Abstract
The central claim of this essay is that many deflationary theories of truth are variants of the correspondence theory of truth. Essential to the correspondence theory of truth is the proposal that objective features of the world are the truthmakers of statements. Many advocates of deflationary theories (including F. P. Ramsay, P. F. Strawson and Paul Horwich) remain committed to this proposal. Although T-sentences (statements of the form “s is true iff p”) are presented by advocates of deflationary theories of truth as truisms or analytic truths, T-sentences are often understood as entailing commitment to the central proposal of the correspondence theory.
摘要
许多真理收缩论都是真理符合论的变种。 真理符合论的一个关键主张是认为世界的客观特征是陈述的使真者。 许多真理收缩论的倡导者(包括拉姆齐、 斯特劳森、 霍维奇)都坚持对这一观点的承诺。 虽然T-语句(“s 是真的, 当且仅当p” 这种形式的陈述)被真理收缩论的倡导者看作自明之理或分析的真理, T-语句通常被理解为蕴涵着对真理符合论的核心观点的承诺。
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Young, J.O. Truth, correspondence and deflationism. Front. Philos. China 4, 563–575 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11466-009-0037-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11466-009-0037-y