Journal of the History of Philosophy

Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.4 (2002) 461-476

Curley and Martinich in Dubious Battle

George Wright

the division of opinion as to the place of religion in the thought of Thomas Hobbes figures today as perhaps the key facet of a general rift in understanding the philosopher's thought and work. A recent conference at University College, London, ¹ confirms this observation, but readers of this journal had some time before ² witnessed an encounter between Edwin Curley, University of Michigan, and A. P. Martinich, University of Texas, which laid out lines of argument that continue to figure in the debate. ³

When two highly accomplished and learned philosophers divide on fundamental points, the result must be of interest. But here the theme itself also compelled attention: Hobbes's theology. Had these dry bones risen? If so, could the dancing angels be far to seek, and what then of the filioque?

While there were gestures of accommodation and agreement throughout the exchange, the essentials that divided the two at the beginning largely remained at [End Page 461] the end. What assumptions underlay this disagreement and determined its rather unsatisfying conclusion?

In answer, I would draw the reader's attention to the peculiarities of the contested concept, that of authorial sincerity: Martinich tenaciously ascribing it to Hobbes's theologus; Curley steadfastly withholding to do so in favor of an ironic reading of the text.

Two factors are of particular interest. First, both participants analyzed the religious material in Leviathan for its possible indications as to the philosopher's personal attitudes regarding belief in God. This agreement that Hobbes's mind-states were a proper subject of inquiry made the debate regarding sincerity possible. Second, in arguing that Hobbes's discussion of religious doctrines was ironic, Curley necessarily passed over the theoretical support they may offer other arguments advanced in Leviathan; that is, he denied the possible coherence of Hobbesian politics and Hobbesian theology taken at face value. But neither concern with Hobbes's subjective mind-states nor slighting the utility of the religious material and the possibility of its coherence with other arguments is warranted, in my view, as I hope to explain.

In what follows, I rely on some hermeneutic principles drawn from some continental thinkers in order both to advance the study of Hobbes and to make use of him as a case study to pose some more general problems of interpretation. He is an apt subject, given both the widely divergent views we have of him and the current impasse, as experienced here, among Hobbes scholars.

A few definitions and stipulations may be of use at the outset. Authorial intention we may define as that content which an author seeks to communicate in and through a text. ⁴ In a philosophic text, the predominant mode of communication has been through argument, though of course other forms, for example, the dialogue, have rightly found place in the tradition. Indeed, in seeking to influence a given audience, philosophers have adopted many discursive forms depending on their views and their estimates of the best ways to express them, in light of their own communicative abilities. And some thinkers have had great impact but have left no writings, Socrates, for example. But in the case of Hobbes, the task is to consider both his thought and the means and methods he chose to communicate it.

Sincerity we may define as congruity between one's inner convictions, feelings, inclinations, etc., and their outer expression in word and deed. As to verbal expression, whether oral or recorded in print or other means, we may mark a difference between two kinds of sentences, viz., those expressive of convictions, feelings, inclinations, etc., and those utterances susceptible to criticism and capable of being taken up in argument. First-person utterances expressive of subjective experiences do not make claims that argument can either vindicate or address; that is, expressive sentences cannot be directly proven to be true or false, as is possible with claims to truth or rightness. Congruity between inner conviction [End Page 462...