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Paternalism and Justification*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

James Woodward
James Woodward*
Affiliation:
Memphis State University
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Extract

Much recent discussion in moral philosophy has focused on the contrast between those moral theories which are consequentialist in structure and those moral theories which admit independent side constraints on the means which can be used to achieve various ends. In this essay I shall attempt to show that this contrast provides an illuminating framework against which to understand two conflicting strategies for justifying paternalistic interference. The first, consequentialist strategy takes paternalistic interference to be justified when it will protect or perhaps enhance some valued goal or end state, such as an agent's welfare or future ability to choose. Gerald Dworkin's essay “Paternalism” contains what is perhaps the most compelling recent development of this sort of rationale for paternalistic interference and accordingly much of my subsequent discussion will focus on this essay.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume , Volume 8: New Essays in Ethics and Public Policy , 1982 , pp. 67 - 89
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1982

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Footnotes

*

I would like to thank Phillip Devine, Norman Gillespie, Hardy Jones, Martin Perlmutter, and Ken Winkler for helpful comments on earlier versions of this essay.

References

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