

Domains, plural truth, and mixed atomic propositions

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Abstract

In this paper, I discuss two concerns for pluralist truth theories: a concern about a key detail of these theories and a concern about their viability. The detailed-related concern is that pluralists have relied heavily upon the notion of a domain, but it is not transparent what they take domains to be. Since the notion of a domain has been present in philosophy for some time, it is important for many theorists, not only truth pluralists, to be clear on what domains are and what work they can do.

The viability-related concern is that it's not clear how a pluralist truth theory could explain the truth-conditions of mixed atomic propositions. To address this concern, truth pluralists should recognize something to which they have not been sufficiently attentive: that some atomic propositions belong to more than one domain. But, recognizing this requires rethinking the relationships between the nature of propositions, their membership in domains, and their truth. I address these issues and propose an understanding of them that is preferable to the best existing account of them, that offered by Michael Lynch.

1 Truth pluralism

In the following, a *pluralist truth theory* will be a truth theory that entails the following claims

(Sub) Some truth-bearers are true in virtue of possessing a substantive property

(Plu) Some truth-bearers are true in virtue of possessing a substantive property Π , others are true in virtue of possessing a distinct, substantive property Π' .¹

The distinction between substantive and non-substantive ('thin,' 'insubstantial,' 'deflated') properties has been a fixture of debates between deflationists and substantivists about truth. More than one criterion for a property to be substantive has been proposed, including that it be possible to explain other things (the natures of mental states, speech acts, or other properties, for instance) by appeal to that property, that it not be possible to entirely understand the property's nature by understanding the meaning of a predicate that expresses it, and that it have a 'hidden structure' that can be revealed by a constitution theory of the property.² In principle, a pluralist truth theory may incorporate some of these criteria for substantiveness, all of them, or even none of them, proposing an alternative criterion/criteria instead.

Also, a truth pluralist is not committed, in principle, to taking any particular type of entity to be the (fundamental) bearer of truth. Any candidate from the standard list of truth-bearers—propositions, sentence-types, sentences-in-context, utterances, beliefs—is available to them. In what follows, I will assume for convenience that propositions are the fundamental bearers of truth.

One of the reasons that pluralist truth theories are interesting is that they promise to deliver two theses which seem, at first pass, to be in tension with one another: *minimalism about truth-aptness* and *substantivism about truth*, i.e. (Sub). In an early statement of truth pluralism, Crispin Wright says ([30]: 72-4):

¹This definition may not be absolutely comprehensive, if it is advisable to class as pluralist some recent deflationary theories which, it has been alleged, are pluralist truth theories. See the views described in [3] and [12], as well as the discussion at [21]: § 5. There is also a question whether (Plu) excludes so-called strong pluralist truth theories from the class of pluralist truth theories. I will set these issues aside, as the definition just given captures the essential details of the best-developed pluralist truth theories, on which I will focus in this paper.

²See [1]; [5]: ch. 3; [8]; [14]: 2; and [18]: ch. 6 for discussion.

[T]ruth is not intrinsically a metaphysically heavyweight notion—the mark of some profound form of engagement between language, or thought, and reality—for which certain areas of assertoric discourse, whatever internal discipline they manifest, may simply not be in the market. . . [A]ny assertoric discourse will permit the definition upon it of a minimal truth predicate. . . Here it is vital that, for the purposes of this claim, assertoric discourses are demarcated not by any deep feature of their contents which might be simulated or masked by surface syntactic features, but merely by their statements’ being subject to acknowledged conditions of acceptance and their possessing the appropriate surface syntactic features. . .

Wright’s version of minimalism about truth-aptness has it that for a sentence ϕ to be truth-apt, only two conditions must be met:³

(DS) ϕ has a *declarative syntax*: ϕ can be grammatically embedded under negation and propositional attitude verbs, serve as the antecedent of a conditional, . . .

(Disc) The use of ϕ is governed by acknowledged standards of warranted acceptability

The upshot is the possibility that not only discourse about ordinary, macroscopic objects, but that of, for instance, moral, aesthetic, and mathematical discourse might be truth-apt, even if the content of the latter is not about objective states of affairs or response-independent properties. ‘Random torture is immoral,’ for instance, is just as embeddable under negation as ‘The temperature today is 80° Fahrenheit.’ The cost of entry into the truth game will have been substantially lowered, and if truth is substantive, it is surprising that entry is so cheap.⁴

Now, though a truth pluralist must affirm (Plu), they need not go so far as to identify the substantive properties mentioned therein with truth itself. Indeed, an influential formulation of truth pluralism due to Michael Lynch called *manifestation functionalism* has it that there is only one property

³(Disc) is referred to as the discipline condition in [15].

⁴The pluralist truth theories of Michael Lynch and Gila Sher also entail forms of minimalism about truth-aptness that are interestingly different from that advanced by Wright. These complexities will be set aside in what follows.

identical to truth itself. Truth, on his view, is a functional property that is manifested by the distinct, substantive properties mentioned in (Plu), which we can refer to as the *manifesters*.

The manifesters manifest truth by instantiating a certain functional role, the ‘truth-role.’ For a property to instance the truth-role is for it to satisfy a number of platitudes that would appear to circumscribe our ordinary concept of truth. For instance, one platitude suggested by Lynch is

(Objectivity) The belief that p is true iff with respect to the belief, things are as they are believed to be.⁵

Surely, the thought can be put, someone who possesses the concept of truth is, for that reason, disposed to accept highly general claims about truth such as (Objectivity). Any property, then, which satisfies such claims is behaving as our concept of truth tells us truth behaves, and for that reason, manifests truth.

Lynch suggests several properties that might be included as manifesters, but we will not need to consider these properties in detail.⁶ Rather, it will be important to note a distinguishing feature of manifestation functionalism. Manifestation functionalism is, as we will put it, a *binary* pluralist truth theory. That is, according to manifestation functionalism, there are two properties (other than truth itself) which, when instantiated by propositions, manifest truth. One of these is a representational, correspondence property which can be taken, following Field [13], to be underwritten by a causal theory of reference. The other is an epistemic, coherence property, which is more nuanced than, though in the tradition of, the coherence properties which figures such as Blanshard [4] and Joachim [16] have taken to be identical to truth.⁷

⁵See [18]: ch. 1 for further discussion of the platitudes about truth.

⁶For discussion, see [18]: ch. 8; [19].

⁷Given Lynch’s definition of manifestation, not only do correspondence and coherence manifest truth, truth actually manifests itself. This is why, in defining ‘binary pluralist truth theory’ above, I include the parenthetical.

2 Domains

What, then, is supposed to determine which manifester a proposition must instantiate to be true? It is here that Wright's notion of a discourse promises to play a critical role: its membership in a certain discourse will determine the manifester that is assigned to a proposition. Wright says ([30]: 37-8; see also 24-5):

The proposal is simply that any predicate that exhibits certain very general features qualifies, just on that account, as a truth predicate. That is quite consistent with acknowledging that there may, perhaps *must* be more to say about the content of any predicate that does have these features. But it is also consistent with the possibility of *pluralism*—that the more there is to say may well vary from discourse to discourse. . .

Wright is raising the possibility that the things we say (and think) comprise various discourses. This is not a novel contention. The conviction that there is more than one discourse underpins many debates about realism, antirealism, and irrealism, error theory, expressivism, and fictionalism, and cognitivism and non-cognitivism. It is thus important for many philosophers, not only truth pluralists, to be clear about what, exactly, a discourse is supposed to be. Discourses are presumably more inclusive than conversations. I could have a conversation about set theory at t_1 and a conversation about arithmetic at t_2 . These would, in the operative sense, be instances of the same discourse: mathematical discourse. Discourses could, then, be thought of as (possibly soliloquized) conversation-kinds. The question then becomes how to individuate these conversation-kinds.

A natural suggestion is to appeal to the kinds of things conversations are about. Lynch has recommended that discourse individuation take just this sort of trajectory. He sketches a procedure for individuating discourses, which he calls *domains* ([18]: 77-80):

[A]n atomic proposition is true when it has the distinct *further* property that plays the truth-role—manifests truth—*for the domain of inquiry to which it belongs*. Not being true consists in lacking that property. . . [What determines whether a proposition is a member of one domain, rather than another, is] the kind of

concepts (moral, legal, mathematical) that compose the proposition in question. . . One kind of concept differs from another by virtue of (a) its relation to, and (b) the character of, the properties that kind of concept is a concept of.

The view that Lynch is advancing here is clearly a development of that suggested by Wright. Call it *domain pluralism*, the view that propositions are members of distinct domains. As the above passage indicates, domain individuation is taken by Lynch to bottom out at the level of properties. A concept-kind K is individuated by: (i) the relations in which K -concepts stand to properties; and (ii) the ‘character’ of those properties. Though it is not absolutely clear what the character of a property is (presumably, a property’s character is determined by, among other things, its physicality and its objectivity), this strategy for individuating concept-kinds appears to involve an appeal to property-kinds. Some concept-kinds are identical to others—trivially, every concept-kind is self-identical. Hence, some properties have the same ‘character.’ Presumably, this is enough for them to instance a property-kind (at least in some sense; perhaps these don’t qualify as *natural* kinds, but there is no clear reason why they would need to). Proposition-kinds are, in turn, defined in terms of concept-kinds. Propositions are taken to be composed of concepts, and proposition-kinds individuated by the kinds of concepts of which their instances are composed. Lastly, domains are individuated by appeal to proposition-kinds: one domain is identical to another iff all of its constituent propositions instance the same kind.

Atomic propositions have a distinctive status, on this view: they are taken to essentially belong to one and only one domain. Lynch says ([18]: 80), “belonging to a particular domain is a feature an atomic proposition at least, has in virtue of being the sort of proposition it is. Propositions are the kind of propositions they are essentially; therefore, belonging to a particular domain is an essential fact about an atomic proposition.”⁸

Lynch’s method of domain individuation certainly goes further than Wright’s, but it isn’t quite adequate. I’ll mention two concerns that arise for it. The

⁸Lynch ([18]: 81) carves out one exception: atomic propositions composed of vague concepts. Such propositions, he suggests, may not determinately be members of any domain; if so, their truth is likewise indeterminate. Vague propositions will be set aside in what follows. As the reader can verify, if this escape clause were used to respond to the problem of mixed atomic propositions, the resultant truth theory would be saddled with massive amounts of indeterminacy in truth-value. This result is questionable on its face, and it would certainly be in tension with minimalism about truth-aptness.

first concern is that the view individuates concept-kinds too narrowly. According to Lynch, propositions are composed only of concepts. An account of propositional composition along these lines should take propositions to be composed not only of concepts of properties, but also of concepts of individuals and relations. \langle Brutus killed Caesar \rangle , for instance, should be taken to be composed of at least one individual-concept and either a property-concept or a relation-concept.⁹

The second concern is that the notion of a domain is ambiguous. Domains have been described thus far as things of which propositions can be members-classes. This is one, but not the only, role that domains are supposed to play in Lynch's view. He also describes domains as 'subject matters,' e.g. mathematics and ethics.¹⁰ A subject matter would appear to be a kind of thing that one can think or talk about.

But, one and the same thing cannot play both of these roles. Most of our thought and talk is not about (classes of) propositions, so propositions are not the subject matter of that thought and talk. This means that if domains are classes of propositions, the collection of all domains cannot exhaust the subject matters about which we think and talk.¹¹

To resolve this ambiguity, we should recognize two distinct notions: that of a subject matter and that of a class of propositions composed of concepts of things that instance that subject matter. There is, for instance, distinctively mathematical subject matter: sets, numbers, the successor function, and so on. There is also a class of propositions that are mathematical in kind: \langle The null set has zero members \rangle , \langle The successor of 1 is 2 \rangle , and so on. These propositions are mathematical propositions because they are composed of mathematical concepts, i.e. concepts about the subject matter mathematics. To put the point another way, the identity of these propositions is determined by the identity of the subject matter they are about, not the other way around. To keep these notions separate, we can refer to

⁹The options here are (brackets are used to denote concepts):

- (B₁) [[Brutus], [ξ killed Caesar]]
- (B₂) [[Caesar], [ξ was killed by Brutus]]
- (B₃) [[Brutus], [ξ killed ζ], [Caesar]]

¹⁰[20]: 14; see also [18]: 19.

¹¹Notice that in the passage quoted below, Marian David also appears to run together these two senses of 'domain.'

subject matters as *topics* and classes of propositions as *domains*. Topics are individuated as follows:

(Topic identity) Topic T is identical to topic T' iff the individuals, properties, and relations that instance T are numerically identical to those that instance T' .

With topics and domains disambiguated, the Lynchian view of domains that emerges is the *One (Domain)-for-One (Atomic Proposition)* strategy:

- (1-1) (i) Domain $D = \text{domain } D'$ iff D exists and D' exists and if $\langle p \rangle \in D$ and $\langle p' \rangle \in D'$, then the concepts C_1, \dots, C_n composing $\langle p \rangle$ and the concepts $C_{1'}, \dots, C_{n'}$ composing $\langle p' \rangle$ instance the same concept-kind K
- (1-1) (ii) Concepts C and C' instance the same concept-kind K iff they bear the same relations R_1, \dots, R_n to things (objects, properties, relations) that instance the same topic
- (1-1) (iii) Every atomic proposition essentially belongs to exactly one domain
- (1-1) (iv) Every atomic proposition is assigned a manifester based upon its domain-membership.

Lynch points out three virtues of One-for-One ([18]: 81-2):

- (V1) Proposition-kinds can be extracted from (1-1(i)). These kinds can be used to explain why there is more than one manifester property: because there is more than one kind of proposition
- (V2) (1-1(i)) individuates domains in a 'natural' way
- (V3) (1-1(iii)) rules out an unattractive possibility: that an atomic proposition might be both true and not true, in virtue of instantiating the manifester assigned to one domain, but not that assigned to another.

3 The problem of mixed atomic propositions

One-for-One provides a clear and initially compelling way to think about how domains, propositions, and truth might be related, but it unfortunately has a fatal flaw. The Achilles' heel of One-for-One is the *problem of mixed atomic propositions*.¹² Marian David ([9]: § 8.2) states the problem well:¹³

First, it seems difficult to sort propositions into distinct kinds according to the subject matter they are about. Take, e.g., the proposition that killing is morally wrong, or the proposition that immoral acts happen in space-time. What are they about? Intuitively, their subject matter is mixed, belonging to the physical domain, the biological domain, and the domain of ethical discourse. It is hard to see how pluralism can account for the truth of such mixed propositions, belonging to more than one domain of discourse: What will be the realizing property?

The problem is that some atomic propositions appear to be composed of concepts of different kinds, ones which bear relations to things that instance different topics. Call these *mixed atomic propositions*. The identity-conditions for domains specified in (1-1(i)) do not range over such propositions, so One-for-One doesn't count them as belonging to any domain, and thus does not count them as truth-apt. This is in tension with minimalism about truth-aptness: 'Immoral acts happen in space-time.' clearly satisfies (DS) and (Disc). Moreover, if these propositions are composed of concepts of different kinds, it isn't clear how (1-1(iii)) could apply to them. Some of the concepts that compose them will be about one topic, some about another, so surely they cannot be members of only one domain, much less essentially members of only one domain.

¹²There are related problems in this vicinity, the problems of mixed compounds (sentences and propositions) and mixed inferences. These problems have been discussed much more extensively: see [2]; [6]; [7]; [10]; [11]; [17]; [18]; [20]; [21]; [24]; [26]; [27]; [28]; and [29]. Any pluralist truth theory must provide a response to these problems, and an optimal solution to them will fit naturally with a solution to the problem of mixed atomic propositions. I will set them aside in the present discussion, however.

¹³For similar remarks, see [26]: 320-22.

3.1 Response: No domains

How should truth pluralists address the problem of mixed atomic propositions? One response is to substantially modify One-for-One by abandoning the notion of domains altogether. This is the response offered by Lynch in recent work ([20]: 15-16). The response might seem attractive, since mixed atomic propositions appear to certify the impossibility of cleanly sorting every proposition into one domain and assigning it a manifestor on that basis. Why, then, keep domains around at all?

Abandoning domains for this reason would, however, be a mistake. Without domains, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to explain why a given proposition must instantiate a certain manifestor, and not any other, to be true. Thus, without domains, pluralists jeopardize their ability to offer a complete theory of truth.

Some truth theories make *constitution claims* about truth—claims that the truth of a range of truth-bearers y_1, \dots, y_n consists (at least partially) in their instantiating property Π . A truth theory that makes a constitution claim about truth is *complete* only if it also includes an explanation of why the truth of those truth-bearers is so constituted, or if it includes an explanation of why the constitution claims about truth included in the theory are inexplicable. When available, explanation is preferable to mystery, so it is better for a truth theory to achieve completeness in the former way than in the latter. Pluralist truth theories have thus far been premised on precisely this promise of explicable constitution claims about truth. Thus, their completeness will be called into question if they are unable to provide explanations of them.

To see the explanatory threat posed, consider a domain-free version of manifestation functionalism. Take the proposition $\langle p \rangle$. One and only one manifestor Π is assigned to $\langle p \rangle$. Why is Π , and no other manifestor Π' , suitable for realizing the truth of $\langle p \rangle$? The domain-free, manifestation functionalist's reply will be, 'Because $\langle p \rangle$ is composed of concepts C_1, \dots, C_n , C_1, \dots, C_n bear relations R_1, \dots, R_n to x_1, \dots, x_n , and x_1, \dots, x_n instance topic T .'

Notice that for the manifestation functionalist to fully explain why Π is $\langle p \rangle$'s manifestor, they must also cite general facts about the concepts composing $\langle p \rangle$ and those things of which they are concepts. Otherwise, they have only offered a brute claim that the composition of a proposition determines which manifestor is suitable to manifest its truth.

As an analogy, suppose that a functionalist about mental states tells

you: ‘State S is a pain state iff S instantiates the property $\Psi =$ being a C-fiber-firing state. Ψ instantiates pain for S because S instantiates the property $\Psi' =$ being a human brain state.’ This is clearly not a complete explanation of why Ψ manifests pain for S . Why not? The reason appears to be that the mental state functionalist has, in effect, offered a claim of the form ‘ X determines Y ’ that isn’t conjoined with a conjecture as to *how* or *why* X determines Y . Call this a *bare determination claim*. To remedy this explanatory incompleteness, the mental state functionalist can replace their bare determination claim with a claim of the form, ‘ X determines Y because Z ’ ($X \neq Y \neq Z$). They can, that is, claim instead that S ’s instantiating Ψ' determines that Ψ manifests pain for S because. . . . Call a claim of the latter form a *grounded determination claim*.¹⁴

The lesson for manifestation functionalism is that manifestation functionalists should answer questions about the assignment of manifesters like the one above by advancing grounded, not bare, determination claims. But, as offered by a manifestation functionalist, a grounded determination claim will cite general facts about the kind(s) of the concepts of which a certain proposition $\langle p \rangle$ is composed. This entails that $\langle p \rangle$ instances a certain proposition-kind. Domains are just classes of propositions that instance a common kind, so domains then enter straight away. This shows that manifestation functionalism should retain domains, even if the problem of mixed atomic propositions demonstrates that their characterization in One-for-One is inadequate. Put differently, because it retains domains, One-for-One has a further virtue:

(V4) The kinds extractable from (1-1(i)) and (1-1(ii)) underwrite explanations of why propositions are apt for certain manifesters, and not others.

Since One-for-One has virtue (V4) and a domain-free version of manifestation functionalism does not, it is worth trying to salvage domains.¹⁵

¹⁴Of course, it is difficult to say just where complete explanations terminate, and why. It is also difficult to say how many hairs someone must have to not be bald. Still, we can say with confidence that someone with hair down to their ankles is not bald. Likewise, we can say with confidence that a certain purported explanation is incomplete, even absent a final theory of explanatory completeness.

¹⁵An anonymous referee suggests that a virtue sufficiently similar to (V4) can be preserved without mentioning proposition-kinds or domains. The thought is that one could explain why a given proposition $\langle p \rangle$ is apt for a certain manifester and no other manifester

3.2 Solution: Multiple domain membership, but one manifester

To close, I will sketch a solution to the problem of mixed atomic propositions that retains domains. The guiding ideas behind the solution are first, that there are some concept-kinds K_1, \dots, K_n such that if $\langle p \rangle$ is composed of K_1 - or \dots , or K_n -concepts, then $\langle p \rangle$ cannot be true in virtue of representationally corresponding. Second, if $\langle p \rangle$ is composed of K_1 - or \dots , or K_n -concepts then $\langle p \rangle$'s manifester is an epistemic (e.g. coherence) property. Third, if $\langle p \rangle$ is not composed of K_1 - or \dots , or K_n -concepts, then $\langle p \rangle$'s manifester is representational correspondence. On this view, then, correspondence serves as a *default* manifester and other manifesters are introduced only to handle propositions that are truth-apt, but are incapable of corresponding.

To illustrate, consider 'Charlie is delicious,' where 'Charlie' is the name of a beet. This sentence is minimally truth-apt, and it presumably expresses $\langle \text{Charlie is delicious} \rangle$. $\langle \text{Charlie is delicious} \rangle$ is composed of the concept [deliciousness], which is plausibly non-representational. Thus, $\langle \text{Charlie is delicious} \rangle$ can't be true in virtue of representationally corresponding. This means that $\langle \text{Charlie is delicious} \rangle$ must be true, if it is, in virtue of instantiating another property. A plausible candidate is an epistemic, e.g. coherence, property.¹⁶

by citing facts only about the specific concepts composing $\langle p \rangle$, rather than any kinds that those concepts instance. Notice, however, that the suggested explanation is a bare determination claim: it has the form 'It is $\langle p \rangle$'s manifester because $\langle p \rangle$ is composed of concepts C_1, \dots, C_n .'

¹⁶An anonymous referee suggests that for manifestation functionalism to address the problem of mixed atomic propositions, it is only necessary that *some* manifester be a default manifester, not that representational correspondence, in particular, be the default manifester. Suppose, then, that an epistemic, coherence property is the default manifester: it manifests truth for $\langle p \rangle$ unless $\langle p \rangle$ is composed of concepts that render $\langle p \rangle$ incapable of cohering with other propositions. Are there any such concepts? It would seem that even propositions that are entirely composed of representational concepts are capable of cohering with other propositions. This means that if coherence were the default manifester, coherence would manifest truth even for thoroughly representational propositions, e.g. $\langle \text{Snow is solid} \rangle$. Treating coherence as the default manifester, then, seems to give the upper hand to monist, coherence theories of truth.

3.2.1 Questions about this solution

Finally, I will consider two illustrative questions about this proposal.

Question #1: To which domain does $\langle \text{Charlie is delicious} \rangle$ belong, then?

Answer: Every domain is *pure*—its membership-conditions specify a single kind of concept of which a proposition must be (at least partially) composed to be a member. $\langle \text{Charlie is delicious} \rangle$ is composed of two kinds of concepts, a ‘macroscopic object’ concept and a ‘taste-based’ concept, so it is a member of both the ‘macroscopic objects’ domain and the ‘taste-based’ domain. This is precisely the insight in David’s description of the problem of mixed atomic propositions: truth pluralists should not presuppose that every atomic proposition belongs to one and only one domain. It is also an insight that motivates Lynch’s recent de-emphasis of domains—though the de-emphasis is hasty, the insight is genuine. Lynch says ([20]: 16), “[T]here is no need for the pluralist to sort (atomic) propositions into strict domains. She takes each proposition as it comes, finding that, in fact, they come in groups, in bunches, in mobs.” Lynch’s second claim is exactly right: propositions must be taken as they come. Some come composed of concepts of things that instance different topics, so that is how they must be taken. But, they can still be sorted into strict (that is, well-defined) domains.

Question #2: Does the proposal preserve the virtues of One-for-One?

Answer: (1-1(i)) will be replaced by

M-1 (i) Domain $D = \text{domain } D'$ iff D exists and D' exists and there is a concept kind K such that $\langle p \rangle \in D$ iff $\langle p \rangle$ is (partially) composed of K -concepts and $\langle p' \rangle \in D'$ iff $\langle p' \rangle$ is (partially) composed of K -concepts.

(M-1 (i)) allows us to distinguish, for instance, the ‘macroscopic objects’ domain and the ‘taste-based’ domain, while allowing that $\langle \text{Charlie is delicious} \rangle$ is a member of both. The domains are distinct because a proposition composed only of taste-based concepts, e.g. $\langle \text{Deliciousness is awesome} \rangle$, is a member of the latter, but not the former.

The content of (1-1(ii)) and (1-1(iv)) will be retained as is. (1-1(iii)) will be replaced by (notice that there is no restriction to atomic propositions)

M-1 (iii) Every proposition essentially belongs to those domains of which it is a member.

The view that emerges can be called *Many (Domains)-One (Manifester)*, since it allows that mixed atomic propositions can belong to more than one domain, though each such proposition is assigned only one manifesters. Many-One, then, consists of the following four theses:

M-1 (i) Domain $D = \text{domain } D'$ iff D exists and D' exists and there is a concept kind K such that $\langle p \rangle \in D$ iff $\langle p \rangle$ is (partially) composed of K -concepts and $\langle p' \rangle \in D'$ iff $\langle p' \rangle$ is (partially) composed of K -concepts.

M-1 (ii) Concepts C and C' instance the same concept-kind K iff they bear the same relations R_1, \dots, R_n to things (objects, properties, relations) that instance the same topic

M-1 (iii) Every proposition essentially belongs to those domains of which it is a member.

M-1 (iv) Every atomic proposition is assigned a manifesters based upon its domain-membership.¹⁷

Many-One preserves (V1): proposition-kinds are extractable from (M-1 (i)) (given the assumption that there is at least one domain), with mixed atomic propositions instancing more than one such kind. (V2) is also preserved: domains are individuated as naturally as by manifestation functionalism. (M-1 (i)), like (1-1(i)), individuates domains according to the composition of their constituent propositions. (V3) is preserved: all atomic propositions, even mixed atomics, are still apt for only one manifesters. Lastly,

¹⁷Of course, a full statement of this view must also specify how manifesters are assigned to compound propositions. Since my focus here has been on atomic propositions, and because I think that Lynch (see [18]) has provided an essentially adequate explanation of how manifesters are assigned to compounds—*given* what is laid down in Many-One, especially its allowance of multiple domain-membership—I set compound propositions aside here.

since a proposition's aptitude for a certain manifester is explained by the fact that the proposition instances a certain kind, (V4) is preserved as well. Many-One, then, does preserve all of the virtues of One-for-One, and has a further virtue, as well:

(V5) The truth-conditions of all atomic propositions—mixed and unmixed—are explained.

In sum, I have argued for two main claims. The first is that domains are a vital detail of pluralist truth theories. The second is that the problem of mixed atomic propositions does not destabilize a suitably revised version of manifestation functionalism. Manifestation functionalism should allow for multiple domain membership and should treat representational correspondence as the default manifester. Doing so preserves the virtues of the Lynchian formulation of manifestation functionalism while providing a more satisfactory resolution of the problem of mixed atomic propositions.¹⁸

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