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Infinitary Belief Revision

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Abstract

This paper extends the AGM theory of belief revision to accommodate infinitary belief change. We generalize both axiomatization and modeling of the AGM theory. We show that most properties of the AGM belief change operations are preserved by the generalized operations whereas the infinitary belief change operations have their special properties. We prove that the extended axiomatic system for the generalized belief change operators with a Limit Postulate properly specifies infinite belief change. This framework provides a basis for first-order belief revision and the theory of revising a belief state by a belief state.

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Zhang, D., Foo, N. Infinitary Belief Revision. Journal of Philosophical Logic 30, 525–570 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1013356315540

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