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Against relativism

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Recent years have brought relativistic accounts of knowledge, first-person belief, and future contingents to prominence. I discuss these views, distinguish non-trivial from trivial forms of relativism, and then argue against relativism in all of its substantive varieties.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of California, 5707 South Hall, Santa Barbara, CA, 93106, USA

    Aaron Z. Zimmerman

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  1. Aaron Z. Zimmerman
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Correspondence to Aaron Z. Zimmerman.

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Zimmerman, A.Z. Against relativism. Philos Stud 133, 313–348 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-4604-3

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