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What Should a Correspondence Theory Be and Do?

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Correspondence theories are frequently either too vaguely expressed – “true statements correspond to the way things are in the world,” or implausible – “true statements mirror raw, mind-independent reality.” I address this problem by developing features and roles that ought to characterize what I call ldquo;modest” correspondence theories. Of special importance is the role of correspondence in directing our responses to cases of suspected non-factuality; lack of straightforward correspondence shows the need for, and guides us in our choice of, various kinds of reconstrual projects. This, I argue, is in contrast to the approaches suggested by deflationism and coherence, and thus modest correspondence theories are appropriately distinct from rivals

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, 94305-2155, USA

    Patricia Marino

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  1. Patricia Marino
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Correspondence to Patricia Marino.

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Marino, P. What Should a Correspondence Theory Be and Do?. Philos Stud 127, 415–457 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-7813-2

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