Dear Jay,
You are probably already aware of this, but Wilfrid Sellars' 'Empricism and the Philosophy of Mind' (EPM) represented a subtle mid-century response to behaviorism, albeit particularly in its Rylean form.  What's complex about Sellars' view -- in addition to the variety of characterizations of behaviorism he gives across his works (see for example his late essay, 'Mental Events', and his book Naturalism and Ontology on what he calls 'verbal behaviourism', for these developments) -- is the way in which he used a 'thick', intentionally characterized version of Rylean verbal behaviourism, abstracting from the notion of inner intentional episodes, as the model for a kind of 'theory theory' explanatory introduction of thoughts as inner mental events (see my 2007 book on 'Wilfrid Sellars', ch. 4, for further details).  What's subtle about his view is that the behaviorist account of intentionality had to be coherent enough to serve as the 'methodologically independent' model for the quasi-theoretical introduction of inner thought-episodes; and yet the reason for positing the latter episodes is that behaviourism is ultimately inadequate on various explanatory grounds.  I think the sort of belief-desire circularity threatening behaviorism that was pointed out by Chisholm and others is noted by Sellars, but given the required methodological independence of the behaviorist model on his own account it's not entirely clear what role the circularity objection plays in his account.

At any rate, Sellars was clearly one philosopher who was deeply sympathetic with behaviorism (and well aware of its Carnapian incarnations) but who was among the first to initiate the cognitive/functionalist revolution during the 1950s, particular through his advance beyond behaviorism in the second half of EPM (1956).  For details on Sellars in general, see Chrucky's handy website: http://www.ditext.com/sellars/.
Best of luck on your work,
Jim O'Shea