From PhilPapers forum Philosophy of Mind:

2009-06-07
The 'Explanatory Gap'
Reply to Stevan Harnad
Stevan,

Before I respond to your last post, I wonder if you could answer one question which you seem to have overlooked in your response.  Wouldn’t we say that the brain (or whatever feels feelings) would not be the same had feelings not existed?


Derek,

You say, " I personally have never observed a thought, feeling, or idea, and I don't know anyone who has."

It seems plain to me that I observe thoughts and ideas as words and images in my head, and as words and images expressed by other people.  I observe feelings in my own bodily reactions to events, and in the bodily reactions of others.  I cannot believe that you do not observe any of these things.  So, when you say you do not observe thoughts, feelings, or ideas, I must conclude that you are talking about something else.  The question is, what are you talking about?

JS:: "Not at all.  I'm suggesting that "science" is a word we use to refer to whatever methodical processes lead to discovery."

DA:  "But this is not a normal use of the word science, surely? Science has its own particular methods and procedures (and assumptions)."

Actually, I think my use is quite standard, at least among scientists, though it may not normally be expressed in the terms I use.

And while it is true that individual sciences are defined by their own methods and procedures, I would not say there are any specific methods or procedures which define science as a whole.  If you disagree, I wonder what methods and procedures you have in mind.

DA:  "You seem to be suggesting that anything that leads to a discovery is science. Presumably anything that leads to a scientific discovery is science (though some have happened partly by chance) but that is a different matter."

Accidents are not scientific per say, though science can use them.  An accident can lead to a method of discovery.