law, it is for him "is a central institution of biblical and rabbinical religion", but the only one of the Ten Commandments, which refers to a ritual and as such the Sabbath "was and is the most outstanding phenomenon of Jewish practice"[14]. The Messianic era as the "Sabbath of Sabbaths" is a promise of an age of universal justice and mercy and thus becomes part of everyday experience only as

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[12] See E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, op. cit., pp. 212–214; E. Levinas, *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*, Dordrecht 1991, pp. 153–162; R. Włodarczyk, *Lévinas. W stronę pedagogiki azylu*, Warszawa 2009, pp. 228–237.

[13] See E. Fromm, *The Forgotten Language. An Introduction to the Understanding of Dreams, Fairy Tales, and Myths*, New York 1951, pp. 241-249; E. Fromm, *You Shall Be as Gods. A Radical Interpretation of the Old Testament and Its Tradition*, New York 1966, pp. 96–120, 152–157.

[14] E. Fromm, *You Shall Be as Gods*, p. 152.

an idea. This is not the case with the Sabbath, which, in its form of a group, communally performed ritual, gives the individual the opportunity to realize and experience freedom, harmony and peace, as a substitute for the Messianic time permanently present in social practice and human experience[15]. Resting on the Sabbath day, with numerous prohibitions of activities, the meaning of which Fromm reads in terms of work defined as interference and disturbance of harmony between man and nature and in social relations changes the individual's goals by rationing the practice. Therefore in this way, not so much goals but rather restrictions on practice are imposed. These restrictions force changes in people's ways of doing things and thus offer a new framework for human orientation in the world and open up a critical perspective on emancipation, crucial for pedagogy. Fromm's understanding of this phenomenon transcends the context of Judaism. Fromm sees it as a model for small groups which, for all their diversity, in practice, create environments devoid of authoritarian elements based on the ideals of radical humanism.

Fromm's analyses and readings of the figures of the Messianic time and the Sabbath ritual indicate several issues for the pedagogy of asylum[16]. The first one concerns the distance that, according to Fromm, groups of a diverse nature can maintain while simultaneously sharing a radically humanistic orientation towards an alienated society. Such distance does not contribute to a gradual dissipation of the asylum potential while the activities of a small group are beginning to resemble authoritarianism, which transforms asylum into a ghetto. The small, independent groups which Fromm sees as the nucleus of change are those capable of anticipating and perpetuating the values essential to radical humanism in everyday practice, individual and group memory.

The second issue of importance for the pedagogy of asylum concerns the suspension of time and make room for a different kind of temporality, namely the one to come. According to Fromm, this is precisely the uniqueness of the Sabbath as a joint change in the way and forms of action[17], which means that the anticipation of Messianic time is not

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[15] Ibidem, pp. 155–156.

[16] See R. Włodarczyk, *Ideologia, teoria, edukacja. Myśl Ericha Fromma jako inspiracja dla pedagogiki współczesnej*, Kraków 2016, pp. 289–295.

[17] E. Fromm, *You Shall Be as Gods*, op. cit., pp.156–157.

only symbolic but also real. In other words, coming across this form of Messianic time in practice becomes part of its present experience. This peculiar gesture of hospitality, exclusion and anticipation, distinguished in the model of the Shabbat ritual, a component of "collective art"[18], remains unnoticed when we focus on the relationship between work and leisure or on the various forms of activity suitable for the types of religious or secular rituals mentioned by Fromm; they are superimposed on this transformed time structure, which cannot be experienced in its pure form. As a result, it should be noted that asylum is not a proper space for social change but a place of activity that prepares for it, where the emotional bedrock of the subject can be transformed to some extent.

The third point concerns pluralism. The Shabbat ritual model allows for different forms of activity and organization, which share the same general frame of orientation. This means that the groups that fall within this model and whose membership is voluntary can be very different They can be, for example, relatively homogeneous internally, but together can make up a mosaic of pockets of educational resistance, in which many people with varying ways of conduct, of different class and ethnic origin, of different sexes, ages, abilities, views, aptitudes, competencies, and interests may seek either an experience that opens up to themselves, others and the world, a strengthening or an opportunity to develop corresponding forms of participation, education and involvement. In this sense, asylum, as a non-existent place of temporary residence only, can go unnoticed, being a discreetly present and only analytically determined aspect of these groups.

Considering the relationship of the Sabbath to the other days, the issue of the impact of asylum experiences on how group members function in their respective areas of social practice should also be raised. Not only are the effects of asylum experiences transferred outside the group. It is practically crucial to find that, as in the case of Sabbath, Messianic time becomes the content experienced in its ritual, in the case of asylum, the Utopia of a new harmony is no longer just an abstract projection of a future which is unattainable today. As a consequence, experiencing this otherness makes us speak of a point of support for social criticism. The experience of a different, contrasting order may make us sensitive to

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[18] See E. Fromm, *The Sane Society*, London – New York 2002, pp. 335–344.

the imperfections of social practice in everyday life. Equally important is that, in conditions of alienation that dominates the society, the constant revival of asylum is at the same time a memorable source of self-crystallization of its criticism and the notion of a new harmony. In conditions of asylum, the subject can self-diagnose, experience and become aware of the possible dissonance between external requirements and internal needs. This is impossible without a change in the educational environment, which takes part not only in shaping the character of individuals but also in constantly strengthening and sustaining their social function via its inherent suppression.

The next issue to be addressed in the context of the pedagogy of asylum concerns the subjective conditions of emancipation possibilities. In the Shabbat ritual model, which includes the potential for asylum, the strengthening of the voice of the conscience becomes possible through the distance from the conditions that weaken or cancel it and through the conditions that are appropriate for this model of activity, since the conscience can only reveal itself to man in an indirect way, by experience. Furthermore, the Shabbat model presupposes community practices designed to open up to a new form of relationship. The revival, restoration or strengthening of the confidence shown in them and the experience of the confidence shown by others requires conditions appropriate to the potential for asylum. On the other hand, the observation that people intuitively and universally look for small groups in which to engage in community practices seems to support its fundamental premise, with the particular importance of these pockets of educational resistance.

HERMENEUTICS OF TRANSLATION

In his classical work from the 1970s, *After Babel. Aspects of Language and Translation*, George Steiner discusses, mainly using examples from the Western literature, the issue of hermeneutics based on translation, thus consolidating the fundamental relation of translation, interpretation and understanding. As we read in one of the prefaces:

> translation is formally and pragmatically implicit in *every* act of communication, in the emission and reception of each and every mode of meaning, be it

in the widest semiotic sense or, more specifically, verbal exchanges. To understand is to decipher. To hear significance is to translate. Thus the essential structural and executive means and problems of the act of translation are fully present in acts of speech, writing, and pictorial encoding inside any given language. Translation between different languages is a particular application of a configuration and model fundamental to human speech even where it is monoglot[19].

In other words, "*inside or between languages, human communication equals translation*"[20].

I want to limit the complex issues related to Steiner's proposal and emphasize here only their selected consequences, significant concerning the pedagogical issues and the issue of the pedagogy of asylum.

Firstly, Steiner subordinates the act of understanding to the skill of translating, as in this sense 'to interpret' means for him as much as 'to translate'. Secondly, he does not juxtapose intercultural, intracultural and intrasubjective communication but indicates that they are based on the same foundation. Therefore, cognitive intercultural competencies are potentially specific for every individual, provided they can perform any acts of comprehension, and can be further developed through education. In other words, comprehension competencies are assumed to be intercultural competencies, while every hermeneutical act is in fact an exercise in the transfer of meaning, an intercultural translation. In this perspective, a difference among these three areas – intercultural, intracultural and intersubjective – would consist mainly of the sum of experience acquired in them and the degree of identification with them.

Thirdly, essential competencies required for communication are not based on knowledge only. However, it is impossible to separate them from knowledge, erudition, i.e. acquisition of knowledge about a different culture or language does not provide the understanding with this culture or language, as it requires the skill of translation because these orders are disproportionate. But interpretations obtained in the case of intercultural communication competence characterized in such a way

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[19] G. Steiner, *After Babel. Aspects of Language and Translation*, Oxford 1998, p. xii – original underline.
[20] Ibidem, p. 49 – original underline.

with only one culture or language refer simultaneously to all other cultures or languages.

Finally, we should also take a look at the action as a type of translation. For example, when we work some theory out, we perform acts of translation within its area, deriving from various sources and authors. However, if it is to be applied in practice, it needs an additional act of translation: from the thought to the system of action different from it. Therefore, the theoretician cannot lead its concept to such a record stage, instruction that it would not require further interpretation during translation into practice. So thinking, speech, action constitute different orders of practice, distinctive languages requiring translation. As Steiner says, while referring to the artistic activity:

> The French word *interprète* concentrates all the relevant values. An actor is an *interprète* of Racine; a pianist gives *une interpretation* of a Beethoven sonata. Through engagement of his own identity, a critic becomes *un interprète* – a life-giving performer – of Montaigne or Mallarme. [...] When we read or hear any language statement from the past, be it Leviticus or last year's best-seller, we translate. Reader, actor, editor are translators of language out of time[21].

DEVELOPMENT OF THE SHARED SPACE AND THE ROLE OF SUBJECTIVE POWERS

In her works, Hannah Arendt provides multilateral analyses of the public space, its architecture, principles of participation and the nature of the mutual impact of subjects operating in it. As she explains in *The Human Condition*:

> The term 'public' signifies the world itself, in so far as it is common to all of us and distinguished from our privately owned place in it. This world, however, is not identical with the earth or with nature, as the limited space for the movement of men and the general condition of organic life. Rather, it is related to the human artefact, the fabrication of human hands, and affairs

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[21] Ibidem, pp. 28–29 – original underline.

that go on among those who inhabit the man-made world together. To live together in the world means essentially that a world of things is between those who have it in common, as a table is located between those who sit around it; the world, like every in-between, relates and separates men at the same time. The public realm, as the common world, gathers us together and yet prevents our falling over each other, so to speak[22].

The very moment of the constitution is significant from the point of view of the hospitality issues:

The space of appearance comes into being wherever men are together in the manner of speech and action, and therefore predates and precedes all formal constitution of the public realm and the various forms of government, that is, the various forms in which the public realm can be organized. [...] Wherever people gather together, it is potentially there, but only potentially, not necessarily and not forever[23].

Analyses of the public space and contexts of its formation proposed by Arendt offer insight into the political structuration and fragmentation of a collective, whose dynamics and nature depend on the establishment of the dominant system.

For the pedagogy of asylum, the complex phenomenon of mutual impact, capable of being distinguished from this perspective, as well as an uneven distribution under the conditions of democratic centres of power – governmental, public and subjective – of non-uniform, often incomparable power, organizing the life of a given community, is of particular importance. Discontinuity, resulting from repealing each other by impacts generated by these numerous centres, becomes the seedbed for distinguishing separate spaces of relative autonomy, protected from a direct impact of the outside, including disciplinary authority, and needed for trusting commitment of subjects to the establishment of new relations. In other words, intersubjective space, relatively free from defined roles and orders, hospitable for everything new, different, constitute one of the principles founding the otherness, asylum.

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[22] H. Arendt, *The Human Condition*, Chicago – London 1998, p. 52.
[23] Ibidem, p. 199.

For this type of association, subjective powers distinguished by Arendt – of judgement, forgiveness, making and keeping promises – corresponding with the necessity of participation in the public life and prevention from the unpredictability of consequences of human acts not synchronized with each other in the community, are of great significance. They help separate select principles temporarily applicable to the asylum. Arendt writes about the powers of making and keeping promises, as follows:

> These moral precepts are the only ones that are not applied to action from the outside, from some supposedly higher faculty or experiences outside action's reach. They arise, on the contrary, directly out of the will to live together with others in the mode of acting and speaking, and thus they are like control mechanisms built into the very faculty to start new and unending processes[24].

THICK AND THIN MORALITY

Universals on which the principles and purposes of education could be based are the foundation of intercultural pedagogy. If we talk about the need for "unlearning of domination", respect for otherness and also irreducibility of differences among cultural practices, ways of life, developed and transferred between generations by particular communities, we also need to be able to justify limitations of hospitability or interventions on behalf of the abused. We need to be able to handle the paradox of our intolerance of intolerant behaviours of other people. We want to follow responsibility and justice, despite our particular membership in numerous cultures, groups, strata, classes, nations, worlds of life, genders, types of abilities and disabilities, communities of residence, etc. Striving for neutrality constitutes both an issue of international and global institutions' functioning and particular communities, open and closed groups and particular individuals.

Apart from the above concept of subjective powers, the Pedagogy of asylum derives from Michael Walzer's thick and thin morality.

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[24] Ibidem, p. 246.

The formation of thick rules of morality is related, according to Walzer, to the dynamics of the public space of a given community. The thickness of consolidated yet continuously transformed customs in the interaction processes exceeds the ability of their conceptualization or codification. Their knowledge is practical, related to learning processes, taking over and modifying knowledge and lifestyles functioning in a given community by individuals, which educational processes model expectations and practices of subjects connected with this community. It does not mean that public space constitutes the only source of morality, where people are together. Individual invention and primary socialization, which may oppose secondary socialization, cannot be ignored, which concerns immigrant communities. However, the power of habit, mimicry, routine causes that for most members of a given group, the thick morality may become a comfortable point of reference to assess all human behaviours and directions of one's actions according to the principle of shared obviousness. However, on the other side, one should look at thick morality as profoundly rooted in subjects, providing them with a sense of ontological security.

Walzer does not propose the transformation of thick morality so that it has a supra-group nature entirely. He realizes that it is impossible. A "universal" moment, thin morality, as he calls it, is necessary for a situation of contact with a visitor, a stranger who does not share our practices of thick morality. These are those special situations when our action, deriving from resources of the subjective experience of being in the world among people, must find its reference not, as usual, to thick morality, members and practices of a well-known community, but to the horizon constituted by humanity. In other words, thin morality is a derivative of the reproduction of thick morality. In this sense, it is an attempt to find what can connect, be accepted among strangers and groups when they land next to each other, enter interdependence. Therefore, Walzer distinguishes: "Morality is thick from the beginning, culturally integrated, fully resonant, and it reveals itself thinly only on special occasions when moral language is turned to specific purposes"[25].

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[25] M. Walzer, *Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad*, Notre Dame – London 1994, p. 4.

According to Walzer, thin morality, "universal" moment that undermines the obviousness of thick morality, testifies to human solidarity, becomes a basis for a social critic[26]. Participating in the life of a given community, he knows its customs. Still, while simultaneously siding with strangers and victims, he confirms the legitimacy of the minimal code (thin morality), which should protect strangers and victims from claims put forth by specific, thick morality, but also should impose on newcomers duties related to participation in humanity. The impartiality of the social critic has its sources in his study of the interrelations between the particular and the "universal"[27].

More broadly speaking, reference to that universal moment should become, as a result of education, a component of any critical awareness, communication reasonability of every citizen of the democratic society. Thus, the Walzer proposal does not promise a decreed in advance solution for contradictions specific to modern societies. Oppositely, as he notices: "But there is no avoiding it, and it may well be that the most important thing people learn in civil society is how to live with the many different forms of social conflict"[28].

DECENT SOCIETY AND DECONSTRUCTION

The duty of hospitality is not something that could or should be imposed if empowerment, autonomy, respect for otherness remains the education rate. However, it should be noticed that social institutions and standards may be formed in a given community to obligate individuals, thus accustomed to specific behaviours humiliating others and ourselves, regardless of their intentions.

It concerns the public life institutions, which regulate social relations and – as areas of socialization – effectively strengthen them. It is something entirely different when a given individual, while demonstrating its invention, acts to the detriment or consults prosperity of some person

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[26] See M. Walzer, *Interpretation and Social Criticism*, Cambridge – London 1993.

[27] See M. Walzer, *Thick and Thin*, op. cit., pp. 85–103.

[28] M. Walzer, *Politics and Passion. Toward a More Egalitarian Liberalism*, New Haven – London 2004, p. 72.

and when rules of operation of some institution dictate it to do this. In a democratic society based on egalitarianism and pluralism, decisions related to the world view should depend on particular individuals. However, there is still the issue of the ethical foundation of all institutions shared by natives and migrants. Hence, Avishai Margalit distinguishes two areas. As he writes in the *Introduction* to *The Decent Society*: "The idea of a civilized society is a microethical concept concerned with the relationships between individuals, while the idea of a decent society is a macroethical concept concerned with the setup of the society as a whole"[29].

In other words, it may happen that the given community of people who refer to each other nicely in direct contact creates a civilized society; however, it does not mean, according to Margalit, that it is a decent society. As he assumes: "A decent society is one whose institutions do not humiliate people"[30]. Margalit justifies a negative form of this deontological rule because, firstly, eradication of evil constitutes the issue relatively more significant than the promotion of good. Secondly, the very expression of respect rarely may become the primary purpose of action. It is more often something in type of its side effect. Thirdly, it is easier to identify a humiliating action than a respectful action.

 For the pedagogy of asylum, it is vital that within existing and newly-created institutions, such as educational ones, individuals of a different culture yet dependent on one another not be obligated to mutual humiliation. This is to assure that these institutions do generate conflicts on this basis and do not promote and strengthen attitudes leading to routinization of humiliating actions in the socialization processes. Not so much individual, but community hospitality is the rate here.

For the pedagogy of asylum, similarly to Jacques Derrida following Levinas, questioning itself constitutes the condition for openness. Lack of radicalism may be a too early – a priori – refusal to the other. Involvement in deconstruction increases and accelerates a risk, making extreme demands before and regardless of whether they appear together with the migrant's arrival. The act of deconstruction indicates conditions, local conventions in which the other is entangled, deprived of its right to its otherness in different ways; obligated to abdication, unable to come as

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29 A. Margalit, *The Decent Society*, Cambridge – London 1996, p. 2.
30 Ibidem, p. 1.

itself, is subject to transformations and deformations. Deconstruction as the preparation for the arrival of the other bears the stamp of a political act, oriented towards exposure, weakening or elimination of barriers and conventions established due to the local power of defining meanings and limits, political and cultural hegemony, ethically motivated act: responsibility for the other, care about it and justice[31]. Derrida emphasizes the nature of this claim, e.g. in the concept "democracy to come" (*la dèmocratie à venir*):

> 'Democracy to come' does not mean a future democracy that will one day be 'present'. Democracy will never exist in the present; it is not presentable, and it is not regulative idea in the Kantian sense. But there is the impossible, whose promise democracy inscribes – a promise that risk being perverted into a threat[32].

Therefore, the introductory rate is not only whether a given order can stand the appearance of the other, strange to it, whether it can survive the intrusion of deconstruction, radical demands, but whether it can move, transform internally to hold this otherness in its area. The durability of asylum is not so much permanence but continuity. That is why it can be said that involvement in acts of deconstruction has an ethical dimension and mainly maintains our readiness:

> We must thus be dutiful beyond duty, we must go beyond law, tolerance, conditional hospitality, economy, and so on. But to go beyond does not mean to discredit that which we exceed. Whence the difficulty of a responsible transaction between two orders or, rather, between order and its beyond. Whence all these aporias, and the inevitability of an autoimmunity risk[33].

Susceptibility to deconstructions understood in such a way decides on making the asylum potentially hospitable.

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[31] See J. Derrida, "Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism", [in:] *Deconstruction and Pragmatism*, ed. by Ch. Mouffe, London – New York 1996, pp. 86–88.

[32] Borradori G., *Philosophy in a Time of Terror. Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida*, Chicago – London 2003, p. 120.

[33] Ibidem, p. 133.

> Pure and unconditional hospitality, hospitality *itself*, opens or is in advance open to someone who is neither expected nor invited, to whomever arrives as an absolutely foreign *visitor*, as a new *arrival*, non-identifiable and unforeseeable, in short, wholly other[34].

Suppose it is to remain the asylum. Asylum must eliminate its barriers to cross its thresholds. However, openness means also exposing oneself to risks. Each admission of somebody new involves a risk of blowing apart the order, its complete and irretrievable loss. Therefore, involvement in deconstructions is triggered by pedagogical foresight out of concern for the other and for oneself as the other.

THE CHILD AS THE FOREIGNER

In one excerpt of his famous essay *The Child's Right to Respect*, Janusz Korczak introduces the figure of a foreigner, to which he likens the child[35]. Like a foreigner, the child does not understand the language and knows his bearings, laws, and customs. It is easy to deceive them, take advantage of their ignorance and ignore them. One could stop considering this simile as an impressive stylistic figure, but the resonance with the foreigner's motif significantly present in the Hebrew Bible and the intriguing afterimage of the surprising identification seem to demand a different approach. The list of analogies between the condition of a foreigner and a child, indicated by Korczak in the essay, can be extended. Foreignness can be understood as far-reaching differences in our perceptions, prevailing over similarities; a stranger is different from us in a complicated way to express, but sensually and emotionally tangible. The foreigner is far more different from us than we are from one another. These differences are self-apparent in appearance, language, behaviour, images, knowledge, taste, ways of being, relationship practice, socialization and upbringing, beliefs and ritual patterns, measures of goodness and justice,

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[34] Ibidem, pp. 128–129 – original underline. See J. Derrida, *Of Hospitality*, Stanford 2000, pp. 25, 27.

[35] J. Korczak, "The Child's Right to Respect", [in:] J. Korczak, *When I Am Little Again* and *The Child's Right to Respect*, Lanham – New York – London 1992, p. 176.

the extent of tolerance, creating and arranging places, constructing tools, humour, art, play, the pursuit of happiness, and mourning. It is difficult to say what distance is necessary and in what dimension. It is impossible to feel the crisis from here and how many years or decades of stay may disenchant foreignness in a meeting or a fleeting encounter with someone. The birth of a child brings about an analogy consistent with Korczak's intentions. However, even with parents and loved ones, the distance and the number of dimensions of otherness, in this case, exceeds the scale and scope of what makes us different from adult foreigners.

Their interesting list can be found in the first five parts of *The Child's Right to Respect*, titled by Korczak "Indifference and Distrust"[36]. In fifteen passages, he discreetly examines and presents the differences between children and adults in terms of size and potential of strength, increase in knowledge, degree of control over oneself and one's environment, ability to withstand hardships, stage of psychophysical consolidation, subordination to authorities, material dependence, life experience, relation to the immediate environment, life expectancy, social importance, autonomy, rationalization, and degree of social control. In all these dimensions, social functioning differences turn out to privilege the adult and to disadvantage the child. In a world tailored to an adult, the child's otherness is reduced to a litany of deficits, which the child can make up for, at least in part, for the price of humbly accepting dependence and relatively minor importance. A severe dependence also awaits a foreigner who, while migrating, enters a world of a complex tangle of ideas, relations and rules obvious to an indigenous inhabitant, who can count on the forbearance or solidarity of his relatives, friends and neighbours. In the many dimensions of this tangle, the receiving party retains the advantage and only too often remains unaware of the arising inequalities and abuses.

It is precisely these that the explicit prohibition formulated in the Hebrew Bible seems to be directed against. It recalls a category also adopted by Korczak: "You shall not oppress a stranger, for you know the feelings of the stranger, having yourselves been strangers in the land of Egypt" (Ex 23: 9), reiterated in one of the subsequent books, in the form of induction: "You too must befriend the stranger, for you were

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[36] Ibidem, pp. 161–167.

strangers in the land of Egypt" (Dt 10: 19). Thanks to the figure of a foreigner and newcomer, prohibition and injunction seem to correspond to the child's inalienable right to respect, both in terms of reducing adult tyranny and the obligation to care for the child's well-being and development[37]. Amazement at the foreignness of the child, which could make us philosophers and poets open to the otherness of the Other, sensitive to diversity, does not in Korczak's eyes usually provoke more than anxiety and often triggers enmity rather than establish an asylum. An asylum like the Orphans' Home at 92 Krochmalna St. in Warsaw, established thanks to Janusz Korczak, Stefania Wilczyńska and many others.

The assumptions mentioned above concerning the pedagogy of asylum require a connection, which constitutes the subject of my separate monographs: *Lévinas. W stronę pedagogiki azylu* (*Levinas. Towards the Pedagogy of Asylum*) and *Ideologia, teoria, edukacja. Myśl Ericha Fromma jako inspiracja dla pedagogiki współczesnej* (*Ideology, Theory, Education. The Thought of Erich Fromm as an Inspiration for Contemporary Pedagogy*), as well as of Part II of that book[38]. Similarly, the justification of the need for asylum in the context of challenges of the "Age of Migration" and the establishment of the very utopian project in the current of intercultural pedagogy created in the spirit of critical pedagogy and dialogic pedagogy requires an extension. However, I consider it appropriate to distinguish and summarise the ethical and political grounds of the pedagogy of asylum to be subject to consideration and discussion in such a concise form.

[37] Ibidem, pp. 174–179; M. Liebel, "Janusz Korczak's Understanding of Children's Rights as Agency Rights", [in:] *The Rights of the Child Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow – the Korczak Perspective*, Vol. I, ed. M. Michalak, Warszawa 2018, pp. 204–238.

[38] R. Włodarczyk, *Lévinas*, op. cit.; R. Włodarczyk, *Ideologia, teoria, edukacja*, op. cit.

CHAPTER X

FIGURES OF MESSIANIC TIME AND THE SABBATH RITUAL VERSUS CONCEPTS OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND PEDAGOGY OF THE ASYLUM IN ERICH FROMM'S PHILOSOPHY

*Psychoanalysis is as exquisitely Western
as Zen is Eastern; it is the child of
Western humanism and rationalism,
and of the nineteenth century romantic
search for the dark forces which elude
rationalism. Much further back, Greek
wisdom and Hebrew ethics are the
spiritual godfathers of this scientific-
therapeutic approach to man*

Erich Fromm,
*Psychoanalysis and
Zen Buddhism*

*Shabbat is one-sixtieth of
the World-to-Come*

Berakhot 57b

Jewish Messianism is not laid out in doctrinal form in the primary texts of Judaism. Rather, it is the subject of conjecture, reflection and theory based on related passages, which is why the many parts of the text and the various themes associated with it, present in the Hebrew Bible, the Talmud, and different religious writings and tradition, can be constantly re-read and re-interpreted[1]. Still, this idea, as a unique uchronia, i.e. the utopia of time[2], is generally seen by individual tendencies of Judaism as the awaiting of an imminent era of peace, prosperity, justice, and

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[1] See W. S. Green, J. Silverstein, "Messiah" and J. Neusner, "Messiah in Rabbinic Judaism", [in:] *The Encyclopedia of Judaism*, Vol. III, ed. J. Neusner, A. J. Avery-Peck, W. S. Green, Leiden – Boston 2005, pp. 1678–1692, 1693–1707.
[2] See B. Baczko, *Wyobrażenia społeczne. Szkice o nadziei i pamięci zbiorowej*, Warszawa 1994, pp. 72–157.

brotherhood, i.e. a universal political, social and spiritual renewal. As an event on a world scale and concerning humanity, this uchronia has repeatedly found expression in secular terms[3]. Furthermore, according to Erich Fromm, who refers to the archetype seen in Thomas More in his famous work from the early 16th century, "From the Renaissance until the end of the nineteenth century, Western thought can be characterized by, among many other things, the fact that utopia as a special version of the messianic vision occupies a central place"[4]. As I will try to demonstrate and define, this translation of messianism into secular terms can also be observed in Fromm's philosophy. What is important here, however, is that uchronia is more closely related to the Sabbath ritual than in other authors. This ritual itself is strictly defined in the rabbinic literature from the point of view of ritual practices and the observance of legal rigour. Nevertheless, as a communally celebrated day of rest and abstinence from work, it also acquires in the Jewish tradition the significance of the mystically understood union of the feminine and masculine elements, a sign of the covenant between God and Israel, a form of commemoration of the act of creation of the world, which was completed and which was significant for the history of the Hebrews in their exodus from Egypt, as well as an anticipation of the future world, a foreshadowing of the realisation of messianic expectations[5]. By tracing the connection between the figures of messianic time and the Sabbath ritual expressed in different parts of the writings of the psychoanalyst and neo-Marxist, published between 1927 and 1980, placing them in the context of his concept of human development will aim to articulate the idea of a pedagogy of asylum, one of the solutions to the problem of alienation of contemporary man, with a significant emancipatory and educational potential.

[3] See K. Löwith, *Meaning in History*, Chicago – London 1949, pp. 1–19, 33–59; Z. Levy, "The Nature of Modern Jewish Philosophy", [in:] *History of Jewish Philosophy*, ed. D. H. Frank, O. Leaman, London – New York 1997, pp. 515–525.

[4] E. Fromm, *On Being Human*, New York 2013, p. 9. Depending on how both ideas are understood, there are more significant differences between them, see e.g. M. Buber, *Paths in Utopia*, Boston 1970, pp. 8–9; A. Bielik-Robson, "The Messiah and the Great Architect. On the Difference Between the Messianic and the Utopian", *Utopian Studies* 2018, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 133–158.

[5] See L. Trepp, *A History of the Jewish Experience*, New Jersey 2001, pp. 373–383; "Sabbath", [in:] *The Encyclopedia of Jewish Life and Thought*, ed. C. Pearl, Jerusalem 1996, pp. 400–402.

VARIANTS AND REMINISCENCES OF THE FIGURE OF PROPHETIC MESSIANISM IN FROMM

Fromm's direct connection to Orthodox Judaism fills his childhood and most of his youth. Born in 1900 in Frankfurt am Main, parallel to and after his academic studies, he received early training in the critical interpretation of the Torah, Talmud and other traditional religious texts from Rabbi Salman B. Rabinkow and for a number of years was an active member of the Society for Jewish Education in Frankfurt (Frankfurt Gesellschaft fur jüdische Volksbildung)[6]. Although in his late twenties he would gradually but consistently move away from Orthodox Judaism and his attention would be absorbed by psychoanalysis and Marxism, the upbringing he received, including Jewish thought, would significantly influence his way of understanding and developing these and other concepts.

In the introduction that opens a kind of intellectual autobiography, i.e. his 1962 text *Beyond the Chains of Illusion. My Encounter with Marx and Freud*, he links in his childhood memories his rapture over biblical prophets' text, with their "vision of universal peace and harmony between all nations"[7] with his later interest in Marx's ideas. Fromm's parallel between the ideals of socialism and Jewish messianism, the promise of an "end of days", peace and harmony, is not reduced to his memories of youthful readings of the prophetic books of the Hebrew Bible, but constitutes the perspective in which he places and reads the philosophy of the author of *Capital*. In his extensive introduction to the first English translation of the early writings of the German philosopher and sociologist, also published at the beginning of the 1960s, he repeatedly emphasises this fundamental connection, and among other things states: "Marx's philosophy was, in secular, nontheistic language, a new and radical step forward in the tradition of prophetic Messianism"[8]. As in his late book

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[6] See L. J. Friedman, *The Lives of Erich Fromm: Love's Prophet*, New York 2014, pp. 3–27. On the subject of Jewish hermeneutics and comments on the Hebrew Bible in Fromm's texts, see E. B. Gertel, "Fromm, Freud, and Midrash", *Judaism. A Quarterly Journal of Jewish Life and Thought* 1999, No. 4, pp. 429–439.

[7] E. Fromm, *Beyond the Chains of Illusion. My Encounter with Marx and Freud*, London – New York 2009, p. 2.

[8] E. Fromm, *Marx's Concept of Man*, New York 1961, p. 3.

of 1976 *To Have or to Be?*, he comments on his own interpretation of the Marxist thought. In his view, it is

> necessary to explain my characterization of Marxian thought, in view of its complete perversion by Soviet communism and reformist Western socialism to a materialism aimed at achieving wealth for everybody. As Hermann Cohen, Ernst Bloch, and a number of other scholars have stated during the past decades, socialism was the secular expression of prophetic Messianism. [...] The Messianic Time is one of universal peace, absence of envy, and material abundance. This picture is very close to the concept of the goal of life as Marx expressed it toward the end of the third volume of his *Capital*[9].

Among the many other motifs and figures of Judaism translated by Fromm into the language of his philosophy, Jewish prophetic messianism is a motif that, as can be seen, recurs in his works, but also takes various forms and at the same time combines important aspects of the ideas he developed. This is how Fromm's reading of Johann J. Bachofen's dialectical theory can be understood, to which he would devote much attention over a number of years, as witnessed by the philosopher's articles and essays from 1933 to 1970 collected by his long-time secretary Reiner Funk in the collection *Love, Sexuality, and Matriarchy: About Gender*. According to Fromm in *Mother Right (Das Mutterrecht)* of 1859, Bachofen concludes on the basis of an analysis of Roman, Greek, and Egyptian myths and symbols, that the patriarchal structure of society is relatively new and that it was preceded by a state of culture where mother was the head of the family, the leader of a society and the Great Goddess[10]. This state, in turn, preceded "heterism", an immature and primitive form of society. Hence Bachofen concluded that the matriarchal phase is a n intermediary link between the lowest and the highest so far stage of development of humanity, i.e. the stage of patriarchate. However, unlike the Swiss ethnologist, Fromm assumed, following Lewis H. Morgan, that patriarchate is neither the ultimate stage nor the

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[9] E. Fromm, *To Have or To Be?*, London – New York 2008, pp. 126–127. See ibidem, pp. 127––129; E. Fromm, *Beyond the Chains of Illusion*, op. cit., pp. 27–28, 43–44.

[10] See E. Fromm, *Love, Sexuality, and Matriarchy: About Gender*, New York 1997, p. 4.

goal of civilisational development[11]. The conflicting matriarchal and patriarchal principles, each with severe limitations, must merge to provide a solution in the form of a synthesis. Thus Bachofen's triad is modified and shifted by Fromm by one level. As a consequence he recognises that if "the matriarchal principle is that of unconditional love, natural equality, emphasis on the bonds of blood and soil, compassion and mercy", and "the patriarchal principle is that of conditional love, hierarchical structure, abstract thought, man-made laws, the state and justice", then "When the patriarchal and matriarchal principles form a synthesis, however, each of the two principles is coloured by the other: motherly love by justice and rationality, and fatherly love by mercy and equality"[12].

Seeing in the synthesis of matriarchal and patriarchal principles a variation of the messianic figure will be more readable if we turn to Fromms understanding of radical humanism. This issue, important for his philosophy, is in turn an essential part of his sociology of religion.

According to Fromm, human religiosity is universal. It is worth emphasising that this does not refer to any particular religion, nor to a narrowly conceived phenomenon that is linked in social consciousness with such developed forms as, for example, the Anglican Church, Jainism or Druzism. Fromm points out that the organisation and subsequent institutionalisation of worship are secondary to the typically human need for a relatively enduring system of views defining thought and action, common to a certain group, which provides the individual with a reference framework in the world and an object of reverence[13]. The appearance of a religious need in representatives of the human species is attributed to biological evolution. As he assumes, the development of the brain and

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[11] See E. Fromm, *The Crisis of Psychoanalysis. Essay on Freud, Marx, and Social Psychology*, New York 1976, pp. 122–124, 134–135.

[12] E. Fromm, *Love, Sexuality, and Matriarchy*, op. cit., pp. 89–90. See E. Fromm, "The Dogma of Christ", [in:] E. Fromm, *The Dogma of Christ, and Other Essay on Religion, Psychology and Culture*, New York – Chicago – San Francisco 1963, pp. 3–91.

[13] See E. Fromm, *Psychoanalysis and Religion*, New Haven 1955, pp. 21, 25–27; E. Fromm, *To Have or To Be?*, op. cit., p. 110. In addition to the need to have a frame of reference and an object of devotion, Fromm distinguishes such human needs as: connectedness, transcendence, rootedness, and identity (see E. Fromm, *The Sane Society*, London – New York 2008, pp. 26–64). The weakness of Fromm's concept of religion is discussed by Svante Lundgren, see S. Lundgren, *Fight Against Idols. Erich Fromm on Religion, Judaism and the Bible*, Frankfurt am Main 1998, pp. 17–76.

the diminished role of instinct, the emergence of such new abilities as self-awareness, reason and imagination, contributed to the emergence of a need whose realization enabled the survival of the species. It is a need to have an orientation system other than the innate one, with a separate object of aspirations and attitudes[14]. We must at once stress the significance Fromm attributes to this change for human freedom, a phenomenon which emerges on the path of human evolution and, at the same time, creates a significant difference between man and the world of other animals. This issue constitutes one of the themes leading him to the general conclusion that the existential dimension of human freedom consists in the question of the individual's own solution to the problem of human alienation.

The understanding of religion adopted by Fromm opens it up to a number of phenomena that are usually considered separately by general society, for example as ideologies. Thus, religion understood in this way constitutes a common denominator for a wide spectrum of divergent reference points that order systems of orientation of individuals and groups. As the philosopher notes, "People may worship animals, trees, idols of gold or stone, an invisible god, a saintly person, or a diabolic leader; they may worship their ancestors, their nation, their class or party, money or success"[15].

If the emergence of human religious beliefs is seen by Fromm as related to human nature and its evolution, Fromm does not see all religions as equally desirable or efficient way of solving the problem of human alienation. He prefers religions which, at a given stage of their transformations and in a given environmental context, are an expression of what he calls radical humanism, a fulfilment of the ideals of human health and a healthy society. In short, according to Fromm, the ideal of a person's health is fulfilled in their pursuit of full birth. One of its determinants is the attainment of freedom and independence in one's development, realised in accordance with the needs of human nature to be in harmony with love, affirmation of people, the world and life, joy of acting, creative use of one's own strengths and skills, ability to think critically, willingness

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[14] See E. Fromm, *To Have or To Be?*, op. cit., pp. 110–114; E. Fromm, *Man for Himself: An Inquiry into the Psychology of Ethics*, London 2002, pp. 38–50.

[15] E. Fromm, *To Have or To Be?*, op. cit., p. 111.

to give and forgive, solidarity and sharing, care for oneself, others and the world[16]. Fromm's comprehensive approach to the goal of human development is a programmatic commitment to the tradition of humanism. He points out that in different parts of the world and at different moments in its history, this ideal has guided many thinkers and spiritual leaders, triggered social movements and inspired political change. It is what according to him links Spinoza with Confucius, Socrates with Jesus, Isaiah with Marx and Freud, and many others whom he calls the great teachers of humanity, and who defined the principles of a healthy life[17].

According to Fromm, every religion which can be considered an expression of the idea of radical humanism, provides the group and the individual with reference points directing them towards optimal development. At the same time, every religion can be corrupted and used as an instrument of supremacy and manipulating others[18]. The duality is the foundation of Fromm's division into humanistic and authoritarian (irrational) religions[19]. Analysing the transformations of Christianity or Judaism, Fromm points to the constant presence, despite the domination of these religions in their histories and variants by authoritarian tendencies, of matriarchal and patriarchal principles perpetuated in their traditions[20]. He observes that only a sustained and proportionate synthesis of these principles, which, it must be stressed, takes the form of the idea of the messianic time, would make it possible to consolidate the diffuse humanistic tendencies present in both religions. This way of understanding is clearly marked in his interpretation of the writings of the prophets of ancient Israel, also bringing to mind his dialectical reading of Bachofen's theory:

[16] See E. Fromm, *The Sane Society*, op. cit., pp. 26–64.

[17] See ibidem, pp. 335–336.

[18] See E. Fromm, *Psychoanalysis and Religion*, op. cit., pp. 33–34; E. Fromm, *Man for Himself*, op. cit., pp. 201–207. For a critique on the messianic age and radical humanism in Fromm: see S. Lundgren, *Fight Against Idols*, op. cit., pp. 143–149; M. Pekkola, *Prophet of Radicalism Erich Fromm and the Figurative Constitution of the Crisis of Modernity*, Jyväskylä 2010, pp. 165–191.

[19] See E. Fromm, *Psychoanalysis and Religion*, op. cit., pp. 34–55. Importantly, Fromm's dichotomy doesnot preclude cults which are inherently destructive for people (see E. Fromm, *The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness*, New York – Chicago – San Francisco 1974, pp. 231–233, 268–368).

[20] See E. Fromm, *You Shall Be as Gods*, op. cit., pp. 70–71, 90–91; E. Fromm, *Psychoanalysis and Religion*, op. cit., pp. 42–49.

messianic age is in a certain sense a re-creation of the paradisiacal state [one from before the conflict between people and God and the expulsion of people – R.W.]. But the paradisiacal state stood at the beginning of history or—if you will—of prehistory. That paradisiacal harmony held sway before man had experienced himself as an individual apart from other individuals. It was a harmony of human underdevelopment, of primitiveness, of a primal, prehistorical unity. The messianic age is a return to that harmony, but only when and after man has fully realized himself in history[21].

The messianic figure which Fromm recalls as strongly appealing to him in his early youth, and which is present in the research he has conducted over the years and in the concepts he has created, eventually also finds expression in his prophetic and non-theistic expectations about the future of humanity. In the concluding parts of *The Sane Society*, he predicts the emergence of a new religion within the next few hundred years. Its major feature will be:

its universalistic character, corresponding to the unification of mankind which is taking place in this epoch; it would embrace the humanistic teachings common to all great religions of the East and of the West; its doctrines would not contradict the rational insight of mankind today, and its emphasis would be on the practice of life, rather than on doctrinal beliefs. Such a religion would create new rituals and artistic forms of expression, conductive to the spirit of reverence toward life and the solidarity of man[22].

Thus, Fromm's essentially messianic expectation of the possible fate of humanity presupposes not so much the disappearance of religion as its evolution, or in fact its reorientation towards the realisation of the ideals of radical humanism. In the light of the well-founded findings in the literature on the widespread occurrence of this phenomenon and the claim adopted by the philosopher, among others on this basis, about religion as an essential component of social life, the view expressing

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[21] E. Fromm, "The Relevance of the Prophets for Us Today", [in:] E. Fromm, *For the Love of Life*, New York 1986, pp. 138. See E. Fromm, *You Shall Be as Gods*, op. cit., pp. 97–98.

[22] E. Fromm, *The Sane Society*, op. cit., p. 343–344. On the utopia of a healthy society and its critique see M. Pekkola, *Prophet of Radicalism*, op. cit., p. 150–164.

the messianic expectation seems understandable. Nevertheless, in the context of tendencies diagnosed already since the turn of the twentieth century, not only by the classics of sociology of religion, related to the emergence of Western bourgeoisie and the disenchantment of the world[23], of importance is both the role ascribed to religion in the project of social change and the significance the philosopher attaches to this phenomenon. Furthermore, the passage quoted refers to new rituals and thus we should ask, referring to the author's other texts, too, about ways of realising or emergence of this expected quality. Importantly, Fromm has a relatively long timeframe in mind and the radical humanism he often refers to, present throughout history in various parts of the globe in a variety of forms, did not preclude different realisations, local specificity and dissimilar contexts and conditions for its emergence.

Of equal interest to the pedagogical perspective is Fromm's direct emphasis of the educational aspect of religion and religiosity, especially that expected by him. Both current and future exemplifications of a radically humanistic religiosity are supposed to be universalistic and compatible with the nature and course of human development. By their orientation towards practice and the development of appropriate rituals, they are to strengthen faith, contribute to the growth of rational knowledge, to the development of a set of skills necessary for the realisation and preservation of the utopia of a healthy society. In other words, if according to Fromm "Socioeconomic structure, character structure [of man – R.W.], and religious structure are inseparable from each other"[24], and "The concentration of effort in any of these spheres, to the exclusion or

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[23] See *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, ed. H. H. Gerth, C. W. Mills, New York 1946, p. 267–301; M. Humeniuk, "Between Secularization and Post-Secularism – On Disenchantment of the World from the Perspective of the Sociology of Religion", [in:] *Hermeneutics, Social Criticismand Everyday Education Practice*, ed. R. Włodarczyk, Wrocław 2020, pp. 159–186; S. Obirek, "The Challenge of Postsecularism", *Journal of Nationalism, Memory & Language Politics* 2019, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 239–250.

[24] E. Fromm, *To Have or To Be?*, op. cit., p. 113. The concept of man's individual and social character is one of the cornerstones of Fromm's anthropology. In the text *Man for Himself*, Fromm observes e.g.: "Not only has character the function of permitting the individual to act consistently and 'reasonably'; it is also the basis for his adjustment to society. [...] But from the social character we must differentiate the individual character in which one person differs from another within the same culture" (E. Fromm, *Man for Himself*, op. cit., p. 60). See E. Fromm, *Escape from Freedom*, New York 1969, pp. 304–327.

neglect of others, is destructive of all change"[25], then the emergence of a new religion crowns the action of the comprehensive transformation of the society he expects. However, we should reiterate that it is unclear where the impulse overcoming the phase of alienation should come from and whether this transformation can be induced or accelerated.

The above analyses and readings indicate not only the key role that the figure of the messianic age occupies in Fromm's philosophy and writings, but also that it takes many different forms and is only occasionally referred to by him explicitly[26]. This picture is completed by yet another version of the idea of prophetic messianism that Fromm has in mind, i.e. the figure of the Sabbath ritual. Its analysis and reading aiming at formulating pedagogically significant conclusions should be placed in the context of his concept of human development, the subject matter of the following section.

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AS THE DIALECTICS OF ALIENATION AND EMANCIPATION

The orientation towards monotheism, present in the traditions of Judaism and Jewish thought, is in its basis a rejection of idols whose worship leads, as Fromm concludes, to alienation. The object of religious veneration, assuming a certain form of a thing or definition, receiving an image whose content and form is the product of people themselves, sets boundaries and directions for their partial development and realisation for the adherents who yield to it and submit to it. If the Jewish tradition accepts that man was created in the likeness of God, who is a living process of becoming (Hebrew *Ehje aszer Ehje*), idolatry leads to disintegration of human personality, to immersion in a form of objectification alien to individual powers and to treating oneself, and consequently others,

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[25] E. Fromm, *The Sane Society*, op. cit., pp. 264–265.

[26] It is only in his collection of the Midrash titled *You Shall Be as Gods* of 1966 that he discusses at length e.g. the biblical and Talmudic sources that are conclusive for the understanding of messianism in the Jewish tradition, see E. Fromm, "The Biblical Concept of the Messianic Time" and "Post-Biblical Development of the Messianic Concept", [in:] E. Fromm, *You Shall Be as Gods*, op. cit., pp. 96–120.

as objects[27]. Thus Fromm draws an analogy between the processes of alienation and transference and idolatry: "In the prophetic concept, an idol is a thing that we ourselves make and project our own powers into, thus impoverishing ourselves. We then submit to our creation and by our submission are in touch with ourselves in an alienated form"[28], similarly to what takes place in alienation born of political doctrine.

An integrated understanding of the processes of transference and alienation brings Fromm towards articulating the dynamics of the relationship between human personality development and ideological conditioning, and thus makes it possible to critically consider the phenomenon of religion both in terms of doctrine and group coordination and compensation and human passions. This point of view is visible already in his first texts from the early 1930s[29]. According to the author of *You Shall Be as Gods*, religions or humanistic ideologies transmogrify into authoritarian ones not only under the influence of leaders' decisions, false assumptions, demagogy, unfavourable events, and external factors. Their components, which form a system of views common to a certain group, defining its thinking and acting, providing its members with a reference framework and an object of veneration, may include elements which in the course of adaptation initiate a process of alienation and consequently lead to or at least foster human alienation[30]. In other words, such communities, while pursuing the goals of radical humanism, namely man's freedom and independence, not only fail to lead man beyond subordination, but also strengthen and deepen it both in him and in his environment. The rejection of ideology, according to Fromm, is not the right solution either because of its social functions or the human condition. The philosopher considers the existence of religious needs and the necessity of basing human development on an ideal to be universals. Finally, the rejection of ideology does not solve the problem of alienation, supposedly remedied by radical humanism. Therefore Fromm concludes that "The

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27 Ibidem, p. 37. See ibidem, pp. 26–33, 36–43, 88–91.

28 E. Fromm, *To Have or To Be?*, op. cit., p. 35.

29 See E. Fromm, *The Crisis of Psychoanalysis*, op. cit., pp. 155–161.

30 It should be stressed again that one can also speak of ideologies which, to use Fromm's terminology, are authoritarian by design. However, Fromm in his analyses mainly focuses on the process of degeneration, of "reversal", examining psychoanalysis, early Christianity, Judaism, or socialism in the Soviet Union.

task of critique is not to denounce the ideals, but to show their transformation into ideologies, and to challenge the ideology in the name of the betrayed ideal"[31].

Importantly, the ideology implemented in a given group does not determine the attitudes and destinies of its members. Nevertheless, by creating, together with the corresponding socio-economic conditions, the educational environment and the world of everyday life, it systematically exerts a strong impact on the configuration of their personalities, thinking and actions. In many cases the pressure of the centres of power and the impact of the environment prove to be too strong or appealing. At the same time, the degree to which individuals are subordinated to the dominant ideology in a given group must be considered in the light of their psychological entanglement, internalisation of principles, strength of individual belief, and other predispositions, which the author of *Man for Himself* tries to generalise, coming up with a typology of characterological orientation[32]. In other words, the process of socialisation and upbringing also brings about tensions in a person's life. The result can be a regressed development, but if this does not happen, growth will mean a dialectic (with an accompanying oscillation) of alienation and emancipation towards the realisation of one's human potential[33]. This is the spirit in which Fromm reads the anthropology of the Hebrew Bible continued by the rabbinical tradition, expressed fully in his Midrash *You Shall Be as Gods*. Addressing the nature of the evolution of man, he observes that

> Its essence lies in man's emergence from the incestuous ties to blood and soil into independence and freedom. Man, prisoner of nature, becomes free by becoming fully human. In the biblical and later Jewish view, freedom and independence are the goal of human development, and the aim of human action is the constant process of liberating oneself from the shackles that bind man to the past, to nature, to the clan, to idols[34].

[31] E. Fromm, *Beyond the Chains of Illusion*, op. cit., p. 100. See E. Fromm, *Marx's Concept of Man*, op. cit., pp. 62–63.

[32] See E. Fromm, *Man for Himself*, op. cit., pp. 54–117.

[33] See E. Fromm, *Escape from Freedom*, op. cit., pp. 39–55.

[34] E. Fromm, *You Shall Be as Gods*, op. cit., p. 57.

As in the Midrash quoted above, in his many texts Fromm illustrates the dialectics and oscillation between estrangement and emancipation by references to biblical figures and myths. He reads the act of disobedience of Adam and Eve (Gen 3)[35] as a rupture of the original harmony with nature, attachment to blood and earth, which rupture, a step taken by man and woman outside the world of nature, initiates the process of their individualisation and also distancing from each other; it moreover begins the history of human freedom.

The fear-motivated return of man to paradise, symbolised by the mother's womb that offers a sense of security, although physically impossible, does not exclude fixation, which in Fromm's psychological terms should be understood as a disruption and regression, and in philosophical anthropology as idolatry. The direction of development, tantamount to the realisation of humanity, is unambiguous at this stage. Alienation in relation to nature and other people must be overcome progressively, by choosing to grow one's own strength and integrate one's personality in order to regain unity with others and the world through one's own aspirations, already as a free and independent subject, which Fromm links to the figure of messianic time[36]. However, before this happens, and if it happens at all, man will repeatedly have to defend their autonomy.

Referring to the next step in the process of liberation from incestuous bonds, which he understood broadly, Fromm draws attention to the figure of Abraham and God's command addressed to him (Gen 12: 1–4), namely that he should leave his father's home and go to the land indicated to him, a precondition of further[37]. God promises to the childless Abraham offspring that He will make into a mighty nation. Fromm explains that at stake at this stage is autonomy from another kind of primordial bond, the subordination to which can be the cause of alienation. Literally, the text points to dependence on the father, but the central issue here is the question of a positive dissolution of the ties linking man to his family home as a basic safeguard for the regularity of his other relationships with his loved ones. As the biblical text emphasizes, God gives his command to the now adult Abraham, thus shifting to him the burden of the

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[35] See ibidem, pp. 57–58, 70–71.
[36] See ibidem, p. 71; E. Fromm, *Marx's Concept of Man*, op. cit., pp. 64–69.
[37] See E. Fromm, *You Shall Be as Gods*, op. cit., pp. 58, 71–72.

task, independently of the will and attitude of his parents. Regression is also possible at this stage and in this dimension, dominated by fear, escaping into a deluded security of incestuous fixation. Man's development depends not only on circumstances but also on the direction he chooses; in this sense it is his choice.

The following passages, to which Fromm devotes his attention in the context of man's emancipatory aspirations, come from the second book of the Torah and relate to the life and exodus of the Israelites from Egypt[38]. The efforts of Moses, instructed by God, go towards breaking the social ties that make his tribesmen dependent on others as slaves, turned into property or commodities. Moses has to overcome not only the opposition of a powerful authority, taking the form of the pharaoh in the story, but also the resistance and fear of his tribesmen.

Escaping Egypt enables man to take the next step, namely to ground freedom in moral principles and law. Addressing this issue, Fromm focuses on the crucial difference between obedience and fixation:

> For the period we are dealing with here, that of the Bible, and for many centuries afterward, obedience and fixation are not only not identical, but they are opposites; obedience to rational authority is the path that facilitates the breaking up of incestuous fixation to pre-individual archaic forces. But, in addition, *obedience to God is also the negation of submission to man*[39].

Obedience to a rational authority is not yet the attainment of man's full freedom and independence; nevertheless, as the quotation reflects, it becomes an important help for him and, at the same time, the attainment of the next stage of development, at which regression is also possible. As the biblical passage instructs, Moses smashes the stone tablets recording the fundamental laws at the sight of men and women worshipping the golden calf smelted during his absence from the jewellery they had collected.

According to Fromm, the final stage is the culmination of the process of emancipation, the achievement of the ideal of full development, which still will not be free from the risk of regression:

[38] See ibidem, pp. 58, 72–91.

[39] Ibidem, pp. 59–60 – original underline. On the incestuous fixation see E. Fromm, *The Heart of Man. Its Genius for Good and Evil*, New York 1964, pp. 95–113.

full independence is one of the most difficult achievements; even if man overcomes his fixation to blood and soil, to mother and clan, he holds on to other powers that give him security and certainty: his nation, his social group, his family; or his achievements, his power, his money. Or he becomes so narcissistic that he does not feel a stranger in the world because *he* is the world, there is nothing besides and outside of him. Independence is not achieved simply by not obeying mother, father, state, and the like. Independence is not the same as disobedience. Independence is possible only if, and according to the degree to which, man actively grasps the world, is related to it, and thus becomes one with it. There is no independence and no freedom unless man arrives at the stage of complete inner activity and productivity[40].

As Fromm points out, numerous fragments of the Bible and the traditions of Judaism which derive from it, point to the independence and freedom of man also in relation to God, which in a way explains the title he gives to his midrash: *You Shall Be as Gods*, which is an allusion to the statement of the cunning serpent (Gen 3: 5), responding in this way to Eve's doubts about the consequences of people eating the fruit from the tree growing in the middle of the Garden of Eden.

Let us revisit the fundamental issues related to the question of freedom which he lays out. Although man is still part of nature, the process of evolution has brought him to a state which Fromm calls the acquisition of a negative "freedom from"[41], a state where man is not subject to instinctual action. "Freedom from" does not automatically transform into the positive "freedom to", but requires an adaptation process, where upbringing plays a significant role. Unlike other animals which gain autonomy relatively quickly, man requires long-term care and assistance in adapting to his environment. In the course of growing up, choosing between different available ways of acting, learning them, he enters the path of dialectics and the accompanying fluctuation between alienation and emancipation. Alienation is inscribed in the human condition and braving it is an indispensable part of his development, just as the desire for freedom arises from the nature of man; as Fromm observes, "*the power*

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[40] E. Fromm, *You Shall Be as Gods*, op. cit., p. 62 – original underline.
[41] See E. Fromm, *Escape from Freedom*, op. cit., p. 48.

to act creates a need to use this power"[42]. The dialectic of estrangement and emancipation, the recognition of good and evil, serves the time- and energy-consuming formation of human personality.

As Fromm acknowledges, at this stage, i.e. before full freedom and independence, religions play an important role in upbringing and social life. They respond to the human lack of determination of action by instinct and provide a common framework of reference in the world for a particular group, together with an object of worship, which helps them to organise their thinking and acting in a systematic way. It is important for the growth of human strength and the integration of the personality, as already mentioned, to distinguish between humanistic ideologies, which as a basis for upbringing support its development and emancipatory aspirations, and authoritarian ideologies, whose influence in upbringing is reduced to the preservation of processes and states of alienation. At the same time, rejecting the authority of ideologies at an early stage of development and upbringing could mean not only disorientation, but also a profound regression, even in the case of their authoritarian versions, because, as Fromm claims

> This identity with nature, clan, religion, gives the individual security. He belongs to, he is rooted in, a structuralized whole in which he has an unquestionable place. He may suffer from hunger or suppression, but he does not suffer from the worst of all pains-complete aloneness and doubt[43].

It can be said that in this way, people consciously or unwittingly, through their own weakness, conformism or compulsion, choose the "lesser evil", an escape from freedom. Nevertheless, Fromm's psychodynamic concept of human development assumes that there are no pauses in the process of human formation, and therefore alienation is not only perpetuated but also deepened[44]. In other words, an absence of endeavours to overcome alienation leads to a constant diminution of man's powers and

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[42] E. Fromm, *Man for Himself*, op. cit., p. 219 – original underline.
[43] E. Fromm, *Escape from Freedom*, op. cit., p. 51. According to Fromm, positive identification with ideology is not the same as individual belief (see E. Fromm, *Man for Himself*, op. cit., pp. 197–210). Rational faith presupposes doubt, which he believes is an essential factor in human development.
[44] See E. Fromm, *The Heart of Man*, op. cit., pp. 132–150.

a disintegration of his personality. Fromm's humanism is radical: the absence of progress is regression. There are no non-religious people, and the essential differences begin at the level of the type of their reference systems and objects of worship.

FROMM'S UTOPIA OF MESSIANIC TIME AND THE SABBATH RITUAL VERSUS THE PEDAGOGY OF ASYLUM

Fromm tackles the issue of the Sabbath just as occasionally as that of messianism, although one might say in a more systematic way[45]. Fromm is constantly aware that Sabbath, as traditionally related messianism, is the unique contribution of Judaism to global culture, and he considers the notion as the most significant of biblical notions, which as an element of Jewish law "is the only strictly religious command in the Ten Commandments"[46] and the only commandment that concerns a ritual: "The reason why the Sabbath has a central place within Jewish law lies in the fact that the Sabbath is the expression of the central idea of Judaism: the idea of freedom; the idea complete harmony between man and nature, man and man; the idea of the anticipation of the messianic time and of man's defeat of time, sadness, and death"[47], he observes in *You Shall Be as Gods*.

However, it is important to note an important difference, also emphasised by Fromm, between these two forms of expression of the central idea of Judaism. While the messianic time as a "time of 'continuous Sabbath'"[48] is a promise of the "end of days", imminent yet unspecified, an imagined beginning of the utopia of the future, an era of justice and mercy, and thus an element of everyday experience solely as an idea, Sabbath in its organised form of a communal ritual offers an individual the power to realise and live freedom, harmony and peace, which are a substitute

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[45] See E. Fromm, "The Sabbath", *Fromm Forum* 2021, No. 25 (Special Issue), pp. 8–18; E. Fromm, *The Forgotten Language. An Introduction to the Understanding of Dreams, Fairy Tales, and Myths*, New York 1951 pp. 241–249; E. Fromm, *You Shall Be as Gods*, op. cit., pp. 152–157; E. Fromm, *To Have or To Be?*, op. cit., p. 42.

[46] E. Fromm, *To Have or To Be?*, op. cit., p. 42.

[47] E. Fromm, *You Shall Be as Gods*, op. cit., p. 153. See ibidem, pp. 73–91.

[48] E. Fromm, *The Forgotten Language*, op. cit., p. 247.

for the messianic time thus permanently present in social practice: "The Sabbath is the anticipation of the messianic time, not through a magic ritual, but through a form of practice which puts man in a real situation of harmony and peace. The different practice of life transforms man"[49].

Resting on Sabbath day, subject to numerous prohibitions of activities whose meaning Fromm reads in terms of work, understood as interference and disruption of the harmony between man and nature and in social relations, changes man's goals by rationing the practice. Importantly, the realisation and affirmation of "the central idea of Judaism" are not independent of man's attitude towards the Messianic time perspective thus opened up. In other words, it is not so much the goals that are imposed, but rather the constraints on practice that force changes in the ways in which people act, and thus make possible the constitution of a new framework for man's orientation in the world. Although we deal here with compulsion, concerning the external side of the ritual, i.e. compliance with prohibitions, the Sabbath ritual does not lose its value for Fromm. Insofar as a ritual "*expresses* strivings which are recognized as valuable by the individual"[50], it should be seen as rational (in terms of radical humanism), and thus justified, which helps Fromm solve the paradox of Sabbath, i.e. that the state of freedom and equilibrium calls for compliance with the constraints and authority of the law.

Fromm's analyses of the Sabbath phenomenon address a few questions, not that frequently raised by him, as the importance of ritual and the close relation in it and interdependence of ideological and practical aspects, the universal and the particular. Although according to the author of *Psychoanalysis and Religion*, "rituals are among the most important elements in every religion"[51], only the concluding sections of his 1950 book furnish comments on a number of related questions:

> We not only have the need for a frame of orientation which makes some sense of our existence and which we can share with our fellow men; we also have the need to express our devotion to dominant values by actions shared

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[49] E. Fromm, *You Shall Be as Gods*, op. cit., p. 155.
[50] E. Fromm, *Psychoanalysis and Religion*, op. cit., p. 108 – original underline. See ibidem, pp. 106–111.
[51] See ibidem, p. 106.

with others. A ritual, broadly speaking, is *shared action expressive of common strivings rooted in common values*[52].

Given the importance Fromm attaches to religious ritual and his expectations for the future destiny of humanity, its unification and the establishment of a new non-theistic religion, we can try to identify why the philosopher refers to the ritual of the Sabbath. As a set of practices that "puts man in a real situation of harmony and peace", placed in a broader context, it may provide a model of communal action anticipating messianic time, which calls for the disruption of the relation between the ideological and practical aspects of the ritual:

> When I speak of the principle of the Jewish Sabbath might, I am not referring to all the details of the Jewish Sabbath law, such as not carrying even a book or a handkerchief or not lighting a fire. Although I believe that even these details are important to create the full atmosphere of rest, I do not think that – except perhaps for a small minority – one could expect people to follow such cumbersome practices. But I do believe that the principle of the Sabbath rest might be adopted by a much larger number of people – Christians, Jews, and people outside of any religion. The Sabbath day, for them, would be a day of contemplation, reading, meaningful conversation, a day of rest and joy, completely free from all practical and mundane concerns[53],

observes Fromm in the margin of his analyses of the ritual.

Fromm is anxious to transfer the anticipatory character of the Sabbath and to consolidate the values essential to radical humanism in the collective memory, in the processes of socialisation and education, but the new religion of humanity, in order to be established and endure, needs not only a framework of orientation and an object of worship. As he shows in his texts, humanist values have already been proclaimed more than once. It does require also corresponding "actions shared with others". For it is only the unity of doctrine and action taking the institutionalised form of ritual that opens the way for the norms of individual

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[52] Ibidem, p. 108 – original underline.
[53] E. Fromm, *You Shall Be as Gods*, op. cit., p. 157.

and collective health to be established and to endure in social consciousness, experience and practice.

The creation or introduction of ritual, as it were, from the outside into social practice, poses many dilemmas and dangers, especially as it can take on an alienated form, or lead to alienation[54]. In no way does this imply that Fromm sees in the life of contemporary Western societies the presence of only religious rituals and their remnants, although he admits that secular rituals are almost non-existent in his view. In the concluding sections of *The Sane Society*, dedicated to projected change, Fromm draws attention to sets of practices such as the Indian rain dance, Japanese ikebana and folk dance present in many cultures, joined by the educational potential, communal nature and ritualisation, and that these actions can be placed neither in religion nor in art, although they seem related to both. Fromm sees them as the origins of future secular rituals, which do not need to be created from scratch, but rather revised, yet whose character and orientation corresponds to the Sabbath model[55].

The aspect of "collective art" that emerges from Fromm's description that is interesting in the context of the issue under consideration here is not only that its exemplifications are actions fixed in the community, but that, while remaining specific forms of expression inherent to culturally and ethnically distinct social groups, they provide a related framework of orientation. Just as the great teachers of mankind, despite their differences, expressed a parallel ideal of individual and social health, similarly, the numerous forms of "collective art" can be considered as varieties of secular rituals, which share the ability to overcome time, depart from the practices of everyday life and introduce one "into a real situation of harmony and peace" and, consequently, "transform man". This aspect of Fromm's pedagogy seems to be related to his other concepts.

The meaning given by Fromm to "collective art" prompts us to think about its place in the movement he outlines in the final pages of *The Revolution of Hope*[56]. The movement, aiming to humanise the technological

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[54] E. Fromm, *Psychoanalysis and Religion*, op. cit., pp. 110–111. See E. Fromm, *The Sane Society*, op. cit., pp. 341–342.

[55] See E. Fromm, *The Sane Society*, op. cit., pp. 339–340.

[56] See E. Fromm, *The Revolution of Hope. Toward a Humanized Technology*, New York 1970, pp. 151–162.

society, to instil in it responsibility and participation, is discussed in the concluding sections of the text from the organisational perspective. In the context of the issue under consideration, its two links, i.e. "Clubs" of several hundred people and "Groups" of about twenty-five people, deserve particular attention. Although Fromm does not address the issue of "collective art" or ritual in the context of clubs and small groups, it may be assumed that in both of them, due to their aims and communal character, the possibility of its practice is assumed, and its significance for their lasting and progressive functioning is fundamental. This is particularly true of groups which, according to the philosopher's intention, constitute the most radical and consistent expression of the humanist ideal of health and productivity, embodied in the lifestyles adopted in them, and a kind of vanguard of a movement oriented towards the transformation of the society as a whole:

> Their aim would be to move toward a personal transformation from an alienated person into one of active participation. Naturally, the Groups would be critical of the conduct of life as the alienated society offers it, but they would try to find an optimum of personal non-alienation rather than the solace of constant indignation as a substitute for being alive[57].

With their open character, the internally integrated groups, when acquiring original knowledge, working on projects important to them and their individual members, and leading their own cultural lives, autonomous from the clubs and loosely connected to the movement, seem to constitute both its basis and a vehicle for social change. While the other links in the movement, as we can infer from Fromm's project, are more closely related structurally and functionally, and are called upon to perform specific tasks, the groups themselves, which are the backbone of the movement and as such able to perpetuate its radical potential, do not need reference and connection within a larger organisation in order to fulfil the educational and emancipatory role envisaged by the philosopher, although they can, and even should, serve as its beginnings[58].

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[57] Ibidem, pp. 158–159. See ibidem, pp. 157–161.
[58] See ibidem, p. 160.

The significance of small groups for a person's sense of security and the realisation of their need for empowerment, as well as the therapeutic value of practising or influencing art, are not the issues in which the originality of issue of Fromm's concept addressed here is manifested. Yet showing the activity of small groups not in the escapist perspective but rather in that of a pedagogy working towards social change, is. These asylums, capable of keeping a distance from the alienation of society, in order to be recognised as working towards such a change, must, apart from being involved in their own specific aims and current activities, anticipate and consolidate the values essential to radical humanism in shared practice and memory. Hence the association of small groups with "collective art", and by extension with the model ritual of the Sabbath and messianism. Thus, both figures, although only occasionally directly referred to by Fromm, are not merely useful illustrations but, interconnected, can be read as an essential part of his concept, whose implementation importantly depends on the pedagogy of asylum that can be found in his philosophy. It is one of the solutions, with emancipatory and educational potential, to the problem of human alienation and reification that can be found in Fromm's texts[59]. Waiting for the emergence of a new great teacher and the arrival of a humanist religion of the future, as Fromm wrote about in the already quoted final parts of *The Sane Society*, can thus take on an active, productive, secular, and collective character[60].

[59] See A. Cohen, *Love and Hope. Fromm and Education*, New York 1990, pp. 72–77; M. Pekkola, *Prophet of Radicalism*, op. cit., pp. 239–253.

[60] See E. Fromm, *The Sane Society*, op. cit., pp. 343–344; E. Fromm, *The Revolution of Hope*, op. cit., pp. 9–13; E. Fromm, *Man for Himself*, op. cit., pp. 209–210.

CHAPTER XI

UNDERSTANDING AS TRANSLATION. AROUND THE CONCEPT OF GEORGE STEINER'S HERMENEUTICS

Translators are men groping towards each other in a common mist

George Steiner, *After Babel*

One who translates a verse literally is a liar, since he distorts the meaning of the text, and conversely, one who adds his own translation is tantamount to one who curses and blasphemes God

Kiddushin 49a

The approach to the hermeneutic act as translation, advocated by such modern humanists and researchers as George Steiner and also Hans--Georg Gadamer, Paul Ricoeur, Zygmunt Bauman, and Jacques Derrida, in its various variants seems to have a significant potential for general pedagogy and philosophy of education and generates interesting impulses for educational practice and education research. As a preliminary approach to the basic assumption inherent in this perspective, we may refer to Steiner's claim, expressed in a work published in the mid-1970s *After Babel: Aspects of Language and Translation*: "Any model of communication is at the same time a model of trans-lation, of a vertical or horizontal transfer of significance"[1]. The exploration of understanding as translation is the substantive axis that organizes the content of the cited study, and at the same time, it is a radical and controversial approach to the problem of thought processes. It may be that Steiner goes furthest in his perception and treatment of understanding and translation, but the group of philosophers mentioned above through their interest in translation write into a general trend in the humanities that has been known

[1] G. Steiner, *After Babel. Aspects of Language and Translation*, Oxford 1992, p. 47.

as the translational turn since the 1980s. Thus, it can be concluded that the translational or translatological turn creates an important context for considering the issue of translation, including Steiner's theory on the grounds of pedagogy. Moreover, the approach of this literary scholar and comparative scholar can also be considered on the level of cultural anthropology, noting the rooting of his beliefs and findings in Judaic thought and tradition. The development of this context of Steiner's concept of understanding makes it possible to distinguish the characteristics of particular variants of philosophical hermeneutics which can be distinguished within the indicated tendency. Consequently, the issue of understanding as translation, addressed here with the intention of inspiring educational theory and practice, will be discussed and characterized successively from four angles: in the context of the translational turn, Judaic thought and tradition, Steiner's concept of understanding, and the relation between theory and action.

AROUND THE *TRANSLATIONAL TURN*

The mapping and identification of major developmental trends in contemporary humanities and social sciences is a challenging, yet systematic task. Depending on the nomenclature and the perspective adopted by a given researcher, their map initially takes different shapes, but over time some landmarks seem to acquire relative stability. These include the *translational turn*, which according to Doris Bachmann-Medick can be observed as a clear tendency since the late 1980s that has resulted from translation studies[2].

An insightful, bottom-down criticism of the Western humanities and social sciences that gained momentum with the events of '68[3], strongly defining poststructuralism, resulted, less than two decades later, in numerous attempts to break the impasse. On the wave of changes inspired

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[2] See D. Bachmann-Medick, *Cultural Turns. New Orientations in the Study of Culture*, Berlin – Boston 2016, p. 176.

[3] See F. Dosse, *History of Structuralism*, Vol. 2: *The Sign Sets, 1967–Present*, Minneapolis, London 1998; A. Burzyńska, "'Przeciw interpretacji', czyli burzliwe lata 60.", [in:] A. Burzyńska, *Dekonstrukcja i interpretacja*, Kraków 2001, pp. 77–274.

by poststructuralist as well as postmodernist criticism, original research directions emerged that spanned multiple academic disciplines and focused on issues such as e.g. interpretation, performatics, the body, reflexivity, place, image, things, experience, and post-colonialism. This is how this orientation is mapped from the perspective of cultural studies in the first decade of the 21st century by Bachmann-Medick:

> these diverse perspectives that are opening up new horizons for the development of the humanities and the study of culture in the wake of the linguistic turn. They are placing emphasis on self-interpretation, staging, corporeality and the power to act, on the politics of social and intercultural difference with their associated practices of translation and negotiation. They are focused on visual insights, image-perceptions and cultures of the gaze; spatiality and the spatial relations of social action; and the incontrovertible materiality of experience and history. Their scope extends to the latest challenges posed by theory within the framework of the emerging posthuman turn[4].

Each of these wide-ranging issues led to a comprehensive, yet well-grounded and fresh look at the reality and resources of theory in the humanities and social sciences, and more importantly, for the development of research corresponding to a given perspective. Their inclusion in the ways of conducting, for example, women's studies or Holocaust studies caused significant changes in their theory and research practice, which led to promising findings, unveiling new and shifting, or clearing the established horizons and problem areas. As a consequence, the expanding interpretative communities have led to the consolidation of a whole range of permeating tendencies in the study of culture and society[5]. However, their influence on particular disciplines, research centers or language areas is not evenly distributed, and depends largely on the specificity and context of operation of given disciplines and centers. For example, in Polish educational studies, the pedagogy of place has

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[4] D. Bachmann-Medick, *Cultural Turns*, op. cit., pp. 1–2.
[5] See ibidem, pp. 1–37; *'Zwroty' badawcze w humanistyce. Konteksty poznawcze, kulturowe i społeczno-instytucjonalne*, ed. J. Kowalewski, W. Piasek, Olsztyn 2010; A. Zeidler-Janiszewska, "O tzw. zwrocie ikonicznym we współczesnej humanistyce. Kilka uwag wstępnych", *Dyskurs* 2006, No. 4.

developed, the postcolonial turn is realized within the framework of intercultural and critical pedagogy; currently the pedagogy of things is gaining ground, while the interest in the translational turn and the issues it addresses can be considered only occasional. However, if we take into account the development of intercultural pedagogy in Poland, we can expect that multilingualism and cultural pluralism, which were one of the inspirations of *translational turn*, will contribute to its opening to the problems of translation. As Bachmann-Medick convincingly points out, "It is no longer possible to ignore the need for processes of cultural translation and their analysis, whether it is in cross-cultural contact, interreligious relations and conflicts, the integration strategies of culturally and ethnically diverse societies or examinations of the interfaces between the natural sciences and the study of culture", hence "in a world of interdependencies and interconnections, translation is increasingly being liberated from the linguistic textual paradigm and recognized as an essential practice. It is emerging as a fundamental new concept in the social sciences and the study of culture"[6].

Focusing research within the *translational turn* extends far beyond the interest in encoding and decoding information in different sign systems, the ability to transfer the meaning of statements despite the occurrence of significant differences between languages and their contexts of functioning, the space of intercultural contact. It allows us to escape the trap of culturalism, which defines separate, opposite identities, and between them spaces for exchange and understanding[7], and to go beyond thinking about translation in terms of harmony and balance towards perceiving negotiations, the dynamics of globalization and the potential of cybernetics. Towards recognizing the social constraint to translate one's own perspective and lifestyle into the dominant idiom[8]. Considering these non-obvious contexts for the functioning of the phenomenon in question, it can be concluded that "act of translation [...] is seen as a comprehensive transfer of foreign modes of thought, worldviews and practices"[9]. Viewing the human being and the social group

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[6] D. Bachmann-Medick, *Cultural turns*, op. cit., p. 175.
[7] See H. K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, London – New York 1994, pp. 36–39.
[8] See D. Bachmann-Medick, *Cultural turns*, op. cit., p. 199.
[9] Ibidem, pp. 178–179.

from this perspective provides a basis for challenging the assumption of the unilinguality of its constituent subjects, the unilinguality of the self and the Other. Consequently, the translational turn makes it possible to see translation as a basic cultural practice, and more broadly as a way of being in the world and acting, which opens up for pedagogy access to new possibilities of self-understanding, areas of research and educational practice. The shift in educational theory and practice, heralded by the translational turn, may also prove attractive for research methodology and scholarship. Bachmann-Medick seems to anticipate such opportunities:

> Can translation serve as a specific model for connecting disciplines? However these questions are answered, the category of translation could also have far-reaching consequences for methodology itself, whether for establishing interdisciplinary approaches or for reconceptualizing comparative literary studies that rethink the process of cultural comparison in light of translation[10],

but also in the transfer of concepts or methods between and within disciplines, the vertical and horizontal integration of knowledge.

DIALOGUE, COMMENTARY AND READING WITH NO LIMIT

A statement "Commentary is without end" could easily be found in Ecclesiastes. The commentary was established long ago, imperceptibly and without our participation, and its potential exceeds the time and capabilities of an individual. In Judaic thought and tradition, the commented text is originally the text of the Pentateuch, the written Torah, but the Talmud can serve as a model example of the relationship between the network of commentaries. The status in Judaism of the Talmuds of Babylon and Jerusalem (the Babylonian and the Jerusalem Talmud were two versions created in parallel for hundreds of years) as sources of

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[10] Ibidem, p. 178. See ibidem, p. 189–192; R. Włodarczyk, "Transgression – Transdisciplinarity – Translation", [in:] *Hermeneutics, Social Criticism and Everyday Education Practice*, ed. R. Włodarczyk, Wrocław 2020, pp. 27–46.

knowledge about revelation and the will of God-addressed at the believers in and those related to Orthodox Judaism, equals that of the Torah in its broadest sense (*Mikra* or *Tanakh*[11]). The Torah in its canonical form contains apart from the Written Torah, Pentateuch of Moses (*Chumash*) also the books of revelations and history of the prophets of Israel and other writings of particular importance for the science, history, authority, and practice of Judaism. However, in the Talmud, the prophets of the Hebrew Bible are replaced by scholars and it is their binding findings and discussions about the tradition and practice of Judaism that are the subject of the commentaries contained therein and of the commentaries to commentaries that have accrued over the centuries. In turn, this written polyphony, too, is subject to careful study by scribes in every generation and place of the Diaspora,[12] and some of these Midrashes prove so valuable that their significance transcends the region and time of the author's life. In a lot of them after quoting a passage from the *Mishnah* (collected and codified in the Talmud by Jewish scholars called the *Tannaim* of oral tradition, which is a canonical supplement to the Written Torah) and *Gemara* (a part of the Talmud which contains discussions of Jewish scholars

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[11] *Tanakh* is an acronym for the words denoting three components of the Hebrew Bible: *Torah* (Instruction, or Law), *Nevi'im* (Prophets) and *Ketuvim* (Writings). The canon of the Hebrew Bible and the final wording of its individual books, most of which are written in Hebrew and only a small number of which are in Aramaic, was determined around the first century AD. However, the final editions of the two variants of Talmud written in Hebrew, a language different from the biblical one, and in two dialects of Aramaic with additions of Latin and Greek words, are the result of discussions among Jewish scholars in Babylonia and Palestine that lasted about 800 years. Knowledge of the issues raised in this subsection is greatly enhanced and organized by the relevant entries developed in: *The Encyclopaedia of Jewish Life and Thought*, ed. C. Pearl, Jerusalem 1996; *The Encyclopaedia of Judaism*, Vol. IV, ed. J. Neusner, A. J. Avery-Peck, W. S. Green, Brill, Leiden – Boston 2005, pp. 2583–2613.

[12] Just as both variants of the Talmud bear witness to the contact and exchange of knowledge between Babylonian and Palestinian scholars, the life of Jews in the Diaspora (from Greek: dispersion) in numerous countries of settlement, at first mainly in the Persian and Macedonian empires, and later on in other continents, was conducive to cultural influences and to the use of languages spoken there for commentary. The Jewish Diaspora was already numerous at the time of the First Temple, and its dynamic growth, surpassing the population living in Palestine, took place after the Babylonian captivity (4th century BCE) and continues to this day. Moreover, its significance for Jewish history is underscored by the term *galut* (from Hebrew: exile, captivity), which defines the distinctive condition of the Jewish people from the destruction of the Second Temple (70 AD) to the proclamation of the State of Israel in May 1948.

called the *Amoraim* and their elaborations and extensions of the previously structured *Mishnah*), there is a wide-ranging commentary by the author. In the comment, in reference to the Hebraic Bible, the comments of the Talmud (*tosafot*), the supplement of the *Mishnah* (*Tosefta*), literary and cultural legacy of Judaism, the researcher tries, using often advanced hermeneutical techniques, to reliably establish a possible connection between the statements gathered in the commented fragments of the text, their meaning and message. Basically, in this way, the discussion on the issue of *halakha* (the legal principles of Judaism) was already conducted by *Amoraim*, generations of Jewish scholars active already after the final arrangement of the *Mishnah*, which took place about eighteen centuries ago. This discussion started from a specific case, an opinion or a decision taken from the *Mishnah*, and ended with a general rule, which would conclusively solve a complex legal and religious problem and would thus enable religious asceticism in line with the commandments and standards of Judaism. Hence George Steiner[13] may not unjustifiably claim that

> In Judaism, unending commentary and commentary upon commentary are elemental. Talmudic exegesis exfoliates into uninterrupted study of and commentary on the Talmud. [...] Hermeneutic unendingness and survival in exile are, I believe, kindred. The text of the Torah, of the biblical canon, and the concentric spheres of texts about these texts, replace the destroyed Temple[14].

Tradition in Judaism does not contain a conclusion, although it is possible that it announces one. A network of commentaries is a constant exchange of opinions and statements open to those who are yet to join. As a rule, the Torah, the Tanah or the Talmud cannot be read in any other way than with and through other recognized texts; it can be argued on the basis of what has already been said that one can say that they themselves constitute successive stages of overlapping comments,

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[13] In particular sections of this and subsequent parts of the article I refer to and use findings from my work: *Lévinas. W stronę pedagogiki azylu* (Warszawa 2009, pp. 136–152, 249–278) and "Hermeneutics of Translation – the Fundamental Aspect of Dialogue. Around the Concept of George Steiner" (in: *Hermeneutics, Social Criticism and Everyday Education Practice*, ed. R. Włodarczyk, Wrocław 2020, pp. 47–59).

[14] G. Steiner, "A Secondary City", [in:] G. Steiner, *Real Presences. Is there Anything in What We Say?*, London 2010, p. 45.

an incarnation of the dialogic principle. The study is a spatially and temporally extended polyphonic conversation.

It therefore becomes in a sense impossible to approach the text in an unmediated way. Reading the riddle of a word, verse, parsha, or story builds a link between distant events and the present day, and at the same time guides it through the many responses that members of Jewish communities have received during their lives. The answers they have given, both those recorded by scholars and those provided daily in the ordinary practice of meetings, are not absolute; they do not attempt to be the last, but rather the penultimate comments in a whole series. Those who offer the comments remember that the Messianic era is still a question of an opaque, albeit expected, anticipated future, so that in the meantime other commentators will come and reveal other facets and possibilities of the text, emphasizing different or contradictory meanings which will be characteristic of their time and circumstances. Synthesis is the great hope of the messianic era when, as tradition has it and as Emmanuel Levinas reminds us, "the prophet Elijah [...] will resolve all antinomies"[15].

The real danger, then, is not the lack of definitive answers, but the severance of the tradition of inquiry, since "In dispersion, the text is homeland. [...] This reading without end represents the foremost guarantee of Jewish identity"[16], observes Steiner. Hence the merger of commentary and interpretation, as long as the latter means the definitive establishment of meaning; its closure before the time of fulfillment is ripe would be tantamount to the erasure of the fundamental tension between them, which points to the position taken by Rabbi Sacha

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[15] E. Levinas, "Judaism and Revolution", [in:] E. Levinas, *Nine Talmudic Readings*, Bloomington & Indianapolis 1990, p. 118. See also: E. Levinas, "The Translation of the Scripture", [in:] E. Levinas, *In the Time of the Nations*, Bloomington & Indianapolis 1994, pp. 33–54.

[16] G. Steiner, "A Secondary City", op. cit., p. 46. See also: H. Bloom, "Free and Broken Tablets: the Cultural Prospects of American Jewry", [in:] H. Bloom, *Agon: Towards a Theory of Revisionism*, Oxford 1982, pp. 328–329. Steiner also speaks about the crisis caused by a discontinuity in the context of Western culture. As he proves, the real problem for a reader who wants to understand a text may be precisely the loss of continuity of tradition (see G. Steiner, "The Broken Contract", [in:] G. Steiner, *Real Presences*, op. cit.; G. Steiner, *Grammars of Creation*, London 2010, chapter V).

Pecaric: "the concept of interpretation in this [Jewish – R.W.] tradition simply does not exist"[17].

Maintaining continuity despite differences in time, space, environmental conditions or language, meticulous storage and recording of glosses in their original form of inquiries, questions and possible answers makes us pay special attention to yet another dimension of the pulsating dialogue and commentary, a dimension distinguished by the ritualisation of the mode of universal reading of the Book. As Pecaric observes:

> In the Jewish world, in the world of Torah, there is a certain obligation to translate, because there is an obligation to strive for understanding. Fulfillment of the commandment of the *shna mikra weechad targum* [twice the Torah and once the translation – R.W.] requires two readings of the Hebrew *parsha* [a fragment of the Torah – R.W.] prescribed for a given week and one reading of the *targum*, i.e. translation. But not every translation. It would not be a meeting of this *mitzvah* [commandments – R.W.] to read a translation that reflects only the grammatical-semantic meanings of the Hebrew words used in the Torah. [...] No translation of a text is necessarily a reflection of the original, but a first step in its understanding[18].

The issue of the commentary, as a link of reading without end, introduces not only the problem of the continuity of Jewish tradition, but also its multilingualism, the understanding of which assumes the practice of translation. Commentary is accompanied by translation due to the multilingualism of the sources commented on and referred to, because of the

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17 S. Pecaric, "Wgląd w Pieśń nad Pieśniami. Istota języka religijnego", [in:] *Hagada na Pesach i Pieśń nad Pieśniami*, ed. S. Pecaric, Kraków 2002, p. 233. By marking the differences between the scholastic tradition and Jewish hermeneutics, Steiner draws attention to the paradigmatic meaning of the "appetite for a summa", a culmination which, according to him, although in a changed form, has survived in Western tradition until the present day (see G. Steiner, "A Secondary City", op. cit., pp. 47–50). Steiner stresses the link between the summa with the tendency to eradicate heresy.

18 S. Pecaric, "Wstęp. Mowa na pustyni", [in:] *Tora. Księga czwarta Bemidbar*, ed. S. Pecaric, Kraków 2005, pp. v–vi. The text at hand is *Targum Onkelos*, the translation of the Torah into Aramaic, which grew up in the oral tradition in Palestine in the 2nd c. AD and was written down in Babylon ca. 500 AD. The author of the text was a proselyte, a scion of Roman aristocracy. See also entries: 'Bible, Reading with translations', 'Targum Onkelos' in: *The Encyclopaedia of Jewish Life and Thought*, op. cit.

time distance and socio-cultural differences, on the account of looking at the chosen link of the intertwined, delaminating and disrupting chains of tradition through the prism of commentaries. We can risk the claim that the commentary itself, as the effect of the work of understanding the selected content of the tradition, constitutes its translation.

GEORGE STEINER'S UNDERSTANDING OF TRANSLATION

George Steiner's statement expressed in the introduction to the extensive study entitled *After Babel*: "translation is formally and pragmatically implicit in *every* act of communication, in the emission and reception of each and every mode of meaning, be it in the widest semiotic sense or in more specifically verbal exchanges"[19], is naturally unoriginal. In his classic article "On Linguistic Aspects of Translation", published in 1959, Roman Jakobson, debating with Bertrand Russell and referring to the concept of Charles Sanders Peirce, expresses a similar conviction: "For us, both as linguists and as ordinary word-users, the meaning of any linguistic sign is its translation into some further, alternative sign [...]"[20]. While developing this concept, Jakobson suggests distinguishing "three ways of interpreting a verbal sign: it may be translated into other signs of the same language, into another language, or into another, nonverbal system of symbols"[21]. Hence Jakobson distinguishes three types of translation: *rewording*, *translation proper* and *transmutation*[22]. Thus, the differences between numerous idiomatic languages in which we act and which we use every day, as well as the differences between the order of thinking and the order of acting, require us to master and constantly develop our translation competence. The more often we use a language and its individual components, the easier, more efficiently, and consequently, automatically and unnoticeably for ourselves, the process of translation takes place. And so, according to Steiner:

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[19] G. Steiner, *After Babel*, op. cit., p. xii – original underline.
[20] R. Jakobson, "On Linguistic Aspects of Translation", [in:] *On Translation*, ed. R. Brower, Cambridge 1959, p. 232.
[21] Ibidem, p. 233.
[22] Ibidem. See G. Steiner, *After Babel*, op. cit., pp. 274–275.

To understand is to decipher. To hear significance is to translate. Thus, the essential structural and executive means and problems of the act of translation are fully present in acts of speech, of writing, of pictorial encoding inside any given language. Translation between different languages is a particular application of a configuration and model fundamental to human speech even where it is monoglot[23].

In other words, "*inside or between languages, human communication equals translation*"[24]. While choosing the right word or phrase to convey the expression of the original is a decision connected with understanding the given expression in all its complexity and the horizon of its context that the translator is able to grasp at a given moment in time. A repetition, or a simple rewriting is impossible. Each translation defines an index of similarities and differences whose reduction and reunification is the work of the translator[25]. A work whose fundamental meaning comes down to an attempt to abolish distance and regain closeness, insight. Literary translation is only a special case here. The author of *After Babel* emphasizes the importance of social differentiation of the circulation of communication due to the existence of irreducible biological, psychological differences between subjects and the practice of group identities, in this context he considers the functioning of separate languages, such as languages of women or children[26].

For Steiner, this incompatibility of worlds results from permanent change and transformation, from constant unsynchronized movement, both within language and in the everyday world of each subject of communication. In his view, "To the extent that every individual speaker uses an idiolect, the problem of Babel is quite simply, that of human individuation"[27]. These changes deplete the reservoir of what is shared, while at the same time widening the distance between the parties to a possible dialogue, a distance present due to the source separateness of the subjects, the mutual separation, as well as the constant disposition of the individual's consciousness to focus on himself/herself and his/her

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[23] G. Steiner, *After Babel*, op. cit., p. xii.
[24] Ibidem, p. 49 – original underline.
[25] See ibidem, pp. 312–435.
[26] See ibidem, pp. 35–47.
[27] Ibidem, p. 498.

own experiences. Thus, according to Steiner, translation is in particular a daily adaptation mechanism, learned and culturally conditioned, whose efficiency usually escapes our attention.

> Time, distance, disparities in outlook or assumed reference, make this act more or less difficult. Where the difficulty is great enough, the process passes from reflex to conscious technique. Intimacy, on the other hand, be it of hatred or of love, can be defined as confident, quasi-immediate translation[28].

Incompatibility is not just a way of drawing attention to the disproportionate existential situation of individuals in the social world, but also to the ontological status of languages. As Steiner points out, we have too little convincing evidence to recognize the premise that allows us to consider language as a system, as something with definable boundaries that could facilitate the constitution of a convenient cognitive perspective and to accept the claim of the symmetry of the internal architectures of each of them. Steiner argues: "we possess civilization because we have learnt to translate out of time"[29]. Moreover, each language, in its temporality, uses its own topography of memory, maps the world in a different way, and marks out a different set of possible realities thanks to its ability to generate counterfactual sentences. This last property is the one that most clearly illustrates the difficulties and challenges of social pluralism and determines human survival. As he points out,

> We endure, we endure creatively due to our imperative ability to say 'No' to reality, to build fictions of alterity, of dreamt or willed or awaited 'otherness' for our consciousness to inhabit. It is in this precise sense that the utopian and the messianic are figures of syntax[30].

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[28] Ibidem, p. 48. See R. Włodarczyk, *Ideologia, teoria, edukacja. Myśl Ericha Fromma jako inspiracja dla pedagogiki współczesnej*, Kraków 2016, pp. 31–33.

[29] G. Steiner, *After Babel*, op. cit., p. 31. As Steiner observes, "The process of diachronic translation inside one's own native tongue is so constant, we perform it so unawares, that we rarely pause either to note its formal intricacy or the decisive part it plays in the very existence of civilization" (ibidem, p. 29).

[30] Ibidem, p. xiv. See also G. Steiner, *Grammars of Creation*, op. cit., pp. 6–11; G. Steiner, "The Hollow Miracle", [in:] G. Steiner, *Language and Silence. Essays on Language, Literature, and the Inhuman*, London 2010, pp. 141–162.

Translation seems to prioritize and expose the interest of the "here and now", the present moment and those present within it, over the permanence of what is inherited. Perhaps in this way it creates the conditions for the possibility of inheritance.

The ability to understand the Other would be a derivative of translation competence and experience, including a wide range of gestures and phenomena accompanying the encounter, and sensitivity to the context, and thus each hermeneutic act is in fact a lesson in the transfer of meaning. By following, as the author of *After Babel* does, translators' records and notes, their translation decisions conditioned each time by specific possibilities and limitations, we can learn a lot about the nature and course of understanding. Although Steiner does not rule out a glimpse of its full achievement, he is far from seeing it as the core of our translation practice. As he remarks: "There is an acute understanding, essential to any treatment of communication within and between languages, of the ways in which a text may conceal more than it conveys"[31], and "any genuine act of translation is, in one regard at least, a transparent absurdity, an endeavor to go backwards up the escalator of time and to re-enact voluntarily what was a contingent motion of spirit"[32]. Furthermore,

> Not *everything* can be translated. Theology and gnosis posit an upper limit. There are mysteries which can only be transcribed, which it would be sacrilegious and radically inaccurate to transpose or paraphrase. [...] Not everything can be translated *now*. Contexts can be lost, bodies of reference which in the past made it possible to interpret a piece of writing which now eludes us. [...] In a sense which is more difficult to define, there are texts which we cannot *yet* translate [...][33].

Our translation clumsiness reveals itself when we are faced with an excess that is only covered but not eliminated by the ontological presence of a verse, phrase or text (the arguments in the discussion around the issue of misreading inspired by deconstruction are widely

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[31] G. Steiner, *After Babel*, op. cit., p. 64.
[32] Ibidem, p. 75.
[33] Ibidem, p. 263 – original underline.

known, there is no need to repeat them[34]). The distance between languages remains highly variable. Examples from the transmutation area point to further limitations. According to Steiner, "In and of itself mathematics can be translated only into other mathematics (as in algebraic geometry)"[35], however, it is not certain that the comparative scholar correctly assessed the possibilities of virtual space and programming languages. On the other hand, when it comes to music, in his opinion "Its only signifying 'translation' or paraphrase is that of bodily motion", in this sense "Music translates into dance"[36]. For these and many other reasons we must take into account that, as Steiner observes, "Translation is both possible and impossible [...]"[37]. In another place, referring to the controversy still present in the Judaic tradition over translations of the Torah, such as *Targum Onkelos* and *Septuaginta*: "Six walls of light surround Holy Scripture. Six walls: the order to translate and the prohibition to translate"[38].

IDEA, STATEMENT, ACTION. PRACTICE AS COMMENTARY

Following Jakobson in the last chapter of *After Babel*, Steiner raises the question of transmutation, the translation between verbal and non-verbal signs "To what extent is culture the translation and rewording of

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[34] See *Dekonstrukcja w badaniach literackich*, ed. R. Nycz, Gdańsk 2000; H. Bloom, *The Anxiety of Influence. A Theory of Poetry*, New York – Oxford 1997.

[35] G. Steiner, *The Poetry of Thought. From Hellenism to Celan*, New York 2011, p. 18.

[36] Ibidem, p. 16. See G. Steiner, *After Babel*, op. cit., p. 445.

[37] G. Steiner, *After Babel*, op. cit., p. 66.

[38] G. Steiner, "Aus Worten, nicht Wörtern", *Dekada Literacka* 1997, No. 8–9, p. 21. Steiner's text is dedicated to the translation of the Bible into German by Martin Buber and Franz Rosenzweig and confirms the claim of a continuous dialectical correspondence between writing and speech in the Jewish tradition. As Pecaric explains the status *Targum Onkelos*, "Importantly, to this day it has retained its normative character, while the Septuaginta, which was created in the third and second centuries B.C., has not gained this status and is actually forgotten by Judaism. What is the difference between them? Well, it is simply that the Septuaginta can be called a translation aiming at the literality, while the targum by Onkelos is certainly a translation, according to tradition inspired and confirmed by Rabbi Akiba and other Tanaites, whose relation to the Hebrew original consists in explaining and making understandable" (S. Pecaric, "Wstęp. Mowa na pustyni", op. cit., p. v). See also G. Steiner, *After Babel*, op. cit., p. 252.

previous meaning?"[39] and proposes that such hermeneutical acts and their effects should be considered in terms of topology, referring to one of the branches of mathematics dealing with, as he notes, "those relations between points and those fundamental properties of a figure which remain invariant when that figure is bent out of shape [...]"[40], as in the case of the expansion of a triangle into a cone. In other words, according to the researcher "The relations of 'invariance within transformation' are, to a more or less immediate degree, those of *translation*"[41]. He is interested in means of expression, such as paraphrase, graphic illustration, pastiche, collage, plagiarism, etc., which are not only translations of texts but also co-creations of them, as in the case of the combination of language and music, but also in issues that we could put under the category of 'performance'. As Steiner writes, referring in this spirit to the sphere of artistic activity:

> Each [selection – R.W.] embodies a specific commentary on the text, each realizes a particular mode of animation. [...] 'Interpretation' as that which gives language life beyond the moment and place of immediate utterance or transcription, is what I am concerned with. The French word *interprète* concentrates all the relevant values. An actor is *interprète* of Racine; a pianist gives *une interprétation* of a Beethoven sonata. Through engagement of his own identity, a critic becomes *un interprète* – a lifegiving performer of Montaigne or Mallarmé. As it does not include the world of the actor, and includes that of the musician only by analogy, the English term *interpreter* is less strong. But it is congruent with French when reaching out in another crucial direction. *Interprète/interpreter* are commonly used to mean *translator*. This, I believe, is the vital starting point. When we read or hear any language-statement from the past, be it Leviticus or last year's bestseller, we translate. Reader, actor, editor are translators of language out of time[42].

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[39] G. Steiner, *After Babel*, op. cit., p. 437.

[40] Ibidem, p. 447. The notion of topology seems to be a reference to the notion of 'family resemblance' introduced by Ludwig Wittgenstein, an important philosopher for Steiner, in his Philosophical Investigations. A broad application of topological thinking in cultural studies is found in Steiner's book *Grammars of Creation* (op. cit.).

[41] G. Steiner, *After Babel*, op. cit., p. 448 – original underline.

[42] Ibidem, p. 28 – original underline.

Thus, in his reflection on understanding as translation, Steiner also gives us the opportunity to look at action as a kind of commentary on theory. Clearly, taking an action guided by a particular intention is a manifestation of understanding that intention, but seeing the relationship of theory and practice that we expect in education as two orders mediated by translation offers an opportunity to re-conceptualize them. In this sense, thinking, speaking, writing, acting are different orders of practice, distinct from each other forms of human expression, and thus in need of translation. Interpretation-commentary always presupposes subjective participation in the form of creative invention. Demanding from "theoreticians", i.e. practitioners of text and thought translation, to apply their work directly to the resources of social practice is a misunderstanding, an attempt to shift onto them the burden of translation-transformation, which they cannot do for someone who takes action anyway, but also an escape from responsibility for the trans-lation risk inherent in crossing orders.

The text and its context and the movement and its conditions are revealed here as belonging to two linguistic orders in which expression not only takes different forms but is based on divergent grammars. Furthermore, in the transition from the substance of the text through the image of its meaning acquired in reading to its application in the chosen field of theory or educational practice, two planes of translation can be distinguished: the translation of a text into an idea and an idea into an action. Monitoring the effects and feedback achieved will in turn require defining the situation that constitutes the effect of translation. Similarly, in the case of educational research, the collection of data through interviews, surveys or observation requires their translation into the concepts of the researcher and then into the languages of theory. On the other hand, learning them by reading studies allows us to establish their topology, which can be used in methodology, if we use simultaneously, for example, a multimedia presentation and a discussion as its translation in the context of a text prepared for the class by learners. Looking at their difficulties in understanding it, provides a way of looking at the practice of photocopying as displacing note-taking, and thus a huge (in terms of academic time) exercise in translation. These are just a few examples of clearances where the moments

of translation in pedagogical terms are more evident. In other words, if for all the multilingualism of educational theory and practice, the horizontal and vertical integration of knowledge from academic disciplines and sub-disciplines means translation, then the perspective opened by the *translational turn* directs us towards the figure of a polyglot educator. This perspective is worth filling with content. As Steiner claims,

> To dismiss the validity of translation because it is not always possible and never perfect is absurd. What does need clarification, say the translators, is the *degree* of fidelity to be pursued in each case, the tolerance allowed as between different jobs of work. A rough and ready division runs through the history and practice of translation[43].

Thus, if the author of *After Babel* proposes a general theory of understanding as translation, then every practice – from thinking through, speaking, to acting – in which we recognize the participation of understanding has a close relationship to translation, its particular factures. Steiner's starting point is literary hermeneutics – the art of understanding and interpreting texts, known not only to the Greek. Like Friedrich Schleiermacher, he does not lose sight of the Hebrew Bible; the thought and tradition of Judaism are an important inspiration for him. Like Wilhelm Dilthey, he draws conclusions for humanities from the subject constitution in the acts of experiencing art. Ultimately, however, he follows Martin Heidegger into philosophical hermeneutics, seeing in the acts of translation a way of man's existing in the world[44].

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[43] Ibidem, p. 279 – original underline.
[44] The main part of Steiner's book on Heidegger's thought and work is his commentary on *Being and Time* (see G. Steiner, *Martin Heidegger*, New York 1980).

CHAPTER XII

UTOPIA OF SCHOOL, DISOBEDIENCE, AND TRANSLATION. TWO BIBLICAL MYTHS IN THE INTERPRETATION OF ERICH FROMM AND GEORGE STEINER

For success, like happiness,
cannot be pursued;
it must ensue, and it only does so
as the unintended side-effect
of one's personal dedication to
a cause greater than oneself
or as the by-product of one's surrender
to a person other than oneself

Viktor Frankl, *Man's*
Search for Meaning

In the oldest book of the Hebrew Bible, we find two passages often cited in discussions about utopias. The first one (Gen 2: 8 – 3: 24) speaks of the Garden of Eden prepared by God and inhabited by Adam and Eve, presumably located somewhere in Babylonia. The inhabitants were able to find there, albeit for a short time only, uninterrupted happiness, perhaps even bliss. However, the secluded place identified with Paradise seems to have had little in common with overseas civilizations, the details of which have been discovered for us since the Renaissance by authors of *A Truly Golden Little Books* who followed into the footsteps of Thomas More's. According to Bronisław Baczko: "Paradise and utopias are lands that the cartographers of the imaginary spaces situate as neighbouring territories. However, these are completely different places, as their location and history differ from each other in several crucial respects"[1].

There is no denying the above statement given the 1516 text by More, paradigmatic for the literary genre, an account of an imaginary journey,

[1] B. Baczko, *Job, mon ami: promesses du bonheur et fatalité du mal*, Paris 1997, p. 93. See ibidem, pp. 93–173; B. Baczko, *Wyobrażenia społeczne. Szkice o nadziei i pamięci zbiorowej*, Warszawa 1994, pp. 72–157.

"at the end of which the narrator discovers a previously unknown country, which stands out thanks to its institutions and becomes the subject of a detailed description"[2]. Utopia is a remote island, its social order being a result of conscious human effort based on the project of a ruler, which not only to the minds of its inhabitants is far better in terms of political, moral and general wellbeing than other commonly known ways of organizing community life. However, the Garden of Eden is a secluded place prepared by God himself, inhabited by the two people He himself took the effort to create, obliged to obey the existing order. Nevertheless, like the island, it is cut off from the world and offers its dwellers a safe haven, happiness, harmony, and fulfilment. Therefore, the biblical Paradise can still be considered as one of several variants of utopia. This is usually the case with educational utopias as well; in line with the assumptions of the literary genre they are projects of a sufficiently perfect social order[3].

The second of the analysed biblical myths (Gen 11: 1–9) speaks of anonymous nomads who "as they migrated from the east, [...] came upon a valley in the land of Shinar and settled there". Having mastered the new technology of baking and joining bricks, they decided to build a city and raise a tower reaching to the sky. It is not clear from the text what motivated the builders from Babel to carry out with the project; perhaps they imagined future security, prosperity, social order, and power. Like an island in the sea, a magnificent product of communal human toil finally is emerging in the valley. Ultimately, as the myth has it, the builders suffered defeat as a result of the intervention of the concerned God. Like the inhabitants of the Garden of Eden, they must leave the valley.

The stories themselves will not tell us much about the layout of the garden prepared by God, or of the city and tower designed by the builders. In both of the cases the focus shifts from the images of the places' appearance and the tools that ensure construction to the history of utopia. The

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[2] B. Baczko, *Wyobrażenia społeczne*, op. cit., p. 85.

[3] See D. Halpin, "Utopianism and Education. The Legacy of Thomas More", [in:] D. Halpin, *Hope and Education. The Role of the Utopian Imagination*, London – New York 2003, pp. 45–58; A. Dróżdż, *Mity i utopie pedagogiczne*, Kraków 2000, pp. 48–154. See also D. Webb: "Where's the Vison? The Concept of Utopia in Contemporary educational Theory", *Oxford Review of Education* 2009, Vol. 35, No. 6, pp. 743–760. On the notion and the kinds of utopias see J. Szacki: *Spotkania z utopią*, Warszawa 1980, pp. 10–56.

fundamental issue in this case is not so much that of the essence but rather of the opaque causes and sources of human failure. In this sense, the said myths are not so much mere representations of utopian projects or goals as stories about their complex fates, and thus they are the philosophies and critiques of utopia. It can therefore be assumed that the biblical myths of Adam and Eve leaving the Garden of Eden or about the builders from Babel are intriguing expressions of the utopian imagination, because they tell of places where projects of a sufficiently perfect social order were carried out in two distinct ways. Nowadays, one such place that can be seen as an ambiguous result of the utopia envisioned during the industrial revolution is school, which is a space for education planned as an important part of the project of a sufficiently perfect social order. Two original readings of the above biblical myths, by Erich Fromm and George Steiner[4], will enrich the discussion of the condition of the modern school with new themes.

THE MYTH ABOUT THE EXPULSION FROM THE GARDEN OF EDEN AS READ BY ERICH FROMM

According to Erich Fromm, the myth of Adam and Eve's life in and expulsion from the Garden of Eden is a story of disobedience which marks the onset of human history[5]. The interpretation of this passage which has been prevailing in the West for centuries supports the thesis that obedience should be considered a virtue, since its opposite was the cause of the downfall of people. Fromm points out that also in Greek mythology the "crime" of Prometheus is presented as the foundation act of civilization,

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[4] Some of the findings and interpretations of myths contained in this article are taken from my previous publications, see R. Włodarczyk, "Denominacje mitu wieży Babel. Esej o względnej nietrwałości" [in:] *W literackich konstelacjach. Księga jubileuszowa dedykowana Profesor Elżbiecie Hurnik*, ed. B. Małczyński, J. Warońska, R. Włodarczyk, Częstochowa 2013, pp. 251–272; R. Włodarczyk, *Ideologia, utopia, edukacja. Myśl Ericha Fromma jako inspiracja dla pedagogiki współczesnej*, Kraków 2016, pp. 177–179.

[5] See E. Fromm, *On Disobedience and Other Essays*, New York 1981, pp. 16–17, 46–48; E. Fromm, *You Shall Be as Gods. A Radical Interpretation of the Old Testament and Its Tradition*, New York 1966, pp. 21–22, 57–58, 70–71; E. Fromm, *Beyond the Chains of Illusion. My Encounter with Marx and Freud*, New York – London 2009, pp. 43–44, 127–128, 137.

since the titan, "like Adam and Eve, is punished for his disobedience"[6]. However, it is not only them who are bound by the sentence. Exile from Paradise and the consequences of the toil of the builders of Babel are, as the exegetes maintain, the legacy we inherited along with the need to atone for the sins of our ancestors. Fromm proposes a different interpretation. He sees in these acts of disobedience the promise of the opportunities opening up to man, and comments on the consequences of the crime of the first humans as follows:

> The original harmony between man and nature is broken. God proclaims war between man and woman, and war between nature and man. Man has become separate from nature, he has taken the first step toward becoming human by becoming an 'individual'. [...] To transcend nature, to be alienated from nature and from another human being, finds man naked, ashamed. He is alone and free, yet powerless and afraid. The newly won freedom appears as a curse; he is free *from* the sweet bondage of paradise, but he is not free to govern himself, to realize his individuality[7].

The banishment from the garden is preceded by the scene of Adam and Eve consuming the fruit of the tree of knowledge, which for Fromm is not so much a scene of people's downfall but of their awakening and becoming aware of their own independence and the sense of powerlessness stemming from alienation, which in the biblical text takes the form of both the sense of shame about nudity and the Creator's sentence announcing their future trials and tribulations. In this myth, their alienation is presented as painful but also indispensable, and the emerging challenge of change, which paves the way for possible development, is not shown as a conscious choice, but as a consequence of the human capacity to make decisions.

It can be said that the Garden of Eden is not a state of fulfilment for people, because it is incompatible with their independence, which ex-

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[6] E. Fromm: *On Disobedience and Other Essays*, op. cit., p. 17. See ibidem, p. 48; E. Fromm, *Beyond the Chains of Illusion*, op. cit., pp. 127–128.

[7] E. Fromm, *Escape from Freedom*, New York 1965, p. 50 – original underline. Fromm reads myths as a symbolic image of the birth of a child, when it leaves, like Paradise, the mother's safe womb without a possibility of return (see E. Fromm, *You Shall Be as Gods*, op. cit., pp. 57–58).

poses both its shortcomings (it is also a frequent accusation against utopias written according to the model determined by More's work) and the immaturity of the people living there. In Fromm's opinion, alienation may end in a fall for the human being, but it may also be a chance to realize and experience one's own needs and to grow to meet them. The ability to disobey that allows the human being to speak up for their needs and development is necessary for this to happen. It is indispensable in situations where power, authority or other external conditions are at odds with them. Although Fromm regards the act of disobedience as an important condition for development, this does not mean that every act of disobedience equals virtue to him: "If a man can only obey and not disobey, he is a slave; if he can only disobey and not obey, he is a rebel (not a revolutionary); he acts out of anger, disappointment, resentment, yet not in the name of a conviction or a principle"[8].

Fromm interprets Adam and Eve's act of disobedience as a breach of the original harmony with nature which, being an offense of a man and a woman outside the world of nature, initiates the process of their individuation and, at the same time, their estrangement from each other. It also gives rise to a history of human independence and freedom in which people can, and must, find their own answers to the questions of how to transcend the state of alienation, how to develop their own strength in order to realize their humanity fully and in harmony with nature and themselves. Fromm maps out human history as follows:

> Man has continued to evolve by acts of disobedience not just in the sense that his *spiritual* development was possible only because there have been men who dared to say 'no' to the powers that be in the name of their conscience or of their faith. His *intellectual* development was also dependent on the capacity for being disobedient, disobedient to the authorities who tried to muzzle new thoughts, and to the authority of long-established opinions which declared change to be nonsense[9].

The destination, then, is likewise in a way predetermined. To Fromm, the vision of the messianic era in the prophetic books and ensuing Jewish

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[8] E. Fromm, *On Disobedience and Other Essays*, op. cit., p. 18.
[9] E. Fromm, *Beyond the Chains of Illusion*, op. cit., p. 128 – original underline.

literature is a symbol and foreshadowing of the fulfilment. Fromm observes:

> This new harmony, the new oneness with man and nature, is called in the prophetic and rabbinic literature 'the end of the days', or 'messianic time'. It is not a state predetermined by God or the stars; it will not happen except through man's own effort. The messianic time is the historical answer to the existence of man. He can destroy himself or advance toward the realization of the new harmony. Messianism is not accidental to man's existence but the inherent, logical answer to it – the alternative to man's self-destruction[10].

The chronology of the events presented in the Bible is compatible with Fromm's historiosophy[11]; upon expulsion from the Garden of Eden, the abandonment of the state of nature, humanity has entered the path of evolution whose splendid diversity and struggle take place in line with the visions of future fulfilment, whether in this world or posthumously. Human disobedience which precedes leaving the garden in the myth referred to above does not rule out the possibility of humans achieving the state of happiness and harmony; on the contrary, it is a prerequisite for their achievement by the individual.

THE MYTH OF THE BUILDERS OF BABEL AS READ BY GEORGE STEINER

Over the centuries, the editors of the Talmud and the Fathers of the Church and their heirs have focused on the story of builders as a narrative on the relation between crime and punishment, rebellion and dispersion, the

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[10] E. Fromm, *You Shall Be as Gods*, op. cit., p. 71. See also E. Fromm, *On Disobedience and Other Essays*, op. cit., p. 17. Fromm observes moreover: "In Paradise man still is one with nature, but not yet aware of himself as separate from nature and his fellowman. By his act of disobedience man acquires self-awareness, the world becomes estranged from him. In the process of history, according to the prophetic concept, man develops his human powers so fully that eventually he will acquire a new harmony with men and nature" (E. Fromm, *Beyond the Chains of Illusion*, op. cit., p. 44).

[11] See E. Fromm, *You Shall Be as Gods*, op. cit., pp. 70–124; M. Pekkola: *Prophet of Radicalism. Erich Fromm and the Figurative Constitution of the Crisis of Modernity*, Jyväskylä 2010, pp. 53–67.

power of a united community and the plague of confused languages. The motifs of the lack of humility, another fall of people, as well as the original language shared by God and Adam, unhappily lost and binding humanity in Babel, and the unique meaning of universal language permeated modern literature, art and philosophy, inspiring inquiries made in philology and linguistics[12]. We have no reason not to believe that the anonymous nomads who settled in the land of Shinar were a decent, democratic community and that only such a just and internally reconciled community could challenge the world, the future, the living conditions, the sky, or the unknown God. However, He who hides his face, having appeared in the city together with an anonymous group, intends to work on the confusion of the language of the builders. Before they are dispersed all over the earth and stop the construction of the city, they will cease to understand one another.

God's strategy towards the inhabitants of Babel seems to be subtle; at any rate it contrasts with such spontaneous reactions as the flooding of the earth by constant rain or the burning of the wicked cities of Sodom and Gomorrah later in fragments adjacent to chapter eleven. In the story, which is placed, as if by mistake, between two parts of Noah's genealogical posterity register, nobody dies. There is no mention of anger or destruction; at best there is astonishment and it is hardly clear whether God's reaction amounts to punishment or prevention. We know from the text in the first book of the Bible that dispersion is something undesirable only from the point of view of builders.

In his study *After Babel*, George Steiner claims that the events do not bring about man's misfortune: "mankind was not destroyed but on the contrary kept vital and creative by being scattered among tongues"[13].

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[12] See P. Cembrzyńska, *Wieża Babel. Nowoczesny projekt porządkowania świata i jego dekonstrukcja*, Kraków 2012; R. Włodarczyk: "Denominacje mitu wieży Babel", op. cit., pp. 251–272.

[13] G. Steiner, *After Babel. Aspects of Language and Translation*, Oxford 1992, p. 244. Steiner's position seems to correspond to the views of the medieval Jewish scholar Abraham ibn Ezra, summarized in his commentary by Rabbi Byron L. Sherwin: "God dispersed people because if they remained focused in one place, they would be more exposed to the natural disasters that threatened them. Dispersion made them safer" (B. L. Sherwin, "Przesłanie opowiadania o wieży Babel, Rdz. 11,1–9", [in:] B. L. Sherwin, *We współpracy z Bogiem. Wiara, duchowość i etyka społeczna Żydów*, Kraków 2005, p. 140). See also B. L. Sherwin, "The Tower Of Babel In Eliezer Ashkenazi's *Sefer Ma'aseh Hashem*", *Jewish Bible Quarterly* 2014, Vol. 42, No. 2, pp. 83–88.

Dispersion is not isolation. Multilingualism, occurring between adjacent and coexisting communities spreading along routes through their linguistically opulent territories, requires translation work. According to Steiner, this kind of effort creates man, strengthens their knowledge, skills and competences to adapt to changes and circumstances, and reveals the disposition of imagination to create alternative worlds[14]. The American literary critic observes: "It is no overstatement to say that we possess civilization because we have learnt to translate out of time"[15].

Steiner makes the act of understanding dependent on the ability to translate; in this sense, interpretation means to him as much as translation. Choosing the right word or phrase to render an original expression is a decision related to the understanding of a given expression in all its complexity and the broad horizon of its linguistic and social context that the translator is able to grasp at a given moment. Repetition and simple rewriting is impossible. Each translation has to define an index of similarities and differences, a balance of profit and loss account. It is something additional that disturbs the initial balance, especially meaning. Its intrusion must be compensated for and harmony restored, which is to be achieved by the work of a translator[16]; this work is essentially an attempt to bridge the gap and restore proximity, to gain insight and in this way remain faithful to the text.

Literature, according to Steiner, is a special case of the hermeneutic act. The work of translation here is an everyday adjustment mechanism, learned and culturally-conditioned, whose efficacy as a rule escapes our attention. Steiner believes that:

> a human being performs an act of translation, in the full sense of the word, when receiving a speech-message from any other human being. Time, distance, disparities in outlook or assumed reference, make this act more or less difficult. Where the difficulty is great enough, the process passes from reflex to conscious technique. Intimacy, on the other hand, be it of hatred or of love, can be defined as confident, quasi-immediate translation[17].

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[14] See G. Steiner, *After Babel*, op. cit., pp. 59–62, 215–247, and G. Steiner, *Real Presences. Is there Anything in What We Say?*, London 2010, pp. 62–67.

[15] G. Steiner, *After Babel*, op. cit., p. 32.

[16] See G. Steiner, "The Hermeneutic Motion", [in:] G. Steiner, *After Babel*, op. cit., pp. 312–435; G. Steiner: *Real Presences*, op. cit., pp. 6–11.

[17] G. Steiner, *After Babel*, op. cit., p. 48. See also G. Steiner, *Grammars of Creation*, London

The tensions caused by the existence of an inter-language periphery are therefore not, as Steiner proves, a primary environment of the art of translation. To find out about this, one should go beyond the logic that periphrasis or metaphor deserves less to be seen in terms of translation than inter-language translation or transmutation[18]. Steiner's approach tends to counter this logic: "The affair at Babel confirmed and externalized the never-ending task of the translator – it did not initiate it"[19].

This is also a task of coping with otherness, as the author of *After Babel* stresses. Each language in its temporal facet uses its own topography of memory, they reproduce in different ways the world and determines a different set of possible realities, thanks to the ability to generate counterfactual sentences. This last property is the strongest expression of the difficulties and challenges of social pluralism, but it is a condition for the survival of mankind:

> We endure, we endure creatively due to our imperative ability to say 'No' to reality, to build fictions of alterity, of dreamt or willed or awaited 'otherness' for our consciousness to inhabit. It is in this precise sense that the utopian and the messianic are figures of syntax[20].

As in the myth of Adam and Eve's exile from the Garden of Eden, the stories of the failure of the builders are accompanied by many and varied visions, accumulated over the centuries, of regaining the harmony once lost in an undefined future. Steiner, in his messianic spirit, refers to one of them in the conclusion of his book:

2010, pp. 158–169; R. Włodarczyk, "Hermeneutics of Translation – the Fundamental Aspect of Dialogue. Around the Concept of George Steiner", [in:] *Hermeneutics, Social Criticism and Everyday Education Practice*, ed. R. Włodarczyk, Wrocław 2020, pp. 47–59; R. Włodarczyk: *Ideologia, teoria, edukacja*, op. cit., pp. 31–35.

18 Roman Jakobson distinguished three types of translation: intralingual (*rewording*), interlingual (or *translation proper*) and *transmutation*, or intersemiotic translation ("an interpretation of verbal signs by means of signs of nonverbal sign systems") (see R. Jakobson, "On Linguistic Aspects of Translation", [in:] *On Translation*, ed. R. Brower, Cambridge 1959, p. 233). See also G. Steiner, *After Babel*, op. cit., pp. 273–275.

19 G. Steiner, *After Babel*, op. cit., p. 49.

20 Ibidem, p. xiv. See also G. Steiner, *Grammars of Creation*, op. cit., pp. 6–11; G. Steiner, "Hollow Miracle", [in:] G. Steiner, *Language and Silence. Essays 1958–1966*, New York 2010.

The Kabbalah, in which the problem of Babel and of the nature of language is so insistently examined, knows of a day of redemption on which translation will no longer be necessary. All human tongues will have re-entered the translucent immediacy of that primal, lost speech shared by God and Adam. [...] shall come a day when translation is not only unnecessary but inconceivable[21].

It seems that in the consciousness of the builders, who had one language and the very same concepts, dispersion was a state that had to be recified. Perhaps this state prevented survival, and certainly, as a result, they interrupted the utopia of the city and the tower, the summit of which was to be in heaven. Their failure to achieve the planned fulfilment is only apparent, however, because it has made enrichment, strengthening and development possible. According to Steiner, both survival and fulfilment were possible not so much in spite of, but thanks to the confusion of language and dispersion.

We have reason to believe that schoolchildren enter the place of a strong stratification of time. It mainly practices what is to come by illuminating past sparks and adding current inspirations to them. Perhaps it is true, then, that the world exists only because of the pupils' breathing and the city where there are no students will be lost. In the context of the analysed myths the school, and more broadly the educational system as an institution of socialization, resembles the work of an anonymous demiurge from the industrial revolution era, promising in its assumptions and shape that the individual and society will reach a state of fulfilment. In this sense, the school enables the realization of the individual and society within the framework of parallel educational utopias. The situation of pupils in school resembles that of Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden. The use of its tools and facilities sets a safe path for self-realization and fulfilment in accordance with the school's ideological vision but also requires subjective subordination. According to the myth in Fromm's original interpretation, this treatment of students limits not only their independence, but also their awareness of themselves and their own

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[21] G. Steiner, *After Babel*, op. cit., p. 499.

potential, the development of which is only made possible by an act of disobedience. Hence, in the context of educational utopias, an important question may arise: Does basing oneself on the project of realization of individual and social potentials provided for in the school vision bring students and teachers closer to fulfilment and is the right way to achieve their full development? Or, on the contrary, does its realization in school impoverishes because it deprives students of their independence and, consequently, of their awareness of themselves and their own potential? Yes and no. If not every fruit but only the forbidden fruit of school knowledge makes us aware of our embarrassing nakedness towards the challenges of the world of everyday life, then the strategy of avoiding fear and alienation seems doubtful. Avoiding eating from this tree, the disciples trust that obedience is enough to experience fulfilment. As Fromm's reading shows, it is a paradise without maturity. Is it right, then, to decide to disobey, to abandon the underlying safe harmony, and to go through a state of alienation? The issue of resistance in school education has been the subject of critical pedagogy for a long time now and reading the issue of educational utopias from the perspective of Fromm's philosophy is only a certain complement. If the alienation stage is necessary, the tension between the vision of fulfilment in the school project and the need for independence of students and teachers can be understood as painful but creative. The state of alienation not only corrupts; a distance towards institutional visions and measures of success may contribute to the crystallization of private utopias and determine their realization, which enriches the world. This can happen, however, if we trust the myth, only outside the borders of the school. Its transformation in accordance with the idea of a given educational utopia may bring fulfilment, but it will not change its status in relation to the students and teachers placed in it as a work of an unknown demiurge, a paradise without maturity. This is not, of course, a praise of the educational system which, by definition, ignores the need of students, their parents and teachers for subjective participation in education, but a conclusion valid on the premise that school, like the Garden of Eden in the myth, was designed to meet also their needs and expectations.

Moreover, we may accept a view expressed by many critics of the modern school that, far from being perfect, the realization of a utopian vision is an unfinished or orphaned project of the industrial revolution

and perhaps even a token of pride punished, which brings to mind an analogy with the events told in the second of the myths cited. As in the case of the builders of Babel, after the initial consensus and enthusiasm for the modernization of the school, there was a crisis of confidence in the common ideal that undermined the efforts of the reformers. Conservatives, supporters of feminism, and technocrats now have a different idea of the final shape of education and describe it in different languages. The project itself, born in modernity, for some time now seems to have been continued by the force of inertia. According to Steiner's reading, in this case the failure to achieve the intended success can be interpreted differently than in the spirit of despair. The dispersion and signs of doubt about the possibilities and mission of the school strengthen alternative education with the influx of educators. In its many variants, the pedagogical utopia of modernity is translated into new formulas in accordance with the expectations of individual ideological factions. Faced with the challenges of a dynamically changing world, such a diversity of forms and multilingualism of education, which requires translation competences, enables people to survive and to develop continuously, and consequently to reform and transform the school itself. If, therefore, diversity enables us to survive, a school that is perfect enough for everyone which is the goal of modernization, could expose us to an unexpected downfall. At the same time, it should be noted, in line with Steiner's reading of the myth of builders, that the ability to translate – the condition for the development and imagining of possible worlds – is shaped in school, although it can manifest itself and be fully realized only outside of it. This raises the question of whether students feel responsible for practicing translating school knowledge into the tasks they undertake in the world of everyday life. Without this activity, which nobody can perform instead of them, there will be not too much flow, not even in one direction, between the different worlds of school and out-of-school. Moreover, if one looks at the school of late modernity as an unfinished realization of the progressive vision of the industrial revolution, one should consider, according to the interpretations mentioned above, that it leaves two instruments of significant utopian potential in the hands of students and teachers: disobedience and translation. Its future fate depends to some extent on their turning away from passivity.

Fromm's and Steiner's readings of the myths of Adam and Eve's banishment from the Garden of Eden and the builders of Babel address two important questions for the discussion of school as one of the possible forms of utopia: disobedience and translation. Of course, they require further study, but nevertheless, although it is impossible to draw final conclusions from the argumentation presented herein, in line with the reading of the myths we can assume that the skills of criticism and translation developed at school are the preconditions for achieving such a success. However, like Viktor Frankl in the quotation that serves as a motto for this article, Fromm and Steiner too seem to state in their interpretations that fulfilment and success can only come "as an unintended side effect".

CHAPTER XIII

SOCIAL CRITIQUE AND THE AMOS SYNDROME. ERICH FROMM AND MICHAEL WALZER ON THE ETHOS OF A PROPHET

*Our epoch is not defined by the victory
of technology for technology's sake, nor
is it defined by art for art's sake, nor by
nihilism. This epoch does something
for the world to come. It transcends
an epoch, it transcends the self that
requires the epiphany of the Other...*

Emmanuel Lévinas,
Humanism of the Other

*... who devour the needy,
annihilating the poor of the land*

Book of Amos 8: 4

It is not entirely clear how deeply and extensively dystopia permeates the core of Western culture. The premonition of its twilight, expressed in the dark visions of urban decay present in Balzac's *La Comédie Humaine* or in a separate genre of painting developed from the third decade of the 19th century onwards, prophetically precedes, according to George Steiner, the ruins of Warsaw or Dresden[1]. Thus, romantic fantasy gives rise not only to Fourier's phalanx and the announcement of "the century of the child", but also to Rousseau's "nostalgia for disaster", not unfamiliar to naturalism, and to the persistent conviction about a constantly mutating virus of corruption occurring only under one particular latitude; this virus, like some hidden programme, is gradually breaking down the civilisation of expansion and enlightenment[2]. The conviction

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[1] See G. Steiner, *In the Bluebeard's Castle. Some Notes Towards the Re-definition of Culture*, New Haven 1971, pp. 16–20.
[2] See L. Koczanowicz, *Anxiety and Lucidity. Reflections on Culture in Time of Unrest*, London – New York 2020, pp. 3–15, 143–178.

that the world continues its liquidation here and now; without interruption, without distraction.

The immensity of the atrocities, crimes and terror of the 20th century, archived in volumes of universal history, overwhelms and at the same time seems to familiarise us with the relentless inhumanity of humans, which manifests itself at times when they have authority over others and can harm them. Awareness of the human beast nips in the bud the utopias motivated by hope for a new, braver world. Looking to the future, the *raison d'être* and life-giving breath of education, no longer inspires enthusiasm, but rather resentment and anxiety. Lessons in darkness have taught the weary Christian watching the ghetto to eschew populism and dreaming, but is it only daydreaming and populism that make up the heart of this darkness? As Steiner suspects, "If the gamble on transcendence no longer seems worth the odds and we are moving into a utopia of the immediate, the value-structure of our civilization will alter, after at least three millennia, in ways almost unforeseeable"[3]. This minimal leaning into the future is like an urban experience of the horizon. Its indistinct, flexible line is replaced in it by the overwhelming dictatorship of the right angle. Moreover, perhaps the disorienting transformation observed by the American critic in the essay *In the Bluebeard's Castle* does not merely seal us off from what will be: "The catastrophic decline of memorization in our own modern education and adult resources is one of the crucial, though as yet little understood, symptoms of an afterculture"[4]. Steiner discusses the "organized amnesia" of school education, but also Western intellectuals living on its margins, aware of their rights and obligations, mostly seem to read the *signum temporis* like a savoir-vivre manual, respect peace and economic growth[5]. The succinct comment made half a century ago by a literary scholar seems to apply to them precisely: "The disease of enlightened man is his acceptance, itself wholly superstitious, of the superiority of facts to ideas"[6].

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[3] G. Steiner, *In the Bluebeard's Castle*, op. cit., p. 93. See G. Steiner, *Grammars of Creation*, London 2010, pp. 289–371.

[4] G. Steiner, *In the Bluebeard's Castle*, op. cit., p. 107.

[5] See Z. Melosik, *Uniwersytet i społeczeństwo. Dyskursy wolności, wiedzy i władzy*, Kraków 2009, pp. 61–103; E. Potulicka, J. Rutkowiak, *Neoliberalne uwikłania edukacji*, Kraków 2010, pp. 281–321.

[6] G. Steiner, *In the Bluebeard's Castle*, op. cit., p. 138.

Nevertheless, it is precisely the ethos of the intellectual that Stanley Aronowitz and Henry A. Giroux would see in the mid-1980s as the prescription for the state of siege of American culture and education[7]. Importantly, their postulate of a transformation of a teacher, overwhelmed by bureaucracy and formalism, into a transformatory intellectual counters the currently dominant tendencies of traditional perception of the link between theory and practice that harks back to the Marxism of Antonio Gramsci and of the Frankfurt School[8]. Among these tendencies, there are, in their view, three other, competing types, which are also to some extent models for the attitude that a teacher may adopt in school[9]: the adaptive intellectual, who does not recognise his ideological conditioning and is therefore rather naively committed to the processes of cultural reproduction; the intellectual leader, who actively supports

[7] See S. Aronowitz, H. A. Giroux, "Teaching and the Role of the Transformative Intellectual", [in:] S. Aronowitz, H. A. Giroux, *Education Under Siege. The Conservative, Liberal, and Radical Debate over Schooling*, London 2003, pp. 23–45; H. A. Giroux, "Authority, Intellectuals, and the Politics of Practical Learning", [in:] H. A. Giroux, *Pedagogy and the Politics of Hope. Theory, Culture, and Schooling. A Critical Reader*, Boulder 1997, pp. 95––115; H. A. Giroux, "Teachers as Transformatory Intellectuals", [in:] H. A. Giroux, *Teachers as Intellectuals. Toward a Critical Pedagogy of Learning*, New York 1988, pp. 121–128.

[8] Aronowitz and Giroux owe to Gramsci the understanding of the political nature of intellectual labour and of the social function of intellectuals (see S. Aronowitz, H. A. Giroux, "Teaching and the Role of the Transformative Intellectual", op. cit., p. 34–35; H. A. Giroux, "Antonio Gramsci. Schooling for Radical Politics", [in:] H. A. Giroux, *Teachers as Intellectuals*, op. cit., p. 196–203). On the other hand, the significance of transformative action in critical theory was raised by Giroux in a chapter opening his earlier, 1983 book *Theory and Resistance in Education* on the Frankfurt School (see H. A. Giroux, "Critical Theory and Educational Practice", [in:] H. A. Giroux, *Theory and Resistance in Education. A Pedagogy for the Opposition*, New York 2001, pp. 7–41). We read there e.g.: "the concept of critical theory refers to the nature of self-conscious critique and to the need to develop a discourse of social transformation and emancipation that does not cling dogmatically to its own doctrinal assumptions" (ibidem, p. 8).

[9] See S. Aronowitz, H. A. Giroux, "Teaching and the Role of the Transformative Intellectual", op. cit., pp. 36–40. According to Aronowitz and Giroux, the intellectual category is analytically useful for a number of reasons: "First, it provides a theoretical basis for examining teacher work as a form of intellectual labor. Secondly, it clarifies the ideological and material conditions necessary for intellectual work. Thirdly, it helps to illuminate the various modes of intelligibility, ideologies, and interests that are produced and legitimated by the teacher work" (ibidem, p. 30). See J. Rutkowiak, "Edukacyjna świadomość nauczycieli", [in:] *Odmiany myślenia o edukacji*, ed. J. Rutkowiak, Kraków 1995, pp. 285–297; E. Potulicka, J. Rutkowiak, *Neoliberalne uwikłania edukacji*, op. cit., pp. 203–227, 249–280.

both the established order with the domination of privileged groups and classes, as well as their awareness of economic, political and ethical functions; and the critical intellectual, who for good reason opposes existing institutions and points to alternatives, but who does not act in relation to or on behalf of any particular group, which in fact distinguishes him, according to Aronowitz and Giroux, from a transformatory intellectual, committed on the side of subordinated groups and classes to transforming social relations to further the implementation of the promises of democracy: justice, egalitarianism, emancipation and solidarity. According to the above authors, by relying on this model, teachers have the chance to oppose not only their own proletarianization, but also the far-reaching instrumentalization that dominates their workplace. Thus, not only is the teacher reduced to the role of a specialised technician of school bureaucracy and his autonomy and the level of skills necessary to perform his profession are reduced due to the routinisation of institutional teaching and the imposition on him of the function of a manager who distributes tasks and content derived from the core curriculum. He is also subject to technocratic rationality which focuses on efficiency, hierarchy and control. Subordination to it results in "the separation of conception from execution, the standardizations of knowledge in the interest of managing and controlling it, and the devaluation of critical intellectual work for the primacy of practical considerations"[10].

This is possible because, as a transformative intellectual, the teacher, according to Aronowitz and Giroux, must be aware of his or her social function and political role, and therefore of the responsibility for his or her contribution to a broader than merely school or educational context. The school, being part of the system, reflects the conflicts, inequalities and other phenomena of social practice that permeate it and that are at odds with the assumptions and values of American democracy in this case. Moreover, as an institution, the school is not ideologically neutral; nor are the worldview and activities of the teachers working in it. Also, the transformative intellectual does not represent unbiased qualities. Nevertheless,

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[10] S. Aronowitz, H. A. Giroux, "Teaching and the Role of the Transformative Intellectual", op. cit., p. 26. See H. A. Giroux, "Teachers as Transformatory Intellectuals", op. cit., pp. 123–124. See also R. K. Merton, "Role of the Intellectual in Public Bureaucracy", [in:] R. K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, New York 1968, pp. 261–279.

his prejudiced engagement, his organic connection to minority or excluded groups furthers the non-partisan aims of equality politics. Standing for democratic ideals means for the transformative intellectual to strive to integrate educational theory and practice and the language of critique with the language of possibility. In other words, he opposes concrete manifestations of injustice, oppressive discourses, institutional constraints and hegemonic practices by showing solidarity with the abused, strengthening their resistance, potential, voice, imagination, creating favourable conditions for their empowerment and initiating a critical dialogue beyond the public sphere of the school, establishing groups with other intellectuals and being committed to creating a better world for all[11].

However, if the school environment is a reflection of the prevalent social relations, the binary model of valuing them, i.e. the oppressed versus oppressive authority, ignores the problem of the dynamics of ideological tensions, clashes and divergences between competing groups, which calls for revisiting the question of the level of self-awareness of the transformative intellectual, determining his critical potential and directions of engagement. Moreover, there is no consensus in critical pedagogy about the concept of the critical educator and the legacy of the Frankfurt School[12]. Therefore, Aronowitz and Giroux's position may be seen as an example of a contribution to such an ideological dispute and an attempt to establish a moral and intellectual hegemony. This dispute reverberates with the echoes of the controversy which emerged some nine decades ago around the Frankfurt-based Institute of Social Research, concerning the role of intellectuals for the critique of ideology[13]. Nevertheless, this

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[11] See S. Aronowitz, H. A. Giroux, "Teaching and the Role of the Transformative Intellectual", op. cit., p. 40–43; H. A. Giroux, "Cultural Politics, Reading Formations, and the Role of Researchers as Public Intellectuals", [in:] S. Aronowitz, H. A. Giroux, *Postmodern Education. Politics, Culture, and Social Criticism*, Minneapolis – London 1997, pp. 103–110. See also M. Czerepaniak-Walczak, *Aspekty i źródła profesjonalnej refleksji nauczyciela*, Toruń 1997, pp. 8–30.

[12] See N. Blake, J. Masschelein, "Critical Theory and Critical Pedagogy", [in:] A *Companion to the Victorian Novel*, ed. P. Brantlinger, W. B. Thesing, Oxford – Malden 2002, pp. 52–55; M. Czerepaniak-Walczak, *Pedagogika emancypacyjna. Rozwój świadomości krytycznej człowieka*, Gdańsk 2006, pp. 41–52, 191–194; I. Gur-Ze'ev, "Toward a Nonrepressive Critical Pedagogy", *Educational Theory* 1998, Vol. 48, pp. 463–486.

[13] This is the dispute between Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno and Karl Mannheim and the position taken by Erich Fromm on the role of intellectuals in the critique of

chapter is not a polemic against the notion of the teacher as a transformative intellectual, but a reconstruction of a concept of the intellectual that seems to fall within the same type, which is a kind of gloss on the position of Aronowitz and Giroux. This reconstruction follows up on the principal assumptions of Erich Fromm's 1967 essay "Prophets and Priests" and Michael Walzer's "The Prophet as Social Critic"[14] from the mid-1980s as well as other texts where the prophet figure as we know it from the Hebrew Bible is read through the prism of contemporary political philosophy. Both see the figure as a model for a social critic, who takes responsibility for the presence of justice in the world of everyday life; they refuse to see the prophet in terms of a commitment to propagating the dogmas of any of the particular variants of theism. This postsecular[15] view of the ethos of the prophet may contribute to the perception of the image of a transformative intellectual as more complex and ambiguous.

THE RELEVANCE OF THE PROPHETS FOR US TODAY AND THE SOCIAL CRITIC

In his essay "Prophets and Priests" from the latter half of the 1960s, Fromm contrasts two figures of the prophet and priest, taken over from the Hebrew Bible. Both, with ample tradition, occupy a major place in the legacy of Judaism[16]. Moreover, no less importantly, one can identify their presence

ideology after he left the Institute of Social Research (see R. Włodarczyk, *Ideologia, teoria, edukacja. Myśl Ericha Fromma jako inspiracja dla pedagogiki współczesnej*, Kraków 2016, pp. 227–276).

[14] See E. Fromm, *On Disobedience and Other Essays*, New York 1981, pp. 41–57; M. Walzer, *Interpretation and Social Criticism*, Cambridge – London 1993, pp. 69–94.

[15] See S. Obirek, "The Challenge of Postsecularism", *Journal of Nationalism, Memory & Language Politics* 2019, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 239–250; M. Humeniuk, "Between Secularization and Post-Secularism – On Disenchantment of the World from the Perspective of The Sociology of Religion", [in:] *Hermeneutics, Social Criticism and Everyday Education Practice*, ed. R. Włodarczyk, Wrocław 2020, pp. 159–186.

[16] See. 'Kohen' and 'Prorok', [in:] *Polski Słownik Judaistyczny. Dzieje, kultura, religia, ludzie*, Vol. 1–2, ed. Z. Borzymińska, R. Żebrowski, Warszawa 2003. See also: M. Grant, *The History of Ancient Israel*, New York 1984, pp. 70–73, 122–131, 147–156, 163–168; M. Weber, *Ancient Judaism*, transl. H. H. Gerth, D. Martindale, New York 1967, pp. 169–187, 267–382; M. Weber, *Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, ed. G. Roth, C. Wittich, Berkeley – Los Angeles – London 1978, pp. 439–468.

and significance in many other religions. However, it is not the complexity of the nature of the loan that is the principal subject of a short essay. Both this essay and the monograph it was part of were dedicated to the preeminent British philosopher, essayist and social activist Bertrand Russell, who according to the author is "among the few in whom the idea has become manifest in the flesh, and whom the historical situation of mankind has transformed from teachers into prophets [...]".

> He happens to be a great thinker, but that is not really essential to his being a prophet. He, together with Einstein and Schweitzer, represents the answer of Western humanity to the threat to its existence, because all three of them have spoken up, have warned, and have pointed out the alternatives. [...] Bertrand Russell for many decades expressed his ideas on rationality and humanism in his books; but in recent years he has gone out to the marketplace to show all men that when the laws of the country contradict the laws of humanity, a true man must choose the laws of humanity. Bertrand Russell has recognized that the idea, even if embodied in one person, gains social significance only if it is embodied in a group[17].

The above passage foregrounds the question of defending an idea by testifying to its importance with one's own life and I am going to focus on this question a little more closely.

It might seem that the situation of the prophets of ancient Israel (Hebrew *Neviim*), active between the eighth and sixth centuries B.C., was of a somewhat different nature. Certainly, they do not present their personal views and convictions, but are by definition vehicles of the will of God, with whom they have a unique, original bond. Nevertheless, the authors of *The Jewish Political Tradition* point out that in their case, too, we are confronted with the problem of the legitimacy of the message and, consequently, of the message itself[18]. Importantly, this is a vital question as it concerns the ability to differentiate genuine and false prophesising

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[17] E. Fromm, *On Disobedience and Other Essays*, op. cit., pp. 44, 45. On Fromm's concept of the teacher, see A. Cohen, *Love and Hope. Fromm and Education*, New York 1990, pp. 78–82.
[18] See *The Jewish Political Tradition*, Vol. 1 *Authority*, ed. M. Walzer, M. Lorberbaum, N. J. Zohar, New Haven – London 2000, pp. 203–204.

and mediation, which cannot be verified at the source[19]. The indicators perpetuated by the Jewish tradition are not always clear-cut. One is to be found in the Book of Deuteronomy: "And should you ask yourselves, 'How can we know that the oracle was not spoken by the Lord?' – if the prophet speaks in the name of the Lord and the oracle does not come true, that oracle was not spoken by the Lord"[20] (18: 21–22).

Another, more problematic indication is to be found in the Talmud[21]. We can find an opinion in the Sanhedrin treatise (89a) among the wise men debating the authenticity of prophetism that it is evident if the man sent by God speaks on behalf of God in his own voice, different from the opinions shared by other prophets. At the same time, an excerpt of the Talmudic treatise warns against a number of hazardous abuses of prophetism:

> The Sages taught in a *baraita* about the punishment of those who sin concerning prophecy: With regard to three of them, their execution is at the hand of man, and with regard to three of them, their execution is at the hand of Heaven. In the case of one who prophesies that which he did not hear from God, and one who prophesies that which was not stated to him, and one who prophesies in the name of idol worship, their execution is at the hand of man. In the case of one who suppresses his prophecy, and one who contemptuously

[19] An important issue in this context, discussed by Max Weber, is the prophets' use of magic; present in various cultures, it acts as a means of authentication (see M. Weber, *Economy and Society*, op. cit., p. 440). A spectacular example of this situation is Moses' and Aaron's negotiation with the pharaoh of the sons of Israel leaving Egypt, an account of which is present in the Torah. Still, as Weber indicates, a gradual rejection of magic is characteristic of the prophetism of ancient Israel (see M. Weber, *Ancient Judaism*, op. cit., pp. 219–223).

[20] The issue, however, is more complex. *The Book of Jonah* tells the story of a prophet sent by God to admonish the inhabitants of the foreign city of Nineveh; the prophet chooses to disobey God's command. The book focuses our attention on the rebellion, the failed escape attempt, and Jonah's change of heart. He eventually repents before God, decides to turn back and go to Nineveh to deliver a message of punishment to its inhabitants. The reaction of the inhabitants is immediate. They show solidarity, repent and do penance. The prophet does not conceal his exasperation. One commentator, Rashi, i.e. rabbi Shlomo ben Itzchak, notes that Jonah may have been afraid of being seen as a false prophet by the residents of Nineveh once God decided not to mete out His punishment since what he has prophesied has not taken place.

[21] See *The Jewish Political Tradition*, op. cit., pp. 203–205, 223–231; A. Cohen, *Everyman's Talmud*, New York 1975, pp. 121–124.

forgoes the statement of a prophet, and a prophet who violated his own statement, their execution is at the hand of Heaven (89a).

According to Maimonides, a medieval rabbi, philosopher and a recognised authority on the codification of religious law, the prophet's credibility derives from his pre-established reputation of a wise and virtuous man, which also has its basis in the Talmud. For example, the treatise titled Shabbat contains an opinion of a rabbi, who saw that "The Divine Presence [*Shechinah* – R.W.] only rests upon a person who is wise, mighty, wealthy, and tall" (92a). Of course, the features indicated were read and understood variously, not only literally. More importantly, however, according to Rabbi Moses ben Maimon, a false prophet incites to idolatry and also makes himself known by proposing abrogation in the commandments binding on Israel. Here, too, Rambam's position is aligned with the authority of the learned men of the Talmud: "Forty-eight prophets and seven prophetesses prophesied on behalf of the Jewish people, and they neither subtracted from nor added onto what is written in the Torah, introducing no changes or additions to the mitzvot except for the reading of the Megillah, which they added as an obligation for all future generations" (Megillah 14a). The authors of *The Jewish Political Tradition* mention one more issue[22], referring to the Book of Jeremiah: a true prophet does not need a gift of the gab and, on the contrary, is angry, rough and careless.

The problem of the legitimacy of the mission and the credibility of the ideas proclaimed by male and female prophets stems not only from their radicalism, the risk of error or deception, but also from the fact that, unlike judges, kings or priests, who are guaranteed by law and custom to influence the affairs of the community, the prophets are neither appointed nor designated by the people of Israel and its institutions[23]. Their authority,

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[22] Fromm indicates one other criterion, too: "The absence of narcissistic motivation is one of the chief criteria for the true prophet in the past as well as now, and there is, perhaps, no other reason for their scarcity than this psychological requirement" (E. Fromm, *You Shall Be as Gods. A Radical Interpretation of the Old Testament and Its Tradition*, New York 1966, p. 76).

[23] See *The Jewish Political Tradition*, op. cit., p. 109–116, 167–170; P. Haddad, "Le prophète, un contre-povoir", [in:] P. Haddad, *Paroles de rabbins*, Paris 2010, pp. 137–142. Priests were a caste of people dedicated to God's service. They were Levites, descendants

contingent on their charisma, has no backing in the power and authority of an institution yet is relatively independent from them. In this sense a prophet or his fervent prayer is "a political force beyond human control – and so he is a threat to every establishment, most clearly to the priests and kings of Israel and Judah, but also to the pharaoh in Egypt and the rulers of Nineveh"[24]. Walzer highlights in his comment that "speech of this sort undermines authority. It challenges the status quo and the people who benefit from it", even if "the goal is a series of turnings, not a change of political regime – although if princes and judges repent, the effect may be something like a change of regime"[25]. Even in the numerous situations in which the prophets criticise the mighty and the powerful, it is not, Walzer argues, in order to undermine the social hierarchy, even though the negative consequences of their abuses, which play the role of collective punishment in the prophecies, can be felt for a long time and more acutely in a much wider circle of people than is the case with the dishonesty of less prominent

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of Moses's brother Aaron. Their unique significance was related to the roughly one thousand years of operation of the Jerusalem Temple, destroyed in 70 A.D. by the Romans. Some followers of Judaism are convinced that the Temple will be rebuilt in Messianic times. Unlike priests, prophets did not form a caste, nor did they hold offices by virtue of their function (as Weber observes: "The typical prophet propagates ideas for their own sake and not for fees, at least not in any obvious or regulated form" – M. Weber, *Economy and Society*, op. cit., p. 441), even if there is a period in the history of Israel where the institution of a court prophet emerges. Still, prophets came from various social classes, strata and occupational groups. For example, Amos was a representative of the people, Isaiah was an aristocrat, Jeremiah and Ezekiel were priests, Deborah and Samuel were judges, Joshua and Gideon were military commanders, while Saul was a king. In Judaism, the prophetic tradition dates back to Abraham, with a special role accorded to Moses, until the time of Ezra, i.e. 5th c. BC (see *Polski Słownik Judaistyczy*, op. cit.). At the same time, there is a strong conviction that prophethood has been continued, a belief expressed already in the Talmud. The Bava Batra treatise contains an opinion that "from the day that the Temple was destroyed prophecy was taken from the prophets and given to the Sages" (12a). That very treatise contains a clearly polemical statement by another scholar: "From the day that the Temple was destroyed, prophecy was taken from the prophets and given to imbeciles and children" (12b).

24 *The Jewish Political Tradition*, op. cit., p. 203.
25 M. Walzer, "Prophetic Criticism and Its Targets", [in:] *The Jewish Political Tradition*, op. cit., p. 217. See M. Walzer, *Interpretation and Social Criticism*, op. cit., p. 69–94. As Walzer has it, "Prophecy aims to arouse remembrance, recognition, indignation, repentance" (ibidem, p. 75).

citizens. Appealing to the consciences of individual men and women in high positions, they demand that the rich stop oppressing the poor and that the strong care for the weak: "Perhaps they will listen and turn back, each from his evil way" (Jer 26: 3).

We find a similar conclusion in Fromm's texts on the Jewish tradition. The only difference is that it concerns not only the activity of the prophets themselves, but the ethical message of the Torah, which is the reference point of their activity. Commenting on a verse from Deuteronomy: "When you reap the harvest in your field and overlook a sheaf in the field, do not turn back to get it; it shall go to the stranger, the fatherless, and the widow – in order that the Lord your God may bless you in all your undertakings" (24: 19), Fromm observes:

> Here, as in many other passages of the Pentateuch and Prophets, the main principle of social justice is expounded: to protect those who have no power (the widow, the orphan, the poor, and the stranger) against those who have power. Here, as in many other passages of the Pentateuch and Prophets, the main principle of social justice is expounded: to protect those who have no power (the widow, the orphan, the poor, and the stranger) against those who have power. Biblical ethics are not primarily concerned with wealth and poverty as such but with the social relations between those who are powerful and those who are powerless[26].

Generally seen by Walzer as social critics, prophets such as Amos or Isaiah represent a position of faithfulness, trust and faith. They believe that women and men, members of a community, can amend their ways and show justice and mercy:

> they criticize the whole of society and hope for its moral transformation, their precise demand is for individual *teshuvah* – 'repentance'; the literal meaning is 'a turning back' to the laws of the covenant. What they want is that

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[26] E. Fromm, *You Shall Be as Gods*, op. cit., p. 146. See ibidem, p. 103. Philippe Haddad is of a similar opinion when he writes: "When a king, judge or priest abuse their powers, God's messenger appears to remind them that rulers are tasked with the sacred ministry of serving the people rather than themselves, and that power is not a privilege but a responsibility of the strong for the sake of the weak and the rich for the sake of the poor" (P. Haddad, "Le prophète, un contre-povoir", op. cit., p. 140).

people repent of their sins (sometimes the emphasis is on idolatry, some-
times on injustice and oppression) and then turn, as it were, in place [...][27].

Like Max Weber, Walzer points to the predicament of the prophet as
a member of the people of Israel[28], as his position within a community
is significant. Firstly, he is not a stranger. He belongs to the community,
although this membership is only a starting point, as he addresses words
of instruction, reprimand and command to that community, showing
his knowledge of its way of life, its values, its problems, and its abuses.
Secondly, he does not belong to the priestly caste. His criticism is lev-
elled also against the priests and his knowledge is different from theirs,
i.e. one related to the Temple, worship and ritual. It is worth pointing
out that the prophet appeals to a different kind of knowledge than the
priests do, or to a different aspect of the tradition, although the former
draws on essentially the same sources. Thirdly, he does not belong to
the house of the ruler; prophets are often persecuted by those in power.
Fourthly, his criticism transcends the here and now of a single cultural
circle or group and is also extended to fellow men from different back-
grounds; one might say that mankind is the ultimate horizon of pro-
phecy. According to Walzer, however, there is a fundamental disparity
in the content and scope of the criticism addressed by the prophets
to the people of Israel and their neighbours, which, according to him,
is clearly exemplified by the situation described in the *Book of Jonah*,
in which a foreigner admonishes the inhabitants of a city unknown to
him. As Walzer has it:

> Jonah is a mere messenger who makes no appeal to social values, though he
> may appeal, without saying so, to a minimal code, a kind of international law.

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[27] M. Walzer, "Prophetic Criticism and Its Targets", op. cit., p. 217 – original underline.
Abraham J. Heschel notes: "The prophet faces a coalition of callousness and estab-
lished authority and undertakes to stop a mighty stream with mere words. Had the
purpose been to express great ideas, prophecy would have had to be acclaimed as
a triumph. Yet the purpose of prophecy is to conquer callousness , to change the inner
man as well as to revolutionize history" (A. J. Heschel, *The Prophets*, Vol. 1, New York
1969, pp. 16–17). See. M. Walzer, *Interpretation and Social Criticism*, op. cit., p. 60.

[28] See M. Walzer, *Interpretation and Social Criticism*, op. cit., pp. 69–94; M. Weber, *Ancient
Judaism*, op. cit., pp. 277–296. See also R. Włodarczyk, *Lévinas. W stronę pedagogiki
azylu*, Warszawa 2009, pp. 27–36.

He is not a missionary, carrying with him an alternative doctrine; he does not try to convert the people of Nineveh to Israel's religion, to bring them into the Sinai covenant. He just represents the minimal code (and God, its minimal author, who can have for the Ninevans none of the historical specificity that he has for the Israelites). We can think of Jonah as a minimalist critic; we do not really know what sorts of changes he required in the life of Nineveh, but they were presumably nowhere near so extensive as those required by Amos in Israel[29].

As Fromm before him, Walzer saw in the figure of the biblical prophet an archetype of a social critic[30], highlighted the moral sense of his activity and set him apart from priests, who were concerned with worship in the temple (Hebrew *Kohanim*). Priests' obligations, unlike those of prophets, are defined and strictly codified in specific provisions of the Torah. For centuries of operation of the Jerusalem Temple and the kingdom of Israel and Judah, priests held an office which is a pillar of theocracy:

Their status is hereditary, carried in the male line, like that of kings. But they have a more obvious divine connection, deriving from their function rather than their blood, manifest in the performance of the all-important temple ritual that binds God to Israel and ensures his presence in Jerusalem. In any religion where priests play this kind of mediating role between God and humanity, humanity is likely to find itself ruled by its mediators[31].

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[29] M. Walzer, *Interpretation and Social Criticism*, op. cit., p. 89–90. See ibidem, pp. 76–80, 89–94; M. Walzer, *Thick and Thin. Moral Argument at Home and Abroad*, Notre Dame – London 2006, pp. 1–19; M. Weber, *Ancient Judaism*, op. cit., p. 302–303; D. Novak, "The Doctrine of the Noahide Laws", [in:] D. Novak, *Jewish-Christian Dialogue. A Jewish Justification*, New York – Oxford 1992, pp. 26–41.

[30] According to Walzer: "The prophets were (the term is only mildly anachronistic) social critics. Indeed, they were the inventors of the practice of social criticism, though not of their own critical messages. And so we can learn from reading them and studying their society something about the conditions that make criticism possible and give it force, and something too about the place and standing of the critic among the people he criticizes" (M. Walzer, *Interpretation and Social Criticism*, op. cit., p. 71). See ibidem, pp. 33–66; M. Walzer, *The Company of Critics. Social Criticism and Political Commitment in Twentieth Century*, New York 1988, pp. 3–28; M. Walzer, *Thick and Thin*, op. cit., pp. 85–104.

[31] *The Jewish Political Tradition*, op. cit., p. 168. See M. Weber, *Economy and Society*, op. cit., pp. 464–468.

While references to biblical prophets are a recurring motif in Fromm's texts, apart from a few references, the figure of the priest is only presented in the above-mentioned essay, without reference to a specific historical background and in a figurative sense. The force of this text seems to lie in its use of hyperbole:

> The prophets live their ideas. The priests administer them to the people who are attached to the idea. The idea has lost its vitality. It has become a formula. [...] The priests use the idea to organize men, to control them through controlling the proper expression of the idea, and when they have anesthetized man enough, they declare that man is not capable of being awake and of directing his own life [...]. It is true not all priests have acted that way, but most of them have, especially those who wielded power[32].

Although the priests would like to be regarded as the successors of the prophets, it is rather in their activity that one should see one of the causes of the degeneration of the ideas preached by their precursors[33]. The last sentence of the above quote only slightly neutralises the negative opinion of the author of "Prophets and Priests"[34].

An important consequence of the essay's characterisation of the functioning of priests is Fromm's pointing to contemporary bureaucracies as pursuing the pattern of alienating subordination, which has spread to all sectors of social life, like economy or education.

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[32] E. Fromm, *On Disobedience and Other Essays*, op. cit., pp. 43–44. As in the case of a prophet, the broad sense of the term is of significance: "There are priests not only in religion. There are priests in philosophy and priests in politics. Every philosophical school has its priests. Often they are very learned; it is their business to administer the idea of the original thinker, to impart it, to interpret it, to make it into museum object and thus guard it" (ibidem, p. 44).

[33] Fromm points out that "the prophet Moses is the man who insight and knowledge; the priest Aaron is the man who translates the insight into the language which the people can understand. The whole ambiguity of the prophet and of the priest is already indicated here. The prophet may not be able to reach the understanding of the people; the priest may speak in the name of prophet, and yet falsify his message" (E. Fromm, *You Shall Be as Gods*, op. cit., p. 77).

[34] It seems that Fromm's extremely critical attitude towards priests fits a certain pattern, briefly characterised by Weber: "No prophet before Ezekiel spoke favorably of the priests" (M. Weber, *Ancient Judaism*, op. cit., p. 382; see ibidem, pp. 382–385). Moreover, the distinction between prophet and priest is, according to Weber, universal (see M. Weber, *Economy and Society*, op. cit., p. 440).

The corruption of the theories of progressive education have led to a method where the child is not told what to do, not give orders, nor punished for failure to execute them. The child just 'expresses himself'. But, for the first day of his life onward, he is filled with an unholy respect for conformity, with the fear of being 'different', with the fright of being away from the rest of the herd. The 'organization man' thus reared in the family and in the school and having his education completed in the big organization has opinions, but no convictions; he amuses himself, but is unhappy; he is even willing to sacrifice his life and that of his children in voluntary obedience to impersonal and anonymous powers[35].

As indicated above, the figure of the priest does not essentially occupy Fromm. For his conception of the critique of ideology, the figure of the prophet is much more important. Significantly, its role remains independent of the strict dichotomy outlined in the essay. The prophets of Israel, as Fromm observes in *You Shall Be as Gods*, not only point to a God who reveals himself to man, but are in his view apologists for humanism, emphasising that "man's goal is to become fully human; and that means to become like God"[36]. In addition, they show the alternatives that people are faced with and their possible consequences[37]. They are the conscience of society and speak out on issues that others are silent about as well as protest when others choose the wrong path. Similarly, in "Prophets and Priests" Fromm observes: "It is the function of the prophet to show reality, to show alternatives and to protest [...] to awake man from his customary half-slumber. It is the historical situation which

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[35] E. Fromm, *On Disobedience and Other Essays*, op. cit., pp. 47–48. See E. Fromm, *The Revolution of Hope. Toward a Humanized Technology*, New York – Evanston – London 1968, pp. 25–55; A. Cohen, *Love and Hope*, op. cit., pp. 47–53.

[36] E. Fromm, *You Shall Be as Gods*, op. cit., p. 93. See S. Lundgren, *Fight Against Idols. Erich Fromm on Religion, Judaism and the Bible*, Frankfurt am Mains 1998, pp. 132–135.

[37] According to Fromm: "The prophet, indeed, says something about the future. But not about a future event which will necessarily occur, a fixed event revealed to him by God or by the knowledge of the astral constellations. He sees the future because he sees the forces operating *now* and the consequences of these forces unless they are changed. The prophet is never Cassandra. His prophecies are expressed in terms of alternatives" (E. Fromm, *You Shall Be as Gods*, op. cit., p. 94 – original underline). See E. Fromm, "The Relevance of the Prophets for Us Today", [in:] E. Fromm, *For the Love of Life*, New York 1986, p. 134.

makes prophets, not the wish of some men to be prophets"[38]. The historical situation and their sense of responsibility to communicate the truth revealed to them without resorting to violence.

Furthermore, the prophets, according to the author of *You Shall Be as Gods*, do not think in terms of individual deliverance or salvation, but recognise that it depends on the salvation of the whole of society and that the problem is "the establishment of society governed by love, justice, and truth; they insist that politics must be judged by moral values, and that the function of political life is the realization of these values"[39]. As a result, they act as spokesmen for a vision of a peaceful world, which

> is the result of a change within name in which union has replaced alienation. Thus the idea of pace, in the prophetic view, cannot be separated from the idea of the realization of man's humanity. Peace is more than not-war; it is harmony and union between men, it is the overcoming of separateness and alienation[40].

Fromm sees prophets as apologists for the order to be aspired to and expected in the future, as ambassadors for the utopia of messianic times, the beginning of a new chapter in history, expressed by each in their own way, when the human being "develops his psychic powers, his reason, and his life to their full extent; for him to be free and centered in himself; for him to become everything a human being is capable of becoming"[41]. It is a perspective which considers man's situation not only in relation to

[38] E. Fromm, *On Disobedience and Other Essays*, op. cit., p. 43. See E. Fromm, "The Relevance of the Prophets for Us Today", op. cit., pp. 134–135; A. J. Heschel, *The Prophets*, Vol. 1, op. cit., pp. 3–26; M. Walzer, *The Company of Critics*, op. cit., pp. 12–16.

[39] E. Fromm, *You Shall Be as Gods*, op. cit., pp. 93–94. "Quite contrast to the Far Eastern masters, the prophets think in historical and political terms. 'Political' here means that they are concerned with historical events affecting not only Israel but all the nations of the world. It means, furthermore, that the criteria for judging historical events are spiritual-religious one: justice and love. According to these criteria nations are judged, as are individuals, by their actions" (ibidem, p. 44). See. ibidem, pp. 54, 91; E. Fromm, "Religious Humanism and Politics", *Judaism. A Quarterly Journal* Spring 1963, pp. 223–224.

[40] E. Fromm, *You Shall Be as Gods*, op. cit., p. 100. See E. Fromm, "The Prophetic Concept of Peace", [in:] E. Fromm, *Dogma of Christ and Other Essays on Religion, Psychology and Culture*, New York 1963, pp. 203–212.

[41] E. Fromm, "The Relevance of the Prophets for Us Today", op. cit., p. 138. See E. Fromm, *You Shall Be as Gods*, op. cit., pp. 96–105.

his potential, but also to the current limitations and adversities rooted in his way of life and in the operation of the society. Thus, the human tendency to succumb to idolatry stands in the way of the vision of peace and fulfilment, of a harmonious relationship between man and woman, between man and man, and between man and nature[42]; this tendency is evident in both communities and individuals. Prophets who oppose it contest, as Fromm indicates, the processes of alienation since they "know that worshiping idols means the enslavement of man"[43] and is the cornerstone of destructive tendencies in social and individual life. Just as the prophets oppose idolatrous worship, recognising the superiority of one God, and fight against idols, Fromm confronts radical humanism with authoritarian ideologies and stigmatises alienation. In his view, "The question is not *religion or not* but *which kind of religion*, whether it is one furthering man's development, the unfolding of his specifically human powers, or one paralyzing them"[44]. Since the need for a system of reference and reverence is universal, failure to mobilise for a radical humanism means that destructive tendencies are allowed. Either humanism or barbarism.

Fromm's concept of the critique of ideology clearly refers to the ethos of the prophets. It consists in exposing and opposing destructive cults and the resulting processes and states of alienation, in explaining their sources, in pointing out the consequences of choices among the available possibilities and in protesting against inappropriate solutions, evaluating them in terms of betrayed ideals, and in exhorting everyone to change their behaviour, that is, to think in terms of realisation of the utopia of fulfilment and peace. In other words, "all radical humanists is that of negating and combating idolatry in every form and shape – idolatry, in the prophetic sense of worshiping the work of one's own hands

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[42] See E. Fromm, *The Revision of Psychoanalysis*, ed. R. Funk, Boulder 1992, pp. 42–55; S. Lundgren, *Fight Against Idols*, op. cit., pp. 136–142; M. Pekkola, *Prophet of Radicalism. Erich Fromm and the Figurative Constitution of the Crisis of Modernity*, Jyväskylä 2010, pp. 97–104; R. Włodarczyk, *Ideologia, teoria edukacja*, op. cit., pp. 159–168, 261–266.

[43] E. Fromm, "The Relevance of the Prophets for Us Today", op. cit., p. 136. In Walzer's opinion: "For the power of a prophet like Amos derives from his ability to say what oppression means, how it is experienced, in this time and place, and to explain how it is connected with other features of a shared social life" (M. Walzer, *Interpretation and Social Criticism*, op. cit., p. 91).

[44] E. Fromm, *Psychoanalysis and Religion*, New Haven 1955, p. 26 – original underlining.

and hence making man subservient to things, and in this process becoming a thing himself "[45]. The more they know, the more they suffer, too.

At a time when prophesising in Israel gradually began to die out after the destruction of the First Temple by Nebuchadnezzar in 586 B.C., people capable of explaining, interpreting and teaching the Torah and the commandments gained in importance. This gave rise to the function of rabbi (Hebrew: my teacher, my master), which, after the destruction of the Second Temple by the Romans in 70 A.D. After the destruction of the Second Temple by the Romans in 70 A.D., which was the realm of the priests, rabbis became the mainstay of the spiritual life of Judaism. Nevertheless, it is possible to recognise in them elements and a continuation of both the ethos of the prophet and the model of the priest, and a process of constant clash between these two tendencies in the development of the various traditions of Judaism. Thus, it may be assumed that the aforementioned petering out of prophethood seems to concern not so much aspects connected with social criticism but the question of the way in which God's will is revealed in earthly reality. It is related to the disappearance of individual mediation, of interventions in the fate of the people of Israel made in His name.

Moreover, it should be remembered that prophethood is not peculiar to only one culture[46]. "Many nations have had their prophets"[47], confirms Fromm, mentioning Buddha, Jesus, Socrates, etc. Unlike Weber, however, he does not focus on the distinction between the prophet proper and the borderline forms[48], but rather, like Walzer, on the function of a social critic, considering the prophets as apologists of radical humanism.

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[45] E. Fromm, *The Revolution of Hope*, op. cit., p. 136.

[46] See M. Weber, *Economy and Society*, op. cit., pp. 439–451.

[47] E. Fromm, *On Disobedience and Other Essays*, op. cit., p. 43. Fromm's position is not uncontroversial, however. For example, a different opinion is held by Abraham J. Heschel, for whom a biblical prophet is someone unique. Criticising and discussing in detail the assumption of the universal presence of prophethood in the ancient world, he presents many important arguments in favour of the unique experience of the prophets of Israel and the importance of the essential features that distinguish such figures as Amos or Jeremiah from, among others, Buddha, Socrates or Confucius (see A. J. Heschel, *The Prophets*, Vol. 2, New York 1975, pp. 227–253). Still, both philosophers refer to different aspects of the prophetic ethos, which largely accounts for the different approaches to this subject.

[48] See M. Weber, *Economy and Society*, op. cit., pp. 440–446.

His texts draw attention to their constant presence in the history of the West, as well as the need for prophetic intervention characteristic of our times: "No historical situation could be more conductive to the emergence of prophets than ours"[49], he observes. No wonder he enthusiastically pays homage to Bertrand Russell's engagement.

[49] E. Fromm, *On Disobedience and Other Essays*, op. cit., p. 44.

CHAPTER XIV

KORCZAK'S POSTULATE AND JUSTIFICATION FOR THE CHILD'S RIGHT TO RESPECT. RESUMÉ ON PEDAGOGICAL DEONTOLOGY AND THE PEDAGOGY OF ASYLUM

No one has returned from Paradise
to speak about it. Besides me.
I was in a utopia. I lived well.
They taught me how to do it.
I had a home, where Stefa was
dad and Korczak was mom

Szlomo Nadel, in:
M. Kicińska, *Pani Stefa*

He [ben Azzai] used to say: do
not despise any man, and do not
discriminate against anything, for there
is no man that has not his hour, and
there is no thing that has not its place

Pirkei Avot 4,3

Although the extensive fragments of Janusz Korczak's *The Child's Right to Respect* contain phenomenography of various types of adult violence against children – its author dilligently notes examples of abuse, draws up graphic descriptions of extortion and oppression, illustrates the details of hidden pain arising from cruelty, disregard and humiliation – norms proposed in the book cannot be reduced to establishing protection against the use of force and manipulation. Respect for the child's property and needs, work, cognition, development – its current state and peculiar course, not only does not fall within the scope of what is usually called *freedom from*, but in many of its dimensions goes beyond the area of codifiable and enforceable legal regulations. In other words, the variety of situations cited by Korczak, building the image and instructing about

the scope of the postulated norms, their typicality, and at the same time the details that he manages to highlight in this descriptive way, seem to indicate that it is about more than a legal rule, a kind moral sensitivity, the basis of everyday operation. The practice of respecting the child's right to respect by adults requires the formulation and justification of the conditions on which it is supported and to which it refers, so that its observance is not based on intuition or habit, but on understanding and knowledge. The general law in its operative part is to be applied, as it results from the examples cited by Korczak, in hundreds of everyday, individual cases differing from each other and thus preventing its potential and actual violations. In all, which is equally important and at the same time problematic, as an guarantor of the law there is an adult who simultaneously takes on two roles, of a judge and a party.

Although the didactic tone dominates in Korczak's work, one can and should undertake a pedagogical analysis of its philosophical and anthropological assumptions, reject the thesis about the simple transfer and inclusion of children in the rights protecting and supporting adults, and find premises justifying postulate in the title of this article. A postulate that proclaims not only the child's right to respect, but also the child's right to a specifc, proper and separate right. From the perspective of general pedagogy, we need to add that the announced topics belong to the issues set against pedagogical deontology, as the claim to rights children can exercise, which is of particular importance for the quality of educational relationship, is tantamount to imposing – in this case mainly moral – an obligation on other people, especially adults. Investigating the nature and character of commitment of postulate in *The Child's Right to Respect* can not only contribute to expanding our knowledge of Korczak's educational philosophy, but also to contribute to educational practice, understanding the requirement and principles of showing respect for others as part of pedagogy of asylum.

ILLUSORY ACCESS TO CHILDHOOD. SEPARATION, ASYMMETRY, FORGETFULNESS

It should be considered signi,cant that the book begins with the characteristics of the position the child takes in the structured life of adults.

It is presented not so much as weak, but as relatively weaker than the situation of the forces of reality and other people more familiar with it. Korczak in a few short sections of the chapter "Indifference – Distrust" illustrates the child lost in a space inhabited and arranged by adults. His helplessness results on the one hand from the lack of relevant property, competence, skills and the necessary knowledge, and on the other hand from the presence in the area of influence and related with it intentions of those who possess and have mastered the appropriate properties and qualifcations. Although to a varying degree adults as a group retain a significant advantage over children. So the child is short, light, inexperienced, naive and disoriented. Korczak write, "Weak, little, poor, dependent – a citizen-to-be only"[1]. All these deficiencies not only determine the nature of access to a shared world of people, but also speak about the extent of disparities in relationship with adults who are stronger, larger, wealthier, better oriented and who set the tone of relationships with children. It should be noted here that the same disparities determine the possibility of adults providing ontological safety to children as the threat of abuse of power against them. Therefore not strength or powerlessness, and the advantage of adults in their ambiguity here becomes the focus of Korczak's attention. In *The Child's Right to Respect* another important ambiguity should arouse interest because of the topic discussed here.

The book should be interpreted as a-story from the world seen and experienced by children. For the issues raised here, the use of this type of narrative by an adult introduces a significant methodological problem: how to exclude the possibility that we are dealing here only with a purely literary trick, and how can we justify the voice of the author who advocates not for himself but for those that are oppressed? In other words, if the readers get upset not only because of the literary gimmick, then one should ask about Korczak's fundamental beliefs, on which he sets his criticism of relationship between adults and children.

To highlight this problem more accurately, it is worth paying attention to Korczak's earlier story *When I Am Little Again*. The main character of the story is a teacher who miraculously goes back in time

[1] J. Korczak, "The Child's Right to Respect", [in:] J. Korczak, *When I Am Little Again* and *The Child's Right to Respect*, New York – London 1992, p. 166.

and becomes a boy again. The character is also the narrator of the story. Events the main character is part of are covered from two diferent perspectives – of a child and of an adult. Korczak uses this literary style to criticize the school, family, educators, social reality, relationships between children, and brings out the contrast between their world and the world of adults. This division of perspectives due to the very construction of the main character is not strictly observed in the text, part of the narration clearly connects and mixes up both points of view:

> There is no law or justice among us. We live like prehistoric people. There are those who attack and those who hide and run away. And there's the fist and the stick and the stone too. There's neither organization nor civilization. There may seem to be, but only for grownups, not for children. Our speech is meagre and awkward (at least it seems to you this way, because it's ungrammatical). That's why it seems to you that we think little and feel even less. Our beliefs are naive because we have no book knowledge, while the world is so big. Tradition replaces the written law. You don't understand our ways, and you have no insight into our affairs. We live like a race of little people subjugated by a race of big people which possesses physical strength and secret knowledge. We are an oppressed class which you want to keep alive only at the price of the smallest self-denial, the least effort to you. We are exceedingly complicated beings. In addition we are taciturn, suspicious, and reticent and your crystal balls won't tell you a thing unless you have faith in us, and feeling for us. An ethnologist ought to study us, or a sociologist, or a naturalist, but not a pedagogue or a demagogue[2].

The accusation formulated by the main character demonstrates the distance between children and adults, as well as the gap between their differently experienced worlds, contains numerous crypto citations and reference to literature. It reaches for conceptual categories referring to the professional knowledge of adults, built within individual research disciplines named at end of the quoted passage. Such a procedure is fully justified by the construction of the main character, combining the child's flesh and blood with consciousness of an adult. The

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[2] J. Korczak, "When I Am Little Again", [in:] J. Korczak, *When I Am Little Again* and *The Child's Right to Respect*, op. cit., p. 83.

criticism of the situation of children and accusations of the adult world contained in both of these texts share a lot of similarities. And yet they differ mainly in form, style and way of building narration, but not the main content. We can successfully prove that *When I Am Little Again* and *The Child's Right to Respect* present Korczak's opinions supported by the results of anthropological research[3].

In the context of the methodological problem considered here, the transformation of the consciousness of the main character is also interesting. His demeanor makes readers realize that concerns, disappointments and hardships of adulthood push him to become a child again. Memories of an early period of his own life, as well as teacher observations and experiences lead his imagination to idealize the freedoms, perspectives and vitality unavailable to him for a long time. This miraculous metamorphosis – the actual incarnation and assumption of the role of a child when over a-few days he shares experiences, school and out-of-school duties with other students and peers, deprive him of any illusions. Thee initial joy is gradually replaced by bitterness and doubt.

> When I was a grownup, I thought it was an easy thing to be an attentive pupil, to pay attention during the lesson and get good grades. Now I see how difficult it is. When I was a teacher, and I had a reason to be worried, I didn't pay attention during the lesson either, and no one was putting me in any corner. It was just the opposite—I became stricter and it had to be quieter in class so that I could ponder over my problem more easily. [...] When I wanted to be little again, I only thought about games and that children are always happy, that they don't think about anything and aren't concerned about anything[4].

The distance between the two worlds, consistently emphasized in the story, speci,cally questions the value of adults' knowledge derived from everyday experience, but also from the early years of their own lives about children's situations and feelings. Eventually, the boy turns

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3 See J. Korczak, "The Child's Right Respect", op. cit., p. 128; J. Korczak, "How to Love a Child", [in:] J. Korczak, *Selected Works*, Warsaw 1967, pp. 93–354.

4 J. Korczak, "When I Am Little Again", op. cit., p. 94.

away from childhood: "I thought in the greyness of that adult life about the colourful years of childhood", confesses the main character – "I returned; I let myself be deceived by memories. And thus, I stepped back into the greyness of a child's days and weeks. I didn't gain a thing. Only I lost the armour of indifference"[5].

The teacher's memory of the past turns out to be false and ostensible at the same time. It cannot be the key to understanding the experiences of children – boys, and even more so girls. On the contrary, as Korczak tries to convey vividly, the distance is increased by the self-assertive, and consequently unverifiable conviction of adult spokesmen who protect the good of the child, in their extensive knowledge of the nature of human life that goes beyond the egotistical and shallow consciousness attributed to minors. But this is just a camouflage of distrust and disregard[6]. "Yes, that's right: I went bad. Yes, we go bad and we improve. And never without a reason. Whoever doesn't know what's going on in someone else's head, or what another's feeling inside his heart, he can judge easily"[7].

Like the other adults, so the main character in *When I Am Little Again*, does not realize or recognize the otherness of children and their world. But only initially. Over time, having undergone a metamorphosis, he becomes entangled in the life of this world, as well as the assigned role of the child, more and more painfully, to eventually become a spokesman for this supervised "anarchy" whose embittered voice will actually capture and read only an anonymous audience of readers. This is possible not so much because the main character in Korczak's story becomes a child, but because he becomes *like* a child and lives *like* a child. He lives in the world without losing the mindfulness of an adult, but he loses his privileges and properties. This is not a child's awareness, but a mature awareness of the otherness and anxiety of his world.

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[5] Ibidem, p. 155.

[6] In creating the illusory knowledge of adults about children, one should also pay attention to the important role of resentment, sublimation and projection, which Korczak also seems to notice, which is evidenced by the descriptions and relations he puts in the Resentment chapter in the *The Child's Right to Respect* (see J. Korczak, "Child's Right to Respect", op. cit., pp. 167–174).

[7] J. Korczak, "When I Am Little Again", op. cit., p. 154.

ADULTS' LOOKING DOWN ON A DIFFERENT POSITION, WHICH DOOMS TO DEPENDENCY

It seems that a similar procedure, apart from the mystery of the transformation, can be found in *The Child's Right to Respect*. The criticism contained in the text is based on a juxtaposition of two different perspectives. One of them is explained by the author's current condition. Speaking on behalf of the world of children requires explanation. One of the basic allegations recurring in the text concerns the adults, including Korczak, who claim to possess knowledge of the nature and world of children. Perhaps it is because as mentioned before every adult already knows how what it means to be child and can open up to their memories to refer to knowledge resulting from their own experience: "We know what is harmful to children" – Korczak says ironically – "we remember what harmed us [...]"[8]. Recognition of this type of argument may face two important objections.

Being a child from the point of view adopted by Korczak in *The Child's Right to Respect* means being a special, separate, shaping and shaped by unique events and dynamically developing person but only in a specific and specific environment. So the question arises: how can the experiences of individual stages of one child's life explain the world and experiences accompanying the development of his peers? In addition, the suggested relationship would assume an evolutionary and cumulative model of the creation of the subject's identity and knowledge, while the basis for the construction of the main character of the story *When I Am Little Again*, to refer to this example again, is a kind of discontinuity or "break". The teacher's adulthood, although clearly supported by childhood, means such a self-understanding for which the points of reference are the complex elements of his current world of everyday life, and assuming the role of a child does not lead to regression, but it only transforms his system and orientation by introducing him new elements, making it no less, but more multidimensional[9]. Similarly, in *The Child's*

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[8] J. Korczak, "The Child's Right to Respect", op. cit., p. 167.

[9] This can be seen in the scene, when the boy thinks about the location and further fate of the dog found on the street, which he wants to look after. He sees in him not only a being in need of help, but also a condition similar to that of children: "Oh, Patch, Patch!" – he asks him, "You're small and weak and so they treat you indifferently, and even mistreat you. You aren't a life-saver who rescues drowning people, or a St. Bernard

Right to Respect, we recognize the difference in perspective from which the world of life of children and adults is reported, obtained not by simulated regression of consciousness, but by adopting criteria other than the other concerned, both adults and children, of the orientation system and assessment of observed events[10]. As a consequence, the perspective used in the text by Korczak does not so much help describe the child's identity, but allows him to critically refer to the positions they attribute to children, based on observation of their behavior and actions, universal and objective features and properties. Adopting the assumption about the social, psychological, economic and political inequality and dependence of children towards adults, as well as the environment created by them casts a shadow on this type of interpretation:

> Researchers have affirmed – we read in *The Child's Right to Respect* – that the adult is guided by motives, the child by impulses, that the adult is logical while the child is caught up in a web of illusory imagination; that the adult has character, a definite moral make-up, while the child is enmeshed in a chaos of instincts and desires. They study the child not as a different psychological being but as a weaker and poorer one[11].

Korczak questions the clear assignment of attributes to age:

> And what about the adult mess, a quagmire of opinions and beliefs, a psychological herd of prejudices and habits, frivolous deeds of fathers and mothers – the whole thing from top to bottom an irresponsible adult life. Negligence, laziness, dull obstinacy, thoughtlessness, adult absurdities, follies, and drinking bouts. And the seriousness, thoughtfulness, and poise of the child? A child's solid commitment and experience; a treasure chest of fair judgements and appraisals, a tactful restraint of demands, full of subtle feelings and an unerring sense or right. Does everyone win playing chess with a child?[12].

who digs out people from an avalanche. You aren't even a huskie. Nor even a smart little poodle, like Uncle's" (J. Korczak, "When I Am Little Again", op. cit., p. 94).

[10] See J. Korczak, "The Child's Right to Respect", op. cit., pp. 184–185.

[11] Ibidem.

[12] J. Korczak, "The Child's Right to Respect", op. cit., p. 185. See also J. Korczak, "When I Am Little Again", op. cit., p. 95.

According to Korczak, the properties, competences and skills assigned to children are not so much the features of the child's nature as they are the result of upbringing and the effect of occupation by adults, or part of them of a certain attitude towards the child and his world, but, not least, not only towards him; "contemporary life is shaping a powerful brute, a homo rapax; it is he who dictates the mode of living. His concessions to the weak are a lie, his respect for the aged, for women's rights and kindness toward children are falsehoods"[13].

The shape and nature of the relationship in which adults occupy and maintain a privileged, dominant position, highlights the child's *deficiencies*, determines their functional significance, and, as a consequence, strengthens and deepens inequalities, instead of limiting their impact. In response to giving the inequalities a fundamental meaning in the relationship, the child can direct his development towards unsuccessful attempts to overcome them, of which observation Korczak succinctly seems to include in the statement: "A feeling of powerlessness summons respect for strength [...]"[14]. The incipit of *The Child's Right to Respect* is maintained in a similar vein: "We learn very early in life that big is more important than little"[15]. Hence the Korczak's postulate regarding the child is understandable: "the teacher's job is to let him live, to let him win the right to be a child"[16], which begins with a change in the shape of the relationship so that the established structure of the set of goals and the hierarchy of values, dictated by the current character of the upbringing environment, is abolished, which is a condition of freeing the development and revealing the proper individual potential of a given person. In a broader plan, according to the New Education, the implementation of this postulate would lead to a fundamental social change – the education of a new, responsible, just and solidary society, for which the starting point is not so much the formation of children in accordance with the adopted uniform concept of their nature, but the pluralism resulting from dynamic relationship between the individual psychophysical potential of the individual and the conditions of the educational environment.

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[13] J. Korczak, "The Child's Right to Respect", op. cit., p. 185.
[14] Ibidem, p. 162.
[15] Ibidem, p. 161.
[16] Ibidem, p. 184.

TYRANTS AND TYRANNIES. RIGHT TO RESPECT VERSUS ARCHITECTONICS OF MULTIPLE AUTHORITY

An indication of the differences between children and adults, the strangeness of their worlds generating mutual misunderstanding, and the importance of inequality in the relationship between them explains the need to establish a separate law protecting children and their world, a law requiring self-restraint for adults. However, it does not yet explain the measure of its application, how it can be followed, since it cannot be based on knowledge of the child's nature and matters. Thus, we return again to the issue of the basis of credibility of the spokesperson for the world of children, as well as to the issue of moral sensitivity. Should it be assumed, then, that this child, one of the parties, can provide this measure that it can act as a judge in his/her own case, become a legislator of the shape of the relationship? Some of the statements in *The Child's Right to Respect* may lead us to such an anti-pedagogical solution, but saying that "We do not allow children to organize; disdainful, distrustful, unwilling, we simply do not care. Yet, without the participation of experts we won't be successful. And the expert is the child"[17], he only tells us that just as an adult accepts only his own way of being in the world and works according to his current state and understanding, so the child's point of reference is the right perception, consideration and experiencing of the reality in which he is involved. However, both of them are constantly changing in the course of their own development.

> Naively we fear death, writes Korczak, not realizing that life is but a cycle of dying and reborn moments. A year is but an attempt at understanding eternity for everyday use. A moment lasts as long as a smile or sigh. A mother yearns to bring up her child. She doesn't see this take place because each day it is a different woman who greets the day and bids good night to a different person[18].

Considering the variation in the quoted passage related to the continuous development of people, their knowledge, sensitivity, skills and

[17] Ibidem, p. 174.
[18] Ibidem, p. 178.

competences, one should ask whose point of view should be represented here? It is worth developing this issue, again reaching beyond *The Child's Right to Respect.*

In the fourth part of the *How to Love a Child* series, Korczak notes his comments on the functioning of the Peer Court. This change in his organization introduced by him as the director of the Orphans' Home was one of the experimental elements of self-government of this institution. The court was obligatory for everyone, both staff and pupils. It convened once a week, five judges were selected to judge fifty cases, and sentences were announced based on a code regulated by the elected Judicial Council. One of Korczak's remarks regarding the court's operation reveals yet another aspect of the problems of inequality, domination and human diversity:

> I quickly realized during the first weeks that many petty matters, annoying to the children, creating a disturbance, did not and could not reach the teacher. A teacher who claims that he knows everything that goes on is deliberately lying. I have satisfied myself that the teacher is no expert on problems affecting children. I have satisfied myself that a teacher's power exceeds his competence. There exists an entire hierarchy among the children in which every older one has the right to humiliate, or at least to ignore a child two years younger than he, that willfulness is strictly apportioned according to the age of children. And the guardian of that edifice of lawlessness is the teacher[19].

When Korczak took on a role of supervisor, who decides independently about their children's matters, he found it difficult to notice side effects manifested by a hierarchy of interdependence and rules of dominance among children seemingly uniformly and directly subordinated to the will of the educator. Even if, while maintaining a privileged position, he had the opportunity to interfere with the world of children, the world itself managed to hide its tensions and differences from him. Again ignorance stood in the way. It was only the resignation from supremacy, the appointment of the Peer Court, that allowed Korczak an insight into the reality that had avoided his controlling gaze, although it did not eliminate her problems appearing at various levelss.

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[19] J. Korczak, "How to Love a Child", op. cit., p. 345.

Just as adopting an adult's point of view as an objective criterion for evaluating action means establishing tyranny, privileging a child's point of view does not tolerate disproportion, does not make his particularism universal, but only introduces a different factor and rules of domination. Shifting accents in the adult-child relationship only changes the person of the tyrant, without eliminating him as a phenomenon that entails the negative effects of abuse. The right to respect is the right of every child – and of all people[20], and the obligation imposed on every other human being, adult or not. In this sense, the sentimental preference of the will of the child, which as a specific individual is not a reflection of something like the universal will, is not an appropriate criterion to which we could refer, wanting to respect the general law, on the contrary – allows its depravity, children and their world.

> We urge respect for the elders and the experienced – we read in *The Child's Right to Respect* – we caution not to argue with or question them. Children have their own experienced elders among them, close at hand – adolescents with their insistent persuasion and pressure. Criminal and deranged adults wander about at large; they shove, disrupt, do harm – and they infect. And children on the whole bear joint responsibility for them (because they even give us signals, however faintly, at times). Those few shock public opinion, smudge with conspicuous stains the surface of the child's life. It is they who dictate the routine methods of treatment: keep a tight reign even though it oppresses; be rough even though it hurts, and stern, i.e. brutal[21].

Korczak recommends kindness, not submission to children. It is against tyranny that the right to respect is directed, the right of the child that in conditions of social inequality, which has significant political

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[20] It is important to stress once again the importance of postulating a separate law regarding children. Between adults, the principles of showing respect can and usually are implemented indirectly by other types of cultural, social, legal and political regulations and safeguards, which are far from the equilibrium of social justice, which Korczak advocates (see J. Korczak, "Szkoła życia", [in:] J. Korczak, *Pisma wybrane*, Vol. 3, Warszawa 1985, pp. 61–199), as well as susceptible to various shocks and appropriations, examples of which are inequalities in the treatment of women, ethnic, cultural and social minorities, and finally individual people, often taking on organized form of discrimination, exclusion, oppression, persecution or use of force.

[21] J. Korczak, "The Child's Right to Respect", op. cit., p. 173.

consequences, lead to self-limitation of an adult and neutralize the difference enough for dialogue – closeness and trust, through respect for work of cognition, for property, development and its course, for the current hour. While among adults, their respect for each other is already indirectly guaranteed by property giving independence and meaning, by assigning social status, a place in the company, or even forced by institutionalized law, customs, none of these safeguards, even if it somehow covers or concerns children, it is not sufficiently effective in their case and does not absorb the pressure accumulating in the chimeric and opaque architecture of the multiplication, which is created by parents, relatives, school, law enforcement, adults in general[22]. In the statement: "The child is a foreigner who doesn't know the language, isn't familiar with the street plan, is ignorant of the laws and customs of the land"[23], reminiscent of the context of the Hebrew bible, the condition of a lonely newcomer, defenseless against an organized community, stranger in a world in which he has never understood, and finally needing understanding and support, is emphasized.

RESPECT, HOSPITALITY, ASYLUM. THE CHILD AS A FOREIGNER

Torah prohibition: "You shall not oppress a stranger, for you know the feelings of the stranger, having yourselves been strangers in the land of Egypt" (Ex 23: 9), repeated in her last book in the amended form of the order: "You too must befriend the stranger, for you were strangers in the land of Egypt" (Dt 10: 19), thanks to the figure of a stranger used by Korczak, he corresponds with the content of the child's right to respect, both in its aspect of limiting tyranny, as well as the obligation to care for the well-being of the child. What is important here, in both versions, indicates a justification, which refers to the solidarity of the human race, resulting from the common fate and experience. In the context of the law postulated by Korczak, a trail leads to accepting the memory of childhood experiences as a common denominator, the basis for understanding the condition, intentions, values and experiences of another, but

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[22] See ibidem, p. 168–169.
[23] Ibidem, p. 176.

the weaknesses of this type of explanation have already been pointed out. The memory of childhood seems to inhabit us like a difficult deposit. The justification of the biblical commandment, recalling the context of Egyptian slavery, speaks of the stranger's condition in the world he inhabits him and the other as an experience of powerlessness, being subordinate, his own weakness and fear, a relationship in which he gives up threat and strength despite will. As a universal experience, this is not attributed to a specific culture, historical period, race, age, position, fitness or gender[24], but – as Korczak shows in *The Child's Right to Respect* – for a long period, starting from the early years of our lives, protection against him depends on the kindness and prudence of those who possess and have strength, and embraces us in the full range of his spectrum, in all spheres of our existence. However, in a world where, as we read, "contemporary life is shaping a powerful brute"[25], time and again we are exposed and we expose others to this experience, and understanding it as current or potential, in some dimension or aspect still present in our individual lives or available memories of the recent past. We can refer to him by analogy as the basis of universal moral sensitivity – as Korczak does in describing the child's condition and world – trying not to violate the right to respect, the rights of every human being, every being, but having a special meaning for the child to do no harm, but support development.

The child's right to respect is therefore revealed as a universal right to hospitality, the right of a newcomer to immunity and the freedom of asylum envisaged for him. Although each of us can be said to be a stranger, not everyone feels a stranger in their surroundings because of their own separateness. We turn to others and are relieved to be met with a friendly or just permissive reception. Disregard, injury, harm, exclusion, violence, rape, oppression, cruelty close the wounded in the experience of loneliness, but we know how to skillfully avoid them, how to use the forces available to us to properly protect or defend against them, and even if we temporarily succumb, disturbed, we try to assert our rights. Years of

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[24] Importantly, the experience of subjective power is always particular and depends on the context of culture, historical period, social and political conditions, sex, race, fitness, status, role, etc. In this sense, Korczak's anthropological diagnosis of the child's condition can be read in the spirit of emancipatory pedagogy as testing the zero level of possible empowerment.

[25] Ibidem, p. 185.

practice, maturity, knowledge of things and self-confidence – without them we could acts like a stranger in whom our strength and advantage raises anxiety. His support in the form of recognition of his right to respect does not yet determine the supremacy and priority of his reasons, but only does not allow them to be crossed out. Vulnerable to injury, we can be sensitive to the risk of injury to others, protect their freedom. Education for the love of people and the world, a lively bond with existence, respect and joy must avoid alienation, so that man has the chance not to turn away from them towards the idol of strength. In any case, this would be an ideal inscribed in the child's right to respect. The ideal to repeat once again, which derives from the universal principle of respect for another human but recognizes the reason for the significant difference associated with the stages of human life deciding on the source inequality and dependence of children on adults. The child's right to respect sets a demarcation line, beyond which the interference of an adult in another world governed by its own rules risks, due to a lack of insight in it, a violation of the child's way of being and value, which can strain the integrity of his subjectivity, as well as affect developmental disorders. This does not mean that adults are not present or cannot participate in the world of children, and children participate in the world of adults. Because of the interpenetration of these worlds, we need the right to respect. It means respecting otherness. However, one of these parties is privileged because of their property, qualifications, knowledge or power of influence, and their way of being and values are, at least potentially, socially secured. The child's right to a specific, specific, separate right results from the need to strengthen the relative weakness of his condition in a world ruled by adults, guarantee asylum until the potential equalizing his chances with other people is reached. By safeguarding against abuse, by giving it status, it makes a child a social subject and a party in activities undertaken with him and towards him. In other words, the universal law of respect protects people from the tyranny of strength and threats, the child's right to respect from adult tyranny.

In the well-known painting *Tobias and the Angel* by Andrea del Verrocchio, whose parts were probably painted by his eminent pupil, Leonardo da Vinci, ahead of the boy carrying the fish a bit, which is to be used for

medicine for his father, the archangel subtly and caringly holds a common companion staring at his benevolent face wandering through unknown surroundings. It would seem that the dance step of the God's envoy gracefully lifts his Renaissance robe with his slim hand in combination with the boy's usual, somewhat heavy gait, it gives the impression of a contrast between exemplary perfection and lack of practice. *The landscape with Tobias* by Jacek Malczewski presents the same couple seen from afar as they traverse the ravine, walking between equally plowed furrows of fields. This time Tobias, supporting the fat fish thrown over his shoulder, follows the path ahead. His guardian, almost half, whose identity is betrayed by impressive wings, leading the boy, persistently follows him. *The Landscape with Tobias* by Jacek Malczewski presents the same couple seen from afar as they traverse the ravine, walking between equally plowed furrows of fields. This time Tobias, supporting the fat fish thrown over his shoulder, follows the path ahead. His guardian, almost half, whose identity is betrayed by impressive wings, leading the boy, persistently follows him. Two performances, two pedagogies.

CHAPTER XV

FUTURE OF A UTOPIA AND SPECTRES OF DYSTOPIAS. NOTES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF EMMANUEL LEVINAS

*When all is erased, then only houses swept
away, cemeteries torn up, names trampled
into the ground. And no breath, no wind has
remembered the language and voice, when
the cloud will not remind, nor the song of the
hill lying crosswise.*

*When it is hard to recognize God in God
and the prophet Elijah is not waiting to lead
a lost boy home in the thicket.*

*When there is nothing, not even an
inscription, though so many generations
have gone to earth here that a spring could
speak their language.*

*When the that cry and lament goes down,
what has happened that will last until the
end of the world. And wanders between the
stars, and plums roll down the slope. And the
apple tree groans, and the space above the
Vistula bursts*

Anna Kamieńska, *Table
of Mordechaj Gebirtig*

*In every epoch, the attempt must be made to
deliver tradition anew from the conformism
which is on the point of overwhelming it*

Walter Benjamin, *On
the Concept of History*

UTOPICS AND ITS AMBIGUITIES

The meaning of utopia is not fulfilled by disappointed expectations. Not
every such an expression of thought is reduced to the pleasures of the

text, to the illusion of a "land of baked pigeons" or a "land of barley", where universal access to abundant goods does not require human effort or toil, and where everyday life does not entail hardship and anguish[1]. Affluence, happiness, and justice, conveyed through the image of a place flowing with milk, honey, and wine, seem to shift our attention from the longing and hopes of human society for the awakened desires for satiety, and especially for the inventiveness of the creator of the details of the construction of the world depicted, which in the eyes of the critics is an exaggerated, in its intention to correct, reflection of the author's contemporary everyday life. Its peculiar caricature helps to regard the original from a distance, perhaps measure the progress of anomie, define the spectrum of alienation, but nothing more. Utopia is an image of a too rigid and static organization of the social system, naively free from crime, human passions and conflicts of interest, in which not only the critic can hear the blatant falsehood. So can Emil Cioran: "What is most striking in utopian narratives is the absence of perspicacity, of psychological instinct"[2]. In such a case, a distant island, a planet, an underground colony or a city in the depths of the ocean would prove by its non-existence that futility of utopia[3], because it is impossible to measure in the imagination alone how wide is the line of demarcation that separates probability from fantasy. And it is this gravitation toward probability that seems to make up the extra-literary value of utopia, even though what is considered realistic or possible in a given time and place is to a large extent historically, socially, and culturally conditioned. In other words, this kind of imagery and type of work goes beyond fantasy to some extent. Its basic intention cannot be reduced to the proliferation of unique objects and devices that constitute a world deserving to be called perfect at the very least, or to the singularity of location – in this respect the name of this phenomenon, based on the word *topos*, is misleading. Nonetheless, the singularity of location highlights the distance between two different states of social order: the shared one and the desired one, in

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1 See R. A. Tokarczyk, *Polska myśl utopijna. Trzy eseje z dziejów*, Lublin 1995, pp. 14–23; B. Baczko, *Utopian Lights. The Evolution of the Idea of Social Progress*, New York 1989.
2 E. Cioran, *History and Utopia*, Chicago 1998, p. 85.
3 See R. Levitas, *The Concept of Utopia*, Oxford 2011, pp. 1–9; R. Nozick, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*, New York 1974, pp. 326–331.

essence the way things are and the way things ought to be. A similar effect is produced by building this distance not so much between points in space, but in time. Reaching a sufficiently perfect man-made social order and human relations is in this case not the effect of travel to distant places, but a matter of crystallizing hopes about the near or distant future. According to Erich Fromm, Messianism of the prophets of ancient Israel would be a good example of this type of expectation. According to him, since the Renaissance it has been customary to locate utopia, the vision of a good society, at the edge of space, "somewhere in an as-yet-undiscovered part of the earth", while "prophetic Messianism saw the perfect society – the good, humane society – standing at the end of time [...]"[4] as the fulfilment of the history of human aspiration. Nevertheless, it should be recognized that both variants at least since antiquity have coexisted and evolved in parallel[5], also outside Europe. Therefore, taking a broader perspective, according to which, as Ruth Levitas points out, "Utopia is the expression of the desire for a better way of being"[6], allows admitting that it is "not just a dream to be enjoyed, but a vision to be pursued"[7]. By focusing attention on the final, we divert it from the process that needs to be and is set in motion by utopia – whether or not a particular imaginary is ultimately embodied, structures aspirations, and generates a social division of labour. In this sense, utopia is part of the ideological complex, as Andrew Heywood makes clear when he argues that all political ideologies "advance a model of a desired future, a vision of the 'good society'"[8], which in turn is not to say that any such vision, of which we are at this moment and here, and hopefully for a long time to come, deeply convinced, by itself excludes terror and crime and

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[4] E. Fromm, *On Being Human*, New York – London 2005, p. 19. See E. Fromm, "The Biblical Concept of the Messianic Time" and "Post-Biblical Development of the Messianic Concept", [in:] E. Fromm, *You Shall Be as Gods. A Radical Interpretation of the Old Testament and Its Tradition*, New York 1966, pp. 96–120; G. Steiner, "The Secular Messiahs", [in:] G. Steiner, *Nostalgia for the Absolute*, Toronto 2004, pp. 1–10.

[5] See R. Włodarczyk, "Utopizm pedagogiczny", [in:] *Pedagogika. Podręcznik akademicki*, ed. Z. Kwieciński, B. Śliwerski, Warszawa 2019, pp. 677–683.

[6] R. Levitas, *The Concept of Utopia*, op. cit., p. 9.

[7] Ibidem, p. 1. See R. Nozick, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*, op. cit., pp. 297–334.

[8] A. Heywood, *Political Ideology. An Introduction*, London 2012, p. 11. See R. Włodarczyk, *Ideologia, teoria, edukacja. Myśl Ericha Fromma jako inspiracja dla pedagogiki współczesnej*, Kraków 2016, pp. 282–289.

protects against a slide into its negation[9]. But a non-accidental shaping of the future, as in education, is motivated by the potential of socially shared perceptions of it as a promise of prosperity and the fulfilment of hope, and since individuals, groups, and societies are constantly accompanied by such incompatible expectations in and of themselves, the various coloratura utopias behind them must be sought. Much of them will remain sketchy; others will unfold with our participation, but without our knowledge; perhaps some particular image of a decent society will awaken in us not only faith, but also commitment. Thus, utopia can be understood more broadly, beyond its identification with illusion or a pipe dream entailing the risk of failure, as an image of a fragment, part, or whole of social order and human relations sufficiently perfect according to one's convictions, which is a mature form of crystallization of collective hopes and can serve as a model of the future expected by an individual or group. It can be a literary image as well as a vision underlying individual or collective aspirations. Rejecting utopias understood in such a way resembles suppressing the future, which takes the place of taming it.

INDELIBLE, ERASED AND OBLITERATED

The wave of fire is followed by a blast of words, of sitting in the ashes, of rubbing fire in a tame form, then the mourners in torn clothes roam the marketplace, months and years pass, and the living do not extinguish the light of memory, the hope aches. If it is possible to conceive of Shoah, it is not as a whole, which, above the clamour of all horror, is expressed as 'Shoah', as 'Holocaust', as 'Extermination'. The sign that it is, strips the ashes of their incalculability and any individual weight. As a threefold emblem, it leads through a labyrinth of separate chronicles of experiences beyond imagination and endurance and disintegrates into individual sounds. It provokes the recognition of cacophony as the only certain truth of organization. A year passes in a transition from one syllable to

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[9] See A. Balasopoulos, "Anti-Utopia and Dystopia. Rethinking the Generic Field", [in:] *Utopia Project Archive. 2006-2010*, ed. V. Valastaras, Athens 2011, pp. 59–67; M. Głażewski, *Dystopia. Pedagogiczne konteksty teorii systemów autopojetycznych Niklasa Luhmanna*, Zielona Góra 2010, pp. 136–139.

another, which escapes an untrained reader, who in one breath utters a shibboleth, this tearing gibberish that cannot be located and cannot be heard, wanting to weave it into a sentence as if hoping that the evil will be washed away and the misfortune will be burnt away. Time flies. The image of catastrophe and collapse into disintegration, freed from the vortex of desolation, floats among those distant from the fire, separated from the ashes. For them, their own names fade, merging into one until the sun, the light, the moon and the stars are eclipsed. Then the question returns, as in Anna Kamienska's poem: where did the houses go?, where did their souls go? Are there still springs in the world? Life does not stop violating and destroying cemeteries, memories, names, tissues and tenements. Even from the short distance of the statute of limitations, 20 years after the crime Vladimir Jankélévitch could see, not only in relation to individual deaths, that "In the final analysis, the number of human beings is not decreasing, on the contrary, it is increasing. The number of people is constantly increasing. What is a tragedy for us, does not cause the slightest harm to the human species. In the twenty-first century there will be a few billion of us. Mankind is doing very well, despite Auschwitz"[10], which he deeply believes is "something hidden, not to be revealed"[11]. But at the same time he had no doubt that the Holocaust, this crime without a name, "even if we do not talk about it, weighs on our modernity in the form of an invisible remorse"[12]. And it is as if the time of stitching, the time of dancing were never to come again, because "The time that smooths all things, the time that works to obliterate cares like eroding mountains, the time that fosters forgiveness and forgetting, that comforts and heals wounds, the time liquidator has in no way diminished the enormous hecatomb. On the contrary, it does not cease to intensify its horror"[13]. What if Jankélévitch was right? A crime without a name not only has no statute of limitations, it is impossible to obtain

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[10] V. Jankélévitch, *Penser la mort?*, Paris 1994, p. 16.

[11] V. Jankélévitch, "Pardonner?", [in:] V. Jankélévitch, *L'imprescriptible*, Paris 1986, p. 15. See G. Steiner, "Uporczywa metafora czyli o podejściu do Szoa", *Dekada Literacka* 1997, No. 8–9, pp. 11–15; P. Śpiewak, "Milczenie i pytania Hioba", [in:] *Teologia i filozofia żydowska po Holocauście*, ed. P. Śpiewak, Gdańsk 2013, pp. 5–59; B. Lang, *Act and Idea in the Nazi Genocide*, Chicago – London 1990.

[12] V. Jankélévitch, "Pardonner?", op. cit., p. 9.

[13] Ibidem, p. 11.

forgiveness, regardless of the differentiation of guilt[14], because there is no one to give it to, the sense of loss presses bitterness into every taste, and our daily study on the details of modern life and numerous employments brings back the memory of those who have passed, and the realization that "The dead depend entirely on our fidelity […] because the past does not defend itself"[15]. And what if he was wrong? Forgetting will cover everything equally, it is cheerful again, so people will cheer up, layer after layer there are more and more victims of chronologically consecutive catastrophes in the sublunar world, moral amnesia makes more and more of those who are not horrified by "the massacre of six million Jews, nor particularly surprised by the gas chambers", and in the forefront of the challenges for those animating the public sphere there is the need for a precise answer to the question: "How many millions would it take for them to be moved?"[16]. These two roads seem to converge at the gate, past which we are left to abandon all hope, walk again and again through the circles of dystopia, and note the expression on the faces of the other condemned.

A SCHOLAR DIES LIKE AN UNSCHOLARLY PERSON

It is possible that contemporary Western humanities and social sciences, in their various variants, are also testing both of these paths, which reduce scholars to a hell of powerlessness and at the same time intensify their expectations of good-naturedly or instrumentally understood education and the human need to know. While the hydrating myth of the nineteenth century, as George Steiner reads the overflowing reservoir that crowns the *belle époque* from the perspective of the 1970s, retains a predisposition to inspire imagination and hope, the indirect witnesses of the Holocaust are struck by its ambiguity. Today, he argues, there is no return to this "squandered utopia", though undoubtedly still "The

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[14] See V. Jankélévitch, *Forgiveness*, Chicago – London 2005, pp. 1-4; E. Levinas, *Existence and Existents*, Hague 1978, pp. 89–92; K. Jaspers, *The Question of German Guilt*, New York 2000, pp. 25–29; H. Arendt, "German Guilt", [in:] *Jewish Frontier Anthology, 1934–1944*, New York 1945, pp. 470–481.

[15] V. Jankélévitch, "Pardonner?", op. cit., p. 24.

[16] Ibidem, p. 13.

image we carry of a lost coherence, of a centre that held, has authority greater than historical truth"[17]. In order to stay within its range of influence, one must not only forget about the benefits of forgetting, but also withstand the toxic fumes released during its demythologization by dismantling successive layers of the 19th and 20th century culture texts. We need it ourselves, if we are to recognize the effectiveness of enculturation, because the derivatives of the myth's deposit resonate within us. Steiner is convinced that "Images and symbolic constructs of the past are imprinted, almost in the manner of genetic information, on our sensibility. Each new historical era mirrors itself in the picture and active mythology of its past or of a past borrowed from other cultures"[18]. At the same time he basically agrees with T.S. Eliot's *Notes on the Holocaust*[19] at its core, despite his striking silence on the Holocaust in this context, three years after signing of the unconditional surrender of the Third Reich at Reims, that it has a religious character, nevertheless he understands the notion differently than the Noble Prize winner: "What is central to a true culture is a certain view of the relations between time and individual death"[20]. The crisis co-creating *belle époque* eroded with the emptiness of heaven and the mutation of hell into a metaphor, which translated into the experience of a world violently flattened, a sense of abandonment and the transition of religious faith into a hollowed-out convention, and as it turned out: "Of the two, Hell proved the easier to re-create"[21]. Of course, this is not all. Nostalgia for the absolute transcends, according to Steiner, the level of barbaric, parodic forms of this kind of transcendental reference, as well as conventional ritual, folk theology, suggesting substitute creeds. Undoubtedly: "The convinced Marxist, the practising psychoanalyst, the structural anthropologist, will be outraged at the thought that his

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[17] G. Steiner, *In Bluebeard's Castle. Some Notes Towards the Re-definition of Culture*, New Haven 1971, p. 8. See G. Steiner, *Real Presences. Is There Anything in What We Say?*, London 2010, pp. 105–107; J. Osterhammel, *The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century*, Princeton – Oxford 2014.

[18] G. Steiner, *In Bluebeard's Castle*, op. cit., p. 3.

[19] See T. S. Eliot, "Notes Towards the Definition of Culture", [in:] T. S. Eliot, *Christianity and Culture*, San Diego – New York – London1976, pp. 100–106, 141–157.

[20] G. Steiner, *In Bluebeard's Castle*, op. cit., p. 89. See G. Steiner, "The Secular Messiahs", op. cit., pp. 2–4.

[21] G. Steiner, *In Bluebeard's Castle*, op. cit., p. 55.

beliefs, that his analyses of the human situation, are mythologies and allegoric constructs directly derivative from the religious world-image which he has sought to replace. He will be furious at that idea. And his rage has its justification"[22]. Nevertheless, their structure, aspirations and demands towards a believer are, according to Steiner "profoundly religious in strategy and in effect"[23]. There is also another possibility. "It may well be that it is a mere fatuity, an indecency to debate of the definition of culture in the age of the gas oven, of the arctic camps, of napalm. The topic may belong solely to the past history of hope"[24]. What remains is to concentrate on the study of individual trees, without any intricate insights into how compactly they must grow and how distinguished by the accumulation of flora and fauna and the interrelationships between them, in order to be able to speak of the forest and legitimately develop knowledge of its beneficial or harmful crops. Ellipses, not only scorched by crematory fire in our understanding of the human being and the restless nature of their socialization, condemn the humanities and social sciences to an uncomfortable and embarrassing dependence, or merely expose it, to the conjectures of philosophy, and for many a scholar it is futility and chasing after the wind. However, just as for a committed ecology, futile effort emerges from the limitations of the documentation of the meticulous dendrologist. In a sense, making Earthlings a speck in cosmos and one of the planet's atoms makes it possible to dismiss this threat of speculation as twisted as the tree of humanity itself as it moves away from the surface of the planet with its optics, from the polarization of the bonds of the majuscule projects towards things, and to give novelty to the humanities while dispensing with the human. The variants of separate paths converging at the gates of Gehenna can be rendered in yet another way, reaching again to Steiner's evocative imagery. As we are reading: "There is Freud's stoic acquiescence, his grimly tired supposition that human life was a cancerous anomaly, a detour between

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[22] G. Steiner, "The Secular Messiahs", op. cit., p. 5.

[23] Ibidem, p. 4. See T. Luckmann, "The Social Forms of Religion", [in:] T. Luckmann, *The Invisible Religion. The Problem of Religion in Modern Society*, New York 1967, pp. 50–68; G. Davie, "Minorities and Margins", [in:] G. Davie, *The Sociology of Religion*, Los Angeles – London – New Delhi – Singapore 2007, pp. 158–180; R. Włodarczyk, *Ideologia, teoria, edukacja*, op. cit., pp. 148–159, 282–289.

[24] G. Steiner, *In Bluebeard's Castle*, op. cit., p. 48.

vast stages of organic repose. And there is the Nietzschean gaiety in the face of the inhuman, the tensed, ironic perception that we are, that we always have been, precarious guests in an indifferent, frequently murderous, but always fascinating world"[25]. At the same time, yet another of his ambiguous statements sounds quite disturbing in this context: "We, in the West, are an animal built to ask questions and to try and get answers regardless of the cost"[26].

UTOPIANISM OF HOSPITALITY AND THE PRIMACY OF THE OTHER

In a synoptic essay triggered by Jankélévitch's death in 1985, Emmanuel Levinas praised the importance of the philosopher's principled attitude toward the Holocaust for his relationship to the ethics of Judaism, which he distanced himself from and did not practice, and which "could be familiar to him only in the forms it had taken in Christian and lay texts [...]"[27] of Pascal, Pushkin, Tolstoy and many leading representatives of French culture and European humanism. According to Levinas "The horror of the crime committed against the human person and human life was no doubt the essence of what prompted the extreme firmness of Jankélévitch's condemnation [...]"[28], and which rightly allows a conclusion that also for him ethics was the "first philosophy". For Levinas, this primacy of ethics – as my concern with the being of the Other, initiated by the revelation of his face, in which one finds "the infinite resistance of a being to pure power"[29]– towards a fundamental ontology, according to

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[25] Ibidem, p. 140.

[26] G. Steiner, "Does the Truth Have a Future?", [in:] G. Steiner, *Nostalgia for the Absolute*, op. cit., p. 59.

[27] E. Levinas, "Vladimir Jankélévitch", [in:] E. Levinas, *Outside the Subject*, Stanford 1994, p. 89. See V. Jankélévitch, *Penser la mort?*, op. cit., pp. 43–44.

[28] E. Levinas, "Vladimir Jankélévitch", op. cit., p. 88.

[29] E. Levinas, "Is Ontology Fundamental?", [in:] E. Levinas, *Entre Nous. On Thinking-of--the-Other*, New York 1998, p. 10. See E. Levinas, "The Temptation of Temptation", [in:] E. Levinas, *Nine Talmudic Readings*, transl. A. Aronowicz, Bloomington – Indianapolis 1990, pp. 30–50. The essay "Is Ontology Fundamental?" was first published in 1951 together with the book *Existence and Existents* from 1947 written by Levinas also when he was imprisoned by the Nazis in a stalag as a war prisoner, announced the work fundamental

which, in line with Martin Heidegger's findings, understanding as our proper way of being is expressed in the care of an entity for its being, as well as the urgent task, due to the recent eruption of the extreme symptoms of Western allergy to otherness, of translating biblical non-Hellenism, the wisdom of The Talmud into the language of contemporary philosophy, i.e. the one that sticks to its Greek roots, are of particular importance for his discussion on the perspectives of Western humanism. In his view, my seeing, one of the variants of taking possession of and maintaining control over one's surroundings, in which the object submits to an understanding gaze, enters into crisis in the face of the Other. In other words: "The meeting with the other person consists in the fact that, despite the extent of my domination over him and his submission, I do not possess him"[30]. It is not about the fact that he does not appear to my curious gazing "I understand him in terms of his history, his environment, his habits. What escapes understanding in him is himself, the being"[31]. In the face of this passive resistance, the nakedness of the face signifying otherness, my quest for exploration would end up denying the essence of the Other, and the extreme symptom of domination, succumbing to the temptation of total negation by killing – seemingly reasserting the completeness of power – would also let it slip away and leave me with nothing. As Levinas points out, "The triumph of this power is its defeat as power. At the very moment when my power to kill is realized, the other has escaped"[32]. In order to create a meaning that can lead me to the trace of the Other's otherness, it is necessary for me to acknowledge my responsibility for the conditions of its manifestation. The turning point here, according to the philosopher, is the realization, in the situation of contact, that the face reveals, in the misery of fragility, precisely that I cannot deprive the Other of life, and that the realization of this physically and technically attainable alternative leads to ethical failure and political exhaustion. But taking the opposite direction, engaged with the misery of the Other's fragility, can also lead to these. When,

for his literary output, which appeared a decade later, i.e. *Totality and Infinity. An Essay on Exteriority* (Pittsburgh 1969).

[30] E. Levinas, "Is Ontology Fundamental?", op. cit., p. 9.

[31] Ibidem.

[32] Ibidem.

having acknowledged responsibility for the Other, we take on responsibilities, but as we do so it becomes increasingly clear that we are unable to fulfil them. Like Lot, who knows what he must do, but has no idea how, and clumsily and then gruesomely tries to protect the divine emissaries in his home from the criminal designs of the inhabitants of Sodom. The divine emissaries take the form of strangers who, as such, with no roots in the city, have no foothold in anyone, and Lot slides down an incline to the downfall of himself, his loved ones, and the city. There is something irresistible in a human being that makes him bring strangers under his roof and hide them from the incommensurable power of human beasts in the darkest days of the Shoah, when man has the power over man to do harm, and there is no end in sight, and drag partners, spouses, parents, children, other relatives, friends, acquaintances, neighbours into the equation. In both cases, to refuse means to risk that fragility at the moment when it is most falling apart, and to contribute to death[33]. Lot's appalling prioritizing of strangers over the safety of his loved ones, his daughters' traumatic surrender to save two strangers, points to the ethical source of my conscious agitation, which Levinas calls an-archy. In his view, it reacts first, like an inner membrane, and my "consciousness is affected, then, before forming an image of what is coming to it, affected in spite of itself"[34], against my interests, in effect I am obliged before I begin anything. It is difficult to accept this impulse and take on responsibilities that can be unmanageable, push away, carry like a block of rock, and in time be as deaf as that rock. This impulse released in me by the haunting proximity of the Other reveals the power that he has over me and which, as a kind of persecution with a call for help, provokes me to overcome it by attacking its source. While killing or indirectly contributing to his death through passivity does not save from ethical failure and does not silence the conscience, recognizing one's responsibility and attempting to meet one's obligations in a world of realized dystopia reduces all chances of meeting them, often bringing them closer to powerlessness. Already in

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[33] See E. Levinas, "From Ethics to Exegesis", [in:] E. Levinas, *In the Time of the Nations*, Bloomington – Indianapolis 1994, pp. 110–111.

[34] E. Levinas, "Substitution", [in:] E. Levinas, *Otherwise than Beingor Beyond Essence*, Dordrecht 1991, p. 102. See E. Levinas, "Toward the Other", [in:] E. Levinas, *Nine Talmudic Readings*, op. cit., pp. 12–29.

the fact that "The I, precisely as responsible for the other and the third, cannot remain indifferent to their interactions, and in the charity for the one, cannot withdraw its love from the other"[35], makes things much more complicated, especially when we take into consideration numerous communities with their multiple inequalities. Hence, "The self, the I, cannot limit itself to the incomparable uniqueness of each one, which is expressed in the face of each one. Behind the unique singularities, one must perceive the individuals of a *genus*, one must compare them, judge them, and condemn them"[36]. According to Levinas, the justice is done by "the comparison between incomparables" and the constant questioning of who has priority in their fragility and particular otherness requiring care, like the biblical figures of the widow, the orphan or the foreigner. And it is precisely the question of accepting and prioritizing the Other, the fact that I am responsible for him and cannot avoid this responsibility, since the Other has turned his face to me, without renouncing and denying him and ethics is, according to the philosopher, an essential component of Hebrew humanism, which, as a biblical non-Hellenism, the wisdom of the Talmud, must be translated into the language of modern philosophy[37]. This was because, according to him, it was not sufficiently protected, as he saw it in fundamental ontology, against the possibility of "elemental Evil" lying at the root of the bloody barbarism of National Socialism[38]. Moreover, it has stored this possibility within itself, and being an important part of the politics of Western culture has perpetuated it as a tendency. Thus, the task undertaken by Levinas of translating this biblical non-Hellenism as the humanism of another human being[39] constitutes

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[35] E. Levinas, "The Other, Utopia, and Justice", [in:] E. Levinas, *Entre Nous*, op. cit., p. 229 – original underline.

[36] Ibidem – original underline.

[37] See C. Chalier, "Levinas and the Talmud", [in:] *The Cambridge Companion to Levinas*, ed. S. Crithley, R. Bernasconi, Cambridge 2002, pp. 100–118; H. Alexander, "Education in Nonviolence: Levinas' Talmudic Readings and the Study of Sacred Texts", *Ethics and Education* 2014, Vol. 9, No.1, pp. 58-68; E. Levinas, "For a Jewish Humanism", [in:] E. Levinas, *Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism*, Baltimore 1990, pp. 273–276; R. Włodarczyk, *Lévinas. W stronę pedagogiki azylu*, Warszawa 2009, pp. 167–173.

[38] See E. Levinas, "Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism", *Critical Inquiry* 1990, Vol. 17, No. 1, p. 63.

[39] Parallel to his strictly philosophical works, Levinas has been publishing separately since the early 1960s books containing his Talmudic readings – among others *Quatre*

not only a supplement of the pluralism of contemporary philosophy, but also an attempt to protect it from such a possibility. Without it, every otherness that maintains a distance in Western culture, including the otherness of the Jews, which at the same time constitutes a part of it, will be perceived as a threat and thus exposed to evil, including radical evil, which in consequence constitutes an act of self-aggression and the beginning of the devastation of one's own material, which in its entire heterogeneous extent consists of mixtures of various degrees of intensity of otherness. In this context, translation is necessary as a component of the acculturation of different systems, if we separate them analytically on the principle of Weberian ideal types, leading to their gradual transformations, otherwise the disturbing alternative, characteristic of the Diaspora experience in the period after the French Revolution, will be continued: "Loyalty to a Jewish culture closed to dialogue and polemic with the West condemns the Jews to the ghetto and to physical extermination. Admission into the City makes them disappear into the civilization of their hosts"[40]. It is not only according to Levinas that the solutions developed by the prominent maskils, protagonists and philosophers of the Haskalah, the Jewish Enlightenment, proved ineffective in Europe with in terms of the ruts of these paths[41]. Without making changes to the intellectual background of Western culture, an apologia of ideas, capturing the "subjectivity as welcoming the Other, as hospitality"[42], the allergy to

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lectures talmudiques (1968) and *Du sacré au saint. Cinq nouvelles lectures talmudiques* (1977), both these works have been translated into English and published in one volume as *Nine Talmudic Readings* (1990), *L'au delà du verset. Lectures et discours talmudiques* (1982; English ed. *Beyond the Verse. Talmudic Readings and Lectures*, 1994), *A l'heure des nations* (1988; English ed. *In the Time of the Nations*, 1994) and *Nouvelles lectures talmudiques* (1996; English ed. *New Talmudic Readings*, 2007) – which differ from the former not so much by their subject matter as by the manner of its presentation. See Z. Lévy, "L'hébreu et le grec comme métaphores de la pensée juive et de la philosophie dans la pensée d'Emmanuel Levinas", *Pardès* 1999, No. 26, pp. 89–99.

[40] E. Levinas, "Introduction", [in:] E. Levinas, *Nine Talmudic Readings*, op. cit., p. 9. See G. Steiner, "A Kind of Survivor", [in:] G. Steiner, *Language and Silence. Essay on Language, Literature, and the Inhuman*, New York 1967, pp. 140–154; H. Arendt, "The Jew as Pariah: A Hidden Tradition", [in:] H. Arendt, *The Jewish Writings*, ed. J. Kohn, R. H. Feldman, New York 2007, pp. 275–297.

[41] See P. Johnson, *The History of the Jews*, London 1987, pp. 311–421; J. Osterhammel, *The Transformation of the World*, op. cit., pp. 865–872.

[42] E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, op. cit., p. 27.

Otherness will continue to reproduce itself in the socialization and education of the inhabitants of the multi-ethnic West and thus will define the horizons of modernity too narrowly and defectively, condensing the energy of self-destruction. Similarly, the risk of dominating Jewish tradition and imagination – as after the destruction of the Second Temple in 1970, the fall of Masada, and more than six decades later, the rise of Bar Kochba[43]– by the inerasable, indelible memory of catastrophe and extreme disillusionment, the kind of dystopian spectre that can effectively overwhelm the diverse aspects and planes of experience accrued over centuries, including the messianic dimension. Less than four decades after the gates of the ravaged Auschwitz were opened, in the early 1980s, Yosef H. Yerushalmi recognized the ambiguity in the fact that "the Holocaust has already engendered more historical research than any single event in Jewish history [...]". At the same time, he was aware that the impact of the disaster went beyond academic interest, he wrote "but I have no doubt whatever that its image is being shaped, not at the historian's anvil, but in the novelist's crucible"[44]. It can be said that for Levinas, like for Fromm, who was inspired above all by rabbinical Judaism,[45] both dangers, i.e. the reduction of multidimensionality of tradition in Jewish culture and the recognition of otherness in Western culture not only introduce tension and hostility between them, but also deprive them of vitality and divert them into dangerous paths of dystopia. Instead, one should hope for the postcolonial era and global migration that the utopia of my hospitality and the primacy of the Other will come true and "will have gone beyond the functions of prudence or the canons of the beautiful to proclaim itself unconditional and universal when the eschatology of messianic peace will have come to super pose itself upon the ontology of war"[46]. Until then, everyone is called to be Messiah, chosen and called to stand in the face of the Other[47]. Undoubtedly, as Levinas realizes the

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[43] P. Johnson, *The History of the Jews*, op. cit., pp. 136–151.

[44] Y. H. Yerushalmi, *Zakhor. Jewish History and Jewish Memory*, Seattle – London 1982, p. 98. See E. Levinas, "Useless Suffering", [in:] E. Levinas, *Entre Nous*, op. cit., pp. 97–100.

[45] See R. Włodarczyk, *Lévinas*, op. cit., pp. 285–300; R. Włodarczyk, *Ideologia, teoria, edukacja*, op. cit., pp. 55–92.

[46] E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, op. cit., p. 22. See D. Epstein, "Contre l'utopie, pour l'utopisme", *Cahiers d' Études Lévinassiennes* 2005, No. 4, pp. 87–104.

[47] See E. Levinas, "Messianic Texts", [in:] E. Levinas, *Difficult Freedom*, op. cit., pp. 89–90.

challenge of immeasurable responsibility for the Other, "the extraordinary phenomenon of prophetic eschatology certainly does not intend to win its civic rights within the domain of thought by being assimilated to a philosophical evidence"[48]. Nevertheless, as Steiner adds, "It is not certain, moreover, that one can devise a model of culture, a heuristic program for further advance, without a utopian core"[49].

According to Levinas, when the child's heaven becomes empty, there is a chance for god to appear in a form acceptable to theists and non-theists alike, as the teachers in the pages of the Talmud instruct. In this sense, utopias are, in their literary form, a polemic against the infinite. Yet it seems that this literary genre has already exhausted itself as a medium of hope, while the hell of dystopia has managed to free itself. Its autonomy leads to numbness. It awakens with war photographs from Congo or Syria, images from the slums of Mumbai, Brazilian favelas, Korean concentration camps, Balkan genocide, American ghettos, reports on human trafficking and child slavery, hunger, epidemics, the horror of addiction, tyrannies, both large and small, and in addition, with images of nightmares and atrocities, the painful memory, which is thus documented more and more bluntly and densely, including the torture of animals, the pollution of the oceans and air, the suffocation of forests, the devastation of the biotope. There is also literature full of silences and bypasses, which corresponds to the organized amnesia required for everyday life to continue to please, to give time for pleasure, without assuming effort. Especially on someone else's behalf. And one would like to feel at last that one is the Other of the Other, that one can stand safely without hiding one's face, shorten the distance, experience closeness, count on hospitality, take advantage of priority. Meanwhile, it seems that one waits indefinitely and only occasionally comes across messiahs, some of whom take on the work, as MSF doctors or Greenpeace activists and Amnesty International lawyers, which would be enough for three full-time jobs. One would like to multiply them. Without asking for permission. Without paying attention to accommodation. Educators, in particular, dream of a world of adults living in hard-won freedom. And the promise of what is education?

48 E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, op. cit., p. 22.
49 G. Steiner, *In Bluebeard's Castle*, op. cit., p. 71.

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