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The indifference argument

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Abstract

I argue against motivational internalism. First I recharacterise the issue over moral motivation. Second I describe the indifference argument against motivation internalism. Third I consider appeals to irrationality that are often made in the face of this argument, and I show that they are ineffective. Lastly, I draw the motivational externalist conclusion and reflect on the nature of the issue.

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Correspondence to Nick Zangwill.

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Thanks for helpful comments to Philippa Foot and especially to an anonymous referee. Distant ancestors of the paper were given as talks in an American Philosophical Association conference in New Orleans and in St Andrews.

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Zangwill, N. The indifference argument. Philos Stud 138, 91–124 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9000-0

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