Abstract
What is it to trust someone? What is it for someone to be trustworthy? These are the two main questions that this paper addresses. There are various situations that can be described as ones of trust, but this paper considers the issue of trust between individuals. In it, I suggest that trust is distinct from reliance or cases where someone asks for something on the expectation that it will be done due to the different attitude taken by the trustor. I argue that the trustor takes Holton’s ‘participant stance’ and this distinguishes trust from reliance. I argue that trustworthiness is different from reliability and that an account of trustworthiness cannot be successful whilst ignoring the point that aligning trustworthiness with reliability removes the virtue from being trustworthy. On the question of what it is distinguishes trustworthiness from reliability, I argue that the distinction is in the opportunity for the trustee to act against the wishes of the trustor and the trustee’s consideration of the value of the trust that has been placed in them by the trustor.
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Notes
Where I have referred to the trustor* (with an asterisk) I have included an asterisk to show that they are the equivalent to the trustor. Since the case is not one of trust, I do not believe that they really are trustors, but I have used this to identify them as the equivalent in a different situation. The equivalent here applies where I have referred to the trustee*.
Baier’s paper only accounts for goodwill rather than a lack of ill will.
The example Holton uses involves opposing armies, which obviously involves groups rather than individuals, but I believe that in this case the difference does not matter.
This example was first suggested to me by Professor Stephen Laurence, University of Sheffield.
The example here has been adapted from Edward H. Lorenz (1988).
This is not taken from Jones’ paper, but I am grateful for Karen‟s comments in responding to the challenge of the selfish individual.
If Jones holds a view that trustworthiness is connected to compliance then I believe that she also has this problem as it is a problem for theories in general that conflate trustworthiness and compliance.
References
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Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the following for their support in the preparation of this paper. Firstly Stephen Laurence, University of Sheffield, who made helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier version of this paper that helped me develop it to its current stage. Secondly Karen Jones, University of Melbourne, whom I would like to thank for her helpful email discussion and for sending me an early chapter of her forthcoming work that has been mentioned in this paper. I would also like to thank an anonymous reviewer who reviewed this paper for Philosophia and provided me with helpful directions and criticisms that helped me clarify the paper.
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Wright, S. Trust and Trustworthiness. Philosophia 38, 615–627 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-009-9218-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-009-9218-0