Abstract
Margaret Gilbert explores the phenomenon referredto in everyday ascriptions ofbeliefs to groups. She refers to this type ofphenomenon as ``collective belief'' andcalls the types of groups that are the bearersof such beliefs ``plural subjects''. Iargue that the attitudes that groups adoptthat Gilbert refers to as ``collectivebeliefs'' are not a species of belief in animportant and central sense, but rathera species of acceptance. Unlike proper beliefs,a collective belief is adopted bya group as a means to realizing the group'sgoals. Unless we recognize that thisphenomenon is a species of acceptance, pluralsubjects will seem prone to changetheir ``beliefs'' for irrelevant reasons, andthus frequently appear to act in anirrational manner.
Similar content being viewed by others
REFERENCES
Clark, A.: 1994, ‘Beliefs and Desires Incorporated’, The Journal of Philosophy XCI(8), 404-425.
Cohen, L. J.: 1989, ‘Belief and Acceptance’, Mind XCVIII(391), 367-389.
Cohen, L. J.: 1992, An Essay on Belief and Acceptance, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Churchland, P.: 1981, ‘Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes’, The Journal of Philosophy LXXVIII(2), 67-90.
Giere, R.: 1988, Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Gilbert, M.: 1987, ‘Modelling Collective Belief’, Synthese 73(1), 185-204.
Gilbert, M.: 1989, On Social Facts, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Gilbert, M.: 1994, ‘Remarks on Collective Belief’, in F. Schmitt (ed.), Socializing Epistemology: The Social Dimensions of Knowledge, Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, MD, pp. 111-134.
Gilbert, M.: 1996, Living Together: Rationality, Sociality, and Obligation, Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, MD.
Gilbert, M.: 2000, Collective Belief and Scientific Change, in Sociality and Responsibility: New Essays on Plural Subject Theory, Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, MD.
Goldman, A.: 1999, Knowledge in a Social World, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Hardwig, J.: 1985, ‘Epistemic Dependence’, The Journal of Philosophy 82(7), 335-349.
Hull, D.: 1988, Science as a Process, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Kitcher, P.: 1993, The Advancement of Science, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Latour, B. and S. Woolgar: 1986, Laboratory Life: The Construction of Social Facts, second edition, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Putnam, H.: 1975, ‘The Meaning of “Meaning”’, in Mind, Language and Reality, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 215-271.
Quinton, A.: 1975, ‘Social Objects’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76, 1-27.
Schmitt, F.: 1994, ‘The Justification of Group Belief’, in F. Schmitt (ed.), Socializing Epistemology: The Social Dimensions of Knowledge, Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, MD, pp. 257-287.
Solomon, M.: 1994, ‘Social Empiricism’, Nous 28(3), 325-343.
Stalnaker, R.: 1984, Inquiry, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Thagard, P.: 1997, ‘Collaborative Knowledge’, Nous 31(2), 242-261.
Tuomela, R.: 1992, ‘Group Beliefs’, Synthese 91, 285-318.
Tuomela, R.: 1995, The Importance of Us: A Philosophical Study of Basic Social Notions, Stanford University Press, Stanford.
Van Fraassen, B.: 1980, The Scientific Image, Clarendon Press, Oxford
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Wray, K.B. Collective Belief And Acceptance. Synthese 129, 319–333 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1013148515033
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1013148515033