The Relevance of Evidence from the History of Science in the Contemporary Realism/Anti-realism Debate
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.4245/sponge.v9i1.26986Abstract
It is widely assumed that it is the anti-realist who stakes his case on evidence from the history of science. I argue that (i) realists have failed to recognize the need to collect evidence from the history of science to support their methodological claims, and (ii) anti-realists do not rely on evidence from the history of science to the extent that many suggest.References
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