Abstract
Phantom limb experiences demonstrate an unexpected degree of fragility inherent in our self-perceptions. This is perhaps most extreme when congenitally absent limbs are experienced as phantoms. Aplasic phantoms highlight fundamental questions about the physiological bases of self-experience and the ontogeny of a physical, embodied sense of the self. Some of the most intriguing of these questions concern the role of mirror neurons in supporting the development of self–other mappings and hence the emergence of phantom experiences of congenitally absent limbs. In this paper, we will examine the hypothesis that aplasic phantom limb experience is the result of an ontogenetic interplay between body schemas and mirror neuron activity and that this interplay is founded on embedding in a social context. Phantom limb experience has been associated with the persistence of subjective experience of a part of the body after deafferentation through surgical or traumatic removal. We maintain that limited association is inconsistent with the extent to which phantom limb experience is reported by aplasic individuals.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
We might understand this by employing the metaphor of the cell membrane whose tensegrity, or tensional integrity, is maintained by compression and pressure from each side of the membrane’s surface. Its embodied immersion has the membrane in sharp relief at the interface. Though here we might be accused of moving towards a philosophy of immanence, of the necessary balance of the constituted/constitutive forces, rather than remaining strictly within the phenomenological conception.
We refer here only to the physical world of objects, but would argue that the capacity to think reflexively of oneself as a self is only possible in socially embedded agents, and these are agents which naturally possess an endogenous intersubjectivity (Gallagher 2007), that is, the practical knowledge of oneself that guides from the inside out. It is through the combination of a socially embedded self-awareness and prereflective bodily self-awareness—derived through active felt agency—that a subjective conception of ourselves by ourselves (first-person) and an intersubjective conception by others of us as persons (second-person) is entailed. It is this notion of personhood which extends the self temporally into a world of morally culpable agents and morally vulnerable patients. Thus, it is that agency is ontically and epistemically prior to self, and it is agency and reflective awareness which entails personhood as judged from a first-person (subjective), second-person (empathetic/intersubjective), and third-person (objective) perspective.
For the sake of clarity, let us state simply that our definition of “social” is broad and not the one favored by, for example, some linguists and sociologists as being specific to human beings and including a set of social structures, norms, institutions, culture, language, and so on. “Social” in our sense is more broadly biological, applying to living organisms that interact in a collective coexistence. See De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007) for an operational, enactive definition of the social which is compatible with our use of the word.
Perhaps we might understand self-givenness in terms of Husserl’s concept of “eidetic intuition”: the direct givenness which “refers to the acts in which ‘objects show up in person’” (Depraz et al. 2003, p. 45) and which primarily reveals itself as a perceptual and imaginative act concerned with disclosing an essence [ibid., p.55]. Self-givenness is concerned with the revelation of the tight experiential coupling between body and ownership of the experience.
This notion of an innate body schema challenges the earlier acquired postural model favored by, amongst others, Piaget (1962), Merleau-Ponty (1962), Wallon (1947, 1965), and Simmel (1966). In their model, the infant’s experience is entirely interoceptive with the external perceptual abilities, which mark the exteroceptive domain, only developing after a matter of months.
References
Botvinick, M., & Cohen, J. D. (1998). Rubber hand ‘feels’ what eyes see. Nature, 391, 756.
Brass, M., & Heyes, C. (2005). Imitation: Is cognitive neuroscience solving the correspondence problem? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9, 489–495.
Brugger, P., Kollias, S. S., Muri, R. M., Crelier, G., Hepp-Reymond, M.-C., & Regard, M. (2000). Beyond re-membering: Phantom sensations of congenitally absent limbs. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 97(11), 6167–6172.
Catmur, H., Gilmeister, H., Bird, G., Liepelt, R., Brass, M., & Heyes, C. (2008). Through the looking glass: Counter-mirror activation following incompatible sensorimotor learning. European Journal of Neuroscience, 28, 1208–1215.
Churchland, P. (1981). Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes. Journal of Philosophy, 78(2), 67–90.
Critchley, M. (1953). Tactile thought, with special reference to the blind. Brain, 76, 19–35.
Depraz, N., Varela, F., & Vermersch, P. (2003). On becoming aware: Steps to a phenomenological pragmatics. Amsterdam: John Benjamins (Advances in Consciousness Research Series).
De Jaegher, H., & Di Paolo, E. (2007). Participatory sense-making: An enactive approach to social cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 6(4), 485–507.
de Vignemont, F. (2004). The co-consciousness hypothesis. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 3(1), 97–114.
Di Pellegrino, G., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., Gallese, V., & Rizzolatti, G. (1992). Understanding motor events: A neurophysiological study. Experimental Brain Research, 91, 176–180.
Fadiga, L., & Craighero, L. (2007). On electrophysiological data on mirror neurons and motor representations. In S. Bråten (Ed.), On being moved: From mirror neurons to empathy. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
Gallagher, S. (2005). How the body shapes the mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gallagher, S. (2006) “Perceiving others in action/La perception d’autrui en action”, Fondements cognitifs del’interaction avec autrui, Collége de France (22 February 2006).
Gallagher, S. (2007). Moral agency, self-consciousness, and practical wisdom. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 14(5–6), 199–223.
Gallagher, S., & Meltzoff, A. (1996). The earliest sense of self and others: Merleau Ponty and recent developmental studies. Philosophical Psychology, 9(2), 211–234.
Gallese, V. (2005). ‘Being like me’: Self–other identity, mirror neurons and empathy. In S. Hurley & N. Chater (Eds.), Perspectives on imitation I (pp. 101–118). Cambridge: MIT.
Gallese, V., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., & Rizzolatti, G. (1996). Action recognition in the premotor cortex. Brain, 119, 593–609.
Gazzola, V., van der Worp, H., Mulder, T., Wicker, B., Rizzolatti, G., & Keysers, K. (2007). Aplasics born without hands mirror the goal of hand actions with their feet. Current Biology, 17(14), 1235–1240.
Georgieff, N., & Jeannerod, M. (1998). Beyond consciousness of external events: A ‘Who’ system for consciousness of action and self-consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition, 7, 465–477.
Henry, M. (1963). L’Essence de la manifestation/The essence of manifestation. The Hague: Nijhoff. 1973.
Heyes, C. (2001). Causes and consequences of imitation. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 5, 253–261.
Hurley, S. L. (2005). Active perception and perceiving action: The shared circuits model. In T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (Eds.), Perceptual experience. New York: Oxford University Press.
Jeannerod, M., & Pacherie, E. (2004). Agency, simulation, and self-identification. Mind and Language, 19(2), 113–146.
Keysers, C., & Perrett, D. I. (2004). Demystifying social cognition: A Hebbian perspective. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8, 501–507.
Kinsbourne, M., & Lempert, H. (1980). Human Figure representation by blind children. The Journal of General Psychology, 102, 33–37.
Legrand, D. (2006). The bodily self: The sensori-motor roots of pre-reflexive self-consciousness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 5, 89–118.
Melzack, R., Israel, R., Lacroix, R., & Schultz, G. (1997). Phantom limbs in people with congenital deficiency or amputation in early childhood. Brain, 120, 1603–1620.
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962). Phenomenology of perception. New York: The Humanities Press. Trans. Colin Smith, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Metzinger, T. (2003a). Phenomenal transparency and cognitive self-reference. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2, 353–393.
Metzinger, T. (2003b). Being no one. The self-model theory of subjectivity. Cambridge: MIT.
Oyama, S. (1985). The ontogeny of information: Developmental systems and evolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Perrett, D. I., Harries, M. H., Bevan, R., Thomas, S., Benson, P. J., Mistlin, A. J., et al. (1989). Frameworks of analysis for the neural representation of animate objects and actions. Journal of Experimental Biology, 146, 87–113.
Perrett, D. I., Mistlin, A. J., Harries, M. H., & Chitty, A. J. (1990). Understanding the visual appearance and consequence of hand actions. In M. A. Goodale (Ed.), Vision and action: The control of grasping (pp. 163–342). Norwood: Ablex.
Piaget, J. (1962). Play, dreams, and imitation in childhood. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Trans. Gattegno & Hodgson.
Poeck, K. (1964). Phantoms following amputation in early childhood and in congenital absence of limbs. Cortex, 1, 269–275.
Price, E. H. (2006). A critical review of congenital phantom limb cases and a developmental theory for the basis of body image. Consciousness and Cognition, 15, 310–322.
Rizzolatti, G., & Craighero, L. (2004). The mirror-neuron system. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 27, 169–192.
Rizzolatti, G., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., & Gallese, V. (1996). Premotor cortex and the recognition of motor actions. Cognitive Brain Research, 3, 131–141.
Rizzolatti, G., Fogassi, L., & Gallese, V. (2001). Neurophysiological mechanisms underlying the understanding and imitation of action. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 2, 661–670.
Saadah, E. S. M., & Melzack, R. (1994). Phantom limb experiences in congenital limb-deficient adults. Cortex, 30, 479–485.
Sheets-Johnstone, M. (2003). Kinesthetic memory. Theoria et Historia Scientiarum, 7, 69–92.
Simion, F., Regolin, L., & Bulf, H. (2008). A predisposition for biological motion in the newborn baby. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 105(2), 809–813.
Simmel, M. L. (1966). Developmental aspects of the body scheme. Child Development, 37, 83–95.
Stuart, S. A. J. (2006). “Extended body, extended mind: the self as prosthesis”, in screen consciousness: Mind, cinema and world. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Thelen, E., & Smith, L. (1994). A dynamic systems approach to the development of cognition and action. Cambridge: Bradford Books.
Thompson, E. (2005). Sensorimotor subjectivity and the enactive approach to experience. Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, 4(4), 407–427.
Thompson, E. (2007). Mind in life. Biology: Phenomenology and the sciences of mind. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Tsakiris, M., & Haggard, P. (2005). The rubber hand illusion revisited: visuotactile integration and self-attribution. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 31, 80–91.
Varela, F. J., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (1991). The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human experience. Cambridge: MIT.
Von Economo, C. (1929). The cytoarchitectonics of the human cerebral cortex. London: Oxford University Press.
Wallon, H. (1947) “Les origines de la pensee chez l’enfant”/“The Origins of Thought in the Child”. In The World of Henri Wallon, trans. Michael Vale. Jason Aronson (1984).
Wallon, H. (1965) “L’evolution psychologique de l’enfant”/“The Psychological Development of the Child”. In The World of Henri Wallon, trans. Michael Vale. Jason Aronson (1984).
Weinstein, S., & Sersen, E. A. (1961). Phantoms in cases of congenital absence of limbs. Neurology, 11, 905–911.
Weinstein, S., Sersen, E. A., & Vetter, R. J. (1964). Phantoms and somatic sensation in cases of congenital aplasia. Cortex, 1, 276–290.
Zahavi, D. (2005) Being someone. Psyche, 11/5, 1–20. Retrieved February 3, 2009, from http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/.
Zoia, S., Blason, L., D’Ottavio, G., Bulgheroni, M., Pezzetta, E., Scabar, A., et al. (2007). Evidence of early development of action planning in the human foetus: a kinematic study. Experimental Brain Research, 176, 217–226.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Vittorio Gallese, Alessandra Umilta and Ezequiel Di Paolo for helpful discussions on the themes of this paper. RW’s work on this paper was supported by the EU Marie Curie - Research Training Network 035975 “DISCOS - Disorders and coherence of the embodied self”.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Wood, R., Stuart, S.A.J. Aplasic phantoms and the mirror neuron system: An enactive, developmental perspective. Phenom Cogn Sci 8, 487–504 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-009-9138-2
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-009-9138-2