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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 30 January 2017
In the fourth book of the Aeneid Virgil presents the epic's titular hero as fated to found Rome, initially neglecting and ultimately reassuming his mission, all the while being accorded praise or blame for his progress. In this article I shall re-examine Virgil's use of the specifically Chrysippan Stoic doctrine of Fate and human responsibility in Aeneid 4, with a focus on three key points: the role of assent in creating a compatibility of Fate and human responsibility; the ‘Lazy Argument’, the position that Chrysippus combatted, that if things are fated they will happen without any effort on my part; and the Stoic conception of Fate as a chain of causes that includes human assents. I shall argue that Virgil's impeccable, almost obsessive, scholarship results in a detailed homage to Chrysippan Stoic doctrine that actually alludes to its finer points. I restrict my comments to Book Four on the grounds that the Dido-episode tests to the limit Aeneas’ resolve to ‘follow … Italy’ (361), even if non sponte, and that the juxtaposition with Dido sheds added light on the picture. I hope thereby to contribute to a topic of research that deserves renewed investigation using the discoveries in Hellenistic philosophy over the last two generations.
My thanks to Anthony A. Long, Malcolm Schofield, Richard Thomas, Andreas T. Zanker and CQ’s anonymous reader for much helpul comment on an earlier draft of this paper.
1 On the phrase see below, pp. 588–92.
2 I am emphatically not presenting Aeneas as a Stoic and therefore ‘good’ character, and Dido as a non-Stoic and therefore ‘bad’ character; against such constructs, see Bowra, ὔὔC.M., ‘Aeneas and the Stoic ideal’, G&R 3 (1933), 8–21 Google Scholar, reprinted in Harrison, S.J. (ed.), Oxford Readings in Virgil's Aeneid (Oxford, 1990), 363–77Google Scholar and Edwards, M.W., ‘The expression of Stoic ideas in the Aeneid ’, Phoenix 14 (1960), 151–65CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
3 Exceptions: Bowra (n. 2) considers the character of Aeneas in the light of Stoic doctrine concerning virtue; Bailey, C., Religion in Virgil (Oxford, 1935), 204–40Google Scholar makes brief and undocumented reference to Stoic theory on fate, the gods and pronoia in the Aeneid at pp. 221 and 232; Carlsson, G., ‘The hero and fate in Virgil's Aeneid ’, Eranos 43 (1945), 118–22Google Scholar indeed argues for a Stoic influence on Virgil's Aeneas, but confines himself to the Senecan evidence; Edwards (n. 2) sees Stoic influence on Virgil's expressions of ‘following fate’, but does not explore the Chrysippan influence for which I argue here; Rabel, R.J., ‘Vergil, tops, and the Stoic view of fate’, CJ 77 (1981), 27–31 Google Scholar, followed in part by Feeney, D.C., The Gods in Epic: Poets and Critics of the Classical Tradition (Oxford, 1991), 167 Google Scholar, examines the simile at Aen. 7.378–87 comparing Amata with a top, locating its genesis in what Cicero tells us in the De fato of the use Chrysippus made of the top in his conception of ‘freedom of the will’, and arguing that Allecto ‘furnishes merely the “proximate and auxiliary” cause of the queen's anger’ while ‘for the rest’ Amata acts freely—which comes towards my conclusions, but more is needed on e.g. Chrysippus’ concept of assent and diathesis; Heinze, R. (trans. H. and Harvey, D.H. and Robertson, F.), Virgil's Epic Technique (London, 1993), 225–7, 236–9Google Scholar presents Aeneas as a Stoic man progressing in wisdom and virtue (the prokoptôn) and as the Stoic wise man, and examines the areas where Stoicism (at least the Senecan version at QNat. 2.37 on the efficacy of prayer) allowed that ‘some kind of human freedom of decision’ was possible because ‘only the main outlines of what happens are regarded as laid down by fatum’; finally, Braund, S. Morton, ‘Virgil and the cosmos: religious and philosophical ideas’, in Martindale, C. (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Virgil (Cambridge, 1997), 204–21CrossRefGoogle Scholar puts Virgil's religion and philosophy in the intellectual context of his times, among other things arguing that ‘Despite all arguments to the contrary, humans seem to be entirely subject to [Jupiter's] divine will. Take the case of Aeneas’ departure from Carthage’ (pp. 211–12), a contention to which the present essay may offer a little more in the way of context. But no one considers the evidence of Aeneid 4 for Virgil's presentation of moral responsibility and its possible origin in the specifically Chrysippan psychology of moral responsibility.
4 Williams, G.W., Technique and Ideas in the Aeneid (New Haven and London, 1983), 5 Google Scholar. These findings are paralleled by Williams's view of the gods at pp. 17–39; cf. Camps, W.A., An Introduction to Virgil's Aeneid (Oxford, 1969), 42Google Scholar, and the criticisms of Williams’s position by Feeney (n. 3), 134–7, 172–5.
5 Gell. NA 7.2.3 = SVF 2.1000; Long, A.A. and Sedley, D.N., The Hellenistic Philosophers, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1987), 55K, vol. 1, 336, vol. 2, 337Google Scholar; see further Long and Sedley, 55J-Q, vol. 1, 336–9, vol. 2, 337–40. Except where otherwise indicated, all translations of the Stoic sources are those of Long and Sedley.
6 Div. 1.125–6 = SVF 2.921; Long and Sedley (n. 5), 55L, vol. 1, 337, vol. 2, 337.
7 Fat. 39–43 = SVF 2.974.
8 Fat. 41 = Long and Sedley (n. 5), 62C (5), vol. 1, 387, vol. 2, 383.
9 Fat. 42–3 = SVF 2.974; Long and Sedley (n. 5), 62C (8)–(9), vol. 1, 387–8, vol. 2, 384.
10 Frede, D., ‘Stoic determinism’, in Inwood, B. (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics (Cambridge, 2003), 179–205, at 191–2CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Cf. most recently Gómez, L.L., ‘Chrysippean compatibilistic theory of fate, what is up to us, and moral responsibility’, in Destrée, P., Salles, R. and Zingano, M. (edd.), What is Up to Us? Studies on Agency and Responsibility in Ancient Philosophy (Sankt Augustin, 2014), 121–39Google Scholar, and J.-B. Gourinat, ‘Adsensio in nostra potestate: “from us” and “up to us” in ancient Stoicism’, same vol., 141–50.
11 Fat. 30 = Long and Sedley (n. 5), 55S (2), vol. 1, 339–40, vol. 2, 341.
12 Fat. 29 = Long and Sedley (n. 5), 55S (1), vol. 1, 339, vol. 2, 339–40.
13 Fat. 30 = Long and Sedley (n. 5), 55S (2), vol. 1, 339–40, vol. 2, 341.
14 confatalia, Fat. 28–30 = Long and Sedley (n. 5), 55S, vol. 1, 339–40, vol. 2, 340–1.
15 Ap. Eusebius, Praep. evang. 6.8.25–9 = SVF 2.998; Long and Sedley (n. 5), 62F, vol. 1, 389, vol. 2, 385–6.
16 This is the interpretation of the passage by A.A. Long, ‘Freedom and determinism in the Stoic theory of human action’, in A.A. Long (ed.), Problems in Stoicism (London, 1971), 196 n. 33 and Long and Sedley (n. 5), vol. 1, 343. S. Bobzien, Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy (Oxford, 1998), 182, translating Origen, C. Cels. 2.20, argues that by means of the concept of co-fating reported by Cicero Chrysippus was in fact striking at either the first or the second of the premises of the ‘Lazy Argument’, namely that ‘If it is fated that you will recover from this illness, then, regardless of whether you consult a doctor or you do not consult <a doctor> you will recover’, or ‘If it is fated that you won't recover from this illness, then, regardless of whether you consult a doctor or you do not consult <a doctor> you won't recover’. She argues that Chrysippus thereby shows that purposeful action is not ruled out of court by a belief in determinism; the matter of responsibility is addressed elsewhere, starting with the cylinder and the top.
17 Ap. Eusebius, Praep. evang. 6.8.25–9 = SVF 2.998; Long and Sedley (n. 5), 62F, vol. 1, 389, vol. 2, 385–6.
18 Bobzien (n. 16), 212–13 argues against the equation of Cicero's confatalis and Diogenianus’ synkatheimar<menon>.
19 Gell. NA 7.2.6–13 = SVF 2.1000, Long and Sedley (n. 5), 62D, vol. 1, 388–9, vol. 2, 384–5; see also 62F, J and K, vol. 1, 389, 391–2, vol. 2, 385–6, 388–9.
20 Bobzien (n. 16), 289.
21 Bobzien (n. 16), 290–301.
22 Bobzien (n. 16), 285.
23 Gell. NA 7.2.9 = SVF 2.1000; Long and Sedley (n. 5), 62D (3), vol. 1, 388, vol. 2, 385.
24 Hippolytus, Refutation of All Heresies 1.21 = SVF 2.975; Long and Sedley (n. 5), 62A, vol. 1, 386, vol. 2, 382.
25 See in particular Cic. Acad. post. 1.40–1 = SVF 1.55, 61, 60; Long and Sedley (n. 5), 40B, vol. 1, 242, vol. 2, 243–4; Diog. Laert. 7.46 = SVF 2.53; Long and Sedley (n. 5), 40C, vol. 1, 242, vol. 2, 244, ‘The cognitive, which they [the Stoics] say is the criterion of things, is what arises from what is and is stamped and impressed exactly in accordance with what is. The incognitive is either that which does not arise from what is, or from that which is but not exactly in accordance with what is: one which is not clear or distinct’; and Stob. Ecl. 2.111.18–112.8 = SVF 3.548; Long and Sedley (n. 5), 41G, vol. 1, 256, vol. 2, 258.
26 Diog. Laert. 7.23 = Long and Sedley (n. 5), 62E, vol. 1, 389, vol. 2, 385.
27 Below, pp. 587–92.
28 R. Salles, The Stoics on Determinism and Compatibilism (Aldershot and Burlington, VT, 2005), 91–110; Bobzien (n. 16), 341–3 argues that the connection between ‘dependent on us’ and ‘freedom of will’ was not seen before Epictetus; see also M. Frede (ed. A.A. Long), A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, 2011), 46.
29 How might Virgil have come by such a detailed knowledge of Chrysippus? First, the general view that Stoicism deeply penetrated Roman culture and literature needs no defence here: see, for example, P.A. Brunt (edd. M. Griffin, A. Samuels and M. Crawford), Studies in Stoicism (Oxford, 2013), esp. 275–328, M.L. Colish, The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages, vol. 1, Stoicism in Classical Literature (Studies in the History of Christian Thought 34) (Leiden, 1985), and G. Reydams-Schils, The Roman Stoics: Self, Responsibility, and Affection (Chicago and London, 2005). More particularly, it cannot be conclusively proven either way whether Virgil read Chrysippus himself or was just relying on Cicero's account in the De fato, written in 44 b.c.: Sharples, R.W., Cicero: On Fate (De Fato) & Boethius: The Consolation of Philosophy IV.5–7, V (Philosophiae Consolationis) (Warminster, 1991), 5–6 Google Scholar. Though Cicero covers all the ground in Chrysippan thought that I argue underlies Virgil's presentation of fate in Aeneid 4, the Academic treatise is critical of Chrysippus. It might therefore seem a strange procedure for Virgil to rely on a hostile source for a system which on my submission he puts to positive use. Nor is there any cogent reason to preclude Virgil's direct use of Chrysippus’ On Fate. We can, however, say with certainty that Cicero's treatise will have put Chrysippan doctrine on human responsibility firmly within Roman philosophical discourse immediately preceding the Aeneid’s gestation and composition.
30 The lines are based on Poseidon's prophecy for Aeneas at Il. 20.307–8, where it is said that Aeneas and his descendants will rule over the Trojans, but significantly Virgil widens the hero's rule to that over the whole world.
31 Richard Thomas directs my attention to Aen. 2.711, where Aeneas orders that Creusa should follow him, Anchises and Ascanius longe, ‘at a distance’, in their flight. The upshot is that Aeneas is responsible for the separation. However, Creusa herself in her apparition to Aeneas is made to lay the separation at Fate's door: non haec sine numine diuum | eueniunt; nec te hinc comitem asportare Creusam | fas aut ille sinit superi regnator Olympi (2.777–9). The situation is interestingly amenable to Stoic analysis: Aeneas’ ‘incognitive’ decision is his own, but it sets Fate in motion.
32 It is already at issue when Jupiter first sees Aeneas and Dido oblitos famae melioris amantis (4.221).
33 See Galen, On Hippocrates’ and Plato's Doctrines 4.5 = SVF 3.476: <Chrysippus says> ‘οἰκείως δὲ τῷ τῶν παθῶν γένει ἀποδίδοται καὶ ἡ πτοία κατὰ τὸ ἐνσεσοβημένον τοῦτο καὶ φερόμενον εἰκῇ’, ‘“Fluttering”, too, is properly assigned to the genus of the emotions in accordance with its agitation and being carried along randomly.’ See also SVF 1.206 (Stob. Ecl. 2.7.1, quoting Zeno): ‘πάθος ἐστὶ πτοία ψυχῆς’; SVF 3.378 (Stob. Ecl. 2.88.10).
34 Servius on this word says blanditiis uel subdole circumuenire, which proves that Aeneas is trying to get around her by a subtle stratagem.
35 Plut. Comm. not. 1062B = SVF 3.539; Long and Sedley (n. 5), 61T, vol. 1, 382, vol. 2, 382.
36 See above, n. 25.
37 See below, p. 590.
38 OLD s.v. 5; so too, essentially, L&S s.v. 1.B.(α) ‘of relations of place, to strive to reach a place or limit, to betake one's self to, to go to, to repair or resort to’, also citing this passage. For the epithets Gryneus and Lycius, see Williams, R.D., The Aeneid of Virgil, vol. 1 (Basingstoke and London, 1972), on 345Google Scholar.
39 The fact that we have seen nothing of these is hardly proof that Aeneas is inventing them: in his focus on Dido up till now Virgil has not allowed Aeneas to express himself by anything other than his objective actions, and indeed some have seen in Aeneas’ late recollection a real psychological insight—that after Mercury's words Aeneas can see the full significance of things which point in the same direction as the god, and to which he has previously paid little attention; see Williams (n. 38), on 351f.
40 One alleged piece of slippage should be dealt with immediately, however. Primed by Fama, who is significantly called impia at this point (4.298), Dido asks Aeneas whether he thought he would be able to cover up, dissimulare, ‘such a great crime’, tantum nefas, and leave Carthage without saying a word, tacitus, loading her question by accusing him of faithlessness, perfide (4.305–6). In his speech Aeneas denies the charge: neque ego hanc abscondere furto | speraui (ne finge) fugam (4.337–8). Who is right? On receiving Mercury's command, Aeneas’ first reaction is, as we have seen, to ‘burn’ to leave Carthage, however agreeable it has become to him (4.281). But that is part of his emotionally confused assent to Jupiter's instructions. Moreover, his next immediate thought is how to announce his decision to Dido, and that shows that in fact he did not intend just to ‘do a runner’, but has, despite his fear and confusion, intended to break the news to Dido in person (4.283–94). True, he commands his men to ready the fleet and to hide the reason for doing so, and this involves a degree of deception which is embedded in Aeneas’ dissimulent (4.291), as Dido angrily remarks when she is made to cast the word back in Aeneas’ face; and it is also true that Dido confronts Aeneas first, though this is while he is considering precisely how to address her (4.293–4). Yet, the fact remains that he has in the final analysis intended to come clean with Dido all along, and he does not deserve Dido's addressing him as perfide. The preparation of the fleet and keeping its purpose secret are therefore most persuasively interpreted as only anticipatory measures in case, as Aeneas fears, Dido flares up threateningly.
41 It should be noted that in Roman eyes Aeneas’ line of argument would have been quite unexceptionable, because without an intention to marry from both sides no marriage could be said to exist: see e.g. S. Dixon, The Roman Family (Baltimore and London, 1992), 61–97, esp. 61 and 81. Simply by denying any such intention, therefore, Aeneas has for a Roman reader dissolved any claim of Dido's about marriage (4.316); cf. P. Agnell, ‘Wed or unwed? Ambiguity in Aeneid 4’, PVS 25 (2004), 95–110. How Virgil's Dido interprets their love-making in the cave is her own construct, cruelly shaped by Juno's participation as pronuba, ‘matron of honour’ (4.166). In Stoic terms, she has given her assent to an akataleptic impression.
42 When Aeneas confronts Dido's shade in the underworld he puts his dilemma perhaps even more clearly. In his attempt to console her (lenibat, 6.468 picking up lenire), he states that me iussa deum … | imperiis egere suis (6.461–3); note also his reference to Fate in his last words to her, extremum fato quod te adloquor hoc est (6.466). A recent article by Berry, D.H., ‘Did Aeneas love Dido?’, PVS 28 (2014), 197–217 Google Scholar mounts a vigorous attack on the belief that Aeneas loves Dido (except belatedly, in the underworld encounter) so that Aeneas might better fit in with Augustus’ and his age's ‘official mind-set’ (213) for the ideal amor-free Roman male. It is, however, a fatal flaw that the article nowhere considers Aen. 4.259–64, where Mercury comes across Aeneas actively helping to found Carthage dressed in extravagant Tyrian finery, a gift from Dido (see above, p. 586).
43 Edwards (n. 2). sponte sua seems to have been another expression current in Latin discussions of Stoic Fate; see Gell. NA 7.2.5, who relates how Chrysippus’ opponents argued that punishments by law must be unjust si homines ad maleficia non sponte ueniunt, sed fato trahuntur; they are using Chrysippus’ premises and Latinized phraseology for it, to refute him. My thanks to Bruce Gibson for this reference.
44 This is Virgil's point also at Aen. 6.450–66, when Aeneas states to Dido's shade that, despite his not having the feeling for her that she needed, he left her shores inuitus, led forcibly by the iussa deum, and begs her not to go: siste gradum teque aspectu ne subtrahe nostro.
45 The usage of placidus by Seneca here both elucidates the meaning of Virgil's placidas and strengthens the case for taking it proleptically; cf. Williams (n. 38), ad loc., who takes the adjective as meaning ‘kindly’. For the Stoic thought, see also Sen. Ep. 9.3: noster sapiens uincit quidem incommodum omne, sed sentit. But it was the product of the Middle Stoa. Chrysippus had laid it down that the wise man should be ἀπαθής, ‘free from emotion’, as can be seen in the remark recorded by Arrian, Epict. Diss. 1.4.27 (SVF 3.144.11-13) τί οὖν ἡμῖν παρέχει Χρύσιππος; “ἵνα γνῷς,” φησίν, “ὅτι οὐ ψευδῆ ταῦτά ἐστιν, ἐξ ὧν ἡ εὔροιά ἐστι καὶ ἀπάθεια, ἅπαντα λάβε μου τὰ βιβλία καὶ γνώσῃ ὡς <ἀληθῆ> τε καὶ σύμφωνά ἐστι τῇ φύσει τὰ ἀπαθῆ με ποιοῦντα.” This stance was relaxed by Panaetius, as we can see from Aulus Gellius’ quotation of Taurus the philosopher at NA 12.5.10 (fr. 111, M. van Straaten, Panaetii Rhodii Fragmenta, Philosophia Antiqua 5 [Leiden, 1962], 42) ἀναλγησία enim atque ἀπάθεια non meo tantum, inquit, sed quorundam etiam ex eadem portico prudentiorum hominum, sicuti iudicio Panaetii, grauis atque docti uiri, inprobata abiectaque est. The modification was certainly available to Virgil.
46 Williams (n. 38), on 416f.
47 The fact that the line is incomplete is therefore immaterial; even in its incomplete state it encapsulates perfectly what is clearly expressed elsewhere.
48 For the interim strengthening of his resolve we again have lines 438–40, sed nullis ille mouetur | fletibus, aut uoces ullas tractabilis audit; | fata obstant placidasque uiri deus obstruit auris. Why is he asleep rather than leaving? Apart from fitting in with the rest of nature at the dead of night and apart from the contrast Aeneas makes with the tormented Dido (522–32), Dido's interception of Aeneas’ approach to her and her consequent forcing of the issue of a confrontation have made a state of alert and mobilization unnecessary.
49 Heinze (n. 3) comes closest to doing so (see n. 3), but does not consider the vital concept of adsensio. Similarly, Liebermann, W.-L., ‘Aeneas – Schicksal und Selbstfindung’, in Görgemanns, H. and Schmidt, E.A. (edd.), Studien zum antiken Epos (Beiträge zur klassischen Philologie 72) (Meisenheim am Glan, 1976), 175–86Google Scholar also emphasizes Aeneas’ freedom of agency, and engages with the Stoic evidence in detail, except for assent. Otherwise, Lyne, R.O.A.M., Further Voices in Vergil's Aeneid (Oxford, 1987), 75 Google Scholar states in an uncharacteristically simplistic and imprecise analysis, ‘… I must stress a vital point: free will. The Aeneid does not adopt the Stoics’ determinism—a doctrine, which the Stoics themselves found not a little unrealistic. Humans are vulnerable to divine interference …; but they also have their measure of freedom, and bear a measure of responsibility … In Aeneas’ case, he may be told what to do, and helped by divine messages, even messengers; and Jupiter may be able to foresee that he will eventually, more or less, do it. But the task is still his.’
50 Williams (n. 38), 362. When Aeneas’ statement is compared with his parallel speech of gratitude to Dido for her welcome at Aen. 1.595–610, we see just how far Aeneas’ emotions for her have come: the earlier speech indeed expresses gratefulness, but this will manifest itself in the honour in which Aeneas will hold her for ever, wherever he is: in freta dum fluuii current, dum montibus umbrae | lustrabunt conuexa, polus dum sidera pascet, | semper honos nomenque tuum laudesque manebunt, | quae me cumque uocant terrae. This is chivalry, rather than any passion for Dido.
51 Accepting priorum in FPpωγ over piorum in M, which has far less point: Dido recalls the earlier prophecies that she ignored (4.65) but now realizes are being fulfilled.
52 See Long and Sedley (n. 5), Section 20, vol. 1, 102–12, vol. 2, 104–13 for the major texts. Cicero, Fat. 21–5 (SVF 2.952 = Long and Sedley [n. 5], 20E, vol. 1, 104–5, vol. 2, 108–10) seems to present a face-off between Epicurus and Chrysippus on the matter of Fate and human responsibility, but the mere nine-year overlap of their lives (according to the dating of Epicurus’ death to 270/271 b.c. and the birth of Chrysippus to approximately 280 b.c.) is strong evidence that it was Chrysippus who was responding to Epicurus.
53 So Servius, nam modo secundum Epicureos ait ‘ea cura quietos’ (though he points out that Dido's si quid pia numina possunt three lines later is, according to Stoic doctrine, where she is most plausibly interpreted as flinging Aeneas’ Stoic mind-set in his teeth). See also e.g. Austin, R.G., P. Vergili Maronis Aeneidos Liber Quartus (Oxford, 1955), 117 Google Scholar; Edwards (n. 2), 158–9.
54 On the Epicurean view that the gods have no passion or even interest in anything that might disturb their ataraxia, see Wigodsky, M., ‘Emotions and immortality in Philodemus On the Gods 3 and the Aeneid’, in Armstrong, D., Fish, J., Johnston, P.A., Skinner, M. (edd.), Vergil, Philodemus, and the Augustans (Austin, TX, 2004), 211–28Google Scholar in reference to Jupiter's words to Juno at Aen. 12.831–2; discussion of Dido's terminology would have supported Wigodsky's thesis. In a detailed study of Virgil's deployment of Lucretian language and imagery in the characterization of Dido, Dyson, J.T., ‘Dido the Epicurean’, ClAnt 15 (1996), 203–21Google Scholar, at 204 argues that ‘Virgil portrays Dido's fall partly as a clash between Epicureanism and the supernatural machinery of the Aeneid’; however, she does not consider the ramifications for Dido and human responsibility.
55 This gives an additional sense to Roman thinking on suicide, exemplified, as the editors point out, at Plin. Ep. 1.12.1: decessit Corellius Rufus, et quidem sponte, quod dolorem meum exulcerat: est enim luctuosissimum genus mortis, quae non ex natura nec fatalis uidetur. It is still worth noting, moreover, that Servius saw an inconsistency between ante diem and Jupiter's pronouncement at Aen. 10.467, stat sua cuique dies, and tried to explain it by assigning the two statements to two types of Fate, respectively fatum denuntiatiuum and fatum conditionale, which is most likely based on Chrysippus’ ‘simple’ and ‘complex’ fates (on which see above, pp. 582–4). When he locates the ‘conditional’ in Dido's words at 657–8, felix, heu nimium felix, si litora tantum | numquam Dardaniae tetigissent nostra carinae, his solution is ingenious, but hardly explains nec fato. It remains interesting that he has what seems to be an instinctual recourse to Chrysippan Stoicism in his analysis of Dido's Fate and responsibility. We should note, finally, that the nuanced study of Virgil's characterization of Dido by Gill, C., ‘Character and passion in Virgil's Aeneid ’, PVS 25 (2004), 111-214, especially 112-18Google Scholar, draws attention to the particular importance of the Stoic reading of her in Aen. 4.
56 Above, p. 581.
57 CQ’s reader suggests that uirisque adquirit eundo (175) may be a recall of Chrysippus’ cylinder; in that case, can Fama's mobilitas, quickness of movement or speed, be thought of as the ‘complete and primary’ cause of her motion? However, as Hardie, P.R., Rumour and Renown: Representations of Fama in Western Literature (Cambridge, 2012), 83 Google Scholar reminds us most recently, Virgil's phraseology here is closely based on Lucr. 6.340–2, describing the speed of a thunderbolt: denique quod uenit longo impete, sumere debet | mobilitatem etiam atque etiam, quae crescit eundo | et ualidas auget uiris et roborat ictum. The juxtaposition would be of a piece with Dido's use of Lucretian terminology when she acknowledges Aeneas’ Stoic mission at Aen. 4.612–14; see above, pp. 593–4.
