Journal of Chinese Philosophy

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"SUDDENLY DELUDED THOUGHTS ARISE": KARMIC APPEARANCE IN HUAYAN BUDDHISM

I. Introduction

Many beautiful Zen poems by Bashō (1644–1694) catch the general spirit of East Asian Buddhism. One of my favorites reads:

> Old pond
> A frog jumps in
> Sound of water.[1]

In my understanding, the old pond stands for the original, pure, and tranquil mind, or reality; the frog jumping in represents the arising of the mind or thoughts; and the sound of water symbolizes the defiled or deluded world. This simple poem depicts two layers of reality that are both of great importance to Buddhist practice. The deluded impure world is where we are, whereas the pure undefiled reality is what Buddhists are striving for.

To ensure the possibility of attaining such reality, one stream of Buddhist teaching, known as Tathāgatagarbha Thought, stresses that the pure state of mind or reality is one's "original" state, that which is always already there. What one needs to do is simply to rediscover it. These teachings make sense for soteriological purposes, but, with the development of philosophical sophistication among Buddhists, a pressing issue has emerged: If reality was originally pure and tranquil, then why is there delusion? How does the deluded mind or deluded thoughts arise?

This is the so-called problem of delusion among East Asian Buddhists. The mainstream Indian Buddhist schools generally consider it to be irrelevant. According to the Yogācāra view, for instance, defiled store consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*) is conceived in its seed of ignorance in beginningless time, and it therefore makes no sense to speculate about its origin. In Chinese mind-set, however, it is unreasonable for something to have an end but no beginning. Thus, in the history of Chinese and East Asian Buddhism, the issue of the origin of the

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Journal of Chinese Philosophy 37:2 (June 2010) 198–214

defiled or deluded mind is considered to be the "puzzle of all history."[2] To these Buddhists, the issue is similar to the problem of evil that has troubled Christian theologians throughout history.

Bashō's poem hints that the image of the frog's jump may hold the key to the problem. But where is the frog from? How does she jump into the pond? To ponder these issues in more theoretical terms, we need to examine the concept of *yexiang* 業相, or karmic appearance, as developed in the *Awakening of Faith* (*Dacheng Qixin Lun*《大乘起信論》) and further elaborated on by a number of Huayan Buddhist masters, including Zhiyan 智儼, Fazang 法藏, Zongmi 宗密, and Zixuan 子璿. This concept illustrates the "sudden arising of deluded thoughts," and provides us with a paradigm to approach the problem of delusion among East Asian Buddhists.

II. The Origin of Store Consciousness

The origin of store consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*) is generally considered to be an irrelevant issue in the Yogācāra school, but to Zhiyan (602–668), the second patriarch of the Huayan school, it was important. Given his background of studying in the Shelun 攝論 school during his early life, Zhiyan is generally considered to have greatly contributed to the Huayan tradition, particularly in terms of his doctrine of the mind. In contrast, the first patriarch Dushun 杜順 (558–640) supplied it with practical or institutional instructions, whereas the third patriarch, Fazang (643–712), contributed to the systematization of Huayan teachings.[3]

Zhiyan's thoughts on the mind are well-summarized in his chapter on "Establishing Consciousness-only" in the *Huayan Jing Nei Zhangmen Deng Za Kongmu Zhang*《華嚴經內章門等雜孔目章》, a work he published shortly after Xuanzang 玄奘 had finished his translation and composition of the masterpiece *Cheng Weishi Lun*《成唯識論》. In the seventh section of this chapter, Zhiyan discusses the cessation of store consciousness. He holds that what actually ceases is the appearance, rather than the substance, of the mind and that this appearance ceases in the first or tenth stage (*bhūmi*) of Bodhisattva practice. He then continues with an interesting discussion of the origin of store consciousness, as follows.

> Question: What does store consciousness rely on as [its] origin?
>
> Answer: A thought (*nian* 念) of ignorance arising at present is the origin of store consciousness. How do [we] know it? It is stated in the *Xianyang [Shengjiao Lun]*《顯揚聖教論》: "The ignorant habit of

> beginningless speculation (*prapañca*, *xilun* 戲論) is the right cause of [store consciousness]." Moreover, it is stated in the *Awakening of Faith*: "A thought of ignorance is unenlightenment. [If one is] enlightened, [there is] no arising [of such a thought]. [If it] arises, there is suffering. Effect is not separated from cause." The matured store consciousness is the effect. So, [a thought of ignorance] is the origin of store consciousness.[4]

In Zhiyan's answer, *nian* is a crucial but difficult word to translate. It goes beyond its literal meaning of the present (*jin* 今) mind (*xin* 心) and signifies thought, memory, or mindfulness. *Nian* closely matches *smṛti* in Sanskrit and *dran* in Tibetan, both of which can mean mindfulness, as well as memory.[5] "A thought arising at present" is the first arising of mindfulness or memory. It is a primordial state of being mindful or conscious, that is, conscious of nothing else but itself.

Zhiyan's answer is formulated in a fairly standard way that can be found among many East Asian Buddhists. However, his supporting quotations are more interesting because they show us how to trace the mode of thinking that inquires about the origin of the defiled mind. The first quotation is taken from Asaṅga's *Xianyang Shengjiao Lun*, a work only extant in its Chinese translation. This text provides us with nineteen accounts of evidence for the existence of store consciousness, a third of which are cited by Zhiyan. His citation is actually slightly different from the original text, which says: "The beginningless speculation (*prapañca*) that perfumes is the cause [of store consciousness]."[6] According to this text, beginningless speculation serves as the basis for the sudden arising of the defiled mind in the present. It appears to be saying that the defiled mind has its origin in speculation, which, again, is beginningless. So this passage is still in conformity with the orthodox Yogācāra view that does not really query the origin of the defiled mind. I do not understand why Zhiyan would choose it to support his view of the origin of store consciousness. A similar doubt is raised by an opponent in Zhiyan's work:

> Question: The above treatise [i.e., the *Xianyang shengjiao lun*] says that store consciousness takes the increasing *karma* and defilements of previous lives as a condition, the beginningless speculation that perfumes as cause, and the matured consciousness of all produced seeds as substance. According to this text, the original consciousness is the substance of birth and cessation. If it is not the cause of birth and cessation, why is it discussed in terms of the causality of birth and cessation?
>
> Answer: This is based on the *Cheng Weishi Lun*, [which aims] to discern the principle of the mutual relation between cause and effect in the [stream] of birth and cessation. It is a gate of provision, and has no ultimate meaning. [We] should know that there is no other *dharma* except consciousness. Consciousness is the gate of undefiled and yet defiled, and it is one of the meanings of *tathāgathagarbha*.[7]

Here, Zhiyan presents us with a complex picture of Yogācāra teachings, wherein the so-called "old Yogācāra" doctrines passed down to him from the Dilun 地論 and Shelun schools interplay with the "new Yogācāra" views introduced by Xuanzang and his followers. Zhiyan is arguing against the new Yogācāra view in the *Cheng Weishi Lun* that store consciousness is totally defiled and has its roots in the beginningless samsaric world. Instead he agrees with the old Yogācāra view that modifies store consciousness to be both defiled and undefiled. At this point, he closely follows the understanding of store consciousness that appears in the *Awakening of Faith*, in which it consists of two aspects: The enlightened and the unenlightened.

III. Karmic Appearance: The Sudden Arising of Deluded Thoughts

Zhiyan's quotation from the *Awakening of Faith* is also slightly different from the original text, which says: "Mind arising on the basis of unenlightenment is what is called *karma*. [If one is] enlightened, [there is] no arising [of such a mind]. [If the mind] arises, there is suffering. Effect is not separated from cause."[8] The expression "a thought of ignorance is unenlightenment" seems to be a fabrication of Zhiyan's and comes from a passage in which the three appearances of unenlightenment are discussed. "The arising of the mind" refers to the concept of *yexiang* or *wuming yexiang* 無明業相, the first of three appearances.

Literally meaning "karmic appearance," *yexiang* is an important concept in the *Awakening of Faith*. However, we do not know how Zhiyan approached this concept, as his two commentaries on the *Awakening of Faith*, *Dacheng Qixin Lun Yiji*《大乘起信論義記》and *Dacheng Qixin Lun Shu*《大乘起信論疏》, have been lost. However, the term *yexiang* does appear in one of his quotations from the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, which says:

> It is not the case that the consciousness of genuine appearance ceases, but karmic appearance ceases. If the genuine appearance ceases, then store consciousness would cease. Mahāmati, if store consciousness ceases, then it has no difference from the heterodox view of annihilation.[9]

When comparing it with the available Sanskrit text,[10] I find that the translation by Guṇabhadra, which is cited by Zhiyan, is actually wrong in saying: "It is not the case that *the consciousness of genuine appearance* ceases." The more correct translation would be Śikṣānanda's: "It is not *the genuine appearance of consciousness* that

ceases" (*na svajātilakṣaṇa nirodho vijñānānṃā*).[11] My observation is supported by another passage in the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*: "Consciousness produces three appearances, i.e., transformative, karmic and genuine appearance."[12] Here, consciousness is distinguished by its three appearances, that is, transformative, karmic, and genuine. Therefore, it makes sense to say that a certain *appearance of consciousness* ceases, rather than that the *consciousness of an appearance* ceases.

In any case, we now know that *yexiang* is a translation of *karmalakṣaṇa*. However, certain references identify its Sanskrit equivalent as *karmajātilakṣaṇa*,[13] which appears only once in the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*.[14] *Karmajātilakṣaṇa* is obviously a combination of *karmalakṣaṇa* and *jātilakṣaṇa*. The passage that it appears can thus be translated as: "Karmic appearance and genuine appearance are bound together. Because the intrinsic nature of matter is not apprehended, Mahāmati, five consciousnesses come to function."[15]

Having identified *yexiang* with *karmalakṣaṇa* in Sanskrit, and with *las gyi mtshan ning* in Tibetan, I find no further exploration of this concept in the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* apart from the aforementioned quotations. In most instances of use that I have come across, the term *yexiang*, or *karmalakṣaṇa*, simply refers to the appearance of functions or deeds, as it is literally understood. For example, in Asaṅga's *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*, *yexiang* is one of the six appearances of the Buddha. In Paramārtha's translation of *Jueding Zang Lun* 《决定藏論》, it is one of the six appearances of matter (*rūpa*).[16] In these cases, it is obvious that *yexiang* is not used in a technical sense to refer to a certain appearance of consciousness.

The other text that uses *yexiang* or *karmalakṣaṇa* in the same technical sense is the *Awakening of Faith*, which is one of the most influential works among East Asian Buddhists, having shaped the thinking of all three major Chinese Buddhist schools, namely, Huayan, Tiantai, and Chan. The authorship of this work has been hotly debated among scholars since the beginning of the twentieth century. Most are skeptical of its traditional attribution to Aśvaghosa. Some identify its author as Paramārtha (500–569), who is credited with its first "translation," others the Dilun monk Tanqian 曇遷 (542–607), and others still the Shelun monk Tanyan 曇延 (516–588).[17] Although they may have different opinions about its authorship, most scholars would agree that its composition is to a great extent based on the Chinese translation of the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*. For instance, Lü Cheng argued that it was based on a particular translation by Bodhiruci, which in his opinion is poor in quality, and that many "wrong" views in the *Awakening of Faith* have their roots in this translation.[18] The continuity in the usage of *karmalakṣaṇa* between the two works seems to provide a further evidence for this argument.

In the *Awakening of Faith*, karmic appearance is the first of three appearances of unenlightenment. Unenlightenment stands for the defiled mind, which is inseparable from the pure mind or from enlightenment. It states:

> Apart from enlightenment, there is no unenlightenment. Because there is the delusive mind of unenlightenment, [one] can have a term to refer to true enlightenment. Apart from the mind of unenlightenment, one cannot say anything about the self-appearance of true enlightenment.[19]

Both enlightenment and unenlightenment, being inextricably bound up with each other, constitute the totality of store consciousness.

The three appearances of unenlightenment are karmic appearance, the appearance of perceiving, and the appearance of objects. They are partially identical to the three appearances of consciousness in the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*. We know that karmic appearance is *karmalakṣaṇa*, and, in the following paragraphs, I show that transformative appearance is identical to the appearance of perceiving. However, genuine appearance cannot be the same as the appearance of objects, as the former refers to the genuine nature of the mind, whereas the latter refers to the world of objects. Moreover, in the *Awakening of Faith*, these three appearances are of the defiled mind, whereas in the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* they cover both the undefiled and defiled mind.

Karmic appearance, or the karmic appearance of ignorance, is the first appearance of unenlightenment. It is called *karma* because the mind first arises at this stage. The arising of the mind is the primordial state of being mindful or conscious, that is, conscious of only itself, as there is not yet any distinction between subject and object. It is also the cause of suffering in later stages. In the second appearance, the subject that perceives comes into being. This is also called transformative appearance because it transforms karmic appearance into subject; that is, it is the transformation from self-consciousness to consciousness, but not yet consciousness of something. In the third appearance, objects are generated from consciousness. Because they are generated from consciousness, objects are considered to be illusory: "On the basis of perceiving, there appears object as illusion. Without perceiving, there is no object."[20] The third appearance is also called the appearance of representation, because this is the stage at which objects are represented.

These three appearances, as the initial activities of the mind, are also called the three subtleties and are followed by six additional appearances known as the six coarsenesses: (i) the appearance of intellect, discriminating between liking and disliking; (ii) the appearance of continuity, memory retaining agreeable and disagreeable

sensations in a continuous succession of subjective states; (iii) the appearance of attachment, holding fast to the discrimination between liking and disliking; (iv) the appearance of speculation over names and letters, analyzing words, which are provisional; (v) the appearance of the performance of deeds, producing all variations of deeds; and (vi) the appearance of suffering due to the fetters of deeds, suffering karmic causality.

The three subtleties and six coarsenesses consist of nine appearances of unenlightenment, which, again, is an aspect of store consciousness. In the *Awakening of Faith*, store consciousness is also called *citta* (*xin* 心) (mind), from which *manas* (*yi* 意) (mentality) arises. *Manas* has five different names: (i) karmic consciousness, in the sense that through the agency of ignorance an unenlightened mind begins to arise; (ii) transformative consciousness, in the sense that when the mind arises, the perceiving aspect evolves; (iii) representative consciousness, in the sense that it represents the world of objects as a bright mirror that reproduces all material images; (iv) intellectual consciousness, in the sense that it discriminates between different things, both defiled and pure; and (v) continuous consciousness, in the sense that it is united with memory and continues uninterruptedly. The fifth *manas* is also called *manovijñāna* (*yishi* 意識) (mental consciousness), and is defined as follows in the *Awakening of Faith*: "What is called *manovijñāna* is the continuous consciousness. Because of their deep-rooted attachment, ordinary people imagine that I and mine [are real] and cling to them in their illusions. [This consciousness] rests on external objects and discriminates the objects of five senses and mind. It is called *manovijñāna*, the separating consciousness, or the object-discriminating consciousness. This consciousness is intensified by the defilement of holding fast to perverse views and the defilement of indulgence in passion."[21]

The *citta–manas–manovijñāna* structure in the *Awakening of Faith* can be partially identified with the Yogācāra doctrine of eight consciousnesses. *Citta* is parallel to the eighth store consciousness. The difference is that *citta* is both pure and defiled, whereas the eighth store consciousness is defiled only. Attached to "I and mine," *manovijñāna* is very much identical to the seventh consciousness *manas*. The fivefold *manas* is parallel to the sixth mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*), although the former is certainly more complicated.

This analysis offers us a complex structure of the mind. However, we should note that this structure of mind does not serve as an epistemology in the *Awakening of Faith*; rather, it is part of a scheme of cosmogony that is used to explain how the delusive world comes into being. For soteriological purposes, this scheme can be reversed to

a process that moves from coarsenesses to subtleties. Ordinary people are caught in the appearances of attachment, the speculation about names and letters, the performance of deeds, and suffering due to the fetters of deeds. The Bodhisattvas are in the appearances of perceiving, objects, intellect, and continuity. Finally, the Buddha is in the stage of karmic appearance.[22] As a stage of the Buddha, karmic appearance functions as a crucial concept in the doctrinal system of the *Awakening of Faith*, not only in a cosmogonical sense, but also in a soteriological sense.

IV. Karmic Appearance and Self-cognition

Since its first appearance between 513 and 592, the *Awakening of Faith* has attracted large numbers of commentators. More than 100 commentaries have been written, and sixty-one of them have been preserved. All are based on its first "translation," except for that by Zhixu 智旭 (1599–1655), which was based on the second translation by Śikṣānanda. This second translation is recorded as an actual event in which the Huayan monk Fazang participated. The Sanskrit text used, however, could be the one that was translated from the Chinese by Xuanzang.[23] The opinion that the *Awakening of Faith* is of Chinese rather than Indian origin is further supported by the fact that all commentaries on it have been written by Chinese, Korean, or Japanese scholars. There seems to be one exception, the commentary entitled *Shi Moheyan Lun* 《釋摩訶衍論》, which is attributed to Nāgārjuna. This attribution becomes an obvious nonsense, however, when one looks into its contents. It is now considered more likely to have been composed by an anonymous Chinese or Korean scholar between 712 and 774.[24]

Although an apocryphal commentary, the *Shi Moheyan Lun* offers us some important insights into understanding the concept of karmic appearance. First of all, it states that "karmic appearance does not distinguish between subject and object. Being the king of mind, its thoughts cannot be analyzed. Only because of its subtle arising and flow, it is called *karma*."[25] Although it is considered to be unanalyzable, in its initial stage karmic appearance gives birth to the delusive world and is categorized into three elements: Independent karmic appearance, independent associate appearance, and combined active appearance. These three appearances characterize the subtle movement of karmic appearance. The popular wave metaphor that is pervasive in the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* and the *Awakening of Faith* can be used to illustrate such movement. Independent karmic appearance is wind, which blows the water (independent associate appearance), and together they make a wave (combined active appearance).

These three elements of karmic appearance are not mentioned in other commentaries on the *Awakening of Faith*. Instead, many commentators have paid attention to the threefold structure of karmic appearance–perceiving–object, which, at first glance, comes very close to the structure of self-cognition–subject–object (*svasaṃvitti–darśana–nimitta*) in Yogācāra teachings. Fazang, the third patriarch of the Huayan school, was the first to point this out, identifying karmic appearance with self-cognition. Fazang was to a great extent indebted to the theoretical structure of the *Awakening of Faith* in his systematization of Huayan teachings. In addition, as he had participated in Xuanzang's translation team during his early life, he was also familiar with the new Yogācāra teachings.[26] His familiarity with both the old and new Yogācāra enables him to deal with the relationship between their two key concepts: Karmic appearance and self-cognition.

To explain karmic appearance, Fazang distinguishes between two meanings of *karma*. In the first meaning, it refers to action in the sense that it signifies the arising of the mind, and, in the second, it refers to cause, as the arising of the mind is the cause of suffering. He states:

> Though a thought arises from it, [karmic appearance] is very subtle because subject and object are not distinguished, although an appearance is dependently originated. It equals the division of self-cognition of store consciousness. As it is said in the *Treatise of Non-appearance*: "Question: What are the appearance and object of this consciousness? Answer: [Its] appearance and object cannot be distinguished. [They are] one body and have no difference." [We] should know that this is talking about the karmic appearance of store consciousness. The following two [i.e., perceiving and object] correspond to subject and object, the [other] two divisions of the original consciousness.[27]

Here, Fazang uses *ziti fen* 自體分 to refer to self-cognition. Literally meaning "the division of self-substance," *ziti fen* is an alternative name for self-cognition because it is considered to be a substance. As it states in the *Cheng Weishi Lun*: "The thing that object and subject rely on as self-substance is the division of self-cognition."[28] Zixuan (965–1038), a Huayan monk during the Song Dynasty, confirmed this point in his subcommentary to Fazang's commentary:

> According to the [doctrine] of consciousness-only, when the self-substance of the defiled consciousness arises, it turns into two divisions of appearance. The appearance that possesses object is called the division of subject. The appearance that is the object of consciousness is called the division of object. Though the words are different, the meaning is the same. My commentary [says:] Self-substance corresponds to the division of self-cognition.[29]

In his commentary, Fazang understands karmic appearance as the cause of the delusive world and suffering within it. This is different from Yogācāra teaching that self-cognition is the effect of cognition. A well-known passage in Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* states: "Whatever the form in which it [viz., a cognition] appears, that [form] is the object of perception. The act of perception and its effect are, respectively, the form of subject and self-cognition. Therefore, these three are not separated from one another."[30]

One way to understand that self-cognition is substance and effect at one and the same time is to think of it in a teleological way.[31] As the final result of perception, self-cognition stands at the end of the process and acts as a substance for such perception. In this sense, it does not stand at the beginning of perception to serve as a cause. This way we differentiate the two modes of thinking, which see self-cognition as an effect or a cause.

Fazang and his Huayan followers seem not to have recognized such a difference because they favored the cause-mode of thinking and simply ignored the fact that self-cognition is an effect of cognition. Among the many commentators on the *Awakening of Faith*, Zhixu, a Tiantai monk during the Ming Dynasty, seems to be the only one to notice this issue and try to reconcile the two ways of thinking. In his view, the arising of karmic appearance is based on the mind, which is the substance of all eight consciousnesses. He goes on to say:

> Mind is cognition of self-cognition (**svasaṃvittisaṃvitti*), and *karma* is self-cognition. Being enlightened, [one] apprehends the true thusness, thus [the mind] does not arise. Being unenlightened, [the mind] arises, then there is suffering in [the mind] itself. The effect of suffering in the mind takes the arising [of the mind] as cause, so in the *Cheng Weishi Lun* it takes the third [division], i.e., self-cognition, as the act of perception, and the fourth [division], i.e., cognition of self-cognition, as the effect of perception. Like the front and back of a mirror, they cannot be separated from each other. So it is said that "effect is not separated from cause."[32]

To resolve the cause-effect dilemma, Zhixu refers to the doctrine of the four divisions of consciousness, which is attributed to the Yogācāra scholar Dharmapāla (530–561). As all of his works in Sanskrit have been lost, and none was translated into Tibetan, this doctrine is recorded only in the *Cheng Weishi Lun* and the *Fodi Jing Lun* 《佛地經論》, which is attributed to Bandhuprabha et al. According to these sources, there are primarily two reasons to establish this additional division of consciousness. First, if cognition of self-cognition is lacking, then self-cognition cannot be perceived. This is because self-cognition, being a division of consciousness, should be perceived as a

subject. Second, as an act of perception, self-cognition should have an effect, which is cognition of self-cognition. The subject cannot be the effect of this third division, because it is sometimes not a means of knowledge.[33] In this sense, self-cognition is the effect of a subject, and the cause of the cognition of self-cognition. However, self-cognition is not the cause of either subject or object. The difference between the cause and effect modes of thinking remains. We need to delve further into what the Yogācāra scholars say about the issue.

The Korean monk Taehyeon 太賢 (active around 750) is the only Yogācāra scholar to have written commentary on the *Awakening of Faith*. In his *Dacheng Qixin Lun Neiyi Luetan Ji* 《大乘起信論內義略探記》, when discussing the five kinds of *manas*, he holds that there should be one additional kind of *manas*, that is, *svajātilakṣaṇa*, or genuine appearance. This genuine appearance is the first *manas*, and is followed by karmic consciousness or appearance. This first *manas* is called genuine consciousness because it does not depend on the other kinds. It is also called wisdom-appearance because of its nature of illumination and is the basis of the other five *manas*. It is changeless, whereas the others are conditioned. Taehyeon also says: "The first two [i.e., genuine and karmic appearance] are the division of self-cognition of store consciousness, and the next two [i.e., transformative and representative consciousness] are the divisions of subject and object of store consciousness."[34]

Taehyeon's opinion is unique in the sense that he takes genuine appearance from the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* and treats it together with the five kinds of *manas* in the *Awakening of Faith*. This is similar to what Zhixu does to consider the mind as a more basic concept. Unlike Zhixu, however, Taehyeon identifies both genuine and karmic appearance with the self-cognition of store consciousness. We know that he was familiar with the doctrine of the four divisions of consciousness because he discussed it in his commentary on the *Cheng weishi lun*. His failure to mention this doctrine here is probably due to the fact that he saw no cause-effect dilemma.

In my view, although karmic appearance can be identified with self-cognition, their functions within their own doctrinal systems are not identical. In the *Awakening of Faith*, karmic appearance, being a state that the mind is solely aware of itself, functions as the cause of everything else arising hereafter, including the subjective aspect of the mind and the illusory world of objects. Whereas in the *Cheng Weishi Lun*, self-cognition is the result or effect of the cognitive process that involves both its subjective and objective aspects. The cause-effect dilemma reflects a fundamental difference between the *Awakening of Faith* and the *Cheng Weishi Lun* in the way in which they deal with such issues as self-consciousness. This, again, reflects a difference

between the old and new Yogācāra teachings in China. The former is cosmogony-oriented and speculative, whereas the latter is epistemology-oriented and analytical.

V. Karmic Appearance and the Huayan Cosmogony

From the foregoing discussion, we can see that karmic appearance in the *Awakening of Faith* has more cosmogonical than epistemological importance. In fact, the reason that the *Awakening of Faith* was so well appreciated among early Chinese Buddhists is that it supplied them with a theoretical structure by which to construct a cosmogony, which, in reverse order, serves the soteriological purpose of attaining enlightenment. Zongmi (780–841), the fifth patriarch in both the Huayan school and the Heze 荷澤 line of Southern Chan, provides us with a good example of this in his well-known *Treatise on the Origin of Human Beings* (*Yuanren Lun*《原人論》).

This article, as its title indicates, is a cosmogonic inquiry into the origin of human beings. As it states in its preface, the treatise was inspired by the models of cosmogony presented by Confucianism and Daoism. Given that Buddhism, in general, lacks such a doctrine, thus being open to challenge by other religions on such issues as the origin of human beings, Zongmi attempted to respond. To do so, he first classified Buddhist teachings into five classes. The lowest is the teaching of humans and devas, which adumbrates the workings of karmic retribution and is addressed primarily to the laity. The second is the teaching of Hīnayāna, followed by the teaching of Mahāyāna, which analyzes phenomenal appearances, that is, Yogācāra, and the teaching that negates phenomenal appearances, that is, Madhyamaka. The highest class is the teaching of one vehicle that reveals the Buddha-nature: Tathāgathagarbha Thought. Different teachings within their own level offer different pictures of cosmogony. After presenting each of the cosmogonic schemes, Zongmi points out their shortcomings and proposes improvements. Finally, he reaches the highest class of teaching, which reveals the Buddha-nature.

In the last part of his article, Zongmi presents an integrated scheme of cosmogony that comprises all of the five aforementioned classes of Buddhist teaching and Confucian and Daoist teachings. This cosmogonic scheme begins with the "one true intellectual nature," which is without birth or cessation, increasing or decreasing, or change or transformation. Sentient beings are unaware of it because of their beginningless delusion. This nature is called *tathāgathagarbha* because of its concealment. On the basis of *tathāgathagarbha*, the mind of birth and cessation appears. The true mind without birth or cessation joins

together with the illusory mind of birth and cessation to constitute store consciousness, which has two aspects, that is, the enlightened and the unenlightened. We then reach the stage at which karmic appearance plays a role:

> On the basis of unenlightenment, the initial arising of thoughts is called karmic appearance. Being unaware of the nonexistence of such thoughts, [it] turns into the appearances of perceiving consciousness and of perceived object. Again, being unaware that the object is an illusion of one's own mind, [one] holds it as a definite being, which is called attachment to *dharma*.[35]

This passage appears to be a summary of what is said in the *Awakening of Faith*. To Zongmi, however, these are the teachings of the Yogācāra school, although the threefold structure of karmic appearance–perceiving–object here is part of a large-scale cosmogony, rather than a structure of the mind, as an orthodox Yogācārin would see it.

This scheme is modified into a ten-stage model in Zongmi's *Chanyuan Zhuquan Ji Douxu*《禪源諸詮集都序》. This model has two aspects: The ten layers of delusion and the ten layers of enlightenment. The former consist of original enlightenment, unenlightenment, the arising of thoughts, the arising of perceiving, the appearance of objects, attachment to *dharma*, attachment to self, defilements, performance of deeds, and experiencing effects. Among these layers, the third, the arising of thoughts, corresponds to karmic appearance. Together with the next two, that is, the arising of perceiving and the appearing of objects, it fits neatly into this scheme of cosmogony. The ten layers of enlightenment consist of sudden enlightenment, resolving to attain enlightenment, the cultivation of five practices, spiritual development, emptiness of self, emptiness of *dharma*, mastery of matter, mastery of mind, freedom from thoughts, and attainment of Buddhahood.[36] These ten stages are a reversal of the corresponding stages in the aforementioned scheme of cosmogony. For instance, mastery of matter and of mind and freedom from thoughts are the reverse of the karmic appearance–perceiving–object structure. They provide a scheme of practice toward enlightenment, which, again, is a soteriological scheme rather than an epistemological structure.

VI. Conclusion: A Huayan Approach to the Problem of Delusion

Mou Zongsan, a contemporary Confucian scholar, once criticized the "sudden arising of deluded thoughts," as expounded in the *Awakening*

of Faith and by the Huayan school as being problematic. Instead, he appreciated the more "all-rounded" approach (*yuanjiao* 圓教) developed by the Tiantai school.[37] Mou's stance indicates tension between the doctrines of inherent arising (*xingqi* 性起) and inherent entailment (*xingju* 性具), which are held, respectively, by the two schools. The Tiantai theory of inherent entailment argues that both the pure and the impure and good and evil are inherently entailed in human nature. This leads to monism and, consequently, to the so-called value paradox, as expressed by Zhili 知禮 (960–1082), a Tiantai master during the Song Dynasty: "Other than the devil there is no Buddha; other than the Buddha there is no devil."[38]

Compared to the Tiantai approach to the problem of delusion, which eventually leads to the value paradox, the *Awakening of Faith* and the Huayan tradition provide us with a better solution. Even in the Tiantai line of thinking, one should not linger on the dialectical relationship between inherent good and inherent evil, which actually indicates that the inherent nature or substance of the mind is beyond good and evil. Instead, the key is to distinguish between inherent good and good conduct (*xiushan* 修善) and between inherent evil and evil conduct (*xiu'e* 修惡). But how is good or evil conduct related to inherent good or evil? Does it evolve from the pure and tranquil mind? These are exactly the issues that the Huayan tradition addresses with its theory of inherent arising.

This theory involves a distinction between substance (*ti* 體) and movement (*yong* 用), which represents a division between, on the one hand, the substance of the mind, that is, the aspect of the mind as thusness or the pure mind, and, on the other, the movement of the mind, that is, the aspect of the mind as birth-and-cessation, or deluded thoughts. According to this theory of inherent arising, the movement arises from the unmoving substance, and the goal of Buddhist practice is to eliminate that movement and return to the substance of quiescence. This is the basic theoretical framework of the schools of Chinese Buddhism that feature the development of Tathāgathagarbha Thought. It also reflects basic features of Indian thought (including Buddhism), which favors quiescence over movement. This is in contrast to the mainstream Chinese way of thinking, which emphasizes movement and processes that "beget unceasingly" (*shengsheng bu xi* 生生不息).[39] Under such a framework that treats quietitude as pure, it is natural to attribute the origin of delusion to a movement that is impure in itself, that is, the sudden arising of deluded thoughts.

Some may think that the "suddenness" here is unpredictable and unintelligible. In my view, however, this Buddhist theory resembles the concept of free will that developed in mainstream Christian the-

ology after Augustine to address the problem of evil, as well as the concept of playfulness (*līlā*) in Indian Vedānta theology that was used to explain the creation of the illusory world. Recall the image of Bashō's poem cited in the beginning of the article. The quantum jump of a frog signifies the arising of the mind or thoughts, a state of mind that is solely aware of itself. It is not contributed by an external agency because the arising or awareness is inherent to the mind or reality itself, just like the frog comes from the pond itself. It is in the same way that free will and playfulness are inherent to the individuals themselves and manifest freely and suddenly as if unpredictable and unintelligible.

In the history of religion, there have been two other major approaches to the problem of evil or delusion. The first is a dualistic approach that was popular among ordinary religious practitioners in the East and West. This dualistic approach attributes the cause of evil or delusion to an external agency such as devil and proposes an eternal struggle between good and evil, reality and delusion. The second is a monistic approach such as that of Tiantai which attempts to maintain the integrity of the reality or goodness, but eventually leads to value paradox. As compared to these alternative solutions, the Huayan dynamic approach presents us a more sensible solution to the problem and deserves to be treated as the mainstream Buddhist approach the problem of evil or delusion, in the same way as its counterpart theories of free will and playfulness were treated in Christian and Vedānta theology.

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Endnotes

The earlier drafts of this article have been presented in conferences in Denver, Taipei, and Hong Kong. A partial Vietnamese translation by Thích Nhuận Châu is based on one of the drafts and can be found online at http://www.quangduc.com/tapsan/04phapluanso6-10.html and http://www.quangduc.com/tapsan/05phapluanso7.html. The substantial revision of the current version is indebted to comments and suggestions of many friends and colleagues, especially Lin Chen-kuo and Professor Chung-ying Cheng.

1. Matsuo Bashō, *Bashō Haiku Shū*《芭蕉俳句集》(Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1970), 265.
2. Morita Ryūsen, *Shakumakaen Ron no Kenkyū*《釋摩訶衍論之研究》(Kyoto: Yamashiroya Bunseidō, 1935), 427.
3. See Kimura Kiyotaka, *Chūgoku Kegon Shisōshi*《中国華厳思想史》(Kyoto: Heirakuji Shoten, 1992), 81ff.
4. Zhiyan, *Huayan Jing Nei Zhangmen Deng Za Kongmu Zhang*《華嚴經內章門等雜孔目章》, CBETA hereafter (Chinese Electronic Tripitaka Collection: Taisho Tripitaka, Vols. 1–55 and 85; *Shinsan Zokuzokyo* (*Xuzangjing*

《玄奘經》) Vols. 1–88 (Taipei: Chinese Buddhist Electronic Text Association [www.cbeta.org], 2007), thereafter (Takakusu Junjirō and Watanabe Kaigyoku, eds., *Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō*《大正新脩大藏經》, 85 Vols. (Tokyō: Taishō Issaikyō Kankōkai, 1924–1932) 45, no. 1870, 547a19–23.

5. For a comprehensive study of this concept in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism, see Janet Gyatso, ed., *In the Mirror of Memory: Reflections on Mindfulness and Remembrance in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992).
6. Asaṅga, *Xianyang Shengjiao Lun*《顯揚聖教論》, CBETA, T31, no. 1602, 480c4.
7. Zhiyan, *Huayan Jing*, 545c17–24.
8. *Awakening of Faith*, CBETA, T32, no. 1666, 577a8–10. See also CBETA, T32, no. 1667, 585c4–5.
9. Zhiyan, *Huayan Jing*, 545c27–546a2.
10. Bunyiu Nanjio, *The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* (Kyoto: Otani University Press, 1923), 38–39: *tasmān mahāmate na svajātilakṣaṇa nirodho vijñānānāṃ kiṃtu karmalakṣaṇa nirodhaḥ/svajātilakṣaṇe punar nirudhyamāna ālayavijñāna nirodhaḥ syāt/ ālayavijñāne punar nirūpyamāṇe nirviśiṣṭas tīrthakaro 'cchedavādena ayaṃvādaḥ syāt//.*
11. *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* translated by Śikṣānanda, CBETA, T16, no. 672, 593c2. The other translation by Bodhiruci errs by omitting *na*.
12. Bunyiu Nanjio, *The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, 37: *trividha utpādo vijñānaṃ pravṛttilakṣaṇaṃ karmalakṣaṇaṃ jātilakṣaṇaṃ ca //*.
13. For instance, *Foguang Da Cidian*《佛光大辭典》, CD-ROM version 2.0 (2000), entry on *yexiang*.
14. Bunyiu Nanjio, *The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, 44: *karmajātilakṣaṇa suvinibaddha rūpasvabhāva anavadhāriṇo mahāmate pañca vijñānakāyāḥ pravartante //*.
15. Suzuki translates *karmajātilakṣaṇa* as "the functioning Vijñānas and the original Vijñānas." See D.T. Suzuki, *The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra: A Mahāyāna Text* (London and New York: Kegan Paul International, 1932), 40.
16. See Asaṅga, *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*, CBETA, T31, no. 1604, 661c13–14; *Jueding zang lun*, CBETA, T30, no. 1584, 1032c4–10.
17. For the opinion that Paramārtha is the author, see William Grosnick, "The Categories of T'i, Hsiang, and Yung: Evidence that Parmārtha Composed the *Awakening of Faith*," *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 12, no. 1 (1989): 65–92. Tanqian as the author is mentioned in Morita Ryūsen, *Shakumakaen Ron no Kenkyū*, 737. For a discussion of Tanyan as the author, see Han Jingqing, "*Weishi Xue de Liangci Yichuan* 唯識學的兩次譯傳," in *Xuanzang Yanjiu Wenji*《玄奘研究文集》 (Zhengzhou: Zhongzhou Guji Chubanshe, 1995), 161–83.
18. See Lü Cheng, *Lü Cheng Foxue Lunzhu Xuanji*《呂澂佛學論著選集》(Jinan: Qilu Shushe, 1991), 292–302, in which he points out seven such "wrong" views.
19. *Awakening of Faith*, CBETA, T32, no. 1666, 577a4–6. It is rendered slightly different in Śikṣānanda's translation, on which Suzuki's translation is based. Hakeda bases his on Paramārtha's translation. See Teitaro Suzuki, *Acvaghosha's Discourse in the Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna* (Chicago: Open Court, 1900; reprint, 1976) and Yoshito S. Hakeda, *The Awakening of Faith* (New York & London: Columbia University Press, 1967).
20. Ibid., 577a11–12. My literal translation. See Suzuki, *Acvaghosha's Discourse*, 72, and Hakeda, *The Awakening of Faith*, 44, for their translations, which fail to maintain the technical usage of certain terms.
21. Ibid., 577b24–27.
22. Ibid., 577c.
23. It is reported that Xuanzang was surprised that his Indian colleagues did not know about this important work and decided to translate it into Sanskrit probably when he was in Indian during 629–645. See his biography in the *Fozu Tongji*《佛祖統紀》, CBETA, T49, no. 2035, 295a13–14. While Śikṣānanda started his translation project in China in 695.
24. See Ryūsen, *Shakumakaen Ron no Kenkyū*, 784.
25. *Shi Moheyan Lun*, CBETA, T32, no. 1668, 625c25–27.

26. See Ueyama Daishun, *Tonkō Bukkyō no Kenkyū*《敦煌佛教の研究》(Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 1990), 38, 70.
27. Fazang, *Dacheng Qixin Lun Yiji*《大乘起信論義記》, CBETA, T44, no. 1846, 262c3–8.
28. *Cheng Weishi Lun*, CBETA, T31, no. 1585, 10b7.
29. Zixuan, *Qixin Lun Shu Bixiaoji*《起信論疏筆削記》, CBETA, T44, no. 1848, 309b23–26.
30. Masaaki Hattori, *Dignāga On Perception* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), appendix: *yad-ābhāsaṃ prameyaṃ tat pramṇāa phalate punaḥ/grāhakākāra-saṃ vittī trayaṃ nātaḥ pṛthak-kṛtam //*. See p. 29 for his translation. This verse is also cited in a slightly different way in the *Cheng Weishi Lun*, CBETA, T31, no. 1585, 10b15–16: "The appearance, which resembles an external object, is the object of the act of perception. What grasps the appearance and self-cognition are respectively the act of perception and the effect [of that act]. The substance of these three is not differentiated."
31. See Iso Kern, "The Structure of Consciousness According to Xuanzang," *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 19, no. 3 (1988): 282–95.
32. Zhixu, *Dacheng Qixin Lun Liewangshu*《大乘起信論裂網疏》, CBETA, T44, no. 1850, 437c11–16.
33. See *Cheng Weishi Lun*, CBETA, T31, no. 1585, 10b17–28.
34. Taehyeon, *Dacheng Qixin Lun Neiyi Luetan Ji*, CBETA, T44, no. 1849, 416b19–20.
35. Zongmi, *Yuanren Lun*, CBETA, T45, no. 1886, 710b13–16.
36. See Zongmi, *Chanyuan Zhuquan Ji Douxu*, CBETA, T48, no. 2015, 409–13 and Peter Gregory, *Tsung-mi and the Sinification of Buddhism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 196–205.
37. See John Berthrong, "Suddenly Deluded Thoughts Arise," *Society for the Study of Chinese Religions Bulletin* 8 (1980): 32–55, esp. 45ff.
38. Zhili, *Siming Zunzhe Jiaoxing Lu*《四明尊者教行錄》, CBETA, T46, no. 1937, 900b29.
39. It should be noted that Daoism and some trends of Neo-Confucianism, probably under the influence of Buddhism, also take quietitude seriously.