I wrote this earlier in the thread:

'My point is that LW's arguments for family resemblance aren't persuasive. No one mentions his example of numbers; the example of games carries
the burden. He writes:

'Consider for example the proceedings that we call "games". I mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so on.  What is common to them all?  Don't say: "There must be something common, or they would not be called 'games'"-- but look and see whether there is anything common to all.-- For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that.'

Note that he isn't interested principally in concepts. His point is that games have nothing in common in virtue of which they are games. Indeed, they have nothing interesting in
common at all.

This is how he is widely understood. He isn't chiefly talking about concepts but about actual phenomena in the world. Perhaps it reflects this way on concepts--
as games or numbers or... have nothing in common in virtue of which they are games (or numbers or...), we can't very well conceptualize them in terms
of that feature. So Hillary Putnam writes:

Even at the ordinary-language level, it is strange to say that all games "have something in common," namely, being games. For some games involve winning and losing, others ("Ring a Ring o'Roses") do not; some games are played for the amusement of the players, others (gladatorial games) are not; some games have more than one player, others do not; and so on. In the same way, when we examine closely all the cases in which we would say that someone has "referred to" something...., we do not find any one relation between the word and the thing referred to.

                Hilary Putnam, 1988

The phenomena themselves lack a commonality. This is an interesting thesis, plainly. And a response which says 'Well, Ludwig didn't mean to deny that games
share a common feature in virtue of which they are games, only that that isn't how our concept works; so if you come up with the feature, it wasn't needed'
conflicts with what he actually wrote and also is a good deal less interesting.

My response to LW is that one can, in the case of games, find a plausible and informative commonalility in virtue of which games are games. And I think it can be
done in other cases where philosophers have invoked Family Resemblances. So LW didn't provide sufficient motivation for the Doctrine. Maybe someone
else can, but on the face of things the Doctrine seems pretty doubtful for the cases W had in mind. I think we can do what he said we couldn't.'

................................

On the face of things, W is a sort of nominalist. If we say that he is merely saying we don't need a definition to use these terms effectively,
well, it conflicts with what he says and it's a good deal less interesting. I'm more interested in the more interesting version of W.
Also this is sort of standard.  A thesis is promulgated in a strong and interesting form until it is effectively challenged--then it turns out
W didn't say it. I'm not a big fan of 'cryptic.'