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Finding Alternatives to Handicap Theory

  • Thematic Issue Article: Strategic Interaction
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Abstract

The Handicap Principle represents a central theory in the biological understanding of signaling. This paper presents a number of alternative theories to the Handicap Principle and argues that some of these theories may provide a better explanation for the evolution and stability of honest communication.

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Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank Carl Bergstrom, Simon Huttegger, and Brian Skyrms for helpful comments on earlier drafts. This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. EF 1038456. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA

    Kevin J. S. Zollman

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  1. Kevin J. S. Zollman
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Correspondence to Kevin J. S. Zollman.

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Zollman, K.J.S. Finding Alternatives to Handicap Theory. Biol Theory 8, 127–132 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-013-0107-1

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