

Anselm and Derrida—An Unlikely Connection

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This essay suggests an unlikely encounter between the recent thinker of the deconstruction of speeches, Jacques Derrida, and the medieval constructor of theological speeches, Saint Anselm. The common motto is the idea of gift. The gift of the death of Christ in the economy of salvation is the target of Derrida's deconstruction. Anselm himself enables this. However, there is in Anselm's theology of Trinity a metaphysics of the gift of being and of being other, elaborated with regard to the procession of the Holy Spirit. And it is possible to submit the original gift of the Holy Spirit to the same kind of deconstruction, that is, of economic reduction, to which the gift of the death of Christ had been submitted. But both the construction and the deconstruction of the theology of gift resort to the same kind of analogy procedure. And economy does not enable us to think the gift as purely as does theology.

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1. The Gift in Question

Since in philosophy ideas do not fade with time, we bring to light a book from 1992 whose title drew our attention: *L'éthique du don*.¹ The book collects a group of texts dedicated to Jacques Derrida and begins with a text by this very 20th century philosopher, entitled "Donner la Mort."² In parallel, we too could collect a group of theological texts by Saint Anselm, and gather them under the broad designation "The metaphysics of the gift." Namely, the texts by the 11th century theologian on grace and the procession of the Holy Spirit,³ and in particular, Anselm's theology of the Holy Spirit could well be entitled "Giving being, the same and the other." Hence, there strikes us an unlikely connection between Jacques Derrida and Saint Anselm, between the philosopher of the deconstruction of speeches and the philosopher constructor of theological speeches: a connection which is neither forced appearance nor pure opposition.

Derrida's text "Donner la Mort" is a reflection in dialogue with another text, by Jan Patočka; a text on the meaning of European civilization⁴ and inherently so on the meaning of Christianity, the latter focused on the responsibility of the sacrificial gift of a death by the other. Derrida questions the authenticity of that gift, and, in quite a Nietzschean manner,⁵ redirects it to an economy of commercial trade between creditor and debtor. Such would be the sacrifice of Christ's life in the economy of salvation, that is, rather the settlement of a debt to the creditor than a gift for the debtor's sake. Now, there is here an incontrovertible connection with Saint Anselm, for this medieval theologian was the main responsible for topicalizing Christ's mission as the payment of a debt which man cannot settle. Obviously, though, Anselm does not do so to denounce any reduction of religion to economics. He does so with the philosophical purpose of finding the rationality in such a mission, thus

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befriending religion and reason. The fact is that Anselm's idea of a human debt settled by the death of Christ would, in the long run, give matter to arguments of contemporary atheism against faith in a creditor God and the illusory gift of the death of Christ. Because of this, many theologians do not forgive Anselm.

However, it is important not to reduce Anselm's Christology of *Cur Deus Homo* to the thesis of the settlement of a human debt. Given the asymmetry between man and God, this debt could be but a minor reason for any divine initiative. Saint Anselm was a Christian believer, but his theological thought was deeply enrooted in Ancient Greek philosophy,⁶ and this legacy did not allow him to conceive that the contingent imperfection of a caused reality, such as (that of) human (imperfection), was the determining reason for the action of a greater cause, such as God; a lesser cause does not act upon a greater one. Hence, man's moral debt could not be sufficient reason for the divine initiative of his salvation. A greater reason was required to understand the meaning of the life and death of Christ for the benefit of humanity: that reason is the necessity of perfection of the divine work of Creation. God, God the Creator, would not resign himself to leaving his work imperfect or unfinished, thus abandoning man to perdition; there was need to rescue him, to renew the Earth and to conclude the work of Creation. The perfection of the work of Creation, as a whole, is the greater reason for the salvation of man in the theology of *Cur Deus Homo*. Ultimately, Anselm's God, in his Christologic treaty, is not a creditor-God, rather an artist or artisan-God, who demands, for his own self-satisfaction, the perfection of his work.

Such is the result of Saint Anselm's search and order of reasons, in his attempt to rationalize the mystery of Incarnation and the sacrifice of the death of Christ; an attempt which our modern thought has had great difficulty in understanding; theology, because such an attempt gives argument to the deconstruction of Christianity as a religion; counter-theology, because such an attempt affects the originality of the critique, thus anticipating the motto of the reduction of religion to a commercial transaction, though devoid of a deconstructing intention.

In its own development, Anselm's Christology of *Cur Deus Homo* is characterized by the construction of an order of reasons for the necessity of the sacrificial death of Christ. Hence, Saint Anselm will have succeeded in ascribing meaning to a datum of his faith which had perhaps constituted one of the greatest challenges to his understanding. But the predominantly operative category in Anselm's rational construction is the one of necessity, not the one of gift. One has to go from Christology to the theology of Trinity in order to find the meaning of an unconditioned gift, though not without a significant critical reservation with regard to the idea of gift.

2. The Gift in Theology

The first chapter of Anselm's theology of Trinity is, so to say, the theology of the Verb. However, the generation of the Verb is still understandable under the sign of necessity. According to an assertion from the author of *Cur Deus Homo*—"the will of God is never irrational"⁷—the God of Anselm's faith is also a reason-God, which means that it is a self-cognoscitive God and that hence it says itself in his own wisdom. Therefore, the divine Verb is necessary through the self-cognoscitive essence of God.⁸ However, in the generation of the divine Verb, there is already a gift of being: the being same of the Father, that is, divine essence; and the being other of the Son, that is, of the first person proceeding in Trinity. But this metaphysics of the gift of being, once applied to trinitary relations, is only explained with regard to the theology of the Holy Spirit.

The topicalization of the procession of the Holy Spirit through the idea of gift was a heritage of Saint Augustine, in a work well-known to Saint Anselm: *De Trinitate*. According to this heritage, the Holy Spirit is to be the gift of God in Trinity, which is why the divine name *donum Dei* is a relative name of the Holy Spirit, that is, it signifies not that which is common to the three divine persons, but the relational unicity of the third person of the Trinity.⁹ Indeed, this unicity of the Holy Spirit as gift of God expresses the difference of the procession of the third divine person in relation to the generation of the Son; quite differently from the Son, which proceeds according to the modality of generation (*quomodo natus*), the Holy Spirit proceeds according to the modality of gift (*quomodo natus*).¹⁰ However, Saint Anselm subtly diverges from Saint Augustine by not applying the notion of gift to the understanding of the difference of procession of the Holy Spirit.

The author of the *Monologion* is committed to ratifying the property of the use of the verbs *nasci* and *gigni* in order to signify the difference of the generation of the Son, but he neither uses nor ratifies the use of the verb *dari* in order to signify the difference of the procession of the Holy Spirit.¹¹ Departing from Augustine, Anselm resumes the conception of the Holy Spirit as unitive love of the Father and the Son, based on the quite Augustinian analogy of mental trinity,¹² but not the sense of the unicity of the Holy Spirit as gift of the Father and the Son. Even though Anselm concedes, along with Augustine, that the Holy Spirit is gift of the Father and the Son, this gift of procession is not that which is characteristic of the Holy Spirit, rather it is that which is common to the Son and the Holy Spirit, inasmuch as the gift of procession in God has a unique content: the divine essence. The gift of procession in God is the gift of essence itself, and this gift is common to the two only divine processions. Hence, the notion of gift is better suited to represent that which is common to the generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit than to represent that which is characteristic of the latter. This is why Saint Anselm also describes generation in terms of a gift of divine essence from the Father to the Son, by interpreting the text of the Gospel of St. John (5, 26).¹³

But if gift in God is the same as procession, how to describe the difference of the procession of the Holy Spirit? While the procession of the second divine person is conceptually differentiated through the idea of generation, and is enunciable through the verbs *nasci* and *gigni* and the name *nativitas*, due to the parental kinship,¹⁴ the procession of the third divine person is differentiated by negation, that is, because it is not a generation; for it is evident, as is underlined by Anselm, that love is son or offspring to no one.¹⁵ In Anselm's theology, the procession of the Holy Spirit does not obtain conceptual expression for its difference, as the one which Saint Augustine had proposed with the notion of gift. In the *Monologion*, the theologian still suggests the verbal form *spirare* in order to distinguish the procession of love in God, yet noting that it is not as is ours, the extraordinary and ineffable divine *spirare*.¹⁶ In fact, dissimilitude is here greater than similitude towards producing theological analogy. In human respiration, there is an inspiration, which is an apprehension, not an emission or exit, and there is an expiration, which is a breath, but also the rejection of a waste. Death itself, as opposed to life, is phenomenically a breath, the last exhalation of life. Unlike human exhalation, divine breath is vivifying whether in the creation of man or Trinity itself. Perhaps for that reason, though he does not explain it as such, Anselm dropped the verb *spirare* in order to say the difference of the procession of the Holy Spirit. In the treaty devoted to this procession, *De Processione Spiritus Sancti*, the theologian does not ascribe it a specific notion and designation, as those which consign the relation of origin of the Son, rather insists on the singularity and the ineffability of the relation of origin of the Holy Spirit.¹⁷

However, Anselm does not exempt himself from thinking the ineffable, by interpreting divine names which are recurrent in biblical texts and may be applied to the Holy Spirit, such as *spiritus dei*, *spiritus patris*,

and *spiritus filii*. These three names have in common two components: the name *spiritus* and a complementary relation of belonging, which we may designate through the pronominal genitive *alicuius*, and which is triply determined by the nominal genitives *dei*, *patris*, and *filii*. Which complementary relation is this? This is not a relation of possession (*possessio*) as is that which is signified by the expressions *equus alicuius* or *domus alicuius*; for in a relation of possession, the possessor is superior to the possessed.¹⁸ Now, in Trinity, the Holy Spirit is not inferior to God, nor is it to the Father, nor is it to the Son. Neither is it a composition as is that which is signified by the expressions *manus hominis* or *pes hominis*, for in God there is no composition,¹⁹ once one assumes the principle that the simple surmounts the composite.²⁰ Possession and composition are possible versions of the relation *alicuius*, but they are not the only ones, and in the context of the theology of Trinity Anselm considers eligible but the relation of origin (*ex aliquo*): “In what way must it be understood that the Spirit is of God but because that which is, is from God?”²¹ This relation of origin is the very divine procession of the Holy Spirit: The Spirit is of God only because it proceeds from God.

Divine procession, which is the relation of origin in God, is, as we have seen, a gift of divine essence or the very substance of God. Insofar, procession in God is the gift of being the same, that is, the gift of being the same as God, the gift of being common to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. However, “Someone can be understood as other by relation to someone, before being of him, though he cannot be of someone without being other.”²² That is, the relation of belonging (*alicuius*) presupposes the constitution of an alterity (*alius*). The Spirit cannot be of God, of the Father and the Son, if it is not somehow other in God. And since the relation of belonging in God is to be understood only by the relation of origin which is divine procession, the very procession must also originate an alterity: that which distinguishes from one another the persons of the Trinity. Divine procession is not just the gift of being the same as God, that is, the gift of essence; it is also the gift of being other, that is, the gift of inter-personal difference. In God, procession is, in a word, a double gift of being and being other: of being divine essence and being another person.

3. The Reduction of the Gift in Question

The double gift of being and being other, which is divine procession, not only does not oppose but it agrees with some fundamental principles which govern the relations of origin in Anselm’s metaphysics.²³ First and foremost, the irreflexivity principle of the relation of origin, according to which nothing originates itself,²⁴ and in conformity with which God is not cause of itself. In truth, Saint Anselm refuses the conception of God as *causa sui*, thus agreeing with Saint Augustine and the later scholastic theologians. The relation of origin always creates difference between an originant and an originated: This much is said in the principle of difference between the terms of the relation of origin, which is also applied to the differentiation of the persons of Trinity, according to their respective processions.²⁵ The relation of origin is not reciprocal, according to the principle of asymmetry which governs it, according to which, in turn, an originant cannot have origin in its originated, nor can the originated originate its originant,²⁶ and such is the case also in divine procession.

The relation of origin always creates some kind of order, as is the superiority of cause over effect in causal relation, though this order is not discernible in the procession in God, which is a gift of the very divine essence which renders originant and originated essentially equal to one another. However, there is an order constituted by the relation of origin, even when there is essential equality between originant and originated: namely, the primacy of the being over the being other, according to which it is not because the being other is originated that the being is originated, rather it is because the being is originated that the being other is originated. Nothing can

be other without first and foremost being.²⁷ In the language of the gift, which is akin to the theology of Trinity, it is not by the gift of being other that the being is given, rather it is by the gift of being that the being other is given. The gift of being other is somehow preceded by the gift of being. In other words, the difference comes with the being. It is in conformity with this principle of the primacy of the being over the being other that Anselm conceives the procession in God, first and foremost, as a gift of divine essence through which the alterity of the proceeding person is constituted. With the priority of the common essence of Trinity in the procession of each divine person, the 11th century theologian defends the justness of the Latin formula *filioque* of the procession of the Holy Spirit, in the question which divided Latins and Greeks in the theology of his time.

The four aforementioned principles enunciate properties of the relations of origin in general—irreflexivity, difference between originant and originated, asymmetry and primacy of the being over the being other—which integrate a metaphysics of the gift suited to the theology of Trinity. Such is, indeed, Anselm's proposition of a metaphysics of the gift, which is framed in the general metaphysics of the relations of origin and allows for some topicalization of the procession in God. Again it is Anselm, in a rationalizing attempt—or temptation—who distinguishes this. Yet now one must question, as would Derrida: Is this really a gift?

Saint Anselm is not acritical with regard to the language he uses in his theological approach of the procession of the Holy Spirit. He himself questions the meaning of gift in this theological context. Evidently, this is not a gift which is to fulfill a previous need, for in God there is no necessity of deprivation. Also it is not a gift that establishes an order of superiority of giver over gift, since the gift in God cannot be but a gift from God to God, from equal to equal, or between equals. Perhaps due to these reasons, Anselm inhibits the use of the name *donum* in the theology of Processions, although he accepts the verbs *dare*, *accipere*, and *habere* in order to periphrastically translate the meaning of divine procession as gift, thus adopting terms suggested by the text of John's Gospel (Jo 5, 26). The meaning of procession as gift is not, in truth, that of a common donation, rather it is a gift from equal to equal and unconditioned by no need or insufficiency intrinsic to the divine being: It is a gift in its plenitude.

The medieval theologian questions the meaning of gift in order to sublime it to the level of the theology of Trinity. We may attempt to question it in order to reduce it to the level of economy, in accord with the deconstructing pulsion of Jacques Derrida's thought, preceded and nourished by Nietzsche, the father of modern deconstructions. And if so, what result would we obtain? Perhaps the reduction of the theological idea of gift-procession to a hereditary transmission of agrarian goods, which was a transaction between equals in the order of social states, as was characteristic of feudal economy. Reductions such as these are analogies in order to deconstruct theological thought. Medieval theologians also resorted to analogy, but they did so in order to construct theological thought. Analogy is, in fact, an operative procedure which, by detecting similitudes and differences, provides the establishment of connections and distinctions which stretch the mesh of thought. Through the same procedure, the mesh of thought may just as well extend to the side of construction as to the side of deconstruction of thought. We prefer the first, while acknowledging the complementary necessity of the second in order to prevent the dogmatization of the constructions of thought.

Economy enables us to think the possession of land, and the relation with land is without a doubt a human bond of greater relevance and of a non-strictly economic nature. But to think the possession of being, which is not an expendable possession; and to think the gift of being in its plenitude, unconditioned by no insufficiency; and to think the gift of alterity regardless of any dynamic of opposition: Can economy make us think all this?

Perhaps speculative theology should be restituted the role of expanding the possibilities of the construction of thought beyond those human interests and illusions which no discipline of thought may avoid reflecting. We, for our part, philosophically believe in the path of critical self-improvement of thought and do not see theology outside of that path.

Notes

1. Rabaté & Wetzel (Orgs.), 1992.
2. Rabaté & Wetzel (Orgs.), 1992, 11-108.
3. Namely, *De Concordia praescientiae et praedestinationis et gratiae dei cum libero arbitrio*, on grace, and *De processione spiritus sancti*, on the origin of the Holy Spirit.
4. Patočka, 1981.
5. As Derrida himself repeatedly assumes at the end of his text: Donner la mort, in Rabaté & Wetzel (Orgs.), 1992, 105-8.
6. A thesis which we assume in the line of Alexandre Koiré, 1923, and which we defend with special emphasis in “Anselm’s Metaphysics in the Lineage of Parmenides: *nihil est per nihil*” (Xavier 2016), a work which we end by acknowledging Saint Anselm as “the medieval Parmenides.”
7. “Voluntas namque dei numquam est irrationabilis” *Cur Deus Homo* I, 8, ed. Schmitt II: 59; 11, in Corbin (Dir.), 1988, 324.
8. See *Monologion* 32, ed. Schmitt: I, 50-51, in Corbin (Dir.), 1986, 130-2. Henceforth: *Mon*.
9. “Sed tamen ille Spiritus sanctus qui non Trinitas, sed in Trinitate intelligitur, in eo quod proprie dicitur Spiritus sanctus, relative dicitur, cum et ad Patrem et ad Filium refertur, quia Spiritus sanctus et Patris et Filii Spiritus est. Sed ipsa relatio non apparet in hoc nomine; apparet autem cum dicitur donum Dei (Act. 8, 20): donum enim est Patris et Filii, quia et ‘a Patre procedit’ (Joan. 15, 26), sicut Dominus dicit; et quod Apostolus ait: ‘Qui Spiritum Christi non habet, hic non est ejus’ (Rom. 8, 9), de ipso utique sancto Spiritu ait. Donum ergo donatoris, et donator doni, cum dicimus, relative utrumque ad invicem dicimus.” *De Trinitate* V, 11; 12, Benedictine ed., in *Études Augustiniennes* (Dir.), 1955, 452. Henceforth: *DT*.
10. “Utrum autem et ad Spiritum sanctum principium sit Pater, quoniam dictum est ‘de Patre procedit,’ non parva quaestio est. Quia si ita est, non jam principium ei tantum rei erit quam gignit aut facit, sed etiam ei quam dat. Ubi et illud elucescit, ut potest, quod solet multos movere, cur non Filius sit etiam Spiritus sanctus, cum et ipse a Patre exeat, sicut in Evangelio legitur (Joan. 15, 26). Exiit enim, non quomodo natus, sed quomodo datus; et ideo non dicitur filius, quia nequenatus est sicut Unigenitus, neque factus ut per Dei gratiam in adoptionem nasceretur, sicuti nos.” *DT* V, 14-15.
11. See *Mon* 39, Schmitt: I, 57, 13-19, in Corbin (Dir.), 1986, 144.
12. “Palam certe est rationem habenti eum non idcirco sui memorem esse aut se intelligere quia se amat, sed ideo se amare quia sui meminit et se intelligit; nec eum se posse amare, si sui non sit memor aut se non intelligat... Patet igitur amorem summi spiritus ex eo procedere, quia sui memor est et se intelligit. Quod si in memoria summi spiritus intelligitur pater, in intelligentia filius: manifestum est quia a patre pariter et filio summi spiritus amor procedit.” *Mon* 50, Schmitt: I, 65; 3-6; 7-10, in Corbin (Dir.), 1986, 160.
13. “Nequaquam enim repugnant, ut filius et per se subsistat et de patre habeat esse. ‘Sicut enim pater habet’ essentiam et sapientiam et ‘vitam in semetipso,’ ut non per alienam sed per suam essentiam sit, per suam sapientiam sapiat, per suam vitam vivat: ‘ita’ gignendo ‘dat filio habere’ essentiam et sapientiam et ‘vitam in semetipso’ (Joh. 5, 26), ut non per extraneam sed per suam essentiam, sapientiam et vitam subsistat, sapiat et vivat.” *Mon* 44, Schmitt: I, 60; 27; 61; 1-6, in Corbin (Dir.), 1986, 150; 152.
14. “Cum igitur pateat verbum summi spiritus sic esse ex ipso solo, ut perfectam eius quasi proles parentis teneat similitudinem, nec sic esse ex ipso solo, ut fiat ab eo: profecto nullo modo convenientius cogitari potest ex illo quam nascendo.” *Mon* 39, Schmitt: I, 57; 9-12, in Corbin (Dir.), 1986, 144; “Quod si convenientissime dicitur nasci, et tam simile est illi de quo nascitur: cur aestimetur simile quasi proles parenti, et non potius asseratur quia tanto verior est ille parens et istud proles, quanto magis et ille ad huius nativitatis perfectionem solus sufficit, et quod nascitur eius similitudinem exprimit? Namque in rebus aliis quas parentis prolesque certum est habitudinem habere, nulla sic gignit, ut omnino nullius indigens sola per se ad gignendam prolem sufficiat; nulla sic gignitur, ut nulla admixta dissimilitudine omnimodam similitudinem parentis exhibeat.” *Mon* 40, Schmitt: I, 57; 22-28; 58; 1, in Corbin (Dir.), 1986, 144; 146.
15. “Solemus enim saepe dicere aliquid gigni ex ea re de qua existit; ut cum dicimus calorem aut splendorem gigni ab igne, seu aliquod effectum ex causa sua. Secundum hanc igitur rationem amor a summo spiritu exiens non omnino asseri potest ingenitus. Ita vero proprie sicut verbum dici genitus non potest, quia verbum verissimam esse prolem et verissimum filium, amorem vero nullatenus filium aut prolem esse manifestum est.” *Mon* 56, Schmitt: I, 67; 26-27; 68; 1-4, in Corbin (Dir.), 1986, 164; 166.
16. “Pater autem pariter et filius non faciunt neque gignunt, sed quodam modo si sic dici potest spirant suum amorem. Quamvis enim non nostro modo spiret summe incommutabilis essentia, tamen ipsum suum amorem a se ineffabiliter procedentem non discedendo ab illa sed existendo ex illa, forsitan non alio modo videtur posse dici aptius ex se emittere quam spirando.” *Mon* 57, Schmitt: I, 68; 21-26, in Corbin (Dir.), 1986, 166; “Quod si dici potest: sicut verbum summa eessentiae filius est eius, ita eiusdem

amor satis convenienter appellari potest spiritus eius. Ut cum essentialiter ipse sit spiritus sicut pater et filius, illi non putentur alicuius spiritus, quia nec pater ab ullo alio est, nec filius a patre quasi spirante nascitur, iste autem aestimetur spiritus utriusque, quia ab utroque suo quodam inenarrabili modo spirante mirabiliter procedit.” *Mon* 57, Schmitt: I, 69; 1-6, in Corbin (Dir.), 1986, 168.

17. “Quoniam tamen verum est filium esse de patre et spiritum sanctum de patre et filio, si suo ineffabili quodam modo intelligitur—quoniam aliter proferri nequit—dici non incongrue potest pater quodam modo principium filii et pater et filius principium spiritus sancti... quamvis de eodem deo sive de eodem principio suo quisque modo sit, alter scilicet nascendo, alter procedendo—si quodam singulari et ineffabili modo intelligitur ista processio. Processio namque multis modis dicitur, de quibus iste solitarie intelligitur, sicut nativitas filii singularis cognoscitur.” *De processione spiritus sancti* 10, ed. Schmitt: II, 206; 4-8; 11-15, in Corbin (Dir.), 1990, 278. Henceforth: *Proc*.

18. “Certum est autem quia non dicitur spiritus dei sicut possessio, ut cum dicitur equus alicuius vel domus alicuius. Maior enim est qui possidet quam quod possidetur.” *Proc* 12, Schmitt: II, 209; 22-24, in Corbin (Dir.), 1990, 284.

19. “Neque dicitur spiritus dei ut membrum dei, sicut manus vel pes hominis. Non enim deus habet membrum aut partem ullam.” *Proc* 12, Schmitt: II, 209; 26; 210; 1, in Corbin (Dir.), 1990, 284; 286.

20. See *Epistola de incarnatione verbi* 4, ed. Schmitt: II, 17-18, in Corbin (Dir.), 1988, 224-6.

21. “Quomodo ergo intelligendus est spiritus esse dei, nisi quia hoc quod est ex deo est?” *Proc* 12, Schmitt: II, 210; 1-2, in Corbin (Dir.), 1990, 286.

22. “Potest enim intelligi aliquis alius ab aliquo, priusquam sit illius, quamvis alicuius nequeat esse, nisi sit alius.” *Proc* 2, Schmitt: II, 187; 8-9, in Corbin (Dir.), 1990, 240.

23. According to the analysis undertaken by Xavier, 1999, 410-501.

24. “Nihil quippe per seipsum fieri potest, quia quidquid fit, posterius est eo per quod fit, et nihil est posterius seipso.” *Mon* 29, Schmitt: I, 47; 16-18, in Corbin (Dir.), 1986, 124.

25. “Quippe nec natura permittit nec intellectus capit existentem de aliquo esse de quo existit; aut de quo existit esse existentem de se.” *Proc* 1, Schmitt: II, 182; 2-4, in Corbin (Dir.), 1990, 230.

26. “Ut vero plura per se invicem sint, nulla patitur ratio, quoniam irrationabilis cogitation est, ut aliqua res sit per illud, cui dat esse.” *Mon* 3, Schmitt: I, 16; 10-12, in Corbin (Dir.), 1986, 62.

27. “Contingit enim aliquem esse quod est, priusquam sit alius, et contingit aliquem alium in existendo fieri; prius autem quemquam esse alium, quam sit hoc quod est, non est possibile.” *Proc* 2, Schmitt: II, 187; 21-23, in Corbin (Dir.), 1986, 240.

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