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DYNAMIC HYPERINTENSIONAL BELIEF REVISION

Part of: General logic

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 July 2020

AYBÜKE ÖZGÜN  and
FRANCESCO BERTO
AYBÜKE ÖZGÜN
Affiliation:
INSTITUTE FOR LOGIC, LANGUAGE AND COMPUTATION UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM SCIENCE PARK 107 1098 XG AMSTERDAM, THE NETHERLANDS and ARCHÉ UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS 17-19 COLLEGE STREET ST. ANDREWS, FIFEKY16 9AL SCOTLAND E-mail: a.ozgun@uva.nlE-mail: fb96@st-andrews.ac.uk
FRANCESCO BERTO
Affiliation:
INSTITUTE FOR LOGIC, LANGUAGE AND COMPUTATION UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM SCIENCE PARK 107 1098 XG AMSTERDAM, THE NETHERLANDS and ARCHÉ UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS 17-19 COLLEGE STREET ST. ANDREWS, FIFEKY16 9AL SCOTLAND E-mail: a.ozgun@uva.nlE-mail: fb96@st-andrews.ac.uk
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Abstract

We propose a dynamic hyperintensional logic of belief revision for non-omniscient agents, reducing the logical omniscience phenomena affecting standard doxastic/epistemic logic as well as AGM belief revision theory. Our agents don’t know all a priori truths; their belief states are not closed under classical logical consequence; and their belief update policies are such that logically or necessarily equivalent contents can lead to different revisions. We model both plain and conditional belief, then focus on dynamic belief revision. The key idea we exploit to achieve non-omniscience focuses on topic- or subject matter-sensitivity: a feature of belief states which is gaining growing attention in the recent literature.

Keywords

belief revisiondynamic epistemic logiclogical omniscienceaboutnesssubject matterhyperintensionalitycompletenessaxiomatization

MSC classification

Primary: 03B42: Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change)
Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Symbolic Logic , Volume 14 , Issue 3 , September 2021 , pp. 766 - 811
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Copyright
© Association for Symbolic Logic, 2020

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