UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS PRESS

North American Philosophical Publications

GROUP BALKANIZATION OR SOCIETAL HOMOGENIZATION: IS THERE A DILEMMA BETWEEN RECOGNITION AND DISTRIBUTION STRUGGLES?

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Much recent work in social theory has struggled to come to terms with the changing forms of political struggle evinced in Western constitutional democracies, in particular, with the rise of demands for social and political recognition of distinctive group identities. Among those interested in social justice, there appears to be a split between those who champion these newer forms of recognition politics and those who champion a revitalization of redistributive politics. On the left, this split is reflected in complementary charges from both camps. Partisans of egalitarian redistribution claim that a focus on issues of group recognition and cultural diversity undermines the social basis for a viable, broad-based politics of redistribution. The rise of identity politics is seen as having diverted political energy from more pressing problems of economic fairness, as leading to the balkanization of groups and so detracting from a realization of solidarity in shared interests, as denying the normative superiority of universal equality, and as taking refuge behind an anti-individualist, anti-rationalist, anti-Enlightenment jingoistic collectivism.[1] In short, a "cultural" politics of recognition is taken to lead to societal balkanization: accentuating the differences between groups without providing the motivational bases needed for common action.

Champions of recognition politics, on the other hand, charge resource egalitarians with ignoring the significant cultural diversification of modern societies, falsely treating recognition as a scarce resource that can be simply "redistributed" from one group to another, avoiding the significance of individual identities intersubjectively formed within culturally distinct communities, and failing to see the way in which putatively universal standards of justice themselves reflect the group

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particularities of historically dominant social groups.[2] In short, an "economic" politics of redistribution is taken to promote a false societal homogenization: overlooking the actual diversity of society while promoting an effectively discriminatory false solidarity. Hence, on the left it seems, there is a rather conventional connection between two different political concerns—redistribution or recognition—and two different societal dynamics of group interaction—dedifferentiation or differentiation. Interestingly, the current rhetoric of the right also employs the tropes of balkanization and false homogenization, but inverts the associated pairs. In the conventional discourse of the right, undesired group differentiation is associated with redistributive politics ("class warfare"), while some preferred forms of recognition politics (concerning, especially, religious identity groups) is associated with overcoming false homogenization (to a putatively universal secularism). At the very least, this inversion between the left and the right should spur us to rethink the question of whether there really are inherent group dynamics of unification and separation associated with the distinct politics of redistribution and recognition.

In contrast to most of the partisans of either multicultural justice or economic egalitarianism who insist that we must choose which type of social justice to pursue, Nancy Fraser has consistently insisted that recognition struggles must be waged alongside, rather than displacing, economic struggles for a fair distribution of rights, resources, and opportunities. Fraser is interested in developing a critical theory of society that is adequate to our contemporary "'postsocialist' condition."[3] According to her account of this condition, everyday political struggles have increasingly bifurcated into movements that, on the one hand, focus on overcoming harms to identities caused by symbolic and interpretive slights carried by a society's patterns of cultural evaluation, and, on the other hand, focus on overcoming harms to material well-being and equal opportunity caused by deprivations and discriminations carried by a society's political-economic structures. Because of this bifurcation of political struggles, and Fraser's conviction that both types of harm are examples of social injustice, she argues that our contemporary condition requires a "bivalent" critical social theory, one that can analyze issues of both recognition and distribution within an integrated framework.[4]

Fraser's first detailed account of this bivalent framework was explicitly built around the thesis that practical and theoretical dilemmas persistently arise from the apparently opposing group dynamics of recognition and redistribution struggles.[5] This paper investigates and critiques that thesis. It claims that the thesis rightly highlights an important practical tension between group differentiation and dedifferentiation that accompanies many struggles for increasing social justice, but argues that this

tension cannot be mapped onto the distinction between struggles for recognition and for redistribution. It is important to note, however, that Fraser no longer explicitly endorses the thesis of an ineradicable dilemma between redistribution and recognition; it is no longer the focus of her theory construction. In the most recent version of her critical social theory she now refers to a multitude of practical and theoretical tensions that may occur across and amongst different types of political action and groups.[6] Nevertheless, her redistribution-recognition dilemma thesis is worth investigating for many reasons: it is intuitively plausible; it is consistent with many of the egalitarian and liberal responses to recognition politics; it has been quite influential; it identifies, but misdiagnoses, an important practical tension between group differentiation and dedifferentiation; and, its misdiagnosis ultimately stems from an overly objectivistic theory of group formation and dynamics, a theory that plays an even more central role in Fraser's most recent work.

   The first section reconstructs Fraser's argument for the thesis that groups which suffer from both misrecognition and maldistribution face a persistent dilemma: either adopt remedies for the economic injustice that tend to put the group out of business as such, or, adopt remedies for the misrecognition that tend to reinforce the group's differentiating characteristics (A). The essay argues that, although she introduces useful ways of distinguishing between the *causes* of harm to groups, her *typology* of groups based on these harms and her conclusion of a chronic *dilemma* between available remedies both suffer from an overly objectivistic account of group identities. In particular, by introducing Axel Honneth's distinctions between the inner logics of different types of social collectivities and their recognition struggles, and by examining different types of political struggles concerned with gender (B) and sexual identity (C), the paper shows that groups facing both kinds of injustice do not necessarily face the dilemma Fraser claims. Taking a step back from the putative recognition/redistribution dilemma, the paper then attempts to show how Fraser's bivalent social theory is led to overlook important differences between groups struggling for social justice precisely because of its theoretical commitment to an objectivistic account of social collectivities (D). The final section takes up the refinements Fraser has recently made in her theory that allow her to retain her original insight into differentiation dilemmas without maintaining the false thesis that they occur specifically between the redistributive and recognition politics (E). It also indicates how the intuitive plausibility of her original thesis, and some of the grounds for its wide influence, can be tied to certain widely shared, but contextually contingent, folk and theoretical paradigms of group dynamics.

A. The Recognition / Redistribution Dilemma

Fraser begins by distinguishing between injustices of misrecognition and injustices of maldistribution by referring to their primary causal roots.[7] Misrecognition is rooted primarily in cultural patterns of symbolic representation, interpretation, and communication, while maldistribution is rooted primarily in the political-economic structures of society. Fraser is careful here to note two caveats. First, this is an ideal-typical, analytic distinction for which one may find no pure empirical examples; in fact, the two types of injustice are usually interimbricated and mutually reinforcing. Second, and more importantly, this distinction is not meant to suggest that misrecognition has no socio-economic effects or, conversely, that maldistribution has no cultural effects. Rather, the claim is that, since each form of injustice has different causal roots, different types of remedies are recommended: cultural and symbolic change on the one hand, political-economic restructuring on the other.

Fraser then distinguishes between three ideal-typical forms of collectivities whose members may face injustice: those whose defining characteristics, as a collectivity, are rooted primarily in cultural patterns of interpretation (such as gays, lesbians, and others with despised sexualities), those whose defining characteristics are rooted mainly in political-economic social structures (such as exploited classes), and those whose defining characteristics are rooted in a combination of the two (such as gender and race). Fraser argues that these last "bivalent collectivities . . . may suffer both socioeconomic maldistribution and cultural misrecognition *in forms where neither of these injustices is an indirect effect of the other, but where both are primary and co-original.*"[8] After further investigation of the specific problems faced by collectivities defined by gender, race, class, and sexuality, she concludes that "for practical purposes, then, virtually all real-world oppressed collectivities are bivalent."[9]

Turning to the practical, political remedies which are usually employed to overcome these types of injustice, Fraser identifies a dilemma often faced by bivalent collectivities suffering from both misrecognition and maldistribution, since the strategies appropriate to each form of injustice will often interfere with one another.

> Recognition claims often take the form of calling attention to, if not performatively creating, the putative specificity of some group and then of affirming its value. Thus, they tend to promote group differentiation. Redistribution claims, in contrast, often call for abolishing economic arrangements that underpin group specificity. . . . Thus, they tend to promote group dedifferentiation.[10]

Insofar as recognition politics tends to reinforce groups distinctiveness, while redistribution politics tends to abolish such distinctiveness, groups attempting both forms of politics will often find their various claims and proposed remedies warring with each other, simultaneously trying to maintain and abolish group boundaries between themselves and the broader society. The problem Fraser here identifies—between the opposing tendencies of solidaristic societal homogenization and balkanizing societal diversification—can be aptly termed the "differentiation dilemma."

So, for example, African-Americans are members of a bivalent collectivity since their existence as a group is rooted in a determinate history of both political-economic exploitation and cultural-symbolic devaluation,[11] and as such should face tensions between the politics of redistribution and those of recognition. In fighting for better education for children in predominately black neighborhoods, activists might pursue economic remedies such as equal funding throughout a broader district, county, or state, at the same time that they pursue cultural remedies aimed at overcoming demeaning characterizations by emphasizing the distinctiveness of African-American language and heritage through curricular reform. But these two forms of remedy will come into conflict with one another, since one pursues a difference-blind politics of equal funding while the other demands difference-sensitive pedagogical policies and hence variegated treatment of minority and majority student populations. The dilemma here goes beyond, however, the manifest tension between difference-blind and difference-sensitive claims. For a remedy oriented toward ameliorating one type of injustice may actually worsen injustices of the other type. Thus while curricular recognition may overcome stereotypical discrimination and Eurocentric normalization by acknowledging African-American distinctiveness, it may also further contribute to the racial division of labor whereby race is one of the structural principles that works to separate low-wage, low-status jobs from high-wage, high-status jobs. Alternatively, a remedy aimed at overcoming the racial division of labor, and so overcoming race as a structuring collectivity category, may lead to misrecognition injustices of only apparently egalitarian difference-blindness. Analogous difficulties, according to Fraser, will arise in feminist politics aiming to struggle simultaneously against cultural-symbolic and political-economic injustices.

Her proposed solution to the differentiation dilemma is that groups facing both types of injustice should eschew "affirmative" remedies which merely attempt to correct inequitable outcomes while leaving the underlying generative social forms intact. Such outcome-focused remedies include liberal welfarist politics and mainstream multiculturalism: both attempt to rectify inequitable results without changing that which

causes them. Liberal welfarism aims to combat unjustifiable distribu-
tive inequalities of the current political economy by redistributing goods
and services to the least well-off after market mechanisms have achieved
an initial distribution, but it does not seek to change fundamentally the
structural relations that persistently produce groups of persons who are
at an unjustifiably low level of material well-being. Analogously, main-
stream multiculturalism aims to combat unjustified group denigration
by taking extant definitions and borders of cultural groups as a given,
and revaluing previously denigrated characteristics associated with these
groups into characteristics seen as worthy, distinctive, and/or empower-
ing. It thus leaves the underlying interpretive schemes that define group
identities unchallenged, while attempting to mitigate their unjust out-
comes. Because affirmative remedies do not attack the underlying causes
of group differentiation, but rather allow the group-defining harms to
continue, they tend to perpetuate societal balkanization.

According to Fraser, bivalent collectivities should rather pursue "trans-
formative" remedies: those aimed at fundamentally altering the underly-
ing causes of injustice, such as socialist reconstructions of the relations
of production and deconstructivist destabilizations of extant interpretive
and valuational structures. These types of remedies reduce the tensions
between the opposing tendencies of group dedifferentiation and differen-
tiation, and avoid painful double binds and self-defeating strategies that
affirmative remedies often lead to.

So, for example, women constitute a bivalent collectivity, defined as
a distinct group by both economic deprivations and androcentric evalu-
ative patterns. With respect to the gender gap in wages, with women
being paid on average about three-quarters of men for equivalent work,
a proposal to make up for the difference through post-market payouts to
women would be an affirmative remedy. In contrast, a proposal such as
Fraser's "Universal Caregiver" model would be a transformative rem-
edy since it aims to change the underlying gendered division of labor
that is largely responsible for the gender gap in wages.[12] In the former
case, gender as a structuring principle of the political-economy is left
intact, thus tending to extend gender-based group differentiation. In the
latter case, the long-term tendency is to end the distributive differentia-
tion between men and women, and thus, so to speak, to put the category
of gender "out of business" with respect to political-economic arrange-
ments. Furthermore, the affirmative remedy may well lead to
misrecognition harms through backlash, whereby women are stigma-
tized as unmotivated, or unproductive, or insufficiently career-driven
because they still shoulder an undue burden of unpaid care-work labor,
even as they are denigrated as free-riders on the distributive largess of

the welfare state. A transformative remedy, in changing the underlying generative causes of the gendered wage gap, would not lend itself as easily to such denigrating interpretive schemes, and so would mitigate, rather than intensify, the tensions between the demands of redistribution and recognition.

For Fraser, the same types of benefits should accrue to transformative remedies aimed at deconstructing and de-essentializing the patterns of cultural interpretation that are at the roots of misrecognition. Thus a mainstream multicultural remedy to androcentrism might seek to simply revalue currently devalued traits and abilities that are traditionally associated with women—such as a focus on concrete, intimate relations rather than formal, anonymous rules, and an emphasis on the importance of care in comparison to justice—and thereby simply affirm pre-given stereotypical gender differences. However, such an affirmative strategy might lead to intensified maldistributive injustices for women, as they are increasingly marginalized in the wage-labor market and encouraged to attend to their "properly feminine" duties according to their "essential" aptitudes. While a transformative misrecognition remedy would also acknowledge difference and specificity, it would not reproduce the traditional gender binaries and rigid borders between masculinity and femininity. Rather, "the long-term goal of deconstructive feminism is a culture in which hierarchical gender dichotomies are replaced by networks of multiple intersecting differences that are demassified and shifting."[13] So, rather than differentiating groups along the lines of stable gender identities and reified "inherent" gender-differentiated traits and capacities, a deconstructive politics of gender would tend, in the long run, to put the opposition between male and female "out of business" as a structuring principle of hierarchical value judgments.

Given this more fine-grained analysis of affirmative versus transformative remedies, it turns out that the dilemma that Fraser first raised is not so much between redistribution and recognition *simpliciter*, but rather between the *differentiating* tendencies of affirmative remedies and the long-term *dedifferentiating* tendencies of transformative strategies. Nevertheless, it makes some sense to retain her label of a "redistribution-recognition dilemma" given her assumptions that most currently compelling forms of current distributive politics (in theory, if not in practice) tend more towards transforming political-economic structures, while current recognition politics (in both theory and practice) tend more towards affirming group specificity as currently articulated culturally and symbolically. Where there is racial or gendered exploitation or exclusion in the structure of the political economy, movements for social justice intend to erase the categories of race and gender as structuring

principles of distribution. Even where such movements may adopt a rem-
edy tending more towards the affirmative end of the scale, they appeal
to ideals, for instance of equality of opportunity, that themselves point
to an end to the group differentiation with respect to economic factors.
In other words, distributive struggles tend to fight against group-based
differentiation as *prima facie* inegalitarian and unjust, and so tend to
put the group out of business as a relevant political-economic collectiv-
ity. On the other hand, where there is racial or gendered disrespect or
denigration, movements for social justice generally intend to equalize
the asymmetrical judgments and evaluations and change their devalu-
ing expressions in social and political institutions, not erase gender or
race as important axes of cultural difference: "the logic of the remedy
. . . is to accord positive recognition to a devalued group specificity."[14]
Thus, insofar as most extant struggles against misrecognition tend to
fight against putative formal equality as unjustly ignoring relevant group-
based differences, they also tend to maintain and reinforce the differen-
tiation of culturally defined collectivities. If we agree with Fraser's two
background assumptions that most contemporary distribution struggles
are more transformative than affirmative and that most recognition
struggles take the form of an affirmative identity politics of difference,
and if her social ontology and social theory are correct, then "the redis-
tribution-recognition dilemma is real. There is no neat theoretical move
by which it can be wholly dissolved or resolved."[15] Bivalent collectivi-
ties should chose transformative economic and cultural struggles, for
only in this way will they be able to reduce—without perhaps entirely
eliminating in the short term—the inherent tensions between group dedi-
fferentiation and further group differentiation.[16]

B. An Internalist Account of Recognition Struggles I: Feminism

While the broad outlines of Fraser's proposal for transformative po-
litical strategies may be compelling and appropriate to the contemporary
"postsocialist" condition, the differentiation dilemma that drives the
argument for such strategies relies on a problematically objectivist ac-
count of social collectivities. Starting from Weber's distinction between
economically delimited classes and culturally defined status groups,[17]
Fraser's account of collectivities occludes the differences between dis-
tinct forms of recognition and their associated struggles. If an internalist
account of collectivities that attends to the differing inner logics of vari-
ous forms of recognition is employed, then it should become apparent
that the group differentiation/dedifferentiation distinction cuts across

the distinction between the causal roots of injustice.[18] Only when we treat recognition politics as centrally tied up with identity—and not just status differentials—can we see that individuals seek not only differentiating status recognition, but also non-differentiating universalist respect recognition. Because a healthy sense of self-identity requires different kinds of recognition, it should be no surprise that misrecognized groups will seek various kinds of social conditions required for undistorted individual identity development, social conditions that may tend to differentiate *or* dedifferentiate that group.

Axel Honneth's recent work[19] articulates a promising internalist account of collectivities based around recognition struggles that is more fruitful than that offered by Fraser because it attends to the different forms of relation-to-self that such struggles aim to promote, to the different justificatory strategies they adopt for overcoming deforming social structures, and most pertinent here, to the distinct group differentiation tendencies evinced by forms of recognition politics. Very briefly stated, Honneth claims that individuals develop three different forms of relation-to-self through three different types of social interaction: self-confidence is gained in primary, affective relations, self-respect in legal relations of rights, and self-esteem in local communities defined by shared value orientations. Corresponding to these three forms of self-relation are three different forms of disrespect that impede an individual's ability for self-realization: physical violations impede the development of self-confidence, the denial of rights impedes self-respect, and the denigration of shared horizons of value impedes self-esteem. When individual experiences of disrespect are understood as the norm for all members of a certain group—when they are experienced epidemically—the potential motivation exists for collective political resistance to the structures of society which systematically deny group members the recognition they need for full self-realization. Hence different types of social struggles for recognition can be identified according to what kind of disrespect and misrecognition they seek to overcome.

More detailed consideration of two examples of recent social struggles for recognition revolving around issues of gender and sexuality will help show that, when analyzed from a perspective internal to the intersubjective constitution of identity, different forms of recognition struggles—*contra* Fraser—may or may not be primarily aimed at cultural and symbolic practices, and further, may or may not lead to remedies which increasingly differentiate social groups. As has been argued elsewhere,[20] Honneth's tripartite distinction between different forms of social recognition and social struggles can help to clarify some of the normative claims raised by universalist and difference feminists. These

normative claims should not be understood as competing, but rather as different kinds of normative claims, focused on different types of recognition, and with different justificatory burdens. What is important here is a socio-theoretic implication of the tripartite distinction: the group differentiation tendencies of the relevant remedy strategies are not the same.

For instance, as Andrea Dworkin has stressed,[21] one deserves one's physical integrity just because one exists as a person. The physical degradation of rape destroys from the outside one's basic self-confidence and trust in the stability of the social world. Since all persons need to develop a basic self-confidence in order to even have the possibility of becoming a competent agent, the need for a social environment of emotional support and freedom from violence is a basic, universal requirement for all persons. Recognition struggles to gain such an environment will not discriminate between persons and so will not tend towards groups differentiation. In this case, struggles for a social environment free of gender-differentiated violence will aim at a complex set of structures: not just symbolic patterns of interpretation, but also at societal structures of the political-economy, international human rights, nationally based legal rights and entitlements, familial norms, educational patterns, and so on. It would be wrong to reduce recognition struggles for the necessary social conditions for the development of self-confidence to a politics aimed only at prevalent cultural patterns. Furthermore, it seems incorrect to posit that such recognition struggles will aim at positively affirming group specificity, and so maintaining or increasing group differentiation. Merely affirmative remedies like increasing the rape detection and reporting capabilities of law-enforcement and medical personnel and transformative strategies like radically diminishing the cultural celebration of sex-based violence, will both tend to put sex "out of business" as a group differentiating characteristic with respect to sexual violence.

The claims made in struggles for the expansion of already partially guaranteed formal legal rights and opportunities to excluded groups are more context-specific because they are indexed to a particular legal-political environment. Here the claims made to the broader society are that, simply because one is a member in a given legal system that has enacted certain universal rights and entitlements, one deserves the same legal protections and benefits as all other members, and that such formal recognition is required for the healthy development of one's sense of self-respect. So, for example, Susan Okin's argument for the propriety of principles of justice and reciprocity in the "private" sphere of the family[22] can be understood as a call to extend socially shared norms governing public, political interaction to the only apparently "private" domain of the fam-

ily, a domain traditionally associated with women. In this way, Okin is calling for the overcoming of a gender-differentiated order that misrecognizes women as incapable of the kind of autonomy and responsibility routinely ascribed to men in virtue of their putative aptitude for the public spheres of politics and business. Her specific recommendations for remedy aim at such diverse areas as marital relations, divorce law, socialization practices, educational policy, the allocation of reproductive labor, and, workplace benefits and policies. Yet in their consistent underlying purpose of extending to women the formal rights and entitlements necessary for them to realize their self-respect in reciprocal relations of equality, Okin's recommendations all are oriented towards ending the misrecognition of women. These types of recognition struggles over the social bases for self-respect will thus tend, in the long run, towards the overcoming of unjustifiable group differentiations and the political-legal structures that contribute to their continuation. As Okin puts it, "a just future would be one without gender."[23]

Of course, as with recognition struggles over the social bases for fundamental self-confidence, struggles concerning the bases for equal self-respect will often employ group-specified legal and political programs, just like any other change of merely formal legal equality under conditions of substantive inequality. At least since Marx's arguments that inegalitarian consequences flow from merely formal legal and political arrangements under existing conditions of significant economic inequality,[24] it has become a commonplace of political thought that "status-quo neutrality" and pure difference-blindness with respect to subordinated groups is not sufficient to secure even political and legal equality.[25] Such a realization means that certain recognition struggles aimed at securing equal social bases for self-respect and self-confidence may need to treat members of some groups differently than others. Nevertheless, the point of such recognition struggles—and their long-term tendency—is towards putting the group differentiation out of business as such by transforming the generative causes of legal and political misrecognition.

In contrast to these first two types of recognition struggles, struggles against the denigration of shared ways of life will tend towards group differentiation. Since self-esteem is gained through the intersubjective recognition of one's unique talents, interests, and contributions by those who share one's specific horizon of values, struggling to end the systematic denigration of one's way of life, as Iris Young shows, will involve a "politics of difference" where "culturally despised groups seize the means of cultural expression to redefine a positive image of themselves."[26] What the denigrated group needs to convince others of is not that their solidaristically shared way of life is worthy, valuable, or "true"

for all persons, but only that it is one viable form of life among others
that establishes the social conditions within which individuals can de-
velop and realize their own self-esteem. So, for example, remedies aimed
at revaluing denigrated traits that are stereotypically coded as feminine
would follow Fraser's analysis of affirmative multiculturalism: they
would affirm rather than disparage women *qua* female. Such struggles
against interpretive patterns that inhibit the development of self-esteem
for group members will tend to reinforce the distinctiveness of women,
a distinctiveness defined in terms of a shared ethical worldview differ-
ent than the mainstream androcentric one. Nevertheless, such
differentiating politics are not the only form of feminist recognition
politics, as the dilemma thesis would suggest.

C. An Internalist Account of Recognition Struggles II: Sexuality

Turning now to the example of struggles against the forms of oppres-
sion associated with despised sexual identities, attending to the differing
logics of self-respect and self-esteem can again indicate how Fraser's
analysis of recognition struggles is one-sided. And, in a way parallel to
feminist debates between universalist and difference politics, an inter-
nalist view can show that apparently contradictory political strategies—in
this case, between assimilationist and queer politics—are in fact not
aimed at the same media of recognition nor focused by the same type of
self-relation.

On Honneth's recognition model, it becomes clear that mainstream
gay politics aims to secure reciprocal conditions for self-respect for all
by aiming at greater inclusion in predominately heterosexual societies,
specifically through the dedifferentiating strategy of extending those
legal and political rights and entitlements granted to others, *qua* citi-
zens, to lesbians and gays. For example, Andrew Sullivan recommends
a "normalization politics" for gays and lesbians, especially with respect
to marriage rights and military service.[27] Such politics are aimed at se-
curing the legal and political conditions required for the development
of equal self-respect as a morally and politically autonomous actor.
Consonant with such an approach, Richard Mohr has developed con-
vincing arguments for ending heterosexist discriminatory misrecogni-
tion. Through a phenomenological analysis of how one comes to
recognize her or his sexual orientation, he claims that sexuality is bet-
ter thought of a discovered aspect of one's personality, whether or not
its causal origins are biological or cultural.[28] If sexual identity is indeed
discovered, then it is non-renounceable, and no citizens should be ex-

cluded from legal rights and entitlements granted to other citizens *qua* citizens on the basis of a politically irrelevant characteristic. Similar considerations apply to struggles for overcoming sexually specific violence: there should ultimately be no group differentiations amongst persons with respect to securing the violence-free social conditions needed for the development of basic self-confidence.

But there are also a number of differentiating strategies associated with "queer" politics, whereby those with despised sexualities aim to take control of interpretive schemas which portray non-mainstream sexual pleasures, practices, and identities as less valuable or even degenerate. Exemplary here is Michael Warner's call for developing an ethic of sexual autonomy that can transform the reigning ethic of shame surrounding sexuality by re-valuing dominant value hierarchies.[29] The aim is to secure the broader social acceptance—or at least an environment free from denigration—of alternative practices and identities so that individuals can develop self-esteem in their irreducible particularity and authenticity. Like feminist reinterpretive and deconstructivist strategies focusing on symbolic and cultural value patterns, the claims to the broader society take on a different burden of justification than struggles for self-confidence and self-respect, since formal political and legal structures are not the appropriate media for realizing self-esteem. Likewise, it is immaterial at this level whether or not one's group identifications are renounceable or non-renounceable, for the claim to the broader society depends upon one's voluntary endorsement of that particular form of life as worthy for oneself and the other members of the group. Thus struggles for the necessary social conditions of self-esteem will tend to perpetuate and reinforce group distinctiveness around different evaluative forms of life.

From this sketch of the different claims involved in mainstream and queer politics, and their correspondence with different types of relation-to-self, it should be clear that these forms of sexual-identity politics are not opposed, but address fundamentally different issues. In combination with the account of different forms of feminist struggles for recognition, these examples suggest that different types of recognition struggles—*contra* Fraser—may or may not be fundamentally aimed at dominant cultural patterns of value, and furthermore, may or may not involve strategies for remedy that tend towards group differentiation.

The central claims here are that not all recognition politics tends towards group differentiation, and thus that there is not an ineliminable tension between recognition and redistribution remedies for bivalent collectivities. Although it has not been systematically pursued here, a parallel point could be made with respect to the ostensible tendencies

of redistributive politics. Consider first "affirmative" redistributive rem-
edies, that is, those that correct for unfair market distributions without
fundamentally changing the underlying political-economic mechanisms
that generate them. Those structured as universal entitlements (such as
social insurance or universal health care) will tend to reduce class-based
deprivations and so will tend to dedifferentiate classes. Those struc-
tured as targeted entitlements (such as means-tested poverty relief) will
tend to maintain class-based distinctions and so will likely give rise to
the stigmatizing misrecognition backlash premised on ongoing class-
based differentiation. Considering transformative remedies, it seems that
even these will not universally tend to dedifferentiate classes in the ab-
sence of a wholesale abolition of market economies. Unless we were to
have a political economy with *no* differences in income, wealth, mate-
rial and cultural resources, and opportunities—and Fraser indicates that
"some such [economic] inequality is inevitable and unobjectionable"[30]—
it is hard to see how classes themselves will disappear. But given the
ongoing existence of classes, some radically transformative remedies,
such as property rights for squatters or the effective abolition of
intergenerational inheritance, would seem to tend to maintain class-based
differentiations even as they softened the subordinating effects of them.
Alternatively, some other transformative remedies, such as international
restrictions on currency speculation or distributing significant "stake-
holder shares" to all adults citizens upon reaching the age of maturity,
would seem to put class out-of-business as a significant axis of subordi-
nation over time. In short, various strategies for ensuring a fair
distribution, whether affirmative or transformative, may or may not tend
to differentiate groups of economic actors.

D. Fraser's Causal Insights and Typological Confusions

Returning now to the dilemma that Fraser claims afflict groups sub-
ject to both misrecognition and maldistribution—namely that the
strategies to combat each form of injustice tend to have warring differ-
entiation tendencies—it should be clear that the putative dilemma arises
from an overly schematic account of the dynamics of groups engaged in
social justice politics. The general point of the examples of feminist
and sexual identity struggles for recognition is that they have different
tendencies towards erasing or sharpening group distinctions based on
what type of recognition they are struggling for, and on what the most
appropriate medium for securing that type of recognition is.

Struggles to secure the social conditions of self-confidence and of
self-respect will tend to put the disrespected group out of business as a

group, precisely because they aim to have individuals recognized in their fundamentally vulnerable humanity, and their equal moral and political autonomy, respectively. Furthermore, such recognition struggles for the social bases required for self-confidence and self-respect are not primarily aimed at cultural-symbolic representations of misrecognized groups, but are first and foremost directed at familial and intimate interaction patterns and at legal-political structures (even if cultural representations play a role in perpetuating the misrecognition). It is telling here that Fraser mentions only in passing that any recognition struggles that fail to respect basic human rights are unacceptable, but then does not pursue how such basic struggles for political and legal equality might be analyzed.[31]

In contrast, struggles against the social denigration that impedes the capacity to develop healthy self-esteem do tend to reinforce group distinctiveness insofar as they attempt to show the wider society that the despised group's shared conceptions of the good can form a horizon within which its members may be recognized for their distinctive contributions and in their particularity. Here, political action is properly directed at cultural patterns of value and schemes of interpretation, and only incidentally at either those interpersonal and intrafamilial behavioral norms or those legal-political structures that reinforce such patterns. However, by adopting a Weberian class and status typology and treating social groups and struggles from the perspective of an external sociological observer, Fraser seems to have collapsed the internal differences between forms of social recognition, types of self-relation, the aims of recognition claims, and the differentiation tendencies of identity groups.

One might object to the argument advanced here that it misidentifies the deficit in Fraser's theory as an overly rigid typology of groups seeking to overcome the injustices of maldistribution and misrecognition. For, it appears that the deficits pointed to in Fraser's analysis of actual social struggles could be overcome by the reintroduction of traditional, state-focused politics into her bivalent social theory. Thus, for example, the differences indicated between universalist and difference-based feminists strategies, and between assimilationist and queer strategies with respect to sexuality, seem to map onto traditional distinctions of liberal political theory whereby the proper forms of redress for the first injustices of each pair are legal enactments, specifically expanded civil rights, while the proper forms of redress for the second pair are increasing cultural tolerance and de-traditionalization. According to this claim then, struggles for the social recognition conditions conducive to healthy self-confidence and self-respect are to be thought of as focused on formal political institutions, while struggles for the social recognition conditions

conducive to undistorted self-esteem are to be thought of as focused on the cultural and symbolic politics of identity interpretation and evaluation. Fraser would have gone wrong, then, not in collapsing important distinctions between recognition struggles, but in excluding traditional politics focused on legal change from her bivalent theory of social justice.

Consider, for instance, the potential pitfalls of following the dichotomizing strategy of a bivalent social theory too closely: one must apparently identify all injustices as rooted either in economic or cultural structures, or a combination of the two, and one will then tend to identify all attempts to reform current modes of life as directed at one of these two causes, or a combination of the two. An example of these pitfalls can be found in an article by Anne Phillips amplifying some of Fraser's concerns and extending the analysis to contemporary British politics, but largely following Fraser's bivalent social theory.[32] There Phillips seems to suggest that there is a direct parallel between the eclipse of redistributive politics by identity politics in North America that Fraser bemoans, and the eclipse of redistributive politics in Britain by a politics focused on constitutional reform in order to increase democratic accountability. According to Phillips's parallel to Fraser's analysis then, it seems that movements for constitutional reform are to be understood as a kind of identity politics! In particular, the implication seems to be that there are only two orders of dominance in society: one constituted by economic imperatives and the other by cultural valuations. But this gives rise to strange claims such as that exclusion from formal democratic participation, if it is not economically based, must be culturally based.[33] Given the evident existence of other alternatives here—such as the possibility that such exclusion could be a rather familiar form of political injustice—this is a false dichotomy, one encouraged by adopting the dual-systems approach.

Taking this apparent eclipse of traditional issues of political and legal equality as his point of departure, Leonard Feldman has suggested that we need to extend Fraser's bivalent theory of justice, so that it becomes a trivalent theory of justice that includes political exclusion as a cause of injustice irreducible to maldistribution or misrecognition.[34] This would be a way of cashing out Fraser's scattered suggestions that, following Weber, political party should take its place alongside class and status as an important type of collectivity with its own constitutive axis of subordination. On this account, then, we should conceive of the possibility of trivalent collectivities, those whose existence as a group is irreducibly rooted simultaneously in economic, cultural, and political causes, and where overcoming injustice would require adopting strate-

gies for redistribution, recognition, and political inclusion that inter-
fere with one another as little as possible.

While Feldman's general assessment that Fraser's redistribution/rec-
ognition framework can end up being blind to state power and to the
importance of political injustices is persuasive, it is not clear how sim-
ply tacking on political power or party as a third axis of analysis will
help. Action aimed at changing administrative policy, or the legal order,
or the political process may or may not involve distributive issues, and
may or may not involve recognition issues. Attending just to recogni-
tion issues, it is simply not the case, as the objection being considered
here has it, that the first two forms of misrecognition concerning self-
confidence and self-respect are exclusively caused by, nor properly
remedied by, formal legal and political institutions, while misrecognition
concerning self-esteem is exclusively caused by and remedied by cul-
tural patterns of interpretation. So the systematic denial of autonomy to
a group of persons—for example recurrent disrespect of the individual
independence of the physically disabled—may be caused by legal dis-
crimination, by political exclusion, by workplace organizational norms,
by efficiency imperatives, and/or by cultural patterns of interpretation.
And the proper remedies to establish the social recognition conditions
necessary for self-respect may likewise vary amongst legal reforms,
changes in political processes, restructured organizational norms, lim-
its on the reach or extent of market imperatives, and/or transformed
cultural patterns of evaluation. Moreover, each of these different rem-
edies tailored to distinct causes may or may not tend to differentiate the
disrespected group, in both the short and long terms. Similar consider-
ations apply to struggles concerning the necessary social conditions for
the achievement of self-confidence and self-esteem. Thus it is not the
case that the differences highlighted here concerning various forms of
recognition struggles map onto the difference between legal-political
and non-legal-political causes and targets of change, nor that these dif-
ferent forms of recognition struggle have distinct differentiation
tendencies in virtue of this mapping. If we introduce the added, and
important, complication of considering how struggles against
maldistribution may work in concert or in tension with various recogni-
tion struggles, it seems that the typological classification that aligns
causes of injustice, types of groups, and proper remedy strategies—
whether bivalent or trivalent—looses whatever initial plausibility it had.[35]
In short, the distinction between formal legal and political institutions
and non-political, cultural patterns simply cuts across the distinctions
between maldistribution and misrecognition, the different types of rec-
ognition struggles, different remedy strategies and their differentiation
and dedifferentiation tendencies.

This essay has argued that Fraser's account of the differentiation dilemma between recognition and redistribution struggles is misplaced. She does grant that not all redistributive remedies tend to dedifferentiate groups and that not all recognition remedies tend to differentiate; it is not an inevitable dilemma. But she does not pay enough attention to the differing inner logics of various types of collectivities to analyze precisely why different types of struggles may have different differentiation tendencies. While Fraser's distinction between injustices rooted primarily in the economic structure of society and those rooted primarily in the social patterns of representation and interpretation is helpful as an analytic lens on the causes of harm,[36] her two next steps of classifying ideal-typical collectivities along these lines and then drawing a remedy dilemma from this classification moves too quickly over the internal differences between types of collectivities and the strategies they may adopt for overcoming unjust social structures. In general then, the causal distinction between types of distributive and recognition harms is helpful, but the schematism that maps this distinction onto group types (class vs. status), remedy types (redistribution vs. recognition), remedy targets (economic vs. cultural structures), and remedy tendencies (dedifferentiation vs. differentiation) is overly rigid and so not sufficiently insightful.

Surely Fraser's basic point is correct: there will be, in all of these cases, tensions between various remedy strategies in terms of their tendencies towards differentiating or dedifferentiating the groups involved, and that a self-aware politics will need to carefully attend to these tensions and to the kinds of double-binds and negative feedback relations pursuit of some strategies may lead to when combined concurrently. But, from a third-person, Weberian typology of collectivities based on class, status, and/or party, it is simply impossible to make the relevant distinctions concerning the proper targets, remedies, and tendencies of socio-political action. Perhaps this is why Fraser has gradually abandoned the thesis that there is a redistribution-recognition dilemma, even as she has recast her original insight in terms of mutually interfering differentiation tendencies.

E. Refinements, Folk and Theoretical Paradigms, and the Heterogeneity of Group Dynamics

Since 1995, Fraser has made three major statements of her bivalent critical social theory: in its original form, in her Tanner Lectures, and most recently in the co-authored book with Axel Honneth.[37] The claim of a redistribution-recognition dilemma has been recast each time. The original version posited a chronic dilemma faced by bivalent collectivi-

ties struggling against maldistribution and misrecognition, given that the remedies appropriate to each type of injustice had opposing tendencies towards group differentiation. In the Tanner Lectures, the claim was softened from an "inherent" dilemma often faced by bivalent collectivities, to the claim that there is "a multiplicity of practical tensions"[38] between different forms of practical remedy for injustice. Nevertheless, the determinate account of these tensions remained largely unchanged in substance from the earlier account, with simply an expanded treatment of specific case studies.

In her most recent work, Fraser now talks of "mutual interferences that arise when those two aims [of redistribution and recognition] are pursued in tandem,"[39] and these mutual interferences between opposing group differentiation tendencies are largely mapped onto the distinction between affirmative and transformative remedies, as in her original account. However, Fraser now seeks to "contextualize" the affirmative-transformative remedy, in order to acknowledge that some remedies attacking only the inequitable outcomes of underlying social structures— and so only apparently affirmative in character—may actually transform the underlying generative cause over time and under the right conditions. According to Fraser, the difficult task now is to find a way of "finessing our Hobson's choice"[40] between the desired features of transformative solutions and a sense of practical realism in light of both the resurgence and globalization of neo-liberal capitalism and our attachments to extant identity-constitutive status group identifications.

In fact, one of the three main strategies she recommends for finessing the tension between feasible and desirable remedies is what she calls a practical posture of "*boundary awareness*. By this I mean awareness of the impact of various reforms on group boundaries."[41] With this formulation, Fraser has hit upon the nub of one of the significant practical dilemmas faced by political actors: namely, the differentiation dilemma. However, Fraser only addresses this dilemma as it arises between the dedifferentiating tendencies of all redistributive struggles, and the differentiating tendencies of affirmative recognition politics, especially mainstream multiculturalism. If the arguments advanced above about feminist and sexual minority recognition struggles, and suggestion about universal versus targeted redistributive remedies, are correct, however, then the differentiation dilemma arises not just between recognition and redistribution, but also amongst various remedies for misrecognition, and amongst various remedies for maldistribution. Fraser is surely right that we should embrace the posture of boundary awareness when considering practical remedy strategies precisely because of prevalence of differentiation dilemmas. But these tensions between group balkanization and

societal homogenization may arise not only when recognition and redistribution "are pursued in tandem,"[42] but also when each aim is pursued singly through multiple remedies. From the earliest formulation of her bivalent theory up through the present one, Fraser has rightly highlighted the differentiation dilemma, but she has misdiagnosed it as arising only across her favored typological dualisms: maldistribution versus misrecognition, remedies for redistribution versus recognition, class versus status groups, transformative versus affirmative remedies. But since tensions between balkanization and homogenization can occur not only across these dualisms but also on each side alone, the most we can say in the absence of a detailed look at any actual set of potential remedies is that we should adopt Fraser's proposal for a posture of boundary awareness.

Aside from this sensible recommendation, and the avoidance of the typological confusions that beset the earlier versions of the theory and those that expanded on it, what else can be learned from Fraser's proper identification but misallocation of the differentiation dilemma? First of all, the formulation of this dilemma in terms of one between redistribution and recognition is consistent with a sort of folk paradigm of social theory that seems to have become widely shared in the last thirty years or so. New social movements have often taken the form of an identity politics of difference at the same time that movements for a new multinational, rather than assimilationist, form of constitutional pluralism have arisen from indigenous, ethnic, and racial minorities within (only apparently) homogeneous nation-states. These kinds of difference-based recognition struggles came to prominence, however, only after a long series of non-differentiating remedies, such as for formal and substantially equal legal, civil, and political rights had already achieved a fair amount of success. Class and union-based movements, on the other hand, have increasingly stressed unity and solidarity, especially after the failure of existing forms of state socialism, while downplaying the "us-against-them" rhetoric of previous labor struggles. So, the intuitive plausibility of the redistribution-recognition dilemma might draw some of its strength from recent historical and societal contingencies, even as they appear less than contingent.

Further plausibility of the dilemma thesis as first formulated by Fraser derives from theoretical sources. There is of course a century-long conflict in African-American thought concerning whether assimilation into or separation from dominant white culture is the best strategy. A similar debate in feminism, framed in terms of identity versus difference, has percolated for at least a generation, and like debates are gaining steam between gay-rights humanism and queer politics. In all of these contexts, the dedifferentiating pole is often associated with political-

economic themes, while the differentiating pole is often associated with asserting cultural and symbolic interpretations celebrating difference.

Perhaps the most significant reason Fraser's original formulation looks theoretically plausible is that the presumptive mapping of redistribution-group dedifferentiation versus recognition-group differentiation has been an unacknowledged assumption underlying some of the most prominent theories responding to the new forms of political struggle. So for example, two of the most influential early theories of recognition, put forth by Iris Young and Charles Taylor, both see such politics as demanding the acknowledgement of the cultural distinctiveness of minority groups and as protesting false homogenization. So Young calls explicitly for a "Politics of Difference," at the same time that she formulates her theory in deliberate opposition to "distributive paradigms" of justice. Although Taylor rarely mentions political-economic structures or distributive injustices, his theory is constructed first around considerations of Quebec separatism, and derivatively around other forms of the demand to have the particularistic culture of one's group protected. According to liberal egalitarian and other theories of distributive justice, it is frequently simply taken for granted that recognition struggles are inherently divisive while economic struggles are unifying. So, for example, Todd Gitlin claims that identity politics has not only displaced struggles for economic fairness, but has also led to the balkanization of those groups that would need social solidarity to influence majoritarian democratic institutions in order to correct for the inequities of laissez-faire globalizing economic systems.[43] In a similar but more theoretical vein, Brian Barry argues that liberal egalitarianism must reject claims for the recognition of distinct cultural groups, and return to an "Enlightenment universalism," fighting for strictly equal, exceptionless guarantees of civil, legal, political, and economic security rights.[44] If, however, the arguments above are correct, then all four of these theorists have oversimplified the diversity of struggles for social justice, and relied on untenable socio-theoretic assumptions about the inherent group differentiation tendencies of political action.

There are real and persistent practical differentiation tensions between the numerous remedies and strategies that might be adopted to achieve social justice. This is evident in the pressing dilemmas faced by conscientious political actors who are subject to multiple forms of domination and subordination simultaneously: should I claim a particularistic or universalistic identity; which of my group affiliations are definitive of my identity; which type of claim is most likely to produce practical results for increased justice; which are likely to lead to more intense forms of discrimination and ostracism; should I pursue cultural, political,

legal, or economic remedies; what others might share my interests even
if they are members of groups culturally or economically distant from
me; can I enlist the help of others who are in different situations? Not-
withstanding the insistence of these dilemmas, it is doubtful that a critical
social theory can simply allocate their sources to an overly objectivistic
typology of group types, remedy targets, or remedy types.

To summarize the conclusions of the paper, it agrees with Fraser's
insistence that a theory of recognition struggles must not ignore struggles
against injustices anchored in the political economy of society, and that
problems of maldistribution are not reducible to, nor analyzable within
the framework of, the intersubjective conditions of recognition. Noth-
ing argued here suggests that we could adequately pursue social justice
by focusing solely on misrecognition or maldistribution, or political
exclusion or legal discrimination for that matter. And, following Fraser's
lead, we need to attend seriously to the practical limits of identity poli-
tics alone if we aim to secure increased social justice. This is in part
because, as she rightly emphasizes, recognition politics alone can't prop-
erly address economic injustices. But it is also because the diversity of
recognition struggles is not reducible to an identity politics of differ-
ence alone, contrary to what Fraser often seems to suggest. This
misleading suggestion is not, however, merely accidental, but follows
from the Weberian roots of her theory that intends to classify group
types from an external, social-scientific observer's perspective. From a
perspective internal to recognition struggles, it becomes evident that
they do not all aim at the recognition of group specificity, promote the
same type of remedy for achieving justice (i.e., cultural-interpretive
change), nor have the same differentiation tendencies.

If we add to this more variegated picture of recognition struggles by
attending to the various legal and political remedies that may be appropri-
ate to injustice—in addition to economic and interpretive strategies—then
we should not be tempted to say that there is a single dilemma between
redistribution and recognition. Rather, we should say that a theory of so-
cial justice must attend to the multiple causal axes of injustice and the
different forms of political struggle appropriate to them. It must be sensi-
tive to their distinct sets of focal issues, types of injustice, normative claims,
candidate remedies, strategic choices, practical tensions between desirability
and feasibility, and so on. Fraser's sensitivity to the numerous sites where
tensions and mutual interferences can arise from opposing differentiation
tendencies is extremely valuable, and her recommendation for adopting a
stance of boundary awareness when evaluating remedies should be unavoid-
able. But, as the paper has tried to show both in assessing Fraser's own
mapping of the differentiation dilemma onto various typologies of redistri-

bution-recognition, class-status, and affirmation-transformation, and in noting the deleterious influence of her dilemma claim on other theorists, the differentiation dilemma occurs not only across but also amidst such classifications. At least with respect to recognition struggles, and perhaps also with respect to economic, legal, and political struggles, a theory based on an objectivistic, third-person typology, where groups types are simply read off of certain social facts, cannot adequately account for the variety of group dynamics that is so important to pressing praxis decisions.[45] There are often mutual interferences between tendencies toward group balkanization and homogenization, and these interferences can lead to practical dilemmas, but they cannot be simply mapped onto class-based versus status-based politics.

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NOTES

Earlier versions of parts of this paper were read at the Eastern Division of the APA, Atlanta (December 2001), and at the Conference on Democracy and Social Cohesion, hosted by Tilburg University, Amsterdam (1998). Thanks are due to the participants at both meetings, and in particular to Jon Mandle for careful comments on the earlier version delivered at the APA.

1. Prominent representatives of the egalitarian critique of recognition politics can be found in Gitlin 1995 and Barry 2001.

2. Influential theoretical accounts of the politics of recognition raising these charges can be found in Young 1990, Taylor 1992, and Honneth 1995.

3. Fraser 1997c, p. 1. By her lights, this postsocialist condition is marked by 1) the absence of any credible, broad emancipatory visions, 2) an increasing differentiation between the interpretive politics of recognition and the economic politics of redistribution, and 3) a resurgence of unfettered global capitalism leading to sharp social inequalities. This paper is most concerned with her theoretical approach to the second of these issues. With respect to the first, she has recently begun to develop a normative account of social justice in terms of the "parity of participation" in social life on equal terms made available to individuals, in Fraser 2003a, Fraser 2001, Fraser 2003b. Critical attention is given to this normative account of social justice, in comparison with competing approaches, in Zurn 2003. Fraser has not done extensive theoretical work on neo-liberal globalization, taking it rather as an empirical given.

4. This bivalent critical social theory is developed in Fraser 1997a, Fraser 1997b, Fraser 1997c, Fraser 1998. Fraser 2003b is said to be "a revised and expanded version of [Fraser's] Tanner Lectures on Human Values" (footnote 1, p. 94), and contains modifications to the theory that are then further amplified in Fraser 2003a.

5. See especially Fraser 1997a.

6. Fraser 2003b.

7. In reconstructing her position, this essay relies mainly on Fraser 1997a Fraser 1998. As indicated below, although Fraser no longer holds this view, it has been widely influential. More importantly, it reflects an underlying set of socio-theoretic assumptions that are widely presupposed in debates about identity politics and multiculturalism.

8. Fraser 1998, p. 15.

9. Ibid., p. 22.

10. Fraser 1997a, p. 16.

11. One might object here that the existence of African-Americans as a group is determined by their "race," taken in a biological sense to pick out clearly distinct anthropological groups according to morphological or genetic differences. If however those groups that our social practices pick out as constituting a race in fact display equivalent or greater intra-group morphological or genetic variability than is evinced between individuals across our socially recognized racial lines, then what we take to be distinct races do not in fact constitute a group differentiable by means of biological factors. This would suggest, further, that we ought to treat racial categories as products of historically and culturally specific social dividing practices. Agreeing with this latter position concerning the social constitution of racial differences, Fraser insists on a quotational use of the concept "race." For a fascinating and compelling version of the argument put forward here concerning racial categories—one articulated in lectures delivered in 1917!—see Locke 1992.

12. Fraser 1994. The central idea in Fraser's Universal Caregiver model is to adopt policies that encourage men to take on much more of the primary care work of society, work that is usually unpaid or underpaid and disproportionately done by women currently. Rather than compensating women formally for the primary care work they currently do (Caregiver Parity model) or by providing social services to accomplish this care work thereby enabling women to take up, on an equal basis, the traditionally masculine role of family breadwinner (Universal Breadwinner model), the Universal Caregiver model seeks to transform the gendered division of labor by transforming masculine roles. "The key to achieving gender equity in a postindustrial welfare state, then, is to make women's current life-patterns the norm for everyone. Women today often combine breadwinning and caregiving, albeit with great difficulty. A postindustrial welfare state must ensure that men do the same, while redesigning institutions so as to eliminate the difficulty and strain," page 61.

13. Fraser 1997a, p. 30.

14. Ibid., p. 20.

15. Ibid., p. 31.

16. Fraser has returned to, and rethought, the distinction between affirmative and transformative remedies in her most recent work; see especially Fraser 2003b, pp. 70–82. Section E, below, returns to this issue.

17. Fraser makes the Weberian origins of her class/status distinction clear in Fraser 1998, pp. 8–14, and more recently in Fraser 2000, pp. 116–117.

18.   The end of Section C, below, briefly touches on the fact that, *contra* Fraser's claim, distinct kinds of redistributive struggles can also evince distinct differentiation tendencies.

19.   Honneth 1992, Honneth 1994, Honneth 1995.

20.   Zurn 1997.

21.   Dworkin 1987.

22.   Okin 1989.

23.   Ibid., p. 171.

24.   See, for instance, Marx 1977.

25.   For an argument against status-quo neutrality in the law, see Sunstein 1993. For an argument against difference-blindness in the law, see Minow 1990.

26.   Young 1990, p. 11.

27.   Sullivan 1996.

28.   Mohr 1988.

29.   Warner 2000.

30.   Fraser 2003b, p. 101, footnote 41.

31.   See the passing references in Fraser 1997a, p. 12; and Fraser 1998, p. 30. Fraser 2001, p. 40, footnote 12, indicates that forthcoming work will deal with problems of exclusion from political practice, and the ways in which such exclusions violate the general norm of participational parity. The essay returns to the relation between Fraser's bivalent social theory and issues of legal and political equality below.

32.   Phillips 1997.

33.   See, for example, ibid., pp. 150–151.

34.   Feldman 2002.

35.   It is also significant that Fraser sets up her account of distributive injustices in terms of the *political-economic* structures of society, but then attends only to *economic* remedies and restructurings, apparently avoiding overtly political and legal remedies for distributive inequalities. In other words, there is a subtle shift from intimations of a more nuanced account of the relationships and interconnections between the state, the legal system, and the economy, to a more materialist model that regards the state as merely epiphenomenal to the economic base of social structures. As Feldman in "Redistribution, Recognition and the State" nicely puts the point, "state power becomes a kind of 'blind spot' in [Fraser's] redistribution/ recognition framework that, while decisively rejecting Marx's reduction of civil society to capitalism, has maintained Marx's prioritization of civil society over the state. The real power—the real injustice [according to Fraser]—develops in civil society, through economic relations of exploitation and cultural relations of stigmatization," page 411.

36.   Concurring with Fraser's claim that distributive and recognition injustices are mutually irreducible since they have different causal roots, a set of arguments against Honneth's attempt to portray maldistribution as an effect of a society's

patterns of recognition concerning the evaluative worth of various positions within the division of labor is advanced in Zurn (Forthcoming).

37. Respectively, Fraser 1997a, Fraser 1998, and Fraser and Honneth 2003.

38. Fraser 1998, p. 45, footnote 46.

39. Fraser 2003b, p. 70.

40. Ibid., p. 79.

41. Ibid., p. 85.

42. Ibid., p. 70.

43. See Gitlin 1995. Diagnosing current social tendencies in the United States, Gitlin claims that they will only be worsened by a politics distracted by internecine divisions along ethnic, racial, sex, and cultural lines, and so recommends a strategy focusing on economic inequality in order to mobilize a sufficiently majoritarian coalition. "The more likely prospect facing the United States is . . . more inequality, more punishment of the poor, more demoralization and pathology among them, the slow (or not-so slow) further breakdown of civic solidarities. A necessary if not sufficient condition for the reversal of these tendencies is the emergence of a vital Left, but this is precisely what is thwarted by the obsession with group difference," p. 230. "The most insistent multiculturalists do not seem to recognize that there is no Left, there is only more panic, unless a plausible hope emerges for greater equality of means. The right to a job, education, medical care, housing, retraining over the course of a lifetime—these are the bare elements of an economic citizenship that ought to be universal," p. 234.

44. See Barry 2001, p. 325.: "Pursuit of the multiculturalist agenda makes the achievement of broadly based egalitarian politics more difficult in two ways. At the minimum, it diverts political effort away from universalistic goals. But a more serious problem is that multiculturalism may very well destroy the conditions for putting together a coalition in favor of across-the-board equalization of opportunities and resources"; see also page 8: "a politics of multiculturalism undermines a politics of redistribution."

45. Fraser's underlying theoretical commitment to an objectivistic account of social groups comes front and center in two more recent works—Fraser 2001 and Fraser 2000—where she recommends the adoption of a "status model" of recognition, rather than an "identity model." This newer status model is again employed in arguments against Honneth: see especially Fraser 2003a. The arguments against this status model in Zurn 2003 can thereby be taken to further the case against the Weberian underpinnings of Fraser's critical social theory. In particular, the latter essay argues that the clear normative and practical advantages evinced by Fraser's theory over Honneth's and Taylor's competing theories of recognition are *not* attributable to the adoption of a status theory of recognition. The advantages are rather due to other elements in Fraser's theory. It also contends that the adoption of an objectivistic account of recognition in terms of status rather than identity leads to a loss of diagnostic acumen, such that a status theory will tend to overlook certain forms of misrecognition while falsely identifying other types of injustice as examples of misrecognition.

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