² Hirzel, R., Der Selbstmord (Darmstadt 1908; rpt.1966)Google Scholar; Katsouris, A.G., ‘The suicide motif in ancient drama’, Dioniso xlvii (1976) 5–36Google Scholar; Aigner, H., Der Selbstmord im Mythos (Diss. Graz 1980)Google Scholar; Walcot, P., ‘Suicide, a question of motivation’, in Studies in Honour of T.B.L. Webster i (Bristol 1986) 2311–7Google Scholar; Seidensticker, B., ‘Die Wahl des Todes bei Sophokles’, in Sophocle (Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique xxix (1982)) 105–53Google Scholar; van Hooff, A.J.L., From Autothanasia to Suicide: Self-killing in Classical Antiquity (London 1990).CrossRefGoogle Scholar Hirzel collected a vast quantity of data about suicide in classical antiquity with emphasis on the relationship between suicide and society; Katsouris and Aigner demonstrated the variety of reasons, methods and patterns of suicide in classical literature by analysing each case in every genre; Walcot cited Durkheimian sociology to point out the great influence on classical suicides of the Greek peoples’ sense of honour and the social pressures they were under; Seidensticker applied the theory of modem clinical psychology to demonstrate the multiplicity of causation of Sophoklean suicides; and van Hooff, who examined 960 cases of both real and fictional ‘self-killing’ from every genre of the literature in the Graeco-Roman world, compiled almost exhaustive statistics on the incidence of suicide and showed the predominance of the sense of honour in the causation of suicide in classical life and literature. (The multifariousness of his sources, from historiography to mythography, may discredit his statistics, but they contain some truth that we cannot ignore.)

³ See n. 7 below.

⁴ Studies which have dealt with the motif of suicide in Herakles are: von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, U., Euripides Herakles² (Berlin 1895)Google Scholar; Chalk, H.H.O., ‘Arete and Bia in Euripides' Herakles’ JHS lxxxii (1962) 7–18CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Adkins, A.W.H., ‘Values in Euripides' Hecuba and Hercules Furens’, CQ xvi (1966) 209–19Google Scholar; James, C., ‘Whether 'tis nobler…: some thoughts on the fate of Sophocles' Ajax and Euripides' Heracles, with special reference to the question of suicide’, Pegasus xii (1969) 10–20Google Scholar; Schwinge, M., Die Funktion der zweiteiligen Komposition im Herakles des Euripides (Diss. Tübingen 1972)Google Scholar; de Romilly, J., ‘Le refus du suicide dans I'Héraclès d' Euripide’, Archaiognosia i (1980) 1–9Google Scholar; Furley, D., ‘Euripides on the sanity of Herakles’, in Studies in honour of T.B.L. Webster i (Bristol 1986) 102–13.Google ScholarBond, G.W., Euripides: Heracles (Oxford 1981)Google Scholar, is a commentary which here and there considers the issue. The study of C. James cited above is a concise collection of the reference data for the motif of suicide in Herakles and Aias; this is an interesting article in itself, but does not seem to contribute directly to one's understanding of either play. Studies mentioned in nn. 2 and 4 will be cited by author's name only.

⁵ Wilamowitz 127 f.; Chalk 10; Adkins 218; de Romilly 8. The controversy between Chalk and Adkins is reviewed concisely in Furley's article (102 f.) which is itself a criticism of the latter's argument. Chalk offers insight into Amphitryon's and Herakles' endurance, but his application of the word aretē seems nonetheless fallacious. On the other hand, few critics seem to have estimated in due detail Adkins' argument on our play. See the end of II(d), especially n. 37 below.

⁶ The quotation is from Chalk 10. The same phrase is also quoted by Adkins 210.

⁷ For example, Schwinge has investigated with rigour the relationship between the first and the second parts of the play, but the only tragic reaction that she finds common to Megara and Amphitryon in the first part and Herakles in the second part is simply that they choose to die (131): she has not marked what is common to their argument for the choice of death. Chalk (9 f.) has noticed that the endurance which Amphitryon displays at 105–6 is a key to the unity of the play (see n. 11 and n. 31 below, and Stinton, T.C.W., ‘Hamartia in Aristotle and Greek tragedy’ CQ xxv (1975) 251Google Scholar, rpt. in his Collected papers on Greek tragedy (Oxford 1989) 181; cf. Bond xxiii), yet he has failed to notice the way in which Amphitryon's argument for contemplating self-murder subsequently develops.

⁸ Schwinge (37 f. and 40) has pointed out perceptively that the intention to die of both Megara and Amphitryon expressed in the First Epeisodion derives not from their personal wish to die but from something else; but she has not traced the earlier development of their arguments.

⁹ Burnett, A.P., Catastrophe survived (Oxford 1971) 159 f.Google Scholar, is right to see much importance in Megara's act of leaving ‘the protection of Zeus’ altar', which means ‘a violation of the rules of the suppliant plot’, cf. Gould, J., ‘Hiketeia’, JHS xciii (1973) 74–103.CrossRefGoogle Scholar We do not have to agree with Burnett, however, that we are expected to find Megara's ‘active unfaith’ in her act. Bond's refutation is just (Bond xix, n. 10). Euripides employed the suppliant plot in order to provide Megara and Amphitryon with time to deliberate on the relevance of choosing death and time to change their minds.

¹⁰ Cf. Bond ad 90.

¹¹ Amphitryon insinuates at 105–6, with rhetorical skill, that a man can be aristos simply by having hope (of any kind), but it is important to recognise that it is not hope in general that deters him, but the specific hope of helping Herakles' children. He is obliged to protect Herakles' children (44–7) when he forbears to accept death and adheres to the possibility of helping them. We must understand that it is in this particular situation that Amphitryon insists that one should not give up hope. He is loyal to the contention that if a man has a duty and there is a possibility that he can perform it, he must not abandon his duty in desperation. This is why later, when he chooses death, he points out repeatedly that it is no longer possible to help the children (318, 326). The same attitude can be seen in Herakles, too, when he rejects suicide. See n. 31 below.

¹² Although his figures are valuable, we must admit that van Hooff's statistics include some arbitrary data (e.g. on the accomplishment of Iphis' suicide, and on the motive for the suicide of Haimon, etc., in his Appendix A). At the same time, a more rigorous distinction between accomplished and merely contemplated suicide would have increased the utility of his statistics. As to the current issue, the numbers cited above are produced by his including the ‘soft cases’ (i.e. the cases of unaccomplished suicides), but we need to know the figure for the accomplished male suicides. It may be useful to look at what he has shown, though without distinguishing between male and female suicides: if we exclude the ‘soft cases’, the proportion of the population of suicides out of dolor falls from 13% to 6%, while that of pudor suicides rises from 32% to 35% and that of desperata salus suicide from 22% to 24%. This suggests that, if we look at the accomplished male suicides, the proportion of the cases motivated by dolor is likely to be less than 17%, while those motivated by pudor and desperata salus are nearly 30% and 19% respectively. Consequently, dolor, though it is ranked as the third motive of Greek male suicides in van Hooff's statistics, would be ranked far below the first two motives if the soft cases were to be excluded. Accordingly, ‘shame’ and ‘despair’ will prove to be the two major motives of accomplished Greek male suicides.

¹³ In Hipp., when Phaidra reveals her intention to kill herself, the Chorus says nothing to rebuke her (431 f., 483); and when she confirms her will, they do no more than say ‘speak no ill words!’. When, later, she is found hanged, they hesitate to save her, but choose to leave her to die (782–5). Here, we detect their passive approval of her suicide. Cf. Barrett, W.S., Euripides: Hippolytos (Oxford 1964) ad 784–5.Google ScholarOd. xi 271–3 is said to offer a similar example, where the poet narrates the suicide of Epikaste without the slightest hint of blame in his tone. Cf. Fedden, H.R., Suicide: a social and historical study (London 1938Google Scholar; rpt. New York 1980) 55; Aigner 46; Alvarez, A., The savage god: a study of suicide (London 1971; Pelican ed., 1974) 76.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Plato, who expresses a rather strict opposition to suicide in Phd. 62b–c, nevertheless states in his Nomoi (ca. 360–48 BC) ix 873c, that suicide is not an act of cowardice if a man kills himself while suffering an ‘exceedingly painful fate’ or ‘unmanageable shame’. Cf. Walcot 231; and n. 30 below. This suggests that in the first half of the fourth century a suicide committed because of disgrace and hopelessness was to be considered justified; and there is no positive reason to believe that people's general attitude to suicide would have changed greatly between the time of Euripides.

¹⁵ Cf. MacDowell, D.M., Athenian homicide law (Manchester 1963) 117–23Google Scholar; Gagarin, M., Drakon and early Athenian homicide law (New Haven 1981) 118–24.Google Scholar Drakon's law on homicide (IG i² 115), which was still valid in Athens in 409/8 BC, declared that a man found guilty of unintentional homicide had to go into exile. MacDowell (120) concludes convincingly that no alternative kind of penalty was permitted in Athens. Gagarin (118) asserts further that capital punishment would be enforced only if the homicide did not go into exile submissively.

¹⁶ Amathia is usually not a word that indicates lack of prudence or thought but rather a lack of knowledge or learning; but de Romilly (5) is right to understand that by this word Theseus is condemning suicide as a ‘conduite impulsive et irréfléchie’.

¹⁷ Cf. III below.

¹⁸ Schlesier, R., ‘Héraclès et la critique des dieux chez Euripide’, ASNP xv (1985) 33Google Scholar, justly describes line 1340 as a ‘protestation générale’.

¹⁹ Bond ad 1340. As to the corruption of this line, we can follow Bond and supply γάρ, if necessary. It is true that Herakles later in fact accepts Theseus' offer, but it cannot be a good reason for Halleran to maintain that tad' cannot refer to Theseus' offer of gifts and other things. Cf. Halleran, M.R., ‘Rhetoric, irony and the ending of Euripides' Herakles’;, CA v (1986) 175.Google Scholar

²⁰ E.g. Lesky, A., Greek tragic poetry, tr. Dillon, M. (Göttingen 1972Google Scholar; Eng. tr., New Haven 1983) 280; de Romilly 3. Some critics, however, have felt that the motivation by which Herakles suddenly comes to recognise so keenly the cowardice of suicide is insufficient. In order to attribute Herakles' rejection of suicide to Theseus' appeal to his sense of honour, they think it necessary to supply a more forceful argument for Theseus in the supposed lacuna post 1312. de Romilly, Ibid., is attracted to this idea. Knox, B.M.W., in Easterling, P.E. and Knox, B.M.W. ed., The Cambridge history of classical literature i (Cambridge 1985) 328Google Scholar, and Lloyd-Jones, H., The justice of Zeus (Berkeley 1971) 154Google Scholar, mention the importance of what seems to have been lost in this lacuna. Bond (ad 1313) reports similar views held by M. Pohlenz and E. Kroeker. Certainly one might well suppose Theseus' speech to suffer from a lengthy lacuna if the two speeches were meant to balance each other in length, but this is not a necessity. If we can pursue an interpretation, a reasonable one, with Bond's simple and short conjecture for the lacuna, we should refrain from expecting more where nothing is guaranteed. The motivation of the rejection of suicide lies elsewhere, as will be seen later. Halleran (n. 19) also believes that Herakles' rejection of suicide results from something other than Theseus' appeal to the sense of honour, although there is a distance between his interpretation and mine.

²¹ This notion is somewhat similar to that of Desch, W., ‘Der Herakles des Euripides und die Götter’, Philologus cxxx (1986) 20Google Scholar, and of Schwinge 175.

²² We might even suspect that any such recognition of the cowardice of suicide would not be enough to enable him to reject it unless Theseus also rescued him from the obloquy of hopeless disgrace; but this is a point open to scepticism. Although it would be rather strange if he were ignorant of the notion of cowardly suicide, the fact is simply that there is no clear indication as to whether he has had any thoughts about the cowardice of suicide before Theseus' offer of help. However, since he was convinced that his honour had already been irreparably and fatally damaged, it is quite understandable that he has not been influenced by such a consideration until this moment. Cf. II(c) and IV(a) below.

²³ Schlesier (n. 18) 32.

²⁴ Schwinge 160 and Zürcher, W., ‘Die Darstellung des Menschen im Drama des Euripides’, Schweizerische Beitr. z. Altertumsw. ii (1947) 94–6Google Scholar have observed that in his speech Herakles gives less weight to his grief and self-reproach than to his ill-fortune and despair as the ground for his determination to kill himself. However, their explanation for this is highly speculative: the latter assumes ‘a change in Herakles’ in the course of his justification speech, while the former supposes the hero's shifting from emotional disturbance to the realization of his own fate. Both have failed to recognise that during the speech the hero becomes increasingly reluctant to raise the topic of grief and self-reproach. See II(c) below.

²⁵ The fact that it is exclusively women who ‘die of achos’ is evident in the contrast between Oidipous and Epikaste in Od. xi; between Laertes and Antikleia in Od. xi and xv; and between Kreon and Eurydike in Ant‥ What Oidipous endures are his pangs of self-reproach for incest, and maybe patricide, besides those of grief for the loss of his parents; what Laertes bears is undoubtedly the grief of losing his son, while Kreon bears both grief and remorse for causing the death of his son.

²⁶ Throughout the whole of Greek myth there are hardly any examples of males who die of grief owing to bereavement. Aigeus, who throws himself from the cliff on seeing the black sail on his son's ship, is surely a rare instance, and it is remarkable that there seems to have been no literature in the archaic and classical period that dealt with his suicide. For the variety of versions of the legend, cf. Frazer's note on the legend of Aigeus' death in Frazer, J.G., Apollodorus ii (Loeb 1921) 137 (n. 4).Google Scholar A. van Hooff (104) observes that suicide as a result of grief is a feminine action.

²⁷ One may sense self-reproach in Sophokles' Aias, when he says, ‘I have let the accursed men escape my hands’ (Aias 371–72), when he compares himself with his glorious father (434–40) or presumes his father's embarrassment at his empty-handed homecoming (462–5). Although he later kills himself, nobody will admit that he acts out of self-reproach when he stabs himself, for his speech just before his suicide has contained no trace of such feelings but is full of his grudges against others.

²⁸ Of course we can think of several reasons for Haimon's suicide: besides the pangs of bereavement and self-reproach, he must fear the people's judgement and contempt for his spitting in Creon's face and for his lunging at his father with his sword, as well as their derision for his failure to carry out the patricide. In general, of course, it is mostly impossible to discern what are and what are not the exact reasons for any suicide. I do not intend to link Haimon's suicide to his grief and self-reproach more closely than to other reasons. I only say that his suicide is certainly exceptional enough, for he kills himself in the state of bereavement and in the situation where the feeling of self-reproach is to be expected.

²⁹ Cf. II. xxiv 46–48.

³⁰ Plato, Nomoi ix 873c attributed suicide to idleness and unmanly cowardice (argiai de kai anandrias deiliai), if it was not due to an exceedingly painful fate (periōdynōi tychēi) or unmanageable shame (aporou aischynēs). Herakles might also have appeared short-tempered or irascible, for suicide was thought to be committed out of anger or rashness: in Antigone the Messenger describes the motive for Haimon's otherwise inexplicable suicide as ‘enraged with himself’ (hautōi cholōtheis: 1235); Aristotle, EN 1138a 10, counted anger (orgēn) as a motive of suicide, along with poverty, the pangs of love, pain and cowardice. Perhaps for this reason Herakles' wish to kill himself is described as leontos agriouk thumon (1211). Anger and rashness were not necessarily regarded as negative ethical values in ancient Greece, particularly before Plato; but here line 1212 (dromon epi phonion anosiori) gives a negative twist to the hero's wild temper.

³¹ To put it more clearly, Herakles abandons the idea of suicide since, as an escape from disgrace has been offered to him, he can no longer claim the licence to evade the duty of enduring grief and self-reproach. It is shrewd of him to explain his choice by comparing his case to that of a soldier who resists the enemies' arrows (1350); but what he has just done is, strictly speaking, not equal to what a good soldier resolves to do upon the battlefield, that is, never to run away but, whatever happens, to stick to his post as long as his duty lasts, (cf. 162–4; Plato, Apol. 28e–29a; Herodotos, i 82, vii 232; Thuc. ii 42–4.) As regards his current agony (setting aside his previous labours), Herakles has only passed the test of not giving up this duty as long as it is practicable. This behaviour is exactly the same as that of Amphitryon which we observed during our discussion of the Parodos and the First Epeisodion. (See n. 11 above.) Chalk offers the insight that Amphitryon in the first part and Herakles in the latter part of the play have a virtue in common, namely endurance, and to the same extent, whether or not it can be called aretē. (See Chalk 9 f., 12; but see also Adkins 212–3.)

³² A further analysis of the figure which Herakles presents at the end of this play is to be found in IV below.

³³ Orphies and Pythagoreans seem to have assumed a totally negative attitude toward suicide, irrespective of its motives, which reminds us of that of the Christians. Cf. Plato, Phd. 62b; Athenaios iv 157c. And the followers of Plato inherited it, according to Diogenes Laertios ix 120. Cf. van Hooff 192; Garland, R., The Greek way of death (London 1985), 98.Google Scholar It is understandable that the ancient Greeks, like every other race or society, issued general injunctions against suicide. Cf. Strachan, J.C.G., ‘Who did forbid suicide at Phaedo 62b?', CQ xx (1970) 216CrossRefGoogle Scholar; for the reasons why most societies have abhorred personal (as opposed to institutional) suicide, cf. Fedden (n. 13) 17, 27 ff., particularly 42 ff. Positive evidence is too scarce, however, for us to assume that the prohibition prevailed in its full strictness in early fifth-century Greece. It is conceivable that the absolutely condemnatory attitude was known to Euripides as de Romilly (8) suggests, but we need not conclude that it was the attitude which he allowed to prevail in this play.

³⁴ For the textual problem post 1312, cf. n. 20 above.

³⁵ E.g. Alkestis in Alk., Makaria in Hkld., Polyxene in Hek., Iphigeneia in I.A., Menoikeus in Pho. The suicide of Phaidra in Hippolytos is also motivated primarily by her sense of wounded honour, although other motives occur to her later to justify her suicide.

³⁶ Cf. the examples of Achilleus and Hektor in Il. xviii 31–4, 98–121 and xxii 99–110, and the accounts in Plato, Nomoi 873c.

³⁷ Adkins 218 f. His argument would have been more apposite if he had written ‘under grief and self-reproach’ instead of ‘under any circumstances’ just after the phrase ‘refusing to commit suicide’ on p. 218. Furley's refutation of his theory (111) is logical and cogent in itself, but Adkins is still right to insist that no new conception of aretē is demonstrated in this play. Doubtless Adkins's argument is not perfect: Stinton (n. 7) 251 f. (rpt. 181 f.) who was aware of the merits of Chalk's view, aptly called Adkins’ attack on Chalk a ‘playing with words’; and it was certainly Adkins' mistake that he refused to recognize what Chalk tried to show by using the notion of ‘new aretē’. However, we should notice that Adkins' article is not merely a commentary on the term aretē. It includes a sound interpretation of the play. Herakles' rejection of suicide is a reaction to the change of his circumstances, and his sense of honour works only passively. Adkins offers a rare example of a scholar who has marked the passivity of Herakles' rejection of suicide.

³⁸ Lesky (n. 20) 281 f.; Kitto, H.D.F., Greek tragedy ³ (London 1961) 247 f.Google Scholar; B.M.W. Knox (n. 20) 322; Greenwood, L.H.G., Aspects of Euripidean tragedy (Cambridge 1953) 62, 64, 81 ff.Google Scholar; Verrall, A.W., Four plays of Euripides (Cambridge 1905) 191 ff..Google Scholar A.P. Burnett (n. 9) 175 f., denies that there is any contradiction between Herakles' statement of faith and the myth quoted and acted out in the play, but she does so in a peculiar way. We must be cautious of her theory, as B.M.W. Knox advises us: ‘Review: Catastrophe Survived’, CP lxvi (1972) rpt. in Word and action (Baltimore 1979) 340. The hero's argument must not be removed from its context, as Bond (ad 1341–6) warns.

³⁹ Greenwood (n. 38) 63–80; Bond xxii and ad 1341–46. Halleran (n. 19) 177–80, and Burnett (n. 9) 176 have tried to absolve Herakles from responsibility for this impious statement. Halleran implies that at 1341–6 Herakles is imprudent: he regards it as the ‘Outburst of a proud man’ in his ‘anger’ against the gods who have humiliated him; and Burnett points out that the hero is aberrant at ‘his most faithless point of despair’ when he attributes mean jealousy to Hera. These views are, however, largely subjective.

⁴⁰ Stinton, T.C.W., ‘“Si credere dignum est”: some expressions of disbelief in Euripides and others’, PCPS n.s.xxii (1976) 83 f.Google Scholar Schlesier (n.18) 34 seems to take a position close to Stinton's on this point. She makes a neat and helpful distinction between Herakles' two criticisms of the gods: namely, the moral reproach directed against them personally and the philosophical doubt about anthropomorphism in general. Cf. ibid. 10 f.

⁴¹ Desch (n. 21) 16, 23, claims that Zeus is not orthōs theos for Herakles and that Hera's offence is an ‘Eifersuch einer übermächtigen Frau gegenüber seiner Mutter’. Moreover, he is right to understand that Herakles considers that in actuality the gods do not behave like gods and denies to them ‘die Göttlichkeit im wahrsten Sinne’.

⁴² In a sense, Herakles' theology sounds odd only superficially. Winnington-Ingram and Knox have sensibly written that the traditional gods in Greek poetry do not possess an unearthly existence endowed with a higher, superior form of morality, but symbolise the uncontrollable forces of human life: Winnington-Ingram, R.P., ‘Hippolytus: a study in causation’, in Euripide (Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique vi (1960)) 169–97Google Scholar; Knox (n. 20) 322.

⁴³ Cf. Halleran (n. 19) 173. The role of hopelessness in our play has already been explained in I above. See also II (a) above.

Along with Desch (n. 21) 19, I deem it unnecessary to think that two lines are lacking after 1241. At 1240 Theseus uses the word ouranos to describe the degree of Herakles' adversity. He implies that even the heavens know of the hero's adversity. This specifies the meaning of toigar at 1241 as the following: ‘I intend to die because the gods have been indifferent to my calamities till now, and because I do not want to bear any longer such cruel adversity’. 1242 is apparently grounded on the idea that a suicide would annoy the gods. Since Euripides was not interested in explaining how a suicide would annoy the gods, it is therefore rash to understand that the issue of the line is the gods’ concern about others’ opinion of them, an understanding to which Desch's explanation of 1343 may lead.

⁴⁵ The general conception of rhetoric current at the time was that the rhetor had to be persuasive about whatever theme was chosen, according to Plato, Gorgias 457a. We can sense in the character Herakles the influence of rhetoric and the sophistic movement which flourished in fifth-century Athens. Cf. Buxton, R.G.A., Persuasion in Greek tragedy: a study of Peitho (Cambridge 1982), 10–20.Google Scholar The fact that Herakles, not apprehensive of appearing inconsistent, denies the authority of the mythical gods soon after making use of it in his argument reminds us of Euripides’ famous fragment 189: ‘A man may make two sides to an argument on any matter, if he has a skill in speaking’ (tr. C. Collard, adapted). For the use of the myth for the sake of rhetoric among the ancient Greeks, see Veyne, P., Les grecs ont-ils cru à leurs mythes? (Paris 1983), ch. 7.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴⁶ Van Hooff 131. (cf. also 90, 108, 120).

⁴⁷ It seems that among the Athenians of the age of Attic tragedy (5c. BC) there were those who believed and those who disbelieved in the sensitivity of a deceased person. Examples of the belief that a deceased person still feels some pain are seen in Sophokles' El. 400; O.T. 1371–4; Euripides' El. 684; Lysias, xii, 99 f. Those of disbelief in O.K. 955; Trach. 1173; Euripides' Hik. 86 f., 1004–5; Hipp. 599 f.; Bac. 1361 ff.; Lysias, vi, 20. Greek ambivalence over the issue can be traced early in Od. xi and xxiv. Herakles 490 f., along with Sophokles' El. 355 f., hints at an agnostic attitude that falls between the two extreme positions, and this attitude seems to have prevailed into the next age (4c. BC): e.g. Lykourgos, , Leokr. 136Google Scholar; Hyperides vi 43; Isokrates xix 42; Xenophon, , Kyr. viii 7.19–22Google Scholar, etc. However, Aischines, i, 14; Plato, Phd. 69e–70a and Menandros, fr. 648 offer evidence that disbelief could still be found in the fourth century. What is important for us is that none of those who wish for death in Greek Tragedy believe in pain after death. For a general survey, see Dover, K.J., Greek popular morality in the time of Plato and Aristotle (Oxford 1974), 243 f, 266 f.Google Scholar; Burkert, W., Greek religion, tr. Raffan, J. (Stuttgart 1977Google Scholar; Eng.tr. Oxford 1985), 196 f.; Mikalson, J.D., Athenian popular religion (Chapel Hill 1983), 77 f.Google Scholar, 81.

⁴⁸ Since the pain of disgrace is intimately related to a subject's awareness of the scrutiny and reports of others, the effect of cutting off such communication weighs considerably with him. This is why Herakles veils his head when Theseus appears (1160, 1199 ff.) and wishes to evade association with the Thebans and the eyes of the Greeks (1281–1300). Many similar cases can be found in Greek Tragedy: e.g. Aias 460 f., 658 f.; Ant. 1321, 1339; Trach. 799 f.; O.T. 1410–12; Hipp. 1290 f.; Or. 460 ff. Certainly their sense of honour and dishonour oppressed the Greeks very strongly as Walcott, op.cit., argues, but the conditions of their shame reveal their general recognition that disgrace was not a perpetual thing nor was it an absolute motive for suicide.

⁴⁹ Disgrace could fade from people's memory, or be cancelled or replaced by honour re-acquired. We can think of the examples of Achilleus (Il. xviii 90–3, 121), Aristodemos (Herodotos vii 231; ix 71), Alkibiades (Xenophon Hell. i 4.8; Ploutarchos, , Alkibiades 32 ff.Google Scholar), etc. This is the basis of Theseus' argument that the city of Athens can redeem Herakles' honour (1328–35), when answering the latter's argument that he will be perpetually disgraced. wherever he goes.

⁵⁰ In his last years Sophokles, too, was interested in blocking the suicide of his heroes. In Phil. he creates a situation in which Odysseus' interference hinders Philoktetes from committing suicide to prevent falling into a humiliating situation, while the rest of the play focuses on the hero's returning to a positive attitude towards life. In O.K., Oidipous recounts that he, deprived of the freedom to kill himself, has, as a part of his penance, survived a terrible ordeal and has consequently acquired enough patience to approach his promised land. In both plays Sophokles absorbed the motif of blocked suicide into the framework of tragedy, but he did not analyse the hidden motives of suicide as Euripides obviously wished to do. His purpose was to introduce into his plays the notion of a reward received for giving up the idea of suicide, whether voluntarily or not, and enduring calamities. For Philoktetes it is the divine promise of his future exploits and glory in the Trojan War, and of the magical healing of his wounds (1421). For Oidipous it is his mysterious end which is ‘blessed', ‘wonderful’ and ‘without pain’ (1663–5, 1720), and which means his becoming an everlasting champion of the Athenians (92, 1524 f.). It is significant that Sophokles makes the turning away from suicide result in the supernatural reward of the subjects, while Euripides rewards Herakles with the distinguished but mere name of a man of endurance. For Sophokles' treatment of Herakles' endurance (while in disgrace) and his blocked suicide, see my, ‘The flammentod of Herakles in Sophokles’ Trachinial', Classical Studies (Kyoto) viii (1990) 55–70.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Sheppard, J.T., ‘The formal beauty of the Heracles’, CQ x (1916) 72–9CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Chalk 14; Bond xxiii and ad 1425 f.; Adkins 219 (cf. 215); Furley 111. Rare exceptions are Burnett (n. 9) 181, n. 29, who doubts that philia is the unifying motif of the play, and Schlesier (n. 18) 32, n. 87, who criticises the tendency to see importance in the motif of philia and so attribute a ‘happy end’ to the play. She is right to deny a happy ending to our play (Ibid. 37–9), but we have not enough reason to belittle the role of this motif in it.

⁵² Bond ad 1347 ff. I follow Bond in taking μυρίων not μυρίαν, at 1352.

⁵³ Adkins 215 f., 219. The inconvenience of Adkins' theory of philia is pointed out rightly by Bond ad 57; on 1426 he translates agathoi philoi simply as ‘effective (friends)’.

⁵⁴ Chalk 11. Cf. Adkins 215 f.

⁵⁵ de Romilly (6 f.) is thus refuted. As to the invention of Euripides, we know that some legends had told of Herakles' murder of his children before Euripides wrote our play, but little is known as to what the legendary outcome of the murder had been. Cf. Bond xxviii f.; Frazer (n. 26) i 183, n3. It is likely that Euripides invented a Herakles who decides and insists, if only temporally, on suicide in the face of grief, regret, the threat of indignity and hopelessness after he has murdered his children. That is, as Bond says, there is a possibility that Euripides intended to emphasise Herakles' catastrophe when he reversed the traditional chronology of the hero's murder while mad and his labours as atonement for it.

⁵⁶ An early draft of this paper was written during my research at the University of Bristol where I was supported by the Overseas Research Students Awards, and in a later version was read at meetings of the Classical Society of Kyoto University and of Hokkaido University. I am most grateful to Dr R.G.A. Buxton for insightful and encouraging supervision in Bristol and to Professor J.Gould for later draft reading and valuable advice. I wish also to thank the audiences in Kyoto and Sapporo, especially Professor M. Oka for shrewd comments.