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Descending Marr's levels: Standard observers are no panacea

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 January 2019

Carlos Zednik  and
Frank Jäkel
Carlos Zednik
Affiliation:
Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg, D-39016 Magdeburg, Germany. carlos.zednik@ovgu.dehttps://sites.google.com/site/czednik/
Frank Jäkel
Affiliation:
Technische Universität Darmstadt, Centre for Cognitive Science, D-64283 Darmstadt, Germany. jaekel@psychologie.tu-darmstadt.de
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Abstract

According to Marr, explanations of perceptual behavior should address multiple levels of analysis. Rahnev & Denison (R&D) are perhaps overly dismissive of optimality considerations at the computational level. Also, an exclusive reliance on standard observer models may cause neglect of many other plausible hypotheses at the algorithmic level. Therefore, as far as explanation goes, standard observer modeling is no panacea.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 41 , 2018 , e249
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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