Abstract
In Zhong (Philos Phenomenol Res 83:129–147, 2011; Analysis 72:75–85, 2012), I argued that, contrary to what many people might expect, the counterfactual theory of causation will generate (rather than solve) the exclusion problem. Recently some philosophers raise an incisive objection to this argument. They contend that my argument fails as it equivocates between different notions of a physical realizer (see Christensen and Kallestrup in Analysis 72:513–517, 2012). However, I find that their criticism doesn’t threaten the central idea of my view. In this paper, I make two separate responses that appeal to two unequivocal notions of physical realizers, respectively. I aim to show that a modified argument that uses either notion would work.
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Notes
The exclusion problem is usually formulated in terms of mental properties rather than mental events, and this paper follows the tradition. A property P is causally efficacious if some event that instantiates P causes another event in virtue of P. Although many philosophers believe that the talk of property causation is quite plausible (even if properties are understood as universals), I acknowledge that this is controversial in the literature on causation. Thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out. And I also want to note that whereas properties are typically understood as universals, some philosophers understand properties as particulars (such as tropes), which no doubt can be causally efficacious (see e.g. Campbell 1990; Heil 2003).
Some counterfactualists who accept causal overdetermination may allow that the effect counterfactually depends upon both the mental property and its physical realizer (for a detailed discussion of this issue, see Harbecke 2011, 2013). But for the purposes of this paper, I will assume that there is no systematic overdetermination by mental and physical properties.
Let’s suppose there is no conceptual or constitutive connection between pain and frowning.
Lewis’s criteria of world similarity disallow that the closest world in which an actual event E1 does not occur is by definition one in which E1 is replaced by an event E1* which is not E1 but resembles E1 almost perfectly (E1* would have the same effect E2 as the actual E1 does). If the latter world were by definition the closest world, then almost any counterfactual “if E1 had not occurred, E2 would not have occurred either” would be false. This is the basic motivation for Lewis’s ban on replacement. But it is worth noting that Lewis’s ban on replacement doesn’t rule out that the closest world in which an actual event doesn’t occur is, as a matter of fact, one in which a very similar event occurs (due to certain contingent features of the actual world).
For my purposes, let me ignore the subtle difference between the notion of supervenience and the notion of realization.
Here ‘physical property’ is commonly understood as a fundamental physical property (e.g. see Bennett 2003).
In my terminology, to say that property A causes property B is to say that an event that instantiates A causes another event that instantiates B in virtue of A and B. Although Kim’ exclusion argument doesn’t contain the principle of downward causation as an explicit premise, he seems to implicitly presuppose this principle in arguing for mental-physical causal exclusion (see Kim 1998, 2005).
This is not enough for the purpose of establishing causal exclusion. As long as mental properties can cause some higher-order properties (such as mental, behavioral, and social properties), the causal efficacy of the mental that is needed would still be largely preserved, even if mental properties cannot cause (fundamental) physical properties. So, the exclusion argument should aim to show that M doesn’t cause M* either. It is worth noticing again that ‘M*’ stands for an (irreducible) higher-order property, rather than a mental property.
If multiple realizability is the case, then (~M&P*)-worlds are a proper subset of (~M&M*)-worlds.
A similar reasoning will show that M would also cause P* if M* counterfactually depends upon a causal intermediary M# that is caused by M.
Nevertheless, it may be worth noticing that my purpose is not to argue for the Downward Causation principle per se, but just to show that the counterfactual theory of causation supports the Downward Causation principle. On a counterfactual account of causation, thesis (D2) entails that if M causes M*, then M would cause P*total (the Downward Causation principle). Regardless of whether we have independent reasons to reject this principle, what matters is that the counterfactual theory seems to endorse it. But perhaps the counterfactualist can put forward an updated theory of property causation that is supplemented by an account of what kind of properties can be causes or effects. Such an updated counterfactual theory of causation may rule out total realizers as suitable causal relata. I won’t explore this issue any further in this paper.
The reason why Shoemaker does not include L in the conjuncts of Ptotal is that he holds a causal theory of properties, according to which properties have their causal powers essentially. According to this theory, Ptotal that doesn’t contain L is still (metaphysically) necessarily sufficient for the instantiation of M. Here let’s assume that Shoemaker’s causal theory of properties is false. Then total physical realizers should contain properties regarding laws of nature, in order to be (metaphysically) necessarily sufficient for instantiations of mental properties.
Physicalists disagree about whether supervenience (or realization) should be understood as a relationship with metaphysical necessity or just nomological necessity, in order to best capture the essence of physicalism. Some argue that if we characterize supervenience in terms of nomological necessity, then physicalism would be immune from some notorious challenges like the ‘zombie problem’ (Chalmers 1996; Leuenberger 2008). Even if the existence of zombies is metaphysically possible, physicalism that is defined in terms of nomological necessity can still be true.
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Zhong, L. Why the Counterfactualist Should Still Worry About Downward Causation. Erkenn 80, 159–171 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-014-9618-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-014-9618-9