Abstract
In this reply to Alex Byrne’s comment on our book Narrow Content (Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne 2018), we address Byrne’s claim that internalism is best framed as a thesis about properties of agents rather than properties of thoughts, arguing that a thought-based framework is better suited to standard internalist ambitions. We also discuss whether there is any prospect for a view in the internalist spirit that prescinds from multiplying indices beyond worlds, address Byrne’s ordinary language considerations against an ontology of thoughts, and briefly evaluate the prospects for giving narrow content ascriptions explanatory life by using them to give an account of how things perceptually seem.
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Notes
Thanks to Daniel Stoljar for discussion here.
Reference
Byrne, A. (2020). ‘Comment on Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne, Narrow Content’, Philosophical Studies, this issue
Davies, M. (1991). Individualism and perceptual content. Mind, 100, 461–484.
Yli-Vakkuri, J., & John, H. (2018). Narrow Content. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cited as ‘NC’.
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Yli-Vakkuri, J., Hawthorne, J. Reply to Byrne. Philos Stud 178, 3049–3054 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-020-01551-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-020-01551-7