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Experts and Bias: When is the Interest-Based Objection to Expert Argumentation Sound?

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Abstract

I discuss under what conditions the objection that an expert’s argument is biased by her self-interest can be a meaningful and sound argumentative move. I suggest replacing the idea of bias qua self-interest by that of a conflict of interests, exploit the distinction between an expert context and a public context, and hold that the objection can be meaningful. Yet, the evaluation is overall negative, because the motivational role of self-interest for human behavior remains unclear. Moreover, if recent social-psychological results from the “heuristics and biases” program are accepted, it is plausible to assume that humans also satisfice (rather than optimize/maximize) when identifying and then acting in their self-interest. My thesis is: insofar as the objection is sound with a particular audience, it is not needed; and insofar as the objection is needed, it is unsound.

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Notes

  1. See Tindale’s contribution to this volume.

  2. See the more detailed exposition in Wagemans, this issue. (Eds.).

  3. Zenker (2011) uses “argumentative structure” to generalize over deductive, inductive and conductive argument forms. The criteria used are “the difference in information-content between premise and conclusion”, and “the dynamics of the premise conclusion support relation under premise revision.”

  4. Read: The difference between the degree of belief that C, given P, and the degree of belief that C.

  5. Read: The probability of obtaining an evidence report, if the hypothesis is true, is greater than the probability of obtaining this evidence report, if the hypothesis is false.

  6. See Gelfert’s contribution to this issue.

  7. See Mercier’s contribution to this volume.

  8. Roughly speaking, agents satisfice (Simon 1956) with respect to a (decision-)task whenever they select options that meet, or satisfy, only some, but not other similarly important constraints, or goals, although better solutions are available and become accessible when searching for them. For example, an employee may be said to satisfice by withholding on a morally demanded act of whistle-blowing—presumably so as to not increase the risk of being “fired”—, although her knowing facts which justify blowing the whistle, paired with the display of courage thus effected, arguably increase her chance of being hired on a different job at least as good as that to be “secured.”

  9. “The Americans, on the other hand, are fond of explaining almost all the actions of their lives by the principle of self-interest rightly understood; they show with complacency how an enlightened regard for themselves constantly prompts them to assist one another and inclines them willingly to sacrifice a portion of their time and property to the welfare of the state. In this respect I think they frequently fail to do themselves justice, for in the United States as well as elsewhere people are sometimes seen to give way to those disinterested and spontaneous impulses that are natural to man; but the Americans seldom admit that they yield to emotions of this kind; they are more anxious to do honor to their philosophy than to themselves” (Tocqueville 1889: Vol II, ch. 8).

  10. See Collins and Weinel’s contribution to this issue.

  11. For example, Walton (2002: 49 f.) offers the following: (1) Major Premise: Source E is an expert in subject domain S containing proposition A. (2) Minor Premise: E asserts that proposition A is true (false). (3) Conclusion: A is true (false). (ibid.: 277) Walton and Reed (2003: 200) adapt the above to the probable case, spelling out the premise which rendered the ad vercundiam a deductively valid form.

  12. See Rehg’s contribution to this volume.

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Acknowledgments

I wish to thank the editors of this special issue as well two anonymous reviewers for comments that helped to improve this paper, which was completed during my term as an Erik Allard Fellow at the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies.

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Zenker, F. Experts and Bias: When is the Interest-Based Objection to Expert Argumentation Sound?. Argumentation 25, 355–370 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-011-9226-7

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