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The many faces of moralized self-control: Puritanical morality is not reducible to cooperation concerns

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 October 2023

Netanel Y. Weinstein
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR, USA netanelw@uoregon.edu, baldwin@uoregon.edu
Dare A. Baldwin
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR, USA netanelw@uoregon.edu, baldwin@uoregon.edu

Abstract

Fitouchi et al.'s moral disciplining approach highlights the significant role social evaluations of self-control appear to play in human moral judgment. At the same time, attributing the wide range of puritanical concerns to a singular focus on self-control seems unwarranted. A more pluralistic approach would enrich understanding of moral judgment in all its cultural and historical diversity.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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