RSS Feeds

The simplest way of submitting metadata to PhilPapers on a regular basis is to set up RSS feeds with the appropriate structure (described below). Just drop us a line with the URL(s) of your feed(s). Make sure to tell us which journals the feeds correspond to or we won't monitor them.

Feed specifications

Your feeds should use RSS 1.0 and contain Dublin Core and PRISM fields describing each article. See the PRISM standard here (currently a draft). The following fields are supported.
  • *title
  • *link
  • *dc:creator (one element per author)
  • *dc:date (the publication year, the publication date, or the string 'forthcoming')
  • description (an abstract)
  • *prism:publicationName (the journal name; can be either in the 'item' or the 'channel' element)
  • prism:volume (in 'item' or 'channel')
  • prism:number (in 'item' or 'channel')
  • prism:startingPage
  • prism:endingPage
  • prism:doi (a Digital Object Identifier)
dc: = Dublin Core prefix
prism: = PRISM prefix
* indicates a required field

You should prepare one feed per journal, and each feed should provide the data for at least the last issue of the journal. To add older items to the index, upload them using the batch import tool. Alternatively, you can prepare a (potentially very big) RSS+PRISM xml file that we will load once. Contact us to arrange this.

Support for on-page metadata

If you already have an RSS feed but no PRISM tags, an alternative option is to add appropriate metadata to the pages linked to from your feed. Our feed monitor will visit the pages and extract the metadata. Metadata for publication dates, volumes, issues, and journal titles should be included. We support the same metadata tags used by Highwire Press and Google Scholar (e.g. "citation_title"). See the Google Scholar publisher documentation for details.

Example from Wiley

Here is a feed from Wiley that can serve as a complete example:

Example of a suitable <item> element:

<item rdf:about="">
<title>Descriptivism, scope, and apparently empty names</title>
<dc:creator>Caplan, Ben</dc:creator>
<description>Some descriptivists reply to the modal argument by appealing to scope ambiguities. In this paper, we argue that those replies don&#x2019;t work in the case of apparently empty names like &#x2018;Sherlock Holmes&#x2019;</description>
<prism:publicationName>Philosophical Studies</prism:publicationName>