Speciesism and Sentientism
Many philosophers accept both of the following claims: (1) consciousness matters morally, and (2) species membership does not matter morally. In other words, many reject speciesism but accept what we might call 'sentientism'. But do the reasons against speciesism yield analogous reasons
against sentientism, just as the reasons against racism and sexism are thought to yield analogous reasons against speciesism? This paper argues that speciesism is disanalogous to sentientism (as well as racism and sexism). I make a case for the following asymmetry: (a) some non-humans clearly
have interests, but (b) no non-conscious entities clearly have interests. This asymmetry, I argue, renders sentientism immune to the principal argument against speciesism.
Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: Department of Philosophy, Classics, History of Art & Ideas, University of Oslo, Norway
Publication date: 01 March 2022
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