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Domains, plural truth, and mixed atomic propositions

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In this paper, I discuss two concerns for pluralist truth theories: a concern about a key detail of these theories and a concern about their viability. The detailed-related concern is that pluralists have relied heavily upon the notion of a domain, but it is not transparent what they take domains to be. Since the notion of a domain has been present in philosophy for some time, it is important for many theorists, not only truth pluralists, to be clear on what domains are and what work they can do. The viability-related concern is that it’s not clear how a pluralist truth theory could explain the truth-conditions of mixed atomic propositions. To address this concern, truth pluralists should recognize something to which they have not been sufficiently attentive: that some atomic propositions belong to more than one domain. But, recognizing this requires rethinking the relationships between the nature of propositions, their membership in domains, and their truth. I address these issues and propose an understanding of them that is preferable to the best existing account of them, that offered by Michael Lynch.

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Notes

  1. This definition may not be absolutely comprehensive, if it is advisable to class as pluralist some recent deflationary theories which, it has been alleged, are pluralist truth theories. See the views described in Beall (2013) and Edwards (2012), as well as the discussion at Pedersen (2006, § 5). There is also a question whether (Plu) excludes so-called strong pluralist truth theories from the class of pluralist truth theories. I will set these issues aside, as the definition just given captures the essential details of the best-developed pluralist truth theories, on which I will focus in this paper.

  2. See Bar-On and Simmons (2007), Burgess and Burgess (2011, Chap. 3), Damnjanovic (2010), Horwich (1998, p. 2) and Lynch (2009, Chap. 6 for discussion).

  3. (Disc) is referred to as the discipline condition in (Jackson et al. 1994).

  4. The pluralist truth theories of Lynch and Sher also entail forms of minimalism about truth-aptness that are interestingly different from that advanced by Wright. These complexities will be set aside in what follows.

  5. See Lynch (2009, Chap. 1) for further discussion of the platitudes about truth.

  6. For discussion, see Lynch (2009, Chap. 8), Lynch (2013a).

  7. Given Lynch’s definition of manifestation, not only do correspondence and coherence manifest truth, truth actually manifests itself. This is why, in defining ‘binary pluralist truth theory’ above, I include the parenthetical.

  8. Lynch (2009, p. 81) carves out one exception: atomic propositions composed of vague concepts. Such propositions, he suggests, may not determinately be members of any domain; if so, their truth is likewise indeterminate. Vague propositions will be set aside in what follows. As the reader can verify, if this escape clause were used to respond to the problem of mixed atomic propositions, the resultant truth theory would be saddled with massive amounts of indeterminacy in truth-value. This result is questionable on its face, and it would certainly be in tension with minimalism about truth-aptness.

  9. The options here are (brackets are used to denote concepts):

    • (B1) [[Brutus], [ξ killed Caesar]]

    • (B2) [[Caesar], [ξ was killed by Brutus]]

    • (B3) [[Brutus], [ξ killed \(\zeta\)], [Caesar]]

  10. Lynch (2013b) see also (2009, p. 19).

  11. Notice that in the passage quoted below, Marian David also appears to run together these two senses of ‘domain.’

  12. There are related problems in this vicinity, the problems of mixed compounds (sentences and propositions) and mixed inferences. These problems have been discussed much more extensively: see Beall (2000), Cook (2011), Cotnoir (2009), Edwards (2008, 2009), Lynch (2004, 2009, 2013b)), Pedersen (2006), Sainsbury (1996), Sher (2004, 2005), Tappolet (1997, 2000) and Williamson (1994). Any pluralist truth theory must provide a response to these problems, and an optimal solution to them will fit naturally with a solution to the problem of mixed atomic propositions. I will set them aside in the present discussion, however.

  13. For similar remarks, see Sher (2005, pp. 320–322).

  14. Of course, it is difficult to say just where complete explanations terminate, and why. It is also difficult to say how many hairs someone must have to not be bald. Still, we can say with confidence that someone with hair down to their ankles is not bald. Likewise, we can say with confidence that a certain purported explanation is incomplete, even absent a final theory of explanatory completeness.

  15. An anonymous referee suggests that a virtue sufficiently similar to (V4) can be preserved without mentioning proposition-kinds or domains. The thought is that one could explain why a given proposition 〈p〉 is apt for a certain manifester and no other manifester by citing facts only about the specific concepts composing 〈p〉, rather than any kinds that those concepts instance. Notice, however, that the suggested explanation is a bare determination claim: it has the form ‘\(\Uppi\) is 〈p〉’s manifester because 〈p〉 is composed of concepts \(C_{1},\ldots,C_{n}. \)

  16. An anonymous referee suggests that for manifestation functionalism to address the problem of mixed atomic propositions, it is only necessary that some manifester be a default manifester, not that representational correspondence, in particular, be the default manifester. Suppose, then, that an epistemic, coherence property is the default manifester: it manifests truth for 〈p〉 unless 〈p〉 is composed of concepts that render 〈p〉 incapable of cohering with other propositions. Are there any such concepts? It would seem that even propositions that are entirely composed of representational concepts are capable of cohering with other propositions. This means that if coherence were the default manifester, coherence would manifest truth even for thoroughly representational propositions, e.g. 〈Snow is solid〉. Treating coherence as the default manifester, then, seems to give the upper hand to monist, coherence theories of truth.

  17. Of course, a full statement of this view must also specify how manifesters are assigned to compound propositions. Since my focus here has been on atomic propositions, and because I think that Lynch (2009) has provided an essentially adequate explanation of how manifesters are assigned to compounds—given what is laid down in Many-One, especially its allowance of multiple domain-membership—I set compound propositions aside here.

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Wyatt, J. Domains, plural truth, and mixed atomic propositions. Philos Stud 166 (Suppl 1), 225–236 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-0067-5

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