CHAPTER 29

The Illuminationist tradition

Hossein Ziai

Orientalists and historians of Arabic and Persian philosophy have, for the most part, ignored much of the scholarship on the systematic side of post-Avicennan Islamic philosophy. The Illuminationist tradition, founded by Suhrawardī in the sixth/twelfth century, represents the principal advancement in Islamic philosophy immediately following Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā). However, the period from Avicenna's death in 429/1037 to the death of Averroes (Ibn Rushd) in 595/1198 encompasses three distinct types of philosophical attitude and style manifest in Arabic and, to a lesser extent, Persian texts. Each of these "schools", or traditions of philosophical thought, tends to be associated with the person considered to be its founder or another scholar who epitomizes that philosophical attitude. The three traditions are as follows.

Firstly, the Peripatetic school. Though known throughout the early period of Islamic philosophy to follow the texts and teachings of Aristotle, after the fifth/eleventh century the Peripatetic school is usually associated with Avicenna and his followers. This tradition is characterized by the structure, technical terminology and philosophical approach of the Aristotelian texts as put forth in Avicenna's major compositions such as *Healing* ("*Shifā'*"). The study of logic, for example, is divided according to the books of Aristotle's *Organon*; physics in accordance with the books, chapters, and subject matter of his *Physics*; and similarly in metaphysics. The Peripatetic school of Islamic philosophy continues in the philosophical writings of Avicenna's pupils, such as Bahmanyār and Abu'l-'Abbās al-Lawkarī; in numerous Arabic and Persian commentaries and glosses on Avicenna's two major works, the *Shifā'* and the *Ishārāt*; and in monographs on specific issues relating to Peripatetic views and problems. Philosophical problems of this school that stand as cornerstones of Islamic Peripatetic philosophy are, in brief: the ontological position of primacy of being, the epistemological priority given to acquired

knowledge, the Necessary Being's knowledge of the universals rather than particulars, and the eschatological position of the soul's immortality.

Secondly, the Averroist tradition. Although Averroes was the foremost commentator of Aristotelian texts, he has in fact had little or no impact on post-Avicennan philosophical thinking in Islam. The impact of his Arabic Aristotelianism is primarily confined to the Latin West. Almost every aspect of Averroes's philosophical thought from logic to political philosophy has been examined in detail. Most of his works, some of which have survived only in Hebrew or Latin versions as abridgements or translations, have also been edited.

Thirdly, the Illuminationist tradition. To understand how philosophy has developed in the Islamic world, especially in Iran, it is of singular importance to examine Suhrawardī's Illuminationist tradition of the sixth/twelfth century and its aftermath. This area of Islamic philosophy, which has long been overlooked the West, has had the most significant, widespread impact not only on Islamic philosophical thought *per se* but also in other areas of thought and creative activity, including speculative mysticism (*'irfān*) and poetry.

It should be noted that these three schools and traditions continue well after the sixth/twelfth century, and that the Peripatetic and the Illuminationist traditions were revived in the tenth/sixteenth century when the philosophical writings and teachings of many thinkers gave rise to yet another so-called new synthesis in Islamic philosophy known as the School of Isfahan.

This chapter will examine the tradition of Illuminationist philosophy after Suhrawardī, and will discuss selected details of its two dominant trends, focusing primarily on the seventh/thirteenth century. Thinkers of other periods considered to have been Illuminationists or to have favoured Illuminationist philosophical positions in their writings will also be mentioned.

The Philosophy of Illumination grew out of reactions to certain aspects of Islamic philosophical texts, most of them associated with the Avicennan corpus. While Avicenna may have seriously intended to compose a separate and distinct "Eastern" philosophy – which he mentions briefly in his work *Logic of the Easterners* (*"Mantiq al-mashriqiyyīn"*) – nowhere does he systematically develop and construct a philosophical system distinct from his monumental and predominantly Aristotelian composition, *Healing*. All of his works reflect a standard Peripatetic structure, terminology and philosophical intention.

A number of thinkers prior to Suhrawardī did compose works that incorporated different, sometimes anti-Aristotelian principles, however. Foremost among them is the philosopher Ḥibat Allāh Abu'l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī. In his major anti-Aristotelian philosophic encyclopedia of the sixth/twelfth century, *Evidential* (*"al-Mu'tabar"*), al-Baghdādī develops

an alternate structure for a foundation of philosophy, especially of epistemology. As shown by Solomon Pines in his many detailed studies, al-Baghdādī also treats certain problems of physics from a distinctly non-Aristotelian perspective.[1] Al-Baghdādī's intent was not to reject Avicennan philosophy, nor to prove its incoherence, as Ghazzālī's polemics would suggest, but to improve the existing structure and rectify the perceived logical and metaphysical inconsistencies of the previous texts. The *Evidential* is the first evidence of a non-Aristotelian trend in Islamic philosophy which was later systematized by Suhrawardī in his Illuminationist reconstruction of philosophy. Al-Baghdādī's three-part text – consisting of logic, physics, metaphysics – differs from Avicenna's *Healing* in both structure and method. Both al-Baghdādī and Suhrawardī base their constructivist philosophical ideas on the same foundation – that of a primary intuition of a knowing subject whose immediate grasp of the totality of existence, time and space, and of the whole as a self-constituted, inherently manifest and knowable object, determines both being and knowledge.

The fact that Abu'l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī is among the few philosophers Suhrawardī actually mentions in his works in reference to specific philosophical problems is indicative of the impact of the *Evidential* on Illuminationist philosophy. Also, Suhrawardī upholds al-Baghdādī's Platonist position. Concerning the significant question of the foundation of philosophy, both Suhrawardī and al-Baghdādī take an intuitionist stance, requiring that primary intuition must constitute the "first step" in philosophical construction. The structure of the *Evidential* is also reflected in Suhrawardī's philosophical works. It is evident, therefore, that al-Baghdādī should be regarded as an important preliminary source for many of Suhrawardī's non-Peripatetic arguments.

Finally, the anti-philosophical works of the famous theologian Abū Ḥamid al-Ghazzālī – especially his *Incoherence of the Philosophers* (*"Tahāfut al-falāsifah"*) – were known to Suhrawardī. Some of the terms used by al-Ghazzālī, specifically in his *Mishkāt al-anwār*, are terms that were later modified and employed by Suhrawardī in his *Philosophy of Illumination*. However, al-Ghazzālī's polemic intention must be distinguished from Suhrawardī's philosophical one. In spite of some similarities in terminology, Illuminationist philosophy should not be understood as resulting from theological polemics, which is basically anti-philosophical in intent. The purpose of Illuminationist thought, on the contrary, is a fundamentally philosophical one: to demonstrate logical gaps in the Peripatetic system and then to reconstruct a more consistent and holistic philosophical structure by solidifying its foundations, methods and arguments. The theologian's aim, however, is not to construct a better philosophical system but to refute the very basis of philosophy. In support of this distinction, none of the major commentators of Illuminationist philosophy ever

mentions al-Ghazzālī's works as immediate sources for Illuminationist methodology or formal techniques, though they were obviously aware of the widespread appeal of such texts by al-Ghazzālī, such as *Mishkāt al-anwār*, *Tahāfut al-falāsifah* and *Maqāṣid al-falāsifah*.

Along with the Peripatetic school, the Illuminationist tradition is the only other systematic school of Islamic philosophy that has continued to be studied as a complete system of thought up to the present day. The epithet "Illuminationist" (*ishrāqī*) is still used, especially in Iran, to characterize the method and philosophical views of individual thinkers. As described in the previous chapter, Suhrawardī's Illuminationist philosophy fundamentally departs from Islamic Peripatetic philosophy in respect to the logical foundations of its epistemology and its reconstructed metaphysical system. Illuminationist philosophy continues immediately after Suhrawardī, primarily in the form of several major commentaries on Illuminationist texts composed in the seventh/thirteenth century, though it is not confined to these.

COMMENTATORS ON SUHRAWARDĪ'S PHILOSOPHY OF ILLUMINATION

Of the main figures in the tradition of Illuminationist philosophy, some were designated Illuminationist; others were not yet clearly influenced by Suhrawardī's thought. The earliest thinkers known for their Illuminationist position are the following seventh/thirteenth-century scholars, all of whom wrote commentaries on Suhrawardī's texts and also composed independent philosophical treatises that include specific Illuminationist positions: Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Shahrazūrī[2] and Sa'd ibn Manṣūr ibn Kammūnah[3] (both of whom are called "Illuminationist") and Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī.[4] Other commentaries on Suhrawardī's texts were composed later, the most important of these being the tenth/sixteenth-century works of Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī[5] and the eleventh/seventeenth-century writings of Muḥammad Sharīf Niẓam al-Dīn al-Harawī.[6] The principal commentators and their works are as follows.

Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Shahrazūrī, al-Ishrāqī, i.e. "the Illuminationist" (d. after 688/1288) is the author of the well-known history of philosophy *Nuzhat al-arwāḥ wa rawḍāt al-afrāḥ*, as well as the author of the first major commentary on Suhrawardī's *Philosophy of Illumination* and his *Intimations*. Among all the commentators Shahrazūrī is the most faithful to the original conception and philosophical constructivist methodology of Suhrawardī's Illuminationist philosophy. His independent philosophical composition, *al-Shajarah al-ilāhiyyah*, will be examined below to show the Illuminationist concepts, method and structure of this work.

Sa'd ibn Manṣūr ibn Kammūnah (d. 683/1284) created a major commentary, *al-Talwīḥāt*, that has earned the status of a textbook among Illuminationist philosophers in Iran. Perhaps the most significant impact of Illuminationist philosophy may be seen in Ibn Kammūnah's philosophical work *al-Jadīd fi'l-ḥikmah* (literally, "The New Philosophy", or *Novum Organum*). I have detected a serious attempt in this book to elucidate further certain anti-Aristotelian philosophical principles that originate with Illuminationist philosophy. The salient features of his *Commentary on al-Talwīḥāt* will be briefly outlined here.

Quṭb al-Dīn Shīrāzī (d. 710/1311) is the author of the best-known commentary on Illuminationist philosophy, as well as the voluminous, encyclopedic *Durrat al-tāj*. However, on careful scrutiny, Shīrāzī's work indicates major borrowings from Shahrazūrī's text that have previously gone unnoticed. Shīrāzī is a better-known figure in Islamic philosophy than Shahrazūri, simply because he is one of the first post-Suhrawardian philosophers in Iran successfully to synthesize Avicennan philosophy and Suhrawardī's Illuminationist philosophy with Ibn 'Arabī's "gnosis" of *waḥdat al-wujūd* in a coherent and accessible independent Persian composition. *Durrat al-tāj* marks the beginning of philosophical compositions in which Avicennan methodology and metaphysics are harmonized with Illuminationist theories of vision and illumination (epistemology and psychology), and where the accepted Illuminationist doctrine of the fourth ontological realm, the *mundus imaginalis*, is fully integrated into the reconstructed cosmological system. This work is also the first Persian philosophical text that accepts Suhrawardī's psychological doctrine of knowledge by and of the self-conscious separate "I" – generalized as "I-it-thou-ness" (*manī, tu'ī, ū'ī*) – as the primary principle in epistemology as well as an alternative proof of prophecy. The only other epistemology that concerns the self in this way is the Peripatetic theory of the holy intellect and its conjunction with the Active Intellect. Shīrāzī's work also discusses resurrection and metempsychosis (*tanāsukh*) within the author's Illuminationist interpretation of gnosis (*'irfān*).[7] In my view this new grouping of ideas in Islamic philosophy was only the popular side of the theory, however, and is indicative of a trend that culminates with Mullā Ṣadrā in the eleventh/seventeenth century. The more genuinely philosophical and theoretical Illuminationist legacy continued through less widely known texts, such as the works of Ibn Kammūnah, which are discussed in detail later in this chapter.

The most recent of the medieval commentaries on Suhrawardī's texts was composed by Muḥammad Sharīf Niẓām al-Dīn al-Harawī, author of the most significant Persian commentary and translation of the *Philosophy of Illumination*. Harawī's work, composed in 1008/1600, includes a translation and commentary of Suhrawardī's "Introduction" and the majority of part two (*al-qism al-thānī*) of *Philosophy of*

Illumination.[8] One of the important characteristics of Harawī's commentary is his attempt to compare Illuminationist principles with the Advaita system of Indian philosophy.

Anwāriyyah is the only Persian translation and commentary on Suhrawardī's *Philosophy of Illumination* known to have survived, though others have been composed and may be found through further research in manuscript collections. Its author was probably an Indian Chishtī Sufi who also composed an independent Illuminationist work in Persian titled *Sirāj al-ḥikmah*.[9] *Anwāriyyah* consists of a Persian translation and commentary of selected sections of the second part of Suhrawardī's Arabic text, which is on metaphysics, cosmology and the Illuminationist accounts of visionary experience. The work is typical of the first trend in post-Suhrawardian Illuminationist interpretation (by Shahrazūrī), and is also indicative of the period's general lack of interest in logic and philosophical methodology. It emphasizes the fantastic side of Illuminationist philosophy and draws heavily on Quṭb al-Dīn's earlier commentary but adds a great many examples drawn from popular mystical sources, especially from *Mathnawī* by Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī (604/1206–672/1274). Harawī's work is also of interest for the study of comparative mysticism and for its overall attempt at a mystical interpretation of Suhrawardī's text, which was not always intended by Suhrawardī. Often, when commenting on a section, Harawī adds "and this is in accordance to the views held by the Sufi masters", or "this argument lends support to gnostic views". These comments are valuable in illustrating how mystics made use of the Illuminationist epistemological priority of the experiential mode of cognition.

Finally, *Anwāriyyah* is also of specific interest for an understanding of how tenth/sixteenth-century Muslims in India viewed the prevalent Hindu views on mysticism. On several occasions, the author attempts to compare Illuminationist views with those of the Indian Advaita system, which he mentions by name. Examples are when he compares the Illuminationist cosmology, especially the *mundus imaginalis*, with the fourfold Sanskrit divisions of *andaja*, *arayuta*, *udbhija* and *khanija*, and Suhrawardī's discussion of eternal time with the Indian notions of *yuga*.[10] The work is also replete with words of reverence for "Indian sages and Brahmins", whom, we are told, the author had consulted on questions relating to philosophical and mystical questions.

OTHER ILLUMINATIONIST PHILOSOPHERS

Many other authors are known for having incorporated certain Illuminationist principles in their works but do not qualify as pure Illuminationists. The following is a selected list of these thinkers.

Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274) is the well-known philosopher, astronomer, mathematician and statesman whose commentary on Avicenna's *al-Ishārāt wa'l-tanbīhāt* has become one of the standard textbooks for the study of Avicenna's Peripatetic philosophy. Many generations of philosophers in Persia came to learn of the quintessence of Avicenna's teaching through this commentary. However the epistemological priority given by Ṭūsī to knowledge by presence does not qualify him as a purely Muslim Peripatetic. Given the impact that Ṭūsī has had on all later Shi'ite authors, however, his Illuminationist attitude should not be overlooked.

Muḥammad ibn Zayn al-Dīn ibn Ibrāhīm Aḥsā'ī (d. after 878/1479), known as Ibn Abī Jumhūr Ishrāqī Aḥsā'ī, is among those whom I have designated as "middle *ishrāqī*" thinkers.

Qāḍī Jalāl al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Sa'd al-Dīn Dawānī (d. 908/1501) is the author of the celebrated work on ethics titled *Akhlāq-i jalālī*, and held the position of vizier under the Āqquyünlü rulers of north-eastern Persia. His commentary on Suhrawardī's *Hayākil al-nūr*, titled *Shawākil al-ḥūr fī sharḥ hayākil al-nūr*, is well known, though unpublished. It falls under the category of popular syncretistic philosophy, which had a strong impact on the generation of thinkers that followed him in Persia and who were instrumental in shaping the Shi'ite world view that has continued to the present.[11]

Ghiyāth al-Dīn Manṣūr Dashtakī (d. 948/1541), too, wrote a commentary on Suhrawardī's *Hayākil al-nūr*, entitled *Ishrāq hayākil al-nūr li-kashf ẓulamāt shawākil al-ghurūr*. This is not an important theoretical work but, once more, it is indicative of Suhrawardī's widespread impact.

Muḥammad Bāqir ibn Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad (d. 1040/1631), well known as Mīr Dāmād, is perhaps the most significant philosopher of his age, more original and systematically philosophical an author than his famous pupil, Mullā Ṣadrā. In my view Mīr Dāmād is to be counted among the few truly Illuminationist philosophers, a company that would include the immediate followers of Suhrawardī, Shahrazūrī and Ibn Kammūnah, as well as, in most recent times, Sayyid Muḥammad Kāẓim 'Aṣṣār. Mīr Dāmād's poetic *takhalluṣ*, or pen-name, is "*Ishrāq*" ("Illuminationist"), a clear indication of his alignment with Illuminationist philosophy. He considers himself a genuine upholder of the Illuminationist methodology of philosophy, combining discursive (*baḥthī*) methods and principles (Avicenna's methodology of the *Shifā'*) with intuitive (*dhawqī*) ones (Suhrawardī's methodology of *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*), carefully stipulated by Suhrawardī to be the fundamental Illuminationist position. This philosophical stance is exemplified in Mīr Dāmād's publicly proclaimed characteristic as "the greatest teacher of the *Shifā'* of his time" and is clearly revealed in the structure as well as the philosophical intention

of his philosophical works, especially in his *al-Ufuq al-mubīn*, *Jadhawāt* and in his best-known work, *Qabasāt*. In his philosophical work, Mīr Dāmād's intent is to construct a holistic philosophical structure based on the self-conscious I's ability to combine perfectly examination of sense-perceivable data with visions and illuminations.[12]

Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, well known as Mullā Ṣadrā (d. 1050/1640), is recognized to be the main originator of still another synthesis in Islamic philosophy which has had a major impact on Shi'ite thought up to this day. This point of view will be examined in more detail in chapter 35.

The fourteenth/twentieth-century Illuminationist philosopher Sayyid Muḥammad Kāẓim 'Aṣṣār also deserves special mention. His *Waḥdat-i wujūd wa badā'*[13] represents the most recent example of a discussion of the special Illuminationist ontological principle of "equivocal being" (*tashkīk fi'l-wujūd*).

Finally, one must consider the possible impact of Suhrawardī's thinking in the West, specifically on the development of Jewish mysticism in the eighth/fourteenth century.[14] This is exemplified by the remarkable, though seldom mentioned, major paraphrase of important sections of the *Philosophy of Illumination* composed by the famous Nāṣirid vizier Lisān al-Dīn Ibn al-Khaṭīb in his *Rawḍat al-ta'rīf bi'l-ḥubb al-sharīf*.[15] Though he is not mentioned by name, the section is clearly a paraphrase of Suhrawardī's works.

The Illuminationist tradition and almost every other aspect of the intellectual dimension of Islam were revived and re-examined in the tenth/sixteenth century during one of history's most active and prolifically fruitful periods of Islamic philosophy. The tenth/sixteenth-century revival of philosophy took place in Isfahan in central Persia, and is of such integral quality that it has been designated "the School of Isfahan". The two main figures of this school – Mīr Dāmād (with the poetic name "Ishrāq") and Mullā Ṣadrā, whose philosophical works are replete with Illuminationist terminology – studied and made use of the Illuminationist tradition. By this time almost all problems covering the entire philosophical corpus were discussed from both the Peripatetic and Illuminationist perspectives. It had become common practice in constructing arguments to pose the two positions first, then demonstrate the superiority of one over the other, attempt a new synthesis between the two, or formulate different arguments.

Philosophical activity from the eighth/fourteenth to tenth/sixteenth centuries is not well known. From the Illuminationist standpoint, a few commentaries on Suhrawardī's texts by the two Dashtakī brothers and by Jalāl al-Dīn Dawānī are known, though none has been published or studied. There is also known to be an Illuminationist tradition in India. A major commentary and Persian translation of Suhrawardī's *Philosophy*

of Illumination, titled *Anwāriyyah*, was composed in India by Harawī. This published work indicates the impact of the Illuminationist tradition on Islamic mystical philosophy in India.

TWO MAIN TRENDS IN ILLUMINATIONIST PHILOSOPHY

Although we cannot give here an examination of the entire scope of Illuminationist tradition from the time of Suhrawardī to the present, the following will identify the two main trends present in seventh/thirteenth-century Illuminationist compositions, both of which had an impact on the School of Isfahan.

The twofold dimension of seventh/thirteenth-century Illuminationist works is exemplified first by Shahrazūrī. His commentaries on Suhrawardī's texts – *Sharḥ ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, *Sharḥ al-talwīḥāt* and the encyclopedic *al-Shajarah al-ilāhiyyah* – not only emphasize the symbolic and distinctly anti-Peripatetic components of Illuminationist philosophy but further elaborate on them by extending their inspirational, allegorical and fantastic side. This trend, though of less philosophical significance than the one examined below, has had more impact in shaping views concerning mystical and religious philosophy. It may well be considered the origin of mystical and religious philosophy with the most popular appeal.

Second is Ibn Kammūnah. In his *Sharḥ al-talwīḥāt*, commentaries on Suhrawardī's *Intimations*, in his major independent philosophical work, *al-Jadīd fi'l-ḥikmah*, as well as in his shorter works, such as *Risālah fi'l-nafs* and *al-Ḥikmah*, Ibn Kammūnah emphasizes the purely discursive and systematically philosophical side of the Philosophy of Illumination. These works go so far as to define Illuminationist symbolism and allegories in terms of standard Peripatetic doctrine, thus further elaborating on the scientific aspect of Suhrawardī's original intention.

In a way, both of these trends are valid interpretations and refinements on Suhrawardī's system in that both are present in the original Illuminationist texts, although distinguished in terms of choice and emphasis.

SHAHRAZŪRĪ'S WORKS

To determine why the more animated, symbolic and inspirational side of the Philosophy of Illumination, as emphasized by Shahrazūrī, gained more popular appeal than Suhrawardī's own philosophical approach, one must first briefly examine the historical background of the Islamic medieval

world concerning attitudes to philosophy in general. By the middle of the second/eighth century, Arab rule over most of Western Asia, the Near East, North Africa and Spain (mainly Andalusia) was well established. The 'Abbasid Empire, founded in 132/750 by the caliph al-Ṣaffāḥ, emerged as a new civilization that drew material as well as intellectual strength from the conquered peoples and lands. The Qur'ān and the Prophet Muḥammad's teachings and personal actions became the inspiration for a gradually codified set of laws. These laws, called the *Sharī'ah*, were sanctioned and upheld by the state and regulated every facet of the public and private life of the multitudes of Muslims from India to Spain. While it can be argued that jurisprudence remained faithful to the letter of revelation and to the Prophet's own conduct, the powerful, rich, diverse and vast empire was in need of a world view to sustain itself as a world power. Therefore it arduously sought knowledge of science, medicine and technology beyond what was revealed and written in a single book. The Greeks, Persians and Indians possessed vast learning manifest in their books, art, architecture, technology, medicine and other disciplines. "Sciences of the ancients" (*al-'ulūm al-awā'il*) was the name given to every aspect of the sciences and of the techniques of the various civilizations encountered by the ruling Arabs. Baghdad, the new capital of the caliphate, was built from scratch near the ruins of Ctesiphon, the conquered centre of the Sassanian Empire, and soon became the centre of the new civilization. Persian statecraft and art of governance was employed to rule the vast dominion. Soon learned men of all nations gathered there, libraries were established, and book dealers travelled to faraway lands in search of ancient sciences.

By the end of the third/ninth century, a tremendous translation activity was fully under way, funded by state endowments. The Dār al-Ḥikmah, literally "Place of Wisdom" – the new academy, as it were – had become a learning centre of unprecedented dimension. Even the caliphs were in attendance at this academy, where the philosophy and the sciences of the ancients were being rewritten and transformed into a new world view. Of special significance was the translation into Arabic of the Greek philosophical and scientific tradition. By this time almost all of the Aristotelian corpus, plus much of the major Platonic works, some pre-Socratic fragments, Stoic treatises, Neoplatonist works – including parts of the *Enneads* erroneously thought to be a work by Aristotle called the "theology" – Porphyry's *Isagoge*, works by Proclus, as well as numerous shorter Greek philosophical compilations, were all translated. The translations were initially from Syriac and eventually from the Greek. The Greek heritage was the most influential element in the rise of rational thought in Islamic civilization at this time. Philosophy, which was reformulated in Arabic and eventually also in Persian, was expanded and refined by such thinkers as

al-Fārābī (the "Second Teacher") and Avicenna, whose philosophical method survived in the Latin West for centuries.

For a short while, the rational heritage of the Greeks was even triumphant in state-sanctioned theology. The Mu'tazilite rationalist theologians attempted to apply their principal view, known as the "primacy of intellect" (*aṣālat al-'aql*), to find a rational basis for revelation. They even went so far as to say that the revealed word cannot be in contradiction to rational thought. Philosophy and philosophical techniques became the sought-after tool by the empire's ruling elite, as well as philosophers and scientists. But the opposing theological view, called "primacy of revelation" (*aṣalat al-waḥy*), was perpetuated by the Ash'arite school and eventually won out. This ended the Mu'tazilah's dominance as the official theology of the land. Rational thought, for a number of complex reasons, did not continue to influence people beyond its few proponents and never gained dominance as a widely accepted world view in Arab society.

In many respects Arabic Aristotelian philosophy had a much deeper impact in the West than in the East. Avicenna's *Shifā'*, known as *Sufficiencia* in Latin, was the primary source for the Latin West's first encounter with Aristotle many decades before any direct translation from the original Greek texts. Other works in Hebrew and Latin translation – such as abridged versions of Avicenna's works, to a lesser extent of al-Fārābī's works, and most important of the major works by the greatest Aristotelian Muslim commentator, Averroes – continued to keep the Greek philosophical heritage alive in the West as it was dying in the East.

This does not mean that philosophy did not continue in the Islamic world. Rather, it was reconstructed in the form of the Philosophy of Illumination. Peripatetic in method, Suhrawardī's philosophy employed a new and different technical language and revived many popularly held views concerning wisdom. It also included references to characters, themes, and sentiments of Persian mythological and religious beliefs, as well as Qur'ānic decrees never discussed to such an extent in Islamic Peripateticism.

Later religious philosophy in Islam, exemplified by Shahrazūrī's works, embraced this new philosophy at least in principle and used it as a point of departure for the depiction of an animated, more personalized and recognizable universe. This is where Greek methodology, Qur'ānic dicta and other Islamic religious sentiments and Persian popular beliefs converge.

For example, the Qur'ān talks about "jinn", or demonic spirits. The Mu'tazilah deny the existence of the *'ifrīt*, al-Fārābī avoids discussing them and Avicenna denies that they exist. Nevertheless, by the seventh/thirteenth century philosophers incorporate all manner of Qur'ānic jinn, as well as a host of other demonic and benevolent creatures of the "unseen" world (*'ālam al-ghayb*) – which is itself a cornerstone of Qur'ānic

proclamations – into their discussion of metaphysics. By doing so, the new philosophers became more accepted by both theologians and jurists as well as by the general public. Many people, learned as well as others, who had a hard time identifying with the abstract notions and terms of Peripatetic philosophy, were able to accept the new religious philosophy because it provided a scientific explanation of the world they had known and believed in as the real realm of prophecy as well as sorcery. Such an animated world is precisely what this larger audience found in Shahrazūrī's works, some aspects of which are suggested in various places in Suhrawardī's texts but never fully explained.[16]

SHAHRAZŪRĪ'S ILLUMINATIONIST PHILOSOPHY

Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Maḥmūd Shahrazūrī (d. after 688/1288), whose voluminous philosophical encyclopedia entitled *al-Shajarah al-ilāhiyyah*, translated here as *Metaphysical Tree* or the "Divine Genealogy", is best known for his history of philosophy, *Nuzhat al-arwāḥ*. But it is the *Metaphysical Tree* that marks the denouement of Suhrawardī's primacy.

Shahrazūrī's underlying method is Illuminationist. Philosophical construction based on a primary intuition of time-space, personal revelation and vision are given fundamental epistemological priority over the inherently rationalist, predicative Aristotelian principles. The Aristotelian *horos* is rejected as the primary epistemological method. Priority is given instead to the Platonist view of knowledge based on an activity of the soul whereby innate knowledge is recovered, which then serves as the first step in constructing syllogistic arguments. Thus, knowledge recovered, or "seen", by the inner disposition of a knowing subject serves as the foundation for all subsequent philosophical construction. The knowing subject, when related to the manifest object, comes to know the object in a timeless instant (*ān*). From this standpoint, definition of an object by genus and differentiae is not a prerequisite. This "knowledge by presence" has no temporal extension and supersedes acquired knowledge. Reincarnation, immortality of the soul and a cosmology that constructs a separate realm of ideas (*'ālam al-mithāl*) as the real and lasting *mundus imaginalis* (*'ālam al-khayāl*) are cornerstones of Shahrazūrī's cosmos.

Shahrazūrī consciously invokes Plato's authority in proving the validity of these ideas. As the Illuminationist philosophers stipulated, "this incorporates the divine philosopher Plato's *Phaedo* where the Peripatetics fail". The real, separate Platonic Forms may be known, not by the Aristotelian demonstration (*burhān*) of the *Posterior Analytics* but by intuition and vision–illumination. The notion of philosophical intuition is of central importance for the constructivist methodology of Illuminationist

philosophy. Intuition here may be shown to be, first, similar to the Aristotelian "quick wit", *agkhinoia*, where the truth of propositions may be known immediately, or a conclusion arrived at prior to constructing a syllogism; or, secondly, recovery by the subject of universals and of sensible objects. But intuition plays a further fundamental role as an activity of the self-conscious being in a state in which the subject and object are undifferentiated. To use Illuminationist terminology, this means unity of perception, with the perceived and the perceiver (*ittiḥād al-mudrik wa'l-idrāk wa'l-mudrik*) as an altered state in the consciousness of the knowing subject. This state exists when the subject is "linked", or otherwise related to the separate realm of the *mundus imaginalis*. This realm contains a multiplicity of self-conscious, self-subsistent "monads" designated as "abstract light" (*al-nūr al-mujarrad*) in place of the finite number of Peripatetic "intellects" (*al-'uqūl al-mujarradah*). Unlike the intellects, the abstract lights are continuous one with the other, differing only in their relative degree of intensity. Together they form a continuum designated as "the whole" (*al-kull*), which is also conscious of itself. Shahrazūrī uses the term "intuitive philosophy" (*al-ḥikmah al-dhawqiyyah*) to distinguish Illuminationist thought from the purely discursive (*al-ḥikmah al-baḥthiyyah*) Peripatetic approach.

Of further interest here is the manner in which fantastic beings – such as jinn, angels and so on – are incorporated within this religio-philosophical structure by Shahrazūrī, specifically in his philosophical encyclopedia but also in his other works, notably the *Commentary on the Philosophy of Illumination*. By philosophically explaining the existence of all manner of non-corporeal, "intelligent beings" – which were previously rejected by all the major Islamic Peripatetics – Shahrazūrī paves the way for the prevalent Iranian and Indian view of a world animated by spirits. This view is incorporated into subsequent religious philosophy and further affects theological development, especially of Shi'ite theology, in the tenth/sixteenth century.

To appreciate the breadth of Shahrazūrī's *Metaphysical Tree*, one must look at its overall structure,[17] which consists of five main treatises (*risālah*) as follows:

1 On methodology and the division of the sciences; which serves as an introduction – marking the first work of its kind in which methodological questions, as well as problems of the philosophy of language are discussed separately and systematically.
2 On logic – one of the most comprehensive compilations including the Islamic Peripatetic corpus plus Stoic fragments and additions such as the long commentary on the *Isagoge* by Ghiyāth al-Dīn al-Abharī.
3 On ethics, political philosophy and statecraft – a recompilation of such works as al-Fārābī's commentary on Plato's *Republic*, titled *The*

Opinions of the Inhabitants of the Virtuous City (*Ārā' ahl al-madīnah al-fāḍilah*), Ṭūsī's *Naṣīrean Ethics* and many other works on practical philosophy.

4 On physics – a summary of Avicenna's *Physics* (*Shifā'*), plus arguments taken from other works, including those specifically designated as Stoic (*riwāqī*).

5 On metaphysics.

The fifth treatise, "On Metaphysical Sciences and Divine Secrets" (*Fī'l-'ulūm al-ilāhiyyah wa'l-asrār al-rabbāniyyah*) is of particular significance here. It is divided into two major sections, each called *techne* (*fann*). The first deals with the subject of *metaphysica generalis* (*al-'ilm al-kullī*), and the second with *metaphysica specialis* (*al-'ilm al-ilāhī*). The latter contains the most comprehensive and lengthy treatments of metaphysics in Islamic philosophy. The ontological position upheld in the first section – after elaborate discussion pertaining to various philosophical, theological and mystical views – is one designated, perhaps clearly for the first time, as "primacy of quiddity" (*aṣālat al-māhiyyah*). Briefly stated, this position holds "existence" (*wujūd*) to be a derived mental concept while "essence" (*māhiyyah*) is considered to be primary and real. Of the seventeen chapters in this section, chapters 10, 11 and 17 are noted here.

Chapter 10 is entitled "On Determining the Platonic Forms" (*Fī taḥqīq al-muthul al-aflāṭūniyyah*); chapter 11 "On Determining the *Mundus Imaginalis*" (*Fī taḥqīq al-'ālam al-mithālī* [*al-khayālī*]; and the seventeenth and final chapter of the *Metaphysical Tree* is entitled "On the Jinn, Satans, Rebellious Angels; and therein the principle of the Devil and its state are explained" (*Fi'l-jinn wa'l-shayāṭīn wa'l-mardah, wa'l-ghūl, wa'l-nasānīs; wa fihi bayān aṣl Iblīs wa aḥwāluhu*). Ifrīt, Ghūl and Nasnās are categories of demons. According to Shahrazūrī, they all dwell in the *mundus imaginalis*, where true dreams occur. This is the location of the sorcerers' power as well as the source of inspiration for saints and the revelations of prophets. Those who travel to this realm – not with the body but with the imagination – may, if they can withstand the terrible ordeal of the quest-journey, come to possess divinelike powers, the least of which are walking on water, traversing the earth, ability to foretell the future and power over the elemental world. Visitors to the *mundus imaginalis* may tap the very source of the demons' powers and may even employ them for benevolent purposes back on earth, as did the kindly mythological Persian, Jamshīd. According to Persian tradition, this phenomenon also explains the miraculous powers of biblical figures such as Solomon.

To gain a better understanding of these philosophical views, it is helpful to look at the Platonic Forms and the Realm of Ideas in Islamic philosophy. In the Islamic Peripatetic scheme three realms are recognized:

intellect, soul and matter. In his Illuminationist philosophy Suhrawardī adds a fourth realm, generally called "the world of forms". This is further elaborated upon and enlivened by Shahrazūrī, who calls it "the intermediary realm" (*al-'ālam al-awsāṭ*). Not confined to empirical appearance, this domain is between the purely intelligible and the purely sensory, where time and space are different from Aristotelian time as a measure of distance as well as from Euclidean space. The way to the intermediary realm is by the active imagination.[18] In the *Metaphysical Tree*, the intermediary realm is considered a "real" place where all manner of extraordinary phenomena, both good and evil, are said to occur, as Shahrazūrī writes:[19]

> This realm is called the Realm of Ideas and the *mundus imaginalis*. It is beyond the world of sense perception and beyond extended space [*makān*] but below the realm of intellect [*'ālam al-'aql*]. It is an intermediary realm between the two. Everything imagined by the mathematicians, such as shapes (round, oblong, square, etc.), quantities (large, small, one, two, etc.), and bodies (cubes, tetrahedrons, spheres, etc.) and whatever relates to them such as rest, position, idea shape [*hay'ah*], surface, line, point and other conditions all exist in this intermediary realm. This is why philosophers refer to the [study of] it as "intermediate philosophy" or "intermediate science". . . . Everything seen [and heard] in dreams such as oceans, lands, loud noises and persons of stature, all of them are suspended Forms not in space nor situated. . . . Archetypes of all known things on Earth exist as luminous Forms in this realm. . . . There are numerous multiple levels in this realm, and only God knows their number. But two bordering levels are known. The virtuous luminous level which lies at the horizon bordering on the realm of intellects; and the lowly dark level, which borders the realm of sense-perception. The numerous other levels are in between the two, and in each level dwell angels, jinn and Satans whose numbers are uncountable. Souls, when separated from the body will come to live in this realm. . . . In this realm are rivers wider than the Tigris and the Euphrates and mountains taller than any on Earth. . . . Souls of evil-doers will encounter scorpions and serpents larger than the largest mountain in this realm. . . . Things that exist in this realm have "formal" bodies and imaginary shapes [*abdān mithālī wa ashkāl khayālī*]. . . . Extraordinary events, miracles, sorcery and all manner of strange manifestations occur because of this realm. . . . Sages on spiritual journeys, who learn how to unravel the signs[20] have all attested to the powers that are manifest there.

The fourth dominion of the Illuminationist cosmos, the Realm of Forms, is the region of the dark (evil) forms, as well as the luminous

(good). Together they are described as constituting a land beyond the corporeal, of the essence of the fabulous (*hūrqalyā dhāt al-'ajā'ib*), or an eighth clime (*al-iqlīm al-thāmin*).[21] Access to this realm is gained through the active imagination when it becomes mirrorlike, turning into a place in which an epiphany (*maẓhar*) may occur. One is said to travel in it not by traversing distances but by being witness to "here" or "there", unsituated and without co-ordinates. Seeing sights in this region is identified as effects suffered by the soul, or experiences within the self-consciousness of the objective self. The *mundus imaginalis* is an ontological realm whose beings, though possessing categorical attributes – such as time, place, relation, quality and quantity – are abstracted from matter. That is, they are ideal beings with a substance, usually depicted metaphorically as "light" (*nūr*). These light beings differ from the substances of other beings only in respect to their degree of intensity, or "darkness" (*ẓulmah*) which is also expressed in gradations.[22]

Creatures who dwell in this land exist in a space without Euclidean spatial extensions and in a time that is absolute, unrestricted and without duration. Things appear in this realm in what appear to be fleeting moments but involve processes that cover etenity and infinity. They possess shapes. This is why they may be seen, although their "bodies" are imaginary, or "ideal" ("*badan mithālī wa khayālī*"). This land has "cities" and "pavilions" with hundreds of thousands of gates and tiers. For all its imaginal qualities, this world is, in the words of Henry Corbin, a "concrete spiritual universe". Like Jacques Duchesne-Guillemin before him,[23] Corbin qualifies the *mundus imaginalis* in terms of what he calls a "neo-Zoroastrian Platonism". As he states, "it is most certainly not a world of concepts, paradigms, and universals", for the archetypes of the species that populate it have "nothing to do with the universals established in logic". Rather, they are an "autonomous world of visionary Figures and Forms" that belong to "the plane of angelology".[24]

Despite the apparent relationship, it would be inaccurate to identify the *mundus imaginalis* totally with Plato's Realm of Ideas in the *Dialogues*. The Illuminationist philosophers are quite specific on this point and distinguish between the suspended forms (*al-ṣuwar al-mu'allaqah*), which are the real beings of the eighth clime, and the Platonic Forms. This is because Platonic Forms are considered to be discrete, distinct entities, or "things", in the realm of intelligible lights, while the beings of the intermediary realm, though considered to be real, are part of the continuum of the imaginal, whether light or dark.[25] The significance of the realm of the *mundus imaginalis* to the history of Islamic philosophy is that it opens up an entirely new chapter, admitting an irrational dimension that the Islamic Peripatetics had vehemently rejected.

Shahrazūrī builds upon the visionary foundations of Illuminationist philosophy by seeking to substantiate the existence of creatures in the

realm of the *mundus imaginalis*. The creatures of this realm, be they luminous or dark, are "proven", according to Shahrazūrī, by the visions and intuitions of the divine philosopher-sages who have strengthened their intuitions and purified their imaginations by ascetic practices, not by mere recourse to rational demonstration. At every turn the author takes issue with the Peripatetics whose preoccupation with discursive philosophy, he claims, has weakened their ability to "see" (*mushāhadah*), reality as it is. Although the Active Intellect is clearly considered a guiding force for the Peripatetics, there is never a hint that it is personified, or in any way "seen" or perceived by the senses.

In contrast, by the sixth/twelfth century the Active Intellect appears in Illuminationist philosophy on several levels, sometimes personified as Gabriel, the archangel of revelation in the Qur'ān; as Surūsh, one of the immortals of Iranian Mazdayasnian cosmology; as Isfahbad al-A'ẓam, the great controlling archetypal light of Illuminationist cosmology; as Sīmurgh, the mythological bird of the Persian epic; as the Holy Spirit (*Rūḥ al-qudus*) of popular mysticism equated with Rawān Bakhsh, *dator spiritis*, of Persian legends. Finally, by the seventh/thirteenth century in Shahrazūrī's *Metaphysical Tree*, the Active Intellect becomes fully personified as a rational creature who exists separately in the intermediary realm and who may appear to the adept who will actually see its ideal shape and *imaginalis* body and hear its shrill cry. This archetypal creature, now with enormous power, may serve, rule or crush the person who has, by use of magic (*nayrang*) and sorcery, or by other means, tapped into its power. To support this contention the new Illuminationist philosophy now invokes the memory of past philosophers and sages, as Shahrazūrī states:[26]

> The ancient philosophers such as Hermes, Aghathadhaemon, Empedocles, Pythagoras and Plato, as well as others from among the ancients, have all claimed to have "seen" them[27] [that is, the archetypal beings, angels, or demons]; and they have all clearly attested their existence by their visions in the realm of lights. Plato has related that when he elevated his soul from the dark shackles of the body he saw them. The Persian and Indian sages, as well as others, all adhere to this and are in agreement. Anyone who absolves himself of the body and rids himself of prime matter would certainly have a vision of these lights, the archetypal essences [*dhawāt al-aṣnām*]. Most of what the prophets and other sages have indicated by way of their metaphorical language refer to this.

At this juncture Shahrazūrī turns to a rebuttal of Aristotelian methodology:

> If the physical observations of a person in matters pertaining to astronomy are accepted, and astronomers accept Ptolemy's and Proclus' and others' observations, and the First Teacher [Aristotle] even accepts the astronomical observations of the Babylonians, why should then one not rely on the spiritual observations [*irṣād ruḥānī*] and the luminous visions [*mushāhadah wa mukāshafah*] of the Pillars of Philosophy and Prophecy . . . so spiritual observation is just as significant in providing knowledge [*ma'rifah*] as physical observation [*irṣād jismānī*]. Rather, many types of error may occur in corporeal observation, as explained in al-Majisṭī, while spiritual observation, when based on the abstract, separate lights, which are all attested by Zoroaster and [King] Kay Khusraw [of Persian mythology], cannot fall into error.

The heritage of rational Greek philosophy so significant in shaping intellectual and even theological attitudes for several centuries in Islam now becomes but one dimension in Islamic Illuminationist philosophy which further defines religious philosophy. This new philosophical position characterizes religious philosophy in Persia from the seventh/thirteenth century to the present.

The overall structure of Shahrazūrī's Illuminationist elaborations is syncretic – that is, it is composed of divergent systems and beliefs that are grouped together under one school of thought. This juxtaposition continues to characterize the fantastic, supernatural, demon-ridden and generally Shi'i religious philosophy that allows Persian epic and religious figures to roam side by side with figures of Qur'ānic and Islamic origin.

Equally significant is the fact that Shahrazūrī's syncretic interpretation and elaboration of Illuminationist religious philosophy is not shunned by theologians nor even by jurists, as had been the case with earlier rational philosophies. In a recent major biographical study of philosophers in Persia from the tenth/sixteenth century to the present, some four hundred major thinkers, each with several works, were enumerated. With the exception of only a few, all were graduates of *madrasahs*, and many at one time or another had assumed specific public, religious and judicial duties.[28]

Islamic Illuminationist philosophy, as interpreted by Shahrazūrī in a religious context, was able to accommodate revelation with all its metaphysical and fantastic implications to a degree Peripatetic philosophy was never able to do. It expanded and refined the powerful Greek analytical tools into well-defined domains comprising semantic, formal and material logic. Above all, it allowed for popular religious sensibilities, superstitions and beliefs to be given a "scientific" explanation within its reformulated cosmology. And finally, through its adoption in at least some of the higher-level school curricula, it even received legal sanction.

The seventeenth and final chapter of the *Metaphysical Tree*, titled "On the Jinn, Satans, Rebellious Angels: and therein the principle of the Devil and its state are explained", adds a new and significant dimension to Illuminationist thinking. The chapter begins with Shahrazūrī stating that the philosophers both ancient and recent ("*mutaqaddimīn wa muta'akhkhirīn*") have different opinions concerning the existence of jinn and Satans. Among the Muslims, three groups are identified and their views rejected. Avicenna's position, stated in the *Book of Definitions*, is: "The jinn are [defined] as etherial beings, and take on different shapes; this being a mere lexical definition [*sharḥ al-ism*] of the utterance 'jinn', and this does not indicate an existence outside the mind (i.e. real)."[29] Shahrazūrī discounts this reasoning because, he contends, arguments based on semantics do not necessarily reject (or prove) the real existence of the thing defined. That is, the reality of the jinn may or may not be indicated simply by naming them as such. Relying on arguments drawn from Illuminationist epistemology, which holds that intuitive experiential knowledge is prior to discursive knowledge, Shahrazūrī asserts that since ancient philosophers, sages and prophets have "experienced" – or, in Illuminationist terms, have "seen" (*yushāhid*) – the jinn, as the Qur'ān also confirms, they must, therefore, have a separate existence. Here even Aristotle's authority is invoked along with that of a host of sages from Hermes to Plato – including Egyptian sages and Persian mythological figures, as well as Indian Brahmins – to prove the separate existence of such beings. Since actual experience of the phenomena is well verified by experts, the argument goes, therefore it must be real.

The statement concludes by claiming a substantial reality for the jinn who are embodied in the Realm of Forms and the *mundus imaginalis* and have non-corporeal, formal bodies and imagined shapes. Shahrazūrī rebukes the Muslim theologians, insinuating that they should know better than to deny the separate reality of the jinn, who are after all authenticated in the Qur'ān.

A summary of Shahrazūrī's arguments in the final chapter of *Metaphysical Tree* also serves as a general account of his specific Illuminationist ideas, as follows. In the intermediary realm, the *mundus imaginalis*, there are two types of entities: light and dark. Both are equally real, according to Shahrazūrī, and are not simply the absence of the other. Suhrawardī's view that darkness is not real but simply the total lack of light, and the Peripatetic view that non-being is the privation of being (or that darkness is the privation of light), are both rejected. Light and dark entities differ in terms of intensity. Just as there is a continuum of light substances from weakest to strongest, there is also a parallel continuum of dark entities. Illuminationist philosophers vehemently deny that this position is a dualist one. Dualism in the Islamic period was identified with ancient Persian infidel beliefs, referred to as Manichaean

idolatry (*ilḥād Mānī*). Shahrazūrī defends his views against this attack by confining the existence of dark entities to substances which have assumed dark shapes, or forms – generally with *imaginalis* embodiment. All of these dark forms, he contends, exist in a limited tier of the intermediary realm of forms and the *mundus imaginalis*, while the light substances cover the whole of reality.

The dichotomy of light substance and dark entity in the Realm of Forms and the *mundus imaginalis* is a new addition to the Greek inspired cosmology of the earlier Islamic Peripatetic philosophy. Some scholars, notably Henry Corbin, have indicated that this cosmology represents an earlier Persian world view. While I disagree with Corbin that the Persian element of this new philosophy was based on an established textual philosophical tradition, I believe that the Mazdayasnian sentiments kept alive in popular and oral traditions and in poetic, epic and mystical compositions have been integrated into this new Islamic Illuminationist philosophy. The Qur'ānic category of demons, satans and other such creatures is introduced by Shahrazūrī along with others from the Persian traditions, such as the category of creatures called the peris. However they are all integrated into a dualist cosmological structure that decidedly reflects the earlier tradition in which the Platonic world of Forms is used to portray a universe permeated with archetypes, good and bad, who affect earthly existence. Nowhere is this continuity more apparent than in Shahrazūrī's *Metaphysical Tree*, and especially in the few chapters examined here.

IBN KAMMŪNAH'S ILLUMINATIONIST PHILOSOPHY

The second trend in the interpretation of Illuminationist philosophy is exemplified by Ibn Kammūnah, whose *Commentary on the Intimations* (*Sharḥ al-talwīḥāt*) completed around 669/1270 emphasizes the rational side of Suhrawardī's thought.[30] It concentrates on the initial, discursive cycle of the reconstruction of the Philosophy of Illumination, but also recognizes Suhrawardī's text to be a fundamentally non-Peripatetic work.

Moshe Perlmann, who edited and translated Ibn Kammūnah's *Tanqīḥ al-ābḥāth li'l-milal al-thalāth* (1967) – translated as *Examination of the Inquiries into the Three Faiths* (1971) – has examined every possible source for Ibn Kammūnah's biography, and is the principal source for the following summary account.

Sa'd ibn Manṣūr ibn Sa'd ibn al-Ḥasan Ḥibat Allāh ibn Kammūnah was "a well-known occulist and teacher of philosophy, [and] lived in Baghdad during the seventh/thirteenth century. He was a distinguished member of the Jewish community."[31] Perlmann translates the notice given

for Ibn Kammūnah in Ibn al-Fuwaṭī's *al-Ḥawādith al-jāmi'ah wa'l-tajārib al-nāfi'ah* under the events of the year 683/1284. This is perhaps the most significant source on Ibn Kammūnah's life now available.[32]

Leo Hirschfeld had in the last decade of the nineteenth century written a brief summary account of Ibn Kammūnah's polemical work, titled *Sa'd b. Manṣūr Ibn Kammūna und seine polemische Schrift*, in which he identified several other treatises, including most of Ibn Kammūnah's philosophical and logical works.[33] These include:

1 A commentary on Avicenna's *al-Ishārāt wa'l-tanbīhāt* titled *Sharḥ al-uṣūl wa'l-jumal min muhimmāt al-'ilm wa'l-'amal* (the title translated into German by Hirschfeld as *Kommentar zu den Grundlehren und dem Gesamtinhalt aus dem Gewichtigsten für Theorie und Praxis*). It is important to note that during the same period two other major commentaries on the same work by Avicenna were composed by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and by Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī. Commentaries on the *Ishārāt* were the standard texts used by later Islamic philosophers to study Islamic Peripateticism. This, in my view, differs drastically from the manner in which the Latin West came to know Avicenna, which was mainly through translations of the *Shifā'*. It remains to be seen how Ibn Kammūnah's commentary differs, or reflects, the synthetic style of the other two works which later found their way into the higher level *madrasah* curricula.[34]
2 Commentary on Suhrawardī's *Intimations* (*al-Talwīḥāt*), to which I will turn later.
3 An independent philosophical work which Hirschfeld titled *al-Ḥikmah al-jadīdah fi'l-manṭiq* (*Neue Abhandlung über die Logik*) and has recently been published with the title *al-Jadīd fi'l-ḥikmah*, or "Novum Organum".[35]
4 Another philosophical treatise by Ibn Kammūnah, not listed by Hirschfeld or Brockelmann, is a short work called *Risālah fi'l-nafs* or *Risālah fī baqā' al-nafs*. Only one manuscript of this work is known to have survived, published by Leon Nemoy in facsimile, and later translated by him into English.[36]
5 Finally, Perlmann has brought to my attention an additional philosophical work by Ibn Kammūnah bearing the generic title *Risālah fi'l-ḥikmah*. Upon brief examination, I find it to be a different work from the one listed above. Apparently it is a summary of seventh/thirteenth-century attitudes in philosophy which combines Peripatetic terms and techniques with Illuminationist epistemological principles.

In the philosophical compilations of the eleventh/seventeenth century, numerous specific references are made only to Ibn Kammūnah's

Commentary on the Intimations. Most notably, these references are found in *al-Asfār al-arba'ah* and in *al-Qabasāt*. One example will serve to indicate the significance of Ibn Kammūnah's *Commentary* for the study of the development of Islamic philosophy in the post-Avicennan period. The reference is in Mullā Ṣadrā's famous work, *al-Asfār al-arba'ah*, in the section, "*al-Safar al-thālith: fi'l-'ilm al-ilāhī: al-Mawqif al-thālith: fī 'ilmihi ta'ālā: al-Faṣl al-rābi': fi tafṣīl madhāhib al-nās fī 'ilmihi bi'l-ashyā'*". Mullā Ṣadrā here distinguishes seven schools of thought: four philosophical, two "theological", and one "mystical" (which combines *'irfān* and *taṣawwuf*).[37] This is typical of Mullā Ṣadrā's classification of the history of philosophy, theology and mysticism and further reflects the same classification found for the first time in Shahrazūrī's *al-Shajarah al-ilāhiyyah*.[38] The four philosophical "schools" – referred to as *madhhab* – which concern us here are:

1 The school of the followers of the Peripatetics ("*madhhab tawābi' al-mashshā'īn*"). Included in this category are the "two masters" (*al-shaykhān*) al-Fārābī and Avicenna, as well as Bahmanyār (Avicenna's famous student and author of *al-Taḥṣīl*), Abu'l-'Abbās al-Lawkarī and "many later Peripatetics" ("*kathīr min al-muta'akhkhirīn*").
2 "The school of the Master Shihāb al-Dīn [Suhrawardī] al-Maqtūl follower of the Stoics ['*madhhab shaykh atbā' al-riwāqiyyah Shihāb al-Dīn al-Maqtūl*'] and those who follow him, such as al-Muḥaqqiq al-Ṭūsī, Ibn Kammūnah, al-'Allāmah {Quṭb al-Dīn] al-Shīrāzī and Muḥammad al-Shahrazūrī, author of *al-Shajarah al-ilāhiyyah*."[39]
3 "The school attributed [*al-mansūb*] to Porphyry, the First of the Peripatetics [*muqaddam al-mashshā'īn*], one of the greatest followers of the First Teacher."
4 "The school of the divine Plato."[40]

The "second school" represents the characteristic position of Ibn Kammūnah's *Commentary on the Intimations*. It is distinguished from the other schools in all philosophical domains: methodology and the division of the sciences, logic, ethics and political philosophy, physics, metaphysics and eschatology. But the question of the immortality of the soul and its "ranks" after separation from the body is a fundamental eschatological position on which Ibn Kammūnah wrote an independent treatise.

Suhrawardī, Ṭūsī, Shīrāzī, Ibn Kammūnah and Shahrazūrī are together considered the followers of Stoic philosophy and form the group of major Illuminationist philosophers of the post-Avicennan period. Excluded from this group is Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī, who is considered a *mutakallim* by the Illuminationist philosophers, notably Shahrazūrī as well as Mullā Ṣadrā. The inclusion of Ṭūsī in this group may also be doubtful in that his views on cosmology and ontology do not coincide with the

overall Illuminationist approach and philosophical technique, although his position in epistemology does.

Ibn Kammūnah's specifically philosophical arguments may best be exemplified by considering sample problems taken from his *Sharḥ al-talwīḥāt*. Before considering these, however, it is important to remember that *al-Talwīḥāt* is the first work in a series of four which constitutes the Philosophy of Illumination as Suhrawardī constructed it. As the first work in the series, this concise treatise tends to emphasize the discursive side of Illuminationist philosophy. However it is not a Peripatetic work nor was it composed during Suhrawardī's youth when, as alleged by some scholars, his position had been that of a pure Peripatetic.[41]

METHODOLOGY AND THE DIVISION OF SCIENCES

Al-Fārābī's *Enumeration of the Sciences* is the model for Ibn Kammūnah's methodology and division of the sciences, with minor modifications. However, it may be noted that by the seventh/thirteenth century every philosophical work – be it a commentary or an independent composition – is prefaced with questions pertaining to these issues. The distinction between theoretical philosophy and practical philosophy is a matter of methodology. Theoretical philosophy is said to deal with things whose existence does not depend on human action. This type of philosophy leads to pure truth (*al-ḥaqq al-ṣirf*). Practical philosophy is said to be a tool (*ālah*) that aims to obtain the "pure good" (*al-khayr al-maḥḍ*) to be utilized in the service of just rule, as well as for the attainment of happiness.

Ibn Kammūnah follows Suhrawardī's divisions within theoretical philosophy, but further elaborates and fills in the gaps as follows. Theoretical philosophy is divided into three parts. First is the "highest science" (*al-'ilm al-a'lā*), also called "first philosophy" (*al-falsafat al-ūlā*), also called "metaphysical science" (*'ilm mā ba'd al-ṭabī'ah*). This primary division is further divided into *metaphysica generalis* (*al-'ilm al-kullī*), having as its subject "being *qua* being" (substance, accident, one, many, etc.), and *metaphysica specialis* (*al-'ilm al-ilāhī*, or *al-ilāhī bi-ma'nā al-akhaṣṣ*), having as its subject the Necessary Being (its essence and acts, God's knowledge, etc.).

The second division is "middle philosophy" (*al-ḥikmah al-wusṭā*), having "quantity" (*al-kamm*) as its subject matter. This has two parts also: continuous quantities, such as geometry; and discrete quantities, such as arithmetic. Middle philosophy is of particular interest in Illuminationist philosophy because in the Illuminationist cosmological scheme the "fourth realm" is also called *mundus imaginalis*, and the Realm of Forms is

designated "the intermediary or middle realm". Thus, the subject matter of both continuous imagination (*al-khayāl al-muttaṣil*) and discrete imagination (*al-khayāl al-munfaṣil*) falls under this branch of metaphysics. The third division is "physics", whose subject matter is corporeal bodies.

Ibn Kammūnah assigns subdivisions, called *furū'*, to each of the three major divisions. Subdivisions within metaphysics include such areas of inquiry as revelation, resurrection, angels and demons, dreams and extraordinary acts. Subdivisions within middle philosophy are more clearly defined and numbered as "twelve sciences": addition and subtraction, algebra, computational geometry, mechanics (*'ilm al-ḥiyal al-mutaḥarrakah*), cranes and pulleys (*'ilm ḥarakat al-athqāl*), measures and weights, war machines, optics, mirrors, hydro-dynamics, astronomical tables and calendars, and musical instruments. Finally, physics has the following seven subdivisions: medicine, astronomy, physiognomy, interpretation of dreams, talismans, occult sciences (*'ilm al-nayranjiyyāt*) and alchemy.

LOGIC

One of the characteristics of Illuminationist logic is that its structure divides logic into three parts: semantics, formal and material. There is no "book" of categories. As in the Stoic–Megaric tradition, the categories are first examined in physics and then in metaphysics.[42] This structure is upheld by Ibn Kammūnah in his *Commentary* as well as in his other works.

Two fundamental problems traditionally presented in logic – universal propositions and essentialist definition – are isolated by Ibn Kammūnah and are considered to have a principal significance for the Illuminationist theory of knowledge, or "Illuminationist knowledge by presence" (*al-'ilm al-ḥuḍūrī al-ishrāqī*).

First, the problem of universal propositions (*al-qaḍāyā al-kulliyyah*) is introduced in formal logic. In the Illuminationist scheme, a conclusion reached by using a formally established syllogism has no epistemological value as a starting point in philosophical construction. The argument for this rests on the mode "necessary" (*al-wajh al-ḍarūrī*) and the modal "always" (*dā'iman*). For a universal affirmative proposition to have philosophical value as a foundation of logic, it must be "necessary and always true". By introducing the mode "possibility" (*imkān*) and by giving it an extension in time as in "future possibility" (*al-imkān al-mustaqbal*), the universal affirmative proposition cannot be "necessarily true always", the Illuminationist position contends. This is because of the impossibility of "knowing", or deducing, all possible future instances. The epistemological implication of this logical position is clear. Formal validity ranks lower than the certitude obtained by the self-

conscious subject who, when alerted to a future possible event through knowledge by presence, will simply "know" it; the future event cannot be "deduced".[43] Therefore, philosophical intuition has precedence over deductive reasoning, and this intuitive knowledge is renewed in every age by the philosopher–sages of that era. In other words, formal structure without philosophical "wisdom" has no actual (*ḥaqīqī*) validity.

The second philosophical problem introduced by Ibn Kammūnah is the rejection of the Aristotelian essentialist definition, *horos*, and of the Avicennan complete essentialist definition, *al-ḥadd al-tāmm*, as once again not a valid first step in the construction of philosophy. Following Suhrawardī, Ibn Kammūnah holds that true knowledge cannot be obtained from the formula which brings together the *summum genus* and the *differentiae*. Knowledge must depend on "something else", which is stated to be a psychological process that seeks the unity of the thing defined in its Form, which is fully defined only by and in the person's self-consciousness as the individual recognizes the thing to be defined (the *definiendum*).

These two philosophical problems bear directly on the methodology of the Philosophy of Illumination. Ibn Kammūnah makes numerous references to other works by Suhrawardī, is clearly familiar with the range of his works and is capable at every turn of applying germane arguments to the whole of the tradition. As such, the *Commentary* serves well to indicate the entire scope of Suhrawardī's Illuminationist compositions. Other significant areas of the numerous aspects of logic covered by this work include semantics and problems of formal logic.

Suhrawardī's theory of semantics (*'ilm dilālat al-alfāẓ*) indicates a Stoic–Megaric influence, and is specifically mentioned by Ibn Kammūnah to be different from the "standard" Avicennan.[44] Problems in this area of logic include: types of signification; relation of class names to constituents (members) of the class; types of inclusion of members in classes (*indirāj*, *istighrāq*, *indikhāl*, *shumūlī*, etc.); and perhaps most significantly from the standpoint of the history of logic, a fairly well defined theory of supposition (the restricted and unrestricted use of quantification).

There are a number of problems of formal logic, such as iterated modalities; the construction of a superaffirmative necessary proposition (*al-qaḍiyyat al-darūriyyat al-battātah*); the question of negation (*al-salb*), especially in the conversion of syllogism (*al-'aks*); reduction of terms; construction of a single "mother" figure for a syllogism (*shakl al-qiyās*) from which all other figures are to be derived; temporal modalities (*al-qaḍāyā al-muwajjahah*); especially non-admittance of an unrestricted validity of the universal affirmative proposition (*al-qaḍiyyat al-mūjibat al-kulliyyah*); and future contingency (*al-imkān al-mustaqbal*). All these problems, as well as others, are identified by Ibn Kammūnah to be part of the significant changes made by Suhrawardī to Peripatetic logic. In

every case Ibn Kammūnah's analysis both distinguishes the problem and provides a fuller account than Suhrawardī's own short description.[45]

EPISTEMOLOGY

Perhaps the most widespread impact of Illuminationist philosophy has been in the area of epistemology. The impact of Illuminationist knowledge by presence, *al-'ilm al-ḥuḍūrī*, which posits a posterior epistemological position to acquired knowledge, *al-'ilm al-ḥuṣūlī*, has not been confined to philosophical and other specialist circles, as has Illuminationist logic, for example. The epistemological status given to intuitive knowledge has fundamentally influenced what is called "speculative mysticism" (*'irfān-i naẓarī*) in Iran as well as informing Persian poetry. The way Persian poetic wisdom, for example, seeks to unravel the mysteries of nature is not through the principles of physics (as with Aristotelians, for example) but by means of the metaphysical world and the realm of myths, dreams, fantasy and the emotions.

Ibn Kammūnah starts his commentary on Suhrawardī's dream-vision of Aristotle (described in the previous chapter) by stating that "this story includes five philosophical problems" ("*tashtamil hādhihi'l-hikāyalah 'alā khamsah masā'il 'ilmiyyah*").[46] There are: (1) unity of the intellect, thinking and the object in the rational soul, in the state when the subject and the object are not differentiated. Knowledge by presence takes place when the rational soul, aware of its essence, is related (by Illuminationist relation, *al-iḍāfah al-ishrāqiyyah*) to the object. This is tantamount to the recovery of prior unity, which is how the soul by knowing itself can know other things. (2) The soul's knowledge of something other than itself is not by acquiring a form of that thing within itself – which is the Peripatetic position – but by the mere presence (*bi-mujarrad ḥuḍūr*) of the other thing. (3) Types of thinking (*aqsām al-ta'aqqul*) are described. (4) How God knows its essence and knows other things is said by Ibn Kammūnah to be based on the principle of knowledge by presence. But since God's essence and existence are the same – in other words, God's consciousness as subject and as object are never differentiated, then God's knowledge by presence never ceases. For God, there is no process of recovering a prior state because prior and future conditions do not apply to God. "God's knowledge of other things is by virtue of the other's presence to it" ("*'ilmuhu bi-mā 'adāhu'l-huḍūruhu lahu*"), to use Ibn Kammūnah's own phrase. (5) On the meaning of union and connection (*al-ittiḥād wa'l-ittiṣāl*), the principle of "knowledge by presence" is explained by comparing it to the Peripatetic notion of union with the Active Intellect. Union or connection with the Active Intellect is a corporeal phenomenon, whereas the "relation" (*al-iḍāfah*) between the knowing subject and the manifest object allows the

subject to know with certainty and takes place without temporal or spatial extension. In a sense, the soul recovers essences that are already present and have an independent as well as real existence.

ONTOLOGY

Ibn Kammūnah's views on the Illuminationist ontological position, called "primacy of quiddity", is a longstanding problem that is said to distinguish philosophical schools in the development of Islamic philosophy in Iran up to the present day.[47] It is also a matter of considerable controversy. Those who believe in the primacy of existence (*wujūd*) consider essence (*māhiyyah*) to be a derived, mental concept (*amr i'tibārī*); while those who believe in the primacy of quiddity consider existence to be a derived, mental concept. The Illuminationist position, elaborated by Ibn Kammūnah, is this: should existence be real outside the mind (*mutaḥaqqaq fī khārij al-dhihn*), then the real must consist of two things – the principle of the reality of existence, and the being of existence, which requires a referent outside the mind. And its referent outside the mind must also consist of two things, which are subdivided, and so on, ad infinitum. This is clearly absurd. Therefore existence must be considered an abstract, derived, mental concept devoid of a real existence which may be referred to outside the mind.

PHILOSOPHICAL ALLEGORY

Finally, among the distinguishing marks of Ibn Kammūnah's *Commentary* is the manner in which he analyses the metaphorical passages in Suhrawardī's work. What I have called the "fourth stage" of Illuminationist constructivist methodology is the use of a special language, a symbolic mode of expression designated as *Lisān al-ishrāq*. Shahrazūrī and later Harawī are the only two Illuminationist philosophers after Suhrawardī who continue using this special language in their works. Most others, including Ibn Kammūnah, attempt to explain the symbolism in terms of standard philosophical language.

One such instance concerns Suhrawardī's allegory of the dream-vision of Aristotle. Another example is the story of Hermes having a vision in which he meets God,[48] which in my view is further indication of the fact that Suhrawardī's *Intimations* includes a clear Illuminationist side. The story is short and reads as follows:

> One night when the sun was shining, Hermes was praying in the Temple of Light (*haykal al-nūr*); when the pillar of dawn ripped

asunder. He saw a land, with cities, upon which the wrath of God had descended. They were entering into an abyss, [disappearing] therein. So Hermes cried out: "O father, deliver me from the abode of the evil neighbours." He was thus summoned: "Catch the edge of [our] rays and fly to the Heavens." So he ascended and saw the Earth and the sky beneath him.[49]

Ibn Kammūnah calls this story "one of the difficult metaphors" (*al-rumūz al-mushkilah*) and makes the following attempt at a "rational" interpretation. The ripping of the pillar of dawn is equated with the appearance of the light of knowledge to man; the earth symbolizes the body, or matter in general; the cities are equated with embodied souls, or with their faculties, and so on. Clearly, his intention is somehow to make "philosophical" sense of Suhrawardī's allegorical style.

In conclusion, it should be emphasized that Ibn Kammūnah's interpretation of Suhrawardī's Philosophy of Illumination as presented in his *Commentary on the Intimations* greatly influenced the later development of philosophy in Persia. Specifically, both Mīr Dāmād and subsequently Mullā Ṣadrā refer to his interpretations and employ many of his arguments in their own work. Part of Ibn Kammūnah's purpose was to clarify and explain Suhrawardī's often terse and difficult style. He further attempted to reduce the philosopher's symbolic language – which was so characteristic of Suhrawardī – to a more standard analytical one. In so doing, Ibn Kammūnah helped the Philosophy of Illumination to become, in my view, more easily accepted by philosophers and accessible to them.

NOTES

See, for example, Solomon Pines, *Nouvelles études sur Awḥad al-Zamān Abu'l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī* (Paris, 1953); "Studies in Abu'l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī's Poetics and Metaphysics", In *Scripta Hierosolymitana*, vol. 6, *Studies in Philosophy*, ed. S. H. Bergman (Jerusalem, 1960): 120–98.

Shahrazūrī's *Sharḥ ḥikmat al-ishrāq* ("Commentary on the Philosophy of Illumination") has not been published. I have prepared a preliminary critical edition: however, prior to its publication I shall refer to the folios of the Istanbul, Saray Ahmad III, MS no. 3230.

Moshe Perlmann's text edition and translation of Ibn Kammūnah's polemics *Tanqīḥ al-abḥāth li'l-milal al-thalāth* are among the few studies on Ibn Kammūnah. See Moshe Perlmann, *Sa'd b. Manṣūr Ibn Kammūna's Examination of the Inquiries into the Three Faiths: a Thirteenth-Century Essay in Comparative Religion* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967 (text) and 1971 (translation)). Ibn Kammūnah is an important figure in the history of post-Avicennan philosophy. His *Sharḥ al-talwīḥāt* ("Commentary on Suhrawardī's Intimations") has not, however, been printed. He is also an important logician of the post-Avicennan period. His *al-Ḥikmat al-jadīdah fi'l-manṭiq* ("Neue Abhandlungen über die

Logik") – which is probably the section on logic of his *al-Jadīd fi'l-ḥikmah* – and his commentary on Avicenna's *Directives and Remarks* entitled *Sharḥ al-uṣūl wa'l-jumal min muhimmāt al-'ilm wa'l-'amal* ("Kommentar zu den Grundlehren und dem Gesamtinhalt aus dem Gewichtigsten für Theorie und Praxis") deserve a special study; see Leo Hirschfeld's short monograph, *Sa'd b. Manṣūr Ibn Kammūna* (Berlin, 1893): 11–13.

4 See Shīrāzī, *Sharḥ ḥikmat al-ishrāq [Commentary on the Philosophy of Illumination]*, lithograph edition by Ibrāhīm Ṭabāṭabā'ī (Tehran, 1895).

5 See Dawānī, *Sharḥ hayākil al-nūr [Commentary on the Temples of Light]*, Tehran, Majlis Library, MS no. 1412.

6 See Harawī, *Anwāriyyah [Abodes of Light]*, ed., with introduction and notes, Hossein Ziai (Tehran, 1980).

7 I have chosen not to discuss Shīrāzī's Illuminationist works because of the availability of an excellent analytical study on him recently published. In this book readers will find an in-depth study of the post-Suhrawardian tradition. See John Walbridge, *The Science of Mystics Lights: Quṭb al-Dīn Shīrāzī and the Illuminationist Tradition in Islamic Philosophy* (Cambridge, Mass., 1992).

8 See my "Preface" to Harawī's *Anwāriyyah*: 13–19.

9 In his *Anwāriyyah*, Harawī informs us of his independent Illuminationist work entitled *Sirāj al-ḥikmah*. This work, however, has not survived, but is indicative of the impact of Illuminationist philosophy in India. See my edition of *Anwāriyyah*: 212, 245.

10 See *Anwāriyyah*: 150–4.

11 See Bakhtiyar Husain Siddiqi, "Jalāl al-Dīn Dawwānī", in *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, ed. M. M. Sharif (Wiesbaden, 1966), 2: 883–8.

12 For a general account of Mīr Dāmād's life and works see S. H. Nasr, "The School of Ispahan" and "Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī", both in *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, ed. M. M. Sharif: 904–60.

13 Sayyid Muḥammad Kāẓim 'Aṣṣār, *Vaḥdat-e vojūd va badā'*, ed. Jalāl Āshtiyānī (Mashhad, 1970). 'Aṣṣār has been hailed by Āshtiyānī, himself one of the most important figures in the tradition of Islamic philosophy of the contemporary period, as the foremost Illuminationist philosopher of recent decades.

14 Christian Jambet in his "Introduction" to *Shihāboddīn Yaḥya Sohravardī, Le Livre de la Sagesse Orientale*, traduction et notes par Henry Corbin (Paris, 1986) states a possible influence of Illuminationist doctrine on Jewish mysticism. See also p. 75 n. 85 where notice of Paul Fenton's *Deux traités de mystique juive* (Lagrasse, 1987) is given. See also Paul Fenton, *Treatise of the Pool* (London, 1983).

15 See Lisān al-Dīn ibn al-Khaṭīb, *Rawḍat al-ta'rīf bi'l-ḥubb al-sharīf*, ed. Muḥammad al-Kattānī (Ribat, 1981).

16 For example Suhrawardī in his *Philosophy of Illumination* (as well as in other texts) states, without further explanation, that "Jinn and satans are obtained from the Suspended Forms" (*Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*: 232), a subject taken up by Shahrazūrī, who treats it in great detail.

17 The work is as yet unpublished – and I am using the Berlin manuscript formerly of the Königlischen Bibliothek, Sprenger Collection, now in the Staatsbibliothek, MS no. 5026. It is a long manuscript comprising 319 folios of 18 × 27 cm, 33 lines per page in a small highly cursive script. I have elsewhere discussed this manuscript in detail. See my "The Manuscript of *al-Shajarat al-ilāhiyyah*:

a Philosophical Encyclopedia by Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Shahrazūrī", *Iran-shenasi*, 2(1) (Spring 1990): 14–16 and 89–108.

18 Henry Corbin has discussed this realm in many of his works. See especially H. Corbin, *Terre céleste*, trans. Nancy Pearson (Princeton, 1977): 82–9.

19 Shahrazūrī, *al-Shajarah al-ilāhiyyah*, fols 267vff. Translation mine.

20 The term used here is *sīmīyā'*, probably derived from the Greek *semeion*.

21 See Suhrawardī, *Opera II*: 254–5; cf. al-Harawī, *Anwāriyyah*: 222, where Hūrqalayā is said to be one of the imaginal spheres, *aflāk-i mithālī*, "travelled" to by Pythagoras.

22 Cf. Corbin, *Terre céleste*: 82–9. Suhrawardī's own theory of the categories bears directly on this issue, in which he considers only substance, quality, quantity, relation and motion – all of which are given to degrees of intensity and are processes more than they are ontic distinct entities.

23 Duchesne-Guillemin, *The Western Response to Zoroaster* (Oxford, 1958): 132.

24 Corbin, *L'Homme de lumière dans le soufisme iranien* (Paris, 1971): 6.

25 See, for example, Shīrāzī, *Sharḥ*: 511: "*wa'l-ṣuwar al-mu'allaqah laysat muthul Aflaṭūn fa-innah muthul Aflāṭūn nūriyyah thābitah fī 'ālam al-anwār al-'aqliyyah*", ("the suspended forms, *ṣuwar*, are not the Platonic Ideas, *muthul Aflāṭūn*, because the latter are luminous and fixed in the realm of intelligible lights").

26 Shahrazūrī, *al-Shajarah al-ilāhiyyah*, fols 292ff. Translation mine.

27 The term used here is *mushāhadah*, which indicates a special cognitive mode as I have explained elsewhere. See my *Knowledge and Illumination* (Atlanta, 1990), chapter 4.

28 See Manuchehr Sadughi Soha, *A Bio-bibliography of Post Ṣadr-ul-Muta'allihīn Mystics and Philosophers* (Tehran, 1980).

29 See Avicenna, *Kitāb al-ḥudūd*, trans. A.-M. Goichon in *Introduction à Avicenne: son épître des définitions* (Paris, 1933): 124.

30 This work has not been published. I refer to the Leiden MS no. Or. 137.

31 Moshe Perlmann, *Sa'd b. Manṣūr Ibn Kammūna's Examination*: ix.

32 *Ibid.*

33 See Leo Hirschfeld, *Manṣūr Ibn Kammūna*: 11–13. The list of works relies primarily on Hājjī Khalīfah and is incomplete.

34 Both Ṭūsī and Rāzī stress the *'irfān* element of Avicenna's work, which was also later integrated into *al-Ḥikmat al-muta'āliyah* by Mullā Ṣadrā, influencing both the intention as well as style of religious philosophy in Persia to the present.

35 This important text by Ibn Kammūnah is edited by Ḥamīd al-Kabīsī (Baghdad, 1982).

36 See Leon Nemoy, *Ibn Kammūna's The Arabic Treatise on the Immortality of the Soul* (New Haven, 1945); translation in *Ignaz Goldziher Memorial Volume II* (Jerusalem, 1958).

37 Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, Mullā Ṣadrā, *al-Asfār al-arba'ah* (reprint: Tehran, n.d.), 6: 180ff.

38 See Hossein Ziai, "The Manuscript": 89–108.

39 Mullā Ṣadrā, *op. cit.*, 6: 187. The attribution of "Stoic" to the Illuminationist school appears in many places in this work. However, concerning certain "novel" philosophical issues, such as the distinction between the idea of "intellectual form" (*al-ṣūrah al-'aqliyyah*) and the idea of "archetypal form" (*al-ṣūrah al-mithāliyyah*) – the latter also as "the idea shape", or "imagined shape" – Mullā

Ṣadrā is careful to use only the attribution "Illuminationist". See, for example, *al-Asfār*, 3: 504ff. In general the Stoic epithet is added to the Illuminationist designation only in conjunction with questions that relate to logic and physics, but in matters that pertain to epistemology, cosmology and eschatology, "Illuminationist" is used alone. See also my *Knowledge and Illumination*, chapter 1, for a discussion of Stoic influences on Illuminationist logic.

40 It is possible that Mullā Ṣadrā here means only Plato himself and not a "school of thought" that had continued after him. I take this reading because of the phrase "*mā dhahaba ilayhi Aflāṭūn al-ilāhī*". The distinction would indicate an attempt on the part of Mullā Ṣadrā to indicate the philosophical position of Plato himself as distinct from later syncretic texts designated "Platonic". See, for example, Mullā Ṣadrā, *op. cit.*, 3: 509, where he clearly attempts to specifically refer to Plato himself by stating "*qāla Aflāṭūn al-sharīf*", and not "*fī madhhab al-aflāṭūniyyah*".

41 Among the authors who have categorized *al-Talwīḥāt* as a Peripatetic work Helmut Ritter should be noted. See Helmut Ritter, "Philologika IX: Die vier Suhrawardī", *Der Islam*, 24 (1937): 270–86 and 25 (1938): 35–86.

42 Suhrawardī discusses the categories at great length in his major Arabic and Persian systematically philosophical works. His theory of categories, which are attributed by him to some Pythagorean person (*shakhṣ fīthāghūrithī*) by the name of Arkhūṭus, has had a major impact on subsequent philosophy in Persia. What is later designated by Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī "motion in category substance" (*al-ḥarakat al-jawhariyyah*), translated as "substantial motion" and "transubstantial motion", is a direct corollary to Suhrawardī's theory. Briefly the theory states that "intensity" (*shaddah wa da'f*) is predicated of all categories which are reduced to five: substance (*jawhar*), quality (*kayf*), quantity (*kamm*), relation (*nisbah*) and motion (*ḥarakah*). This is in direct agreement with Suhrawardī's special theory of being as continuum, as well as with his theory known as "theory of future contingency" (lit. theory of the contingency of the most noble, *qā'idat imkān al-ashraf*).

43 The favourite example given by Suhrawardī in support of his arguments, one discussed in detail by Ibn Kammūnah in his *Sharḥ al-talwīḥāt*, is: Take the universal affirmative proposition "All animals move their lower jaw when they chew". This proposition is valid only prior to the "discovery" of the alligator, who moves both jaws when chewing. A single exceptional instance negates the proposition in question. By analogy, the Illuminationist critique goes on to stipulate that the Peripatetic definition of "man" as "rational animal" – which is reduced to the generalized form $(\forall x)(f(x) \rightarrow g(x)$ – has only formal validity. This is because for it to be valid it must exhaustively enumerate all differentiae combined in the formula, which is negated because of future possibility of one differentia not known "now". Thus, Ibn Kammūnah concludes that the essentialist definition of man does not establish the essence "man" – also here called "man-ness" (*al-insāniyyah*) – which is established by other types of argument resting in the idea of self-consciousness and is picked up in physics and further developed in metaphysics.

44 As I have shown elsewhere there may here be certain connections with the Stoic theory of *lekton*. See my *Knowledge and Illumination*: 42ff.

45 Ibn Kammūnah himself indicates that one of his reasons for writing the commentary is to provide the details left out by Suhrawardī. See *Sharḥ al-Talwīḥāt*, fol. 23v.

46 *Ibid.*, fols 235v – 238v.
47 See Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī, *Hastī az naẓar-i falsafih wa 'irfān* (reprint: Tehran, 1982): 1–39.
48 Also discussed by Corbin in his *Terre céleste*: 2.1.
49 See Suhrawardī, *Opera I*: 108. Translation mine.

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