Abstract
This paper explores the political import of Husserl’s critical discussion of the epistemic effects of the formalization of rational thinking. More specifically, it argues that this discussion is of direct relevance to make sense of the pervasive processes of ‘technization’, that is, of a mechanistic and superficial generation and use of knowledge, to be observed in current contexts of governance. Building upon Husserl’s understanding of formalization as a symbolic technique for abstraction in the thinking with and about numbers, I argue that processes of technization, while being necessary and legitimate procedures for the reduction of complexities, also may give rise to politically unresponsive and ultimately dysfunctional ‘economies of thinking.’ This paper is structured in three parts. In the first part I outline Husserl’s account of the formalization and technization of thought and knowledge. In the second part I make my case for the political import of this account, departing in this context from positions that (a) regard Husserl’s discussions of formalization and its effects as merely epistemological, or that (b) try to mobilize Husserl for a one-sided critique of instrumental reason. In the final part I address a major shortcoming of Husserl’s account, namely its neglect of the concrete and historically evolving technological infrastructures of processes of formalization/technization.
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Notes
The elephant in the room here is the nature of the relation, and of the grounds for distinction, between ‘politics’ and ‘administration’—a subject of continuing debate in both the fields of political science and public administration (see for a recent overview Overeem 2012). This paper is based on the assumption that, from a governance perspective, strictly separating politics and administration, most of all on the basis of instrumental ‘ends-means’ or hierarchical ‘higher–lower’ oppositions, remains problematic. This is mainly for the reason that in the political system, political ends cannot be determined independent of means, and even are often influenced by the availability of means from the very start, and for the reason that power is exercised also ‘from below’ [see Luhmann 1966, pp. 274–275; the latter point is of course also made by Foucault (see, e.g., Foucault 1978, p. 94)].
Miller and Rose (2008) derive the concepts of ‘political rationality’ and ‘political technology’ from Foucault, in apparently quite liberal manner however. The former concept of ‘political rationality’, it is claimed by Miller and Rose, denotes an epistemological domain of political reason, that is, a field “in which conceptions of the proper ends and means of government are articulated” (p. 30). By comparison, the latter concept of ‘political technology’ is taken to denote a technological domain of mechanisms, processes and practices through which this reason is put into practice, that is, which “seek to translate thought into the domain of reality” (p. 32).
I will develop on the reception of Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy in political theory and philosophy in Sect. 3.1.
See Rang (1989).
Husserl (1970a, p. 51).
One should note that this does not mean that Husserl in his later writings questions the objectivity of geometrical and mathematical concepts per se, which for him however is necessarily an “‘ideal’ objectivity” (Husserl 1970b, p. 356).
Husserl (1970a, p. 46).
Husserl (1970a, p. 52).
See Husserl (1970a, p. 46).
See Krämer (1988, pp. 1–3).
See Husserl (1970a, pp. 46–47).
Husserl (1970a, p. 44, translation modification).
Husserl (1970a, p. 46).
See Husserl (1970a, p. 46).
Husserl (1970a, p. 46).
Husserl (1970a, p. 48, my insertion, translation modification).
Husserl (1970a, p. 46, my insertion, translation modification).
Husserl (1970a, p. 45).
Husserl (1970a, p. 44).
Husserl (1970a, p. 44).
For a recent, both seminal and comprehensive discussion of the relationship between Klein’s and Husserl’s work see Hopkins (2011).
Klein (1968).
Klein (1985, pp. 62–63).
Klein (1985, p. 63).
Klein (1968, p. 197).
Klein (1985, p. 64).
Klein (1985, p. 65).
See Schuhmann (1988, p. 18), who estimates that in the first twenty volumes of the Husserliana, the German word ‘Politik’ does not appear more than ten times. The lack of explicit and systematic considerations of political themes in Husserl’s work may explain why there are, to the best of my knowledge, remarkably few more comprehensive publications that are explicitly devoted to the political dimensions of Husserl’s philosophy. One notable exception to this, which is published in the German only, is Schuhmann’s (1988) attempt of reconstructing Husserl’s philosophy of the state (Staatsphilosophie). More sustained considerations of the political dimensions and implications of Husserl’s thought can also be found in Schnell, which is likewise only available in the German (1995), and in Velkley (1987). What is missing in all these texts, however, is a profound consideration of and argument for the direct political relevance of Husserl’s theory of technization.
Husserl (1965).
At the same time, and without being able to expand on this point in more detail here, Husserl also holds Weltanschauungsphilosophie to possess its own legitimacy and place, which is based on him linking Weltanschauung to wisdom (Husserl 1965, pp. 131–134; see on this point also Strauss 1983, pp. 7–8).
Husserl (1965, p. 78).
Husserl (1970a, p. 66).
See Buckley (1992, p. 67).
Husserl (1970a, p. 49).
Buckley (1992, p. 73).
I will discuss this further in Sect. 4.
Husserl (1980, p. 82).
Husserl (1980, p. 82, my insertions).
Husserl (1970a, p. 51).
Husserl (1989, p. 209, my translation).
See Buckley (1992, p. 71).
See Husserl (1989, p. 209).
Husserl (1970a, p. 291).
See Luhmann (1999, p. 30). As one could also say in reference to Weber, formalization implies and enables the separation of ‘person’ and ‘office’ (see Weber 1978, p. 957; p. 968). As has been correctly noted, such separation has itself at least in part a technical basis in that its accomplishment requires the systematized use of the technique of writing (see Goody 1986). The use of writing is crucial both for the purpose of establishing regulations concerning conduct that are of a formal and general character, as well as for the purpose of creating enduring and exact records of large stocks of information (e.g., of taxation records) (see Weber 1978, p. 957). Symbolic technologies such as writing systems are also a condition necessary for the use of the formal method in scientific thinking—see on this point comprehensively Krämer (1988). I will briefly develop upon the symbolic-technological dimensions of processes of formalization, and their link to technization, in my discussion in Sect. 4.
Weber (1978, p. 975). The link between formalization and (functional) differentiation in social systems is also stressed by Luhmann (1999, chapter 6). For Luhmann, the specific role of formalization in this context of system differentiation is that of a generalizing medium of orientation for all differentiated (sub-)systems. Luhmann considers such medium to be essential for facilitating these systems’ overall integration—where such an integration, Luhmann clarifies in his later writings, can in turn be directly associated with the reduction of the degrees of freedom of such differentiated systems (e.g., Luhmann 1998, p. 603; p. 619).
For Weber, this also applies and particularly applies, just as for Husserl, to the domain of science, to the point of him observing in his Science as a vocation lecture that “[a] really definitive and good accomplishment is today always a specialized accomplishment” (Weber 1948, p. 135).
Weber (1978, p. 988).
Weber (1930, p. 182).
As a matter of fact, it overall appears as if the relation between the Weber’s theory of rationalization and Husserl’s theory of technization has remained comparatively little researched. Most available publications explicitly devoted to exploring the relationship between Weber and Husserl’s thought rather seem to focus on exploring the extent to which Husserl’s earlier work may have directly influenced Weber in developing and formulating his own methodology (e.g., Muse 1981).
See exemplarily for this contention Habermas, who in his Knowledge and Human Interests (1987) regards Husserl as a proponent of the “traditional concept of theory” (p. 305) who, in spite of his critique of scientific objectivism, falls prey to the “illusion of pure theory” (p. 315). Such characterization is not only problematic in that paints an overly simplistic picture of the critical impetus of Husserl’s phenomenology, but also in that it ignores the fundamentally empirical basis and orientation of Husserl’s phenomenology, as well as Husserl’s understanding of theory as a form of practice (see, e.g., Husserl 1970a, p. 111).
O’Neill (1988).
O’Neill (1988, pp. 330–331; p. 334).
O’Neill (1988, p. 332).
See Husserl (1980, p. 82).
Marcuse (1964).
Marcuse (1964, p. 129; also p. 135).
Marcuse (1964, p. 135).
See, e.g., Marcuse (1964, p. 129).
See O’Neill (1964, p. 331).
Husserl (1970a, p. 52).
Husserl (1970b, p. 376).
I do not have the space here to develop in detail on how technization articulates itself, in concrete policy developments and settings for instance, in the governance of specific societal subsystems. Complementing the more overarching discussion presented here, I am planning to develop on the specific articulations and effects of technization in one particular field of governance—the domain of science policy—in a paper that is currently in preparation.
Power (2004, pp. 771–774).
Power (2004, p. 771).
Power (2004, pp. 771–772). An obvious example is the recent trend, in some countries more pronounced than in others, toward the institutionalized use of rankings in various policy and governance domains such as research and education. Even if the rankings in question may themselves generally be constructed in a sophisticated manner, by experts who are aware of their limitations and complexities, one can observe that they nevertheless tend to be only too often mobilized uncritically and simplistically in the policy domain.
Husserl (1970a, p. 45).
See Power (1997, p. 115).
See for a related discussion Power (2005, pp. 333–334).
See Power (1997, p. 115). I am following Luhmann here in conceiving of political systems as comprising both the functional domains, and subsystems, of politics and of administration (1966).
Weingart, Sehringer, and Winterhager (1990, p. 481).
Husserl critically discusses such ‘thought-economies’ already in his Logical Investigations (1970c, chapter 9), in a way that anticipates many of his later insights concerning technization. ‘Thought-economies’ are for Husserl constituted through the mechanical application of methods—which for Husserl are “devices that economize thought”—and in particular through the application of those (formal) methods “which are rendered secure because a general proof of the efficiency of the method has been once and for all guaranteed” (Husserl 1970c, p. 201).
Power (2004, p. 774).
See for discussion in this regard Hummel (2006).
Buckley (1992, p. 82).
Husserl (2003).
This point is also made by Rang (1989, p. 120). The only exception to this apparent neglect of symbolic technologies and their epistemic dimensions in Husserl later writings can be found in Husserl’s essay on the Origin of geometry (1970b). In this essay, the concept of ‘sedimentation’ is employed to refer to a process of a consolidation of meanings that unavoidably occurs with and through the use of symbolic media, most importantly, the media of writing. What is lacking however in these discussions is a reflection on the genuinely constructive and, one can claim, historically expanding epistemic function of symbolic technologies.
Blumenberg (1981, p. 28).
See on this point also Woelert (2012).
Saying that all practices of formalization have a technical dimension is of course not the same as saying that there is a one-way street from actual symbolic technologies to practices of formalization. In some instances, practices of formalization, involving the actual manipulation of signs, may actually anticipate later technological developments, the most important of which is the construction of the modern computer (see for a comprehensive discussion Krämer 1988; a similar point is also made by Blumenberg 1981, pp. 41–42).
Donald (1991).
Feenberg (1991, p. 5).
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This research was completed thanks to the support of the Australian Research Council’s Discovery Projects funding scheme (project number DP110102466).
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Woelert, P. Technology, knowledge, governance: The political relevance of Husserl’s critique of the epistemic effects of formalization. Cont Philos Rev 46, 487–507 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-013-9277-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-013-9277-6