Abstract
Recently, in this journal, Jeremy Gwiazda has offered a critique of our separationist view of hell. His objection relies on two key assumptions, and we show in our reply that both assumptions can be denied.
Notes
To calculate the probability that Jones remains in hell over n number of choices, we take .999 to the nth power (on the assumption that we assign the same probability that Jones remains in hell for each choice). The larger the value of n is, the lower the probability that Jones remains.
For more on the idea of tracing the responsibility for some determined choice or act to formative choices and actions in the past, see Kane (1996), 39–40.
Pawl and Timpe (2009), 408 make a similar claim about the residents in heaven, such that their choice not to sin and to remain in bliss is determined by the character they formed in their earthly lives, and yet, they act freely and responsibly in heaven.
The probability is 1 because such choices are determined by Jones’ freely formed character, yet the choice is nevertheless a free choice (see references in Footnotes 2 and 3). For a distinct defense of a similar claim, see Swinburne (1983).
References
Davis, S. T. (1990). Universalism, hell, and the fate of the ignorant. Modern Theology, 6, 173–186.
Gwiazda, J. (2011). On making the same choice eternally: a reply to Davis. Sophia, 50, 693–696.
Kane, R. (1996). The significance of free will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pawl, T., & Timpe, K. (2009). Incompatibilism, sin, and free will in heaven. Faith and Philosophy, 26, 396–417.
Swinburne, R. (1983). A Theodicy of Heaven and Hell. In A. Freddoso (Ed.), The existence and nature of God (pp. 37–54). Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
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Yang, E.T., Davis, S.T. Choosing Eternal Separation: Reply to Gwiazda. SOPHIA 54, 217–219 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-014-0427-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-014-0427-z