Abstract
Extreme formalism is a radical and important position in the aesthetics of inorganic nature. Zangwill offers a new formulation of what formal aesthetic properties are, according to which a formal aesthetic property of a thing is an aesthetic property that is determined merely by its appearance properties. An appearance property of a thing is the way it seems if perceived under certain conditions. With the notion of formal aesthetic properties formulated as such, extreme formalism, the claim that all aesthetic properties of inorganic things are formal, says that all aesthetic properties of inorganic things are determined merely by their appearance properties. Recently, Zangwill defends extreme formalism by deflecting the famous counter-example of the cumulonimbus cloud given by Budd, and argues for extreme formalism by arguing against the idea of the existence of non-formal beauty in inorganic nature. In this paper, we argue that both his defense and positive arguments are not successful. If our arguments are right, the burden of proof is still on Zangwill’s side.
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Notes
Levinson suggests that we appreciate music by recalling. He says, “the simplest phenomenon of this sort is that in which in the course of listening, some bit or passage currently being heard recalls another bit or passage, from earlier in a piece, leading a listener to recognize the connection involved and contemplate it as such.” (Levinson 1997: 53) However, the case here is different, since when we know that the cloud is a thunder cloud, only the temporal part A exists. So, it seems that in order to introduce B and C, Zangwill needs to appeal to imagination.
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Acknowledgments
We wish to thank an anonymous referee for critical comments. We are grateful to Ruoyu Zhang, David Rose, and Simon Goldstein for helpful discussions. Special thanks to Nick Zangwill and Jonathan Schaffer for their insightful detailed suggestions.
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Xu, M., Deng, G. Against Zangwill’s Extreme Formalism About Inorganic Nature. Philosophia 43, 249–257 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-014-9575-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-014-9575-1