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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 February 2013
After the end of World War II, East Asia gradually formed what can be referred to as a quasi-anarchical regional order. The quasi-anarchy system is defined by the anarchy system associated with a sub-hierarchical system, so this system possesses the characteristics of both anarchy and hierarchy in terms of security relations among states. The states in a quasi-anarchical order can be differentiated into three types according to the method through which they seek security. They comprise that of self-help states, the state that provides security guarantees to client states (security guarantor), and states that receive security protection from the security guarantor (client states) within the quasi-anarchy. The standard security relationship between states consists of two types: the first is a competitive security relationship; the second is a security-dependent relationship. The quasi-anarchical order in East Asia has restricted the continuance and positive effect of a rising China's reassurance policy through three mechanisms: dependence, reliance on support, and imitation.
This article is the revised version of the author's Chinese piece. [Sun Xuefeng, “Dongya zhunwuzhengfu zhixu yu Zhongguo de Dongya anquan zhengce” (“Quasi-anarchic Order in East Asian and China's East Asian Security Policy”), Waijiao pinglun (Foreign Affairs Review), No. 6 (2011)]. The author would like to express his sincere thanks to the following scholars for their critical comments and suggestions for revisions: Chen Hanxi, Chen Zhirui, Gao Cheng, Chikako Ueki Kawakatsu, Takashi Inoguchi, Lin Minwang, Liu Feng, Chisako Masuo, Key-young Son, Tang Shiping, Wu Wencheng, Xu Jin, Yan Liang, Yang Yuan, Zhang Ruizhuang, Zhou Fangyin.
1 In this article, East Asian states refer to China, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, ASEAN states, and the United States.
2 On the proposal of China's policy, see Wen Jiabao, ‘China's Development and the Revitalization of Asia’, speech at the ASEAN Business and Investment Summit, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/pds/gjhdq/gjhdqzz/lhg_14/zyjh/t27173.htm. China's policy of ‘bringing harmony, security and prosperity to neighbors’ is actually the same as reassurance policies as discussed in international relations theory. Theoretically speaking, a reassurance policy refers to efforts by one state to the fears that other states have with respect to its intentions (capabilities) in principle and practice. See Shiping, Tang, A Theory of Security Strategy for Our Times: Defensive Realism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 132.Google Scholar For the sake of simplicity, this article uses the term reassurance policy to refer to China's policy of ‘friendship, peace and security between neighbors’.
3 On China's reassurance policy towards ASEAN states, see Shambaugh, David, ‘China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order’, International Security, 29, 3 (2004 /05): 64–99CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Xuefeng, Sun, ‘Why Does China Reassure South-East Asia’, Pacific Focus, 24, 3 (2009): 298–316.Google Scholar
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6 The core objective of China's reassurance strategy is to weaken concerns on the part of other states in the region related to the rise in Chinese power, to lessen security pressures on China to the greatest extent possible, and to maintain an advantageous regional security environment. As such, the means by which this article considers the effectiveness of China's reassurance policy is by looking to see whether China's security pressures are increasing. Specifically, this might include: actions by states in strengthening their sovereign territorial claims; or strategic adjustments or measures taken in response to China.
7 International Crisis Group, ‘Stirring up the South China Sea (II): Regional Responses’, Asian Report No. 229, 24 July 2012, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/north-east-asia/229-stirring-up-the-south-china-sea-ii-regional-responses.
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14 See Waltz, Kenneth, Theory of International Politics (Beijing: Peiking University Press, 2004, reprint edition)Google Scholar, chapter 5; Mearshiemer, John, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001)Google Scholar, chapter 2; Robert Art and Jervis, Robert, ‘Anarchy and Its Consequences’, in Art, Robert and Jervis, Robert (eds.), International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues (New York: Longman, 1999), pp. 2–4.Google Scholar
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16 It is important to point out that these states continue to exhibit the behaviors of independent sovereign states in the areas of trade and finance. For example, Japan is dependent on the US in terms of security, and in this area it is a classic client state; in the economic and financial realms, Japan continues to maintain its own clearly independent position.
17 For the hierarchy in international relations, see Lake, David, Hierarchy in International Relations (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009).Google Scholar
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24 Manuel Mogato and Stuart Grudgings, ‘Philippines May Ask for US Spy Planes over South China Sea’, 2 July 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/02/us-philippines-aquino-southchina-idUSBRE8610H020120702.
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26 Both anonymous reviewers of this revised version challenge the relevance of the quasi-anarchy to explain the success and failure of China's policy. I fully understand their concerns and agree with them that the structural factor cannot fully explain the failure of a policy in real life. The aim of this article is precisely to identify the mechanisms that the regional structure constrains on the efficiency China's regional reassurance policies and explore the strategic efficiency of China's reassurance policy under the quasi-anarchical order. For the explanation based on China's strategy, see Sun Xuefeng, ‘The Efficiency of China's Multilateral Policies in East Asia (1997–2007)’, pp. 515–41.
27 US AP, Manila Cable, 3 April 2004, cited in Zemin, Zheng, Nanhai wenti zhong de daguo yinsu (Great Power Elements of the South China Sea Issue) (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2010), p. 85.Google Scholar
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30 Thanks to Dr. Liu Feng for his reminder.
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35 In the case of the dispute over the South China Sea, the imitation mechanism is less evident. China's involvement in the Korean nuclear issue can provide more evidence of this, and for more on this see Sun Xuefeng, ‘The Efficiency of China's Multilateral Policies in East Asia (1997–2007)’, pp. 528–31.
36 Ibid., pp. 266–7.
37 Ibid., p. 266.
38 ‘In the Face of the Asian Financial Crisis, China Adopts Positive Policy’, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/pds/ziliao/wjs/t8973.htm.
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46 Ibid., p. 170.
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58 ‘Speaker of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ma Chaoxu Holds Routine Press Conference’, 12 May 2009, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/gxh/tyb/fyrbt/jzhsl/t561871.htm.
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64 ‘Joint Statement of the 2ND US– ASEAN Leaders Meeting’, 24 September 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/09/24/joint-statement-2nd-us-asean-leaders-meeting.
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80 ‘Hillary Clinton Attempts in Vain to use International Law to Contain China; Claims that the South China Sea should be Handled According to Topography’, 24 July 2011, http://world.people.com.cn/GB/15230111.html.
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