Abstract
This paper takes a conceptual look at cosmopolitanism and the related issue of what it means to be human in order to arrive at an alternative conceptual framework which is free from empiricist assumptions. With reference to a discussion on Homer’s Iliad, the author develops a ‘humanist’ model of discerning humanity. This model is then compared and contrasted with Martha Nussbaum’s version of cosmopolitanism. The notion of ‘aspect-seeing’ discussed by Wittgenstein in the second part of the Philosophical Investigations is also examined in order to shed light on what it involves to discern humanity. Finally, racism is discussed from the philosophical perspective elaborated in order to highlight its distinctive conceptual features. It is hoped that this paper can refocus our attention on important issues concerning the basis of what it means to see human beings as human beings.
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Notes
A recent conference on cosmopolitanism has this passage in its own web-page: ‘Cosmopolitanism says that the moral standing of all people is equal. One should not give preference to one’s compatriots, co-religionists, demographic identity groups, generational groups, or gender.’ (‘Questioning Cosmopolitanism’ organized by the Second Biennial Conference of the International Global Ethics Association.)
This explains why it is possible to make the claim that a statesman such as Metternich has a cosmopolitan outlook in the sense that he has a vision of a kind of polity which can transcend the pre-existing national boundaries.
Cf. The discussion and analysis on the distinctions between cosmopolitan, liberal and communitarian perspectives in Scheffler 1999. Scheffler’s own stance on cosmopolitanism takes it to consist in a doctrine about justice and a doctrine about culture and the self. Cosmopolitanism about justice can be expressed in terms of a principle that is opposed to ‘any view that posits principled restrictions on the scope of an adequate conception of justice’ (P. 255) while cosmopolitanism about culture is basically a claim emphasising the fluidity of cultures. Understood in this way, cosmopolitanism about justice led Scheffler to discuss the validity of cosmopolitanism in relation to the issue of special obligations. While Scheffler’s formulation of cosmopolitanism about justice can be termed ‘cosmopolitan’, one of the themes in this paper is the suggestion that understanding cosmopolitanism in terms of principles risks obscuring the nature of cosmopolitanism as an ethical sensitivity which can only be developed through a cultural process where the ability to discern humanity is acquired.
For a survey of cosmopolitanism in antiquity, see Brown 2006.
For a discussion on the philosophical issues related to empiricism in the context of the social sciences, see Trigg 2001, esp. pp. 1–22.
A relevant case here is Doris and Stich 2005. Although Doris and Stich do not mention empiricism in their article, their empirical perspective on ethics appears to be very close to empiricism. In the introductory section of the article, they write: ‘Our point is not that reference to empirical literatures can be expected, by itself, to resolve debates in moral theory. Rather, we hope to convince the reader that these literatures are often deeply relevant to important debates, and it is therefore intellectually irresponsible to ignore them. Sometimes empirical findings seem to contradict what particular disputing parties assert or presuppose, while in other cases, they appear to reconfigure the philosophical topography, revealing that certain lines of argument must traverse empirically difficult terrain. Often, philosophers who follow these challenging routes will be forced to make additional empirical conjectures, and these conjectures, in their turn, must be subject to empirical scrutiny. The upshot, we conclude, is that an intellectually responsible philosophical ethics is one that continuously engages the relevant empirical literature.’ (P. 116.) In this article Doris and Stich focus on a number of philosophical perspectives on character, moral motivation, moral disagreement and thought experiments. By arguing that since the philosophical perspectives in question involve (implicit) empirical claims, the authors conclude that the philosophers putting forward such perspectives must respond to the empirical literatures. See also the relevant discussion on character in Goldie 2004, esp. Chapter Three, ‘The Fragility of Character’, pp. 52–77.
See Winch’s remarks on history in Winch 1958.
Whether my analysis here deserves to be understood as reflecting the fact-value distinction merits some explanation. I hesitate to accept the fact-value distinction since such a distinction seems to implicitly endorse certain assumptions which are fundamentally empiricist. For a discussion on the value-fact distinction (or the ‘Is-ought’ distinction) in the context of the social sciences, see Root 1993, esp. chapter 9, ‘The fact/value distinction’, pp. 205–28.
To forestall misunderstanding, note that my claim here about the ability to see human beings as human beings is essentially a claim about human perception: it does not deny the fact that human perception has to have some material basis.
This seems to be a particularly tricky matter because it is difficult to gauge how far Homer would expect his audience to bring with them their knowledge of myths and legends in their appreciation of the Iliad itself.
See Winch 1958, pp. 86–91.
To highlight the potential ethical problem related to using species membership as the criterion of what it means to be human, consider the disturbing coexistence of the recognition of biological species membership and unethical treatment of human beings. The use of human beings as experimental subjects in Nazi concentration camps such as Dachau can serve as an example here: the use of human subjects is precisely premised on the belief that since the subjects belong to the same species as the target population, the experimental findings are therefore validated.
For a discussion on whether there is a common humanity which is a part of a common reality, see Trigg 2004.
Cf. Aristotle’s claim that ‘he who by nature and not by mere accident is without a state [apolis], is either a creature inferior or superior to humanity’. (Politics, Book I, section 2.)
One may make a similar move here by considering whether Kantianism, which focuses primarily on the rationality of human beings, can accommodate the kind of cosmopolitanism I am advocating here. For, equipped with the understanding that all human beings are rational persons in the abstract, this kind of Kantian would consider coming to know an individual’s actual cultural background or personal history as something superfluous and lacking in any intrinsic value. The conceptual tension here has also been discussed in the writing of Clifford Geertz. See Geertz 1973, esp. pp. 33–54. I would like to thank P. J. Ivanhoe for drawing my attention to these issues.
See Gaita 2002, ‘The Honour of Corpses’, pp. 85–94.
If my analysis here is sound, it follows that despite the absence of the utilitarian way of reasoning, a consistent cosmopolitan needs to face the ethical issue whether the scope of ethical concern should extend to non-human species since the notion of clear species boundaries is not available to the cosmopolitan. I owe this observation to Andy Dobson.
Such a form of utilitarianism has been discussed and criticised in Diamond 1978, pp. 319–34. By using the phenomena of eating human meat and treating animals as pets as examples, she shows that the utilitarian approach that bases itself on abstract, general principles fails to give an adequate account to fundamental human values. Some of Diamond’s ideas have been developed in Gaita 2002.
For a discussion of Wittgenstein’s notion of aspect-seeing, see Mulhall 2001.
One may compare this relationship people have towards photos with the relationship certain people have towards business cards which have the names of people on it. For some people, to scrunch up another person’s card or to openly discard it like trash can be considered offensive.
For the notions of ‘race’ as a social construction and racialization, see Rattansi 2007. Due to the lack of space I cannot offer arguments to support the social constructionist view on ‘race’ here.
Based on my understanding of this very short introductory passage, it seems that Peter Singer and Renata Singer are not aware of the contention that a ‘race’ is a social construction. From their position, an unforeseen implication may follow: the notion of a ‘race’ will be accepted unquestionably and this itself may contribute to the perpetuation of racism. On this issue, see, for example, Rattansi 2007; Blackwell et al. 2003, chapters 2 and 3; Garcia 1996; López 1994; Jackson 2000; Moody-Adams 2003; Zack 2003.
A point already made by Cora Diamond in her ‘Eating Meat and Eating People’.
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Acknowledgement
I would like to thank Andy Dobson for his constructive comments on an earlier version of this article. Another version of this article has benefited from the comments offered by the members of the Applied Ethics team at the City University of Hong Kong. I am particularly grateful to P. J. Ivanhoe and Julia Tao for their recommendations and suggestions. Lastly I would like to thank Samantha Wray for her substantial support in various ways.
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Yan, H.K.T. Cosmopolitanism and What it Means to be Human: Rethinking Ancient and Modern Views on Discerning Humanity. Philosophia 38, 107–129 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-009-9185-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-009-9185-5