Abstract
Using the Epicurean position on death as a starting point, this article re-examines the basic assumptions of philosophers regarding their views on whether death should be seen as a bad. It questions the positions of philosophers such as Thomas Nagel and Derek Parfit by applying Wittgenstein’s notion of grammar as developed by G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker. While philosophers may characterize questions such as ‘What is the nature of death?’ and ‘Is death a bad?’ as metaphysical, I propose that such questions can be better characterized as grammatical. The failure to understand the grammatical character of such questions creates the illusion that questions concerning the nature of death can be adequately tackled with reference to empirical or metaphysical ‘facts’. If the arguments in this article are substantiated, some philosophical puzzles about death can be dissolved.
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Notes
The belief that it is possible to talk about ‘death as such’ can be found among other contemporary philosophers. As an example, consider the following: ‘The variety of ways in which death is understood and the variety of forms of death may take on in different cultural or social contexts need not imply, however, that there is nothing to be said about death from a more purely ‘metaphysical’ perspective’ (Malpas and Solomon 1998, p. 3).
For a detailed reconstruction of Epicurean positions and arguments on death see Warren (2004).
See, for example, Warburton (2011), p. 25.
Cf. Luper-Foy (1987), p. 286.
In a more recent article, Luper-Foy writes: ‘…it seems to follow [from the Epicurean argument] that we have no reason to avoid death and also that if we save people from death, we are not doing them any good. If death is not bad for us, it seems, living is not good for us’ (Bruce and Barbone 2011, p. 99).
Cf. Soll (1998) , p. 27.
Cf. Baker and Hacker (1985), ‘Rules and Grammar’, p. 57.
Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/af/Hermes_e_Sarpedon.jpg (Accessed: 30th October, 2011.)
See, for example, Yourgrau (1987), p. 140: ‘Nagel, as we have seen [in his article ‘Death’], recognizes the relational character of the evil of death, but his insufficient attention to metaphysics weakens his final account. Who is it, after all, that suffers from this (relational) evil? [Nagel writes:] “If there is a loss, someone must suffer it, and he must have existence.” But the dead, alas, do not have existence, and so this account is as yet incomplete.’
Resorting to conditions about life as a means to understand death can lead to different directions. Apart from focusing on empirical conditions about life, it is possible to take an alternative approach by looking at the narrative dimension of life in relation to other human values. For an example of this approach, see Velleman (1991), pp. 329–357.
In ‘Rules and Grammar’, Baker and Hacker (1985) write: ‘Wittgenstein’s “rules of grammar” serve only to distinguish sense from nonsense. Unlike the depth rules of logical syntax, they do not reflect ineffable metaphysical truths. They do not give rise to any theses or doctrines. They settle what makes sense, experience settles what is the case. Hence also they are, in a deep sense, arbitrary […]. Grammar is a free-floating array of rules for the use of language. It determines what is a correct use of language, but is not itself correct or incorrect. It is not answerable to the nature of reality, to the structure of the mind or to “the laws of thought”. Grammar is autonomous’ (Baker and Hacker 1985, p. 40). For the specific claim that grammar is ‘autonomous’, see the chapter ‘Grammar and Necessity’, esp. pp. 329–338, from the same volume.
By raising the question concerning who suffers from death and when the suffering takes place, Nagel initiated a long, on-going philosophical debate regarding the subject and the temporal dimension of death’s harm. Writing in 2007, Steven Luper presents Epicurus’ argument in the following way: ‘We might state Epicurus’ well known argument concerning death as follows: the harm thesis, on which death may harm the individual who dies, can hold true only if there is a subject who is harmed by death, a clear harm which is received, and a time when the harm is received’ (Luper 2007, p. 239). Luper, following a number of philosophers mentioned in his article, tries to argue against Epicurus, who is seen to be denying the harm thesis. To do so, Luper focuses on the temporal dimension of the harm of death and discusses a number of positions including concurrentism, subsequentism and priorism. While I have no desire to dispute Luper’s arguments, if my argument based on the grammatical perspective in this article is correct, philosophers who argue along the lines of Luper would reinforce a view further removed from the grammatical position I have tried to develop. Through their attempts to temporally locate the subject of death’s harm, these philosophers can be seen as doing what I would call ‘assimilating death’. By identifying the moment a subject is harmed by death, (perhaps unwittingly) they seem to be trying to draw analogies between the harm of death and other forms of harm (such as having one’s desires frustrated). This appears to take them to a position which cannot be farther away from the Epicurean position I have portrayed in this article—while Epicurus’ argument highlights the radical difference between the meaning (or ‘harm’) of death and other forms of harm in human life, philosophers who argue against Epicurus seem ready to deny this radical difference. In this context one might say that while Epicurus’ view on death perpetuates the ‘mystery’ of death, these philosophers see the ‘mystery’ of death as something to be explained away.
Nagel argues against Lucretius by stating that while there is no identifiable person who can said to be suffering from pre-natal non-existence, there is a definite person who suffers when he or she dies. To further highlight the asymmetry between pre-natal non-existence and postmortem non-existence, he points out that while a person who prolongs his or her life through dying at a later stage can be seen as the same person, a person who is born substantially earlier and has therefore gained some ‘extra life’ cannot be said to be the same person. (See Nagel 1979, pp. 67–8.) Nagel’s argument above has been discussed in Rosenbaum (1986), pp. 119–134.
See Warren (2004), pp. 57–108.
Brueckner and Fischer restate a similar view in a later article thus: ‘[…] the asymmetry must be grounded in a preference for future pleasures over past pleasures simply in virtue of their being future rather than past. […] we are indifferent to past pleasures simply in virtue of their being in the past. Of course, if having these past pleasures were to result in more pleasures in the future, we would not be indifferent to the past pleasures; but then this lack of indifference would issue from instrumental considerations and not from the past pleasures as such’ (Brueckner and Fischer 1993, p. 329). Cf. Yourgrau (1987), p. 155.
A recent commentator puts the objection to the ‘Symmetry Argument’ in the following way: ‘…fear itself has a temporal aspect and is essentially future-directed in the way it is natural to fear being fired next week but not to fear having been fired last week’ (Bruce and Barbone 2011, p. 101). As fear has this particular characteristic, one may conclude that our attitudes towards our future death and our pre-natal non-existence are bound to be different.
Cf. Hacker (2007), p. 9.
Warren (2004, p. 92) claims that Parfit’s Timeless is reminiscent of Epicurus himself. According to the Epicurean tradition, Epicurus, while experiencing great pain before he dies, comforts himself with pleasant memories from the past. The similarities between Timeless and Epicurus are only apparent: recollecting pleasant memories from the past is a move on Epicurus’ part to alleviate present pain. As such, it does not indicate any symmetrical attitude towards the past and the future exemplified by Timeless.
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Acknowledgment
I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for his or her constructive comments. In addition, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Samantha Wray for her support.
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Yan, H.K.T. Epicurus, Death and Grammar. Philosophia 42, 223–242 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-013-9475-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-013-9475-9