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Hume's View of ‘Is-ought’

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 January 2009

D. C. Yalden-Thomson
D. C. Yalden-Thomson
Affiliation:
University of Virginia
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Extract

I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an observation, which may, perhaps, be found of some importance. In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention wou'd subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceiv'd by reason.

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy , Volume 53 , Issue 203 , January 1978 , pp. 89 - 93
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1978

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References

1 It is not possible to present an exegesis of his views without including a number of quotations. For the convenience of readers, references to interpretations of Hume's views have been confined where possible to The is-ought question, ed. Hudson, W. D., London, 1969CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Quotations from Hume are from Selby-Bigge, 's edition of the TreatiseGoogle Scholar (T.) and the Enquiries (E.), unless otherwise stated.

2 The is-ought question. Ed. Hudson, W. D.. London. 1969. p. 35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3 Ibid., p. 59.

4 Ibid., p. 120.

5 Ibid., pp. 176, 181.

6 Ibid., p. 46.

7 Ibid., p. 56.

8 See ‘Hume's Law’, by Grice, G. R. and Edgley, R.. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. XLIV, 1970Google Scholar. ‘Hume himself… presents his doctrine as a general doctrine about the difference in meaning between “ought” and “is”…’, p. 115.

9 E.g., recently Henze, D. F., Philosophy, 07, 1973.Google Scholar

10 T. 477. My italics.

11 T. 498.

12 T. 517.

13 Hudson, ., pp. 60–61.Google Scholar

14 T. 472.

15 E. 173, 294.

16 T. 581–2.

17 This is reflected in Hume's letter to SirDick, Alexander of 27 08 1760Google Scholar. ‘…Impartiality; a State of Mind, which I have always endeavoured to bring myself to, and which, tho' I hop'd to attain it by my total Freedom from particular Interests and Attachments, I am yet uncertain how far I have been able to reach’.

18 T. 474.

19 T. 468. My italics in the last sentence.

20 Hudson, , p. 66.Google Scholar

21 It is difficult to understand what Mr. Hudson means by saying that, in Hume, ‘moral judgements [are] statements of objective, non-natural fact’. Ibid. p.75.