Abstract
This paper responds to Justin Broackes’ reply to my paper, “On the retinal origins of the Hering primaries.” This paper aims to clarify and further develop the ideas presented in that article. I take up several of the points Broackes raises regarding the connection between my work and that of William Thornton (Journal of the Optical Society of America 61:1155–1163, 1971) and (Color Research and Application 24:139–156, 1999) on the “prime” and “anti-prime” colors of the human visual system, the connection between those prime and anti-prime colors and hue category boundaries, and my attempt to link facts about low-level processing to the unique hues. Ultimately, while Broackes brings up several interesting issues and usefully illustrates the limits of my approach, I see no reason to retreat from the main claims I made about human spectral sensitivity and the hues.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
I also include an additional anti-prime in the extra-spectral region for reasons explain in my 2011. Since that point is irrelevant to the issues treated in this section, I pass over it here.
I say this while also wanting to raise a point about phenomenology. Broackes claims that “There are no purples that do not look to have some red and some blue in them” [doi:10.1007/s13164-011-0050-7] and in correspondence has said much the same about red and yellow always being seen in orange samples. Such claims are, of course, common in philosophical and scientific discussions of color. While I can understand their appeal, my own phenomenological reflection leads me to not know what to make of them; I have normal color vision by the usual tests. For example, I can find in the Munsell Book of Color (1976) orange (and purple) chips with hues that appear to me as basic as any unique Hering primary. I do not detect any redness or yellowness (/redness or blueness) in them, but find only certain similarities to redness and yellowness (/redness and blueness), in the same way that I find similarities between blue and green. However, samples between, say, focal yellow and this balanced/unique orange have a binary appearance that is described pretty well by “seeing amounts of yellow and red in it,” although at a certain point it becomes natural for me to prefer describing them as more-or-less orangish. Similar remarks apply for purple. On the other hand, samples between blue and green and between green and yellow all have a binary appearance to me. These observations are among the reasons I have for taking seriously Jameson and D’Andrade’s (1997) dissent from mainstream thought about the hues. See also Jameson (2010).
Characteristic curves were determined by first separating plant reflectances (those used in my 2011) denominated by ‘red’, ‘green’, ‘blue’ (or ‘violet’), or ‘yellow’ into four groups based on those generic color descriptors; “reds” with strongly U-shaped reflectance spectra were reassigned to blue. For each sample, a new curve was derived, with the value at each wavelength determined by dividing the sample’s reflectance at that wavelength by the sum of the sample’s reflectances across all measured wavelengths. For each hue group, the characteristic curve was generated by taking the mean of the values of its members’ new curves at each wavelength. The rationale for using the new curves and characteristic curves based on them, rather than empirical reflectances, was to enable comparisons of patterns in natural spectral shapes that are unaffected by variations in absolute reflectivity throughout the spectrum between individual samples or groups.
For the record, I am convinced that the other method of predicting unique hues that I considered in section 5 of my 2011 is altogether a nonstarter. I noted its shortcoming when it was introduced and nothing since then has led me to think it can be rehabilitated.
References
Abramov, L., and J. Gordon. 1994. Color appearance: On seeing red—or yellow, or green, or blue. Annual Review of Psychology 45: 451–485.
Abramov, L., and J. Gordon. 2005. Seeing unique hues. Journal of the Optical Society of the Optical Society of America A 22: 2143–2153.
Broackes, J. 2011. Where do the unique hues come from? Review of Philosophy and Psychology. doi:10.1007/s13164-011-0050-7.
Changizi, M., Q. Zhang, and S. Shimojo. 2006. Bare skin, blood and the evolution of primate colour vision. Biology Letters 2: 217–221.
Egan, F. 2010. Computational models: A modest role for content. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41: 253–259.
Fairman, H., M. Brill, and H. Hemmendinger. 1997. How the CIE 1931 color-matching functions were derived from Wright-Guild data. Color Research & Application 22: 11–23.
Hinks, D., L. Cardenas, R. Kuehni, and R. Shamey. 2007. Unique-hue stimulus selection using Munsell color chips. Journal of the Optical Society of America A 24: 3371–3378.
Indow, T. 1987. Psychologically unique hues in aperture and surface colors. Die Farbe 34: 253–260.
Jameson, K. 2010. Where in the World Color Survey is the support for color categorization based on the Hering primaries? In Color ontology and color science, ed. J. Cohen and M. Matthen. Cambridge: MIT.
Jameson, K., and R. D’Andrade. 1997. It’s not really red, green, yellow, blue: An inquiry into perceptual color space. In Color categories in thought and language, ed. C.L. Hardin and L. Maffi. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kuehni, R. 2001. Determination of unique hues using Munsell color chips. Color Research & Application 26: 61–66.
Kuehni, R. 2005. Unique hue stimulus choice: A constraint on hue category formation. Journal of Culture and Cognition 5: 387–407.
Lee, D. 2007. Nature’s palette: The science of plant color. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Maloney, L. 2003. Surface color perception in constrained environments. In Colour perception: Mind and the physical world, ed. R. Mausfeld and D. Heyer. London: Oxford University Press.
Mollon, J.D. 2006. Monge: The Verriest Lecture, Lyon, July 2005. Visual Neuroscience 23: 297–309.
Mollon, J.D., and G. Jordan. 1997. On the nature of unique hues. In John Dalton's colour vision legacy, ed. C. Dickinson, I. Murray, and D. Carden. London: Taylor and Francis.
Munsell Color Company. 1976. Munsell book of color: Matte finish collection. Baltimore: Munsell.
Romney, A.K., and C.C. Chiao. 2009. Functional computational model for optimal color coding. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 106: 10376–10381.
Schrödinger, E. 1920/1970. Outline of a theory of color measurement for daylight vision. In Sources of color science, ed. D. MacAdam. Cambridge: MIT.
Shepard, R.N. 1992. The perceptual organization of colors: An adaptation to regularities of the terrestrial world. In The adapted mind: Evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture, ed. J.H. Barkow, L. Cosmides, and J. Tooby. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stockman, A., and L. Sharpe. 2000. The spectral sensitivities of the middle- and long- wavelength- sensitive cones derived from measurements in observers of known genotype. Vision Research 40: 1711–1737.
Thornton, W.A. 1971. Luminosity and color-rendering capability of white light. Journal of the Optical Society of America 61: 1155–1163.
Thornton, W.A. 1972. Three-color visual response. Journal of the Optical Society of America 62: 457–459.
Thornton, W.A. 1999. Spectral sensitivities of the normal human visual system, color-matching functions and their principles, and how and why the two sets should coincide. Color Research & Application 24: 139–156.
Thornton, W.A. 2000. Suggested optimum primaries and gamut in color imaging. Color Research & Application 25: 148–150.
Wright, W. 2011. On the retinal origins of the Hering primaries. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2: 1–17.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
I thank Justin Broackes for his insightful reply to my 2011 and the exchanges we have had about these matters. His reply provides a good opportunity for me to further clarify and reflect on the project undertaken in my 2011.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Wright, W. More on the Origins of the Hues: A Reply to Broackes. Rev.Phil.Psych. 2, 629–641 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-011-0049-0
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-011-0049-0