Normative competence, autonomy, and oppression
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5206/fpq/2022.1.13639Keywords:
Autonomy, Feminist Philosophy, Autonomy theory, Social OppressionAbstract
Natalie Stoljar posits that purely procedural theories of autonomy are unable to explain the ‘feminist intuition’, which is the idea that the internalization of false and oppressive norms are incompatible with autonomy. She claims instead that an account based on ‘normative competence’ – which requires true beliefs and critical reflection – can explain why oppressive norms should be excluded as legitimate decision-making inputs. On my view, however, the normative competence approach is subject to a worrying problem. While Stoljar's view successfully problematizes the internalization of oppression, her view misattributes non-autonomy also to those who perpetrate the oppression. I suggest that this is implausible, arguing instead that we can establish an asymmetry of autonomy between those who oppress others and those who are made target of oppression.
Downloads
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2022 J. Y. Lee
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
The authors of work published in FPQ under the Creative Commons CC BY 4.0 License retain copyright to their work without restrictions and publication rights without restrictions. However, we request that authors include some sort of acknowledgement that the work was previously published in FPQ if part or all of a paper published in FPQ is used elsewhere.